


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AND COLLEAGUES IN ALLIED DEPARTMENTS

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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THE PRE-CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

ALFRED BERTHOLET
University of Göttingen

*Credo in Jesum Christum, qui tertio die resurrexit a mortuis.
Credo in carnis resurrectionem.*

The Christian belief in the resurrection resembles a tree which springs from a common soil in two separate trunks which are, however, closely intertwined. As we seek to uncover its pre-Christian roots, we shall follow this twofold division.

I

"Tertio die resurrexit a mortuis": This affirmation suggests at once the thought of the rising God. Passing over this main idea, the secondary notion is that the resurrection of one departed takes place shortly after his death, and in any case independently of "the end of the days." Both of these topics are to be investigated more exactly in the following discussion.

Considered from the point of view of the history of religion, the faith in the resurrection of Jesus is indissolubly connected with the faith in the resurrection of other gods. Especially is this belief present throughout the whole eastern Mediterranean Levantine coast which extends from Ephesus and Bithynia, through Anatolia, to Tarsus and Antioch, and from there through Syria, Babylonia, Phoenicia, and Palestine, beyond the cult centers Bubastis and

Sais to Alexandria.¹ The names of Attis, Adonis, Tammuz, Marduk, Melcart, Eshmun, Sandan, Osiris, etc., are known and they lead us in part even farther westward to Greece,² Carthage, Sardinia, and Rome. But this is not all: on German soil the much-discussed figure of Balder belongs at any rate in the circle of analogous God-phenomena;³ and again in Mexico, for example, the belief in the death and resurrection of certain gods is plainly present in customs which are certainly not out of harmony with the altogether bloody character of the Mexican religion.⁴

The gods to be mentioned in this connection are, so far as we can see, vegetation or astral deities. Thus in Peru, there is the goddess Chicomehuatl, the maize deity, whose death is symbolized by the actual death of a young girl and whose resurrection is represented by a priest concealed in the skin of this human sacrifice.⁵ Balder's connection with the stars is revealed, perhaps, in the etymology of his name which represents him as the bright, glowing god.⁶ Alongside of this, however, his relations to vegetation, especially to the oak tree, are unmistakable.⁷ Attis has been explained as a sun-god,⁸ but his origin from the almond tree,⁹ his change into a pine cone,¹⁰ the sprouting of violets from his blood,¹¹ the prohibition of the use of bread and grain at the time of the mourning for his death,¹² all point in still another direction: "Attis personnifie probablement la végétation, brûlée par les ardeurs de l'été avant d'avoir atteint sa maturité et qui durant l'hiver paraît s'affaiblir et pour ainsi dire perdre sa virilité, puis

¹ Cf. K. Vollers, *Die Weltreligionen in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange* (Jena, 1907), p. 152.

² Cf. here also Dionysus, Hyacinthus; others in S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes et religions* (Paris, 1906), III, 58 f.

³ Cf. R. M. Meyer, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 313, 324.

⁴ See J. G. Frazer, *The Scapegoat* (London, 1913), pp. 288 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 286, n. 1; pp. 292 ff.

⁶ Cf. W. Golther, *Handbuch der germanischen Mythologie* (Leipzig, 1895), p. 366.

⁷ Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful* (London, 1913), II, 88 ff.

⁸ H. Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult* (Giessen, 1903), p. 168, p. 180, n. 4; p. 209, n. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 106, n. 1; p. 117.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 114; cf. pp. 150 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114, n. 4; pp. 119, 150.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

mourir, pour renaître au printemps avec un nouvel éclat."¹ The relation of Adonis to vegetation has been already expressed through the custom, also attested in the Old Testament (Isa. 17:10 f.), of the Adonis gardens as well as through his connection with the anemone.² The later Greeks and the Latins conceived of him as the ripened fruit. His death represented the harvested fruit or the grain sowed in the earth and growing up again therefrom.³ When even as late as about the year 1591 A.D., at the spring festival at Malta, according to Al Hasan Al-Bûrîni, a highly honored idol was thrown into a garden under bean blossoms, we see in this practice, perhaps rightly, an echo of an old Adonis-cult which exhibits the god as a vegetation deity.⁴ But certainly he was also looked upon, evidently at a later time, as a sun-god.⁵ And this same twofold character recurs in the case of Tammuz. For example, in a Babylonian Tammuz hymn it is said that he buries himself like a great man in the grain and lies down therein.⁶ He is compared⁷ in his departure to a withering plant or to the tamarisk, and buds and green leaves are connected with his death.⁸ Furthermore, in consequence of his connection with Shamash,⁹ he appears as a heaven-god, or more precisely as a star-god, even if not himself perhaps as a sun-god, in which character there has been a disposition to portray him.¹⁰ At least, in a cuneiform text from Boghazköi, belonging somewhere in the fourteenth century B.C., a star of the god Dumuzi is mentioned;¹¹ and in Antioch the feast

¹ F. Cumont, "Notice sur un Attis funéraire," *Extrait du Bulletin de l'Institut archéol. Liégeois*, XXIX (1901), 5.

² Cf. W. Graf Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun* (Leipzig, 1911), pp. 88, 129.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 161 ff.

⁴ R. Wünsch, *Das Frühlingsfest auf der Insel Malta* (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 19 ff.

⁵ See Baudissin, *op. cit.*, pp. 169 ff.

⁶ H. Zimmern, *Sumerisch-babylon. Tammuslieder* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 208 B at end (Lied 1).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 220, 16 ff. (Lied 3).

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 208 B, 1 ff. (Lied 1); pp. 236, 1 ff. (Lied 7).

⁹ H. Zimmern, *Der babyl. Gott Tammus* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 715.

¹⁰ So, for example, Delitzsch, Jastrow, Lenormant, Pinches, Sayce. See, on the other hand, Baudissin, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-7.

¹¹ Zimmern, *op. cit.*, p. 735.

of Adonis, who is here, however, to be identified with Tammuz, was celebrated in connection with the ascent of a star bringing salvation.¹ Furthermore, the Babylonian Marduk was originally perhaps a vegetation deity before he became the god of the spring sun,² and with greater probability the same thing may be said of Melcart.³ Just so Eshmun⁴ and Sandan⁵ are to be accounted for as originally vegetation deities. Sandan, for example, is often drawn with a branch or a flower in his hand.⁶ Likewise, Osiris is not lacking in relations to vegetation: in Byblos, whither, according to the well-known myth transmitted to us through Plutarch, his sarcophagus was carried upon the sea, he is identified with the *erica* surrounding the body.⁷ Further, in representations from later times, we see trees growing from his grave or grain sprouting forth from his body.⁸ On the other hand, the songs which Isis and her sister Nephthys are said to have sung at Osiris' grave represent Osiris as a pure sun-god.⁹ So also the greater part of the Egyptian texts place the death of the god and the lamentation for him upon the last day of the month Choiak, at the time of the shortest day of the year, upon which the Egyptians formerly placed the death of the sun-god Râ and other peoples the death and rebirth of the sun.¹⁰ In addition, to be sure, the numbers given by

¹ Ammianus Marcell. xlii. 9. 14.

² Cf. Baudissin, *op. cit.*, 107 f., 172. That a disappearance and reappearance of Marduk was supposed even as in the case of Tammuz is certainly not attested by inscriptions (H. Zimmern, *Zum Streit um die Christusmythe* [Berlin, 1910], p. 48), but it is probable. See, for example, also P. Jensen, *Das Gilgameschepos* (Strassburg, 1906), p. 925. Here, moreover, the "apparently self-evident" supposition is that also Gilgamesh in the oldest form of his legend rose again after his death. Marduk is pre-eminently also *muballit mlti*; that is, "the one who brings the dead to life."

³ Baudissin, *op. cit.*, p. 359. Melcart is also meant when Menander (Jos., *Ant.*, VIII, v, 3) speaks of an *ἑρμῆς* of the Tyrian Heracles.

⁴ Baudissin, *op. cit.*, pp. 282, 345.

⁵ Cf. H. Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen Zeitalter* (Göttingen, 1913), pp. 44 f.

⁶ Böhlig, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 45.

⁷ W. R. Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (Edinburgh, 1889), p. 175.

⁸ Baudissin, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁹ A. Wiedemann, *Die Religion der alten Aegypter* (Münster, 1890), p. 115.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Plutarch are significant: 28, the number of years of Osiris' life (or reign), and 14, the number of parts of his body—both lunar numbers. Moreover, texts bring him expressly into connection with the moon. Thus, Ramses IV upon his memorial stone at Abydos says, "Thou art the moon which is in heaven, thou renewest thy youth at will, thou becomest young at thy pleasure, thou appearest in order to drive away the darkness,"² etc. The lunar character of Osiris is indicated by Plutarch's statement³ that the day of his death fell upon the seventeenth of Athyr, and that of his resurrection upon the nineteenth—that is, the third day, for most probably the three days should be connected with the time of the invisibility of the moon. As a matter of fact, as will be considered below, already at the primitive stage, the faith in resurrection on the third day is motivated by the allusion to the equally long invisibility of the moon. Of course, it may be pointed out that the third day serves likewise, especially in Parseeism,⁴ and in the rabbinical literature,⁵ and also in other places,⁶ as the day on or after which the fate of the soul is decided.⁶ But if, as is still the most probable supposition, this idea of the third day originates in the simple observation of the fact that the body begins to decay at about this time, it is far less suitable as an explanation of the belief in the revival of the deity than the thought of the reappearing star, which is evidently personified in the deity. According to the faith of later times, Osiris was three days and three nights in the waters before he was restored to life again.⁷ We are thereby reminded naturally of the three days and the three nights of the Jonah story (Jon. 2:1)

² Ad. Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion* (Berlin, 1905), p. 82.

³ *De Is. Os.*, c. 13, 39; cf. 42.

⁴ E. Böklen, *Die Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der persischen Eschatologie* (Göttingen, 1902), p. 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 ff.

⁶ For instance, among the tribes of Western Victoria; see Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I (London, 1913), 142.

⁷ Cf. Baudissin, *op. cit.*, pp. 412 ff.; Bousset, *Kyrios Christos* (Göttingen, 1913), pp. 30 f.

⁸ R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1910), p. 213.

and we cannot escape the question whether the myth of the sea-monster that swallows the star which sinks into the waves did not affect this story in some way. Hans Schmidt, upon the basis of a rich collection of parallels, has furnished proof of this;¹ but because of the three days we should not think, with Schmidt, of a sun-myth, but of an original moon-myth.² In a sun-myth the return of the hero, or the resurrection of the god, must follow on the next day. Perhaps we may thus explain the fact that in the cult of Adonis, who appears in the rôle of a sun-god but not in that of a moon-god, the resurrection festival occurs τῇ ἐνέτῃ ἡμέρᾳ,³ after the wailing for the dead. Or this return or resurrection falls in an essentially later time, when it is associated with the dying of the sun only through the decline of its power during the winter period. Thus, according to a Babylonian text from the Arsacid period,⁴ there are 160 days between Nergal's descent to the underworld on the eighteenth of Tammuz, and his reappearance therefrom on the twenty-eighth of Chislev, and these dates, according to Zimmern's conjecture,⁵ may hold good perhaps for Tammuz also. In the Roman Attis-cult, the feast which bore the name Hilaria, and symbolized the resurrection of the god, fell upon the twenty-fifth of March, while the twenty-second—that is, the fourth preceding day—marked the proper beginning of the mourning ceremonies.⁶ We cannot perhaps succeed in showing Attis to have been a moon-god; but scarcely any difficulty could be raised in the way of the supposition that the characteristics which originally

¹ *Jona* (Göttingen, 1907).

² Similarly then, of course, in the Orion legend, *op. cit.*, pp. 101 f., 111, as in the Indian tale communicated on pp. 44 f. If here the man dwelling three days in the great fish is the moon, then his sister who rescues him is the sun. That Orion, "exhausted and worn, but still living and bestirring himself," was borne to land by the dolphin may be a reflection of the fact that after the three days only a part of the moon appears; the sun, on the other hand, returns in full vigor.

³ Lucian, *De dea Syria*, § 6.

⁴ *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, VI (1891), 244, 52 ff.

⁵ *Der babyl. Gott Tammuz*, p. 734. The Jewish fast on the seventeenth of Tammuz went back perhaps originally to an old mourning festival for Tammuz (M. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* [Boston, 1898], p. 682), according to Houtsma, *Over de israelietische Vastendagen* (Amsterdam, 1897), pp. 4-6, 12-17.

⁶ Hepding, *op. cit.*, pp. 149, 165 f.

belonged to a moon-god were gradually carried over to the cult of a sun-god; and the interchange of the third and fourth days may have originated simply from the fact that in one case the day of death was reckoned in the three days and in the other case was not.¹

How the transition from a vegetation deity to an astral deity or vice versa is to be explained in any particular case need not here be investigated more closely. In general, it need only to be noted that on the one side is evident the spread of the idea that the growth of vegetation depends upon the influence of the stars; a star-deity can therefore easily become queen of vegetation. On the other hand, as time goes on there is abundant proof of the tendency to transfer to the heavens a deity who was originally wholly earthly; to say nothing of the fact that in one or another case, through the combination of originally independent divine beings, the idea of a god can be enriched with new characteristics.

This is the point at which we have arrived: how the observation of the processes of nature can give rise to a resurrection faith by transforming the fate of vegetation on the one hand, and of the star on the other, into the fate of the deities connected with them: out of the course of nature arises personal experience. This is shown by the myth as well as the cultus of the deities concerned, it being immaterial which of the two is the older. As vegetation dies and as the stars disappear so the deity dies and is bewailed; as the vegetation again bursts into bloom and as the stars are "born again,"² so the deity comes to life again and is greeted with joy; and the correct performance of this act of the cultus may in its turn serve to restore to the deity the strength necessary for his new life,³ or, otherwise expressed, to exercise magical influence upon the growth of vegetation and the return of the star.

¹ The occasional mention of three and a half days as the resurrection terminus must be regarded as a specifically Jewish combination between the third and fourth days (Rev. 11:9, 11; Apocalypse of Elijah, edited by Steindorff in *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, XVII, N.F. 2, p. 163); for three and a half, the half of seven, is a number of the Jewish apocalyptic; cf. Dan. 9:27. From the three days rise the three hours as an indication of the time after which Adam was raised into the third heaven (Apoc. Moses, § 37). Cf. Böhlen, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

² Cf. the characteristic rabbinical designation of the new moon as מוליד.

³ Cf. Frazer, *The Dying God* (London, 1912), pp. 212, 233, 252, 261 ff.

However, is there any actual connection between the faith in the resurrection of the deities we have considered and the faith in Christ's resurrection? No dogmatic considerations of any sort may predetermine the answer. Rather, proceeding along purely historical lines, we must first of all ask the simple question whether the faith in Christ's resurrection is not to be explained primarily in and of itself; that is, whether we should not content ourselves merely with the fact that it is narrated in the New Testament. But just at this point differences arise, in that these narratives, as is well known, are full of contradictions.¹ This holds true, among other things, particularly in reference to the degree of corporeity of the risen one (cf., for example, on the one hand, Luke 24:15, 31, 36; John 20:19; and especially I Cor. 15:50; and, on the other, Luke 24:39; John 20:24-29; Acts 10:40 f.), as well as in reference to the date of his resurrection (on the third day: Matt. 16:21; 17:23; 20:19; after three days: Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:34; three days and three nights in the bosom of the earth: Matt. 12:40). With reference to one thing only the narratives leave us in no doubt—namely, that the disciples on the basis of personal experiences became increasingly certain that the Crucified One lived. Of whatever sort, however, may have been the historical facts upon which such a faith is based,² the distinctive character of this faith is so complex that there is scarcely any escape from the supposition of the activity of extraneous influences in its making. Of course, the fact that Christianity shows the same variation as other cults in the determination of the resurrection day is so extraordinary that we may see in this agreement much more than mere coincidence.³ And this variation goes back even to the choice of the Old Testament passages which are hunted out as *dicta probantia* for the resurrection of Christ. With his *τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς* (I Cor. 15:4) Paul doubtless has in mind Hos. 6:2;

¹ Cf. the latest exposition by Joh. Weiss, *Das Urchristentum* (Göttingen, 1914), pp. 60-75; further, e.g., Arnold Meyer, *Die Auferstehung Christi* (Tübingen, 1905).

² Most of all, in my opinion, it must here be especially emphasized that Paul, through the recurring *ὥσθι*, I Cor. 15:5-8, puts his visionary experience upon the same level with that of the original apostles.

³ Cf. O. Pfeiderer, *Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens* (Berlin, 1903), p. 69, n. 1 and p. 105.

on the other hand, Matt. 12:40 parallels Jesus' sojourn for three days and three nights in the bosom of the earth with Jonah's stay of the same length of time in the body of the fish (Jon. 2:1). The more contradictory these data are, the more probable does it become that these Old Testament passages of the primitive Christian theology must have been employed only gradually as the basis for a thought taken over in the main from other sources.¹ We are supported in this supposition through observing how far Hos. 6:2 is from having any messianic meaning.²

¹ That these passages had already served in the synagogue for that sort of demonstration can in no way be proved.

² I do not think that Hos. 6:2 has anything whatever to do with resurrection in the correct sense of the word. The opposite of חַיִּים, according to Hebrew usage, may even be "sickness" (cf. for example, Isa. 38:16b), and this alone agrees with vs. 1, רָפָא and חָבַשׁ. Also in the sickness-psalm, Ps. 41, חָקִים (v. 11) stands in all probability in the sense of "to raise up from a sick bed"—to help up. "After two days . . . on the third day" belongs indeed simply in the category of the so-called number-proverbs, in which there occurs the distribution of the number-items between two sentences—for example, Prov. 30:15, 18, 21 and 29. Such combinations serve merely for the expression of indefinite enumeration (cf. Gesenius-Kautzsch, *Grammar*, § 134f). Furthermore, the third day—as is shown by II Kings 20:5—is perhaps a proverbial idiom to express a short time. Thereby the greatness of the hyperbole in the mouth of the people loses the objectionable element which Baudissin (*op. cit.*, p. 410) finds in the words. If he were right in his contention that the revivification was thought of as following on the third day after the return to Yahweh, and not on the third day after the occurrence of the people's deathlike condition (pp. 410 f.), then this would obviate again the possibility of bringing the three days into connection with a resurrection-festival of the cult on the third day; whereas he in his noteworthy review of the passage (pp. 403-11) takes particular pains to point out this possibility. All the more does *our* conception of the passage gain in probability. I Sam. 2:6 is to be understood in similar fashion, a passage from which a resurrection belief has been extracted quite erroneously. That חַיִּים in opposition to מָוֶת may mean simply "to let live" is incontrovertibly shown by Gen. 12:12, and this conception of I Sam. 2:6 is supported by the related passage Deut. 32:39, where again, as in Hos. 6:2, אֶחַיָּים stands parallel to מָוֶת. It may not be asserted that the second half-verse "down to Sheol" and "to bring up again from Sheol" makes necessary an understanding of the passage in the sense of restoration to life after death; for, as indicated by Ps. 30:4, "to bring up from Sheol" means nothing more than to release from the danger of death. One hovering on the edge of the grave is already as good as dead in the vivid imagination of the Semite. Who knows whether the epithet so common in Babylonian divine names—namely, *muballit mti* (see above, p. 4, n. 2, and cf. Baudissin, *op. cit.*, pp. 311 ff., p. 315, n. 2, pp. 317, 329, 398 f., n. 3)—is not also to be understood in a corresponding sense, as a designation of the deity who helps his own through the most difficult dangers? The thought of a resurrection proper does not otherwise occur in Babylonian literature.

How one could be misled into relating the passage to the Messiah is unintelligible, unless he was seeking for a proof-text for resurrection on the third day and so read into it this thought which was originally probably wholly alien to it. Thus, belief in resurrection on the third day does not find its proper root in the Old Testament.

All the more must we resort to the supposition of an influence from the side of the aforesaid cults. The only question is whether an acquaintance with them is historically demonstrable upon the soil from which the Christian faith sprang. This question is to be answered in the affirmative.¹ Osiris, according to the brilliant conjecture of Lagarde, is perhaps named in Isa. 10:4. In any case, he is known in Palestine much earlier, according to the excavations there.² We have already had to relate³ Isa. 17:10 and 11 to the Adonis-cult (cf., further, Jer. 22:18; 34:5; I Kings 12:24 in LXX). The practice of the Tammuz-cult in Jerusalem is expressly shown by Ezek. 8:14, and possibly Dan. 11:37 also goes back to it. On the other hand, it seems to me a less fortunate suggestion when Gressmann⁴ would understand Isa., chap. 53, as a cult-song originating from the mystery-religions which was sung by the worshipers on the death-day of the god—a god from the circle of the Adonis or Tammuz forms. What is said in Isa. 53:2 and 3, regarding the lack of beauty and the general contempt for the martyr, is absolutely out of harmony with these gods. Zach. 12:11 might much better be named in this connection, since to relate the lamentation for Hadad Rimmon to the god Hadad, who was probably in some way connected with Adonis, has the most in its favor.⁵ According to Jerome,⁶ the Tammuz- or Adonis-worship was carried on even in the time between Hadrian and Constantine in the birth-cave of Jesus at Bethlehem. Finally, it may be noted

¹ Cf., for example, Bruno Meissner in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, V (1902), 233.

² Cf. P. Volz., *Die biblischen Allertümer* (Calw and Stuttgart, 1914), p. 175.

³ See p. 3.

⁴ *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie* (Göttingen, 1905), pp. 326 f., 330. Concerning Isa., chap. 53, see below.

⁵ Cf. Baudissin in *Protest. Realencyclopädie*, VII, 295.

⁶ *Epistola LVIII ad Paulinum* (in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, XXII, col. 581).

that centers of Christian faith outside of Palestine, like Alexandria and Antioch and even Tarsus,¹ the home of Paul, were headquarters of cults of specifically resurrection deities. And the fact, at least supplementary, of an amalgamation of the Christ-cult with the cults of the older resurrection-gods is beyond question. With what is known of those cults² we may compare, for example, only one description such as the following³ of the Easter festival in the Greek church:

The community buries its Christ in a solemn manner even as if he had actually died. Finally, the wax figure is again set up in the church and the same desolate wailing sounds break forth anew. This lamentation lasts in connection with the strictest fast until midnight Saturday. As soon as twelve o'clock strikes, the bishop appears and announces the joyful message "Christ is risen"; whereupon the mass answers "He is risen indeed," and at once the whole town quakes with the noisy jubilation which is let loose in yells and cries as well as in endless shots from guns and cannon, and setting off of fireworks of every sort. And the very hour after the most stringent fasting, they rush to the enjoyment of the Easter lamb and the unmixed wine.

The investigation thus may be said to make highly probable the supposition that belief in the resurrection of Christ was influenced by thoughts and customs from pre-Christian resurrection-cults. But actual certainty cannot be attained until we have obtained new materials as a basis for further investigation. We ought not, therefore, to give further space here to mere suppositions regarding the question.⁴

II

Christ's resurrection is for Paul the guaranty of the resurrection of Christians. Christ is only "the first fruits of those who sleep" (I Cor. 15:20). Quite similarly is it said of Osiris that he is "the first of those in the West." On the basis of the mystical connection

¹ Cf. the book by Böhlig, cited above.

² Cf., for example, Firmicus Maternus, *De errore prof. relig.*, chap. xxii; Tertullian, *De praescr. haer.*, xl. 4: *imago resurrectionis* in the mysteries of Mithra.

³ C. Wachsmuth, *Das alte Griechenland im neuen* (Bonn, 1864), pp. 26 f.

⁴ Cf. on the question, among others, M. Brückner, *Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheit in den orientalischen Religionen und ihr Verhältnis zum Christentum* (Tübingen, 1908).

between Osiris and the believer, the latter participates in the fate of the god:

"As true as Osiris lives, will he also live; as true as Osiris is not dead, will he not die; as true as Osiris is not destroyed, will he not be destroyed. Osiris' mother, Nut, comes to the aid of the deceased. She gives thee thy head, she brings thee thy bones, she joins thy members together, and she sets thy heart in thy body.¹ . . . Thy transfigured spirit and thy strength come to thee as to the god, the representative of Osiris. . . . Thereupon thou ascendest upon the ladder to the heavens; the gate of heaven is opened to thee and the great bars will be drawn back for thee; thereupon thou findest Re [the sun-god]. . . . He sets thee upon the throne of Osiris in order that thou mayest reign over the dead."²

That the believer repeats the experiences of his god is a favorite thought in the ancient mystery-religions. Thus the belief in the resurrection of man can, wherever such a resurrection is expected, be based upon belief in the resurrection of the god honored by him. In harmony with the individualistic character of the mystery-religions, this resurrection faith is primarily concerned with the resurrection of each individual on his own account.

But it is not necessary that man should follow so circuitous a route in order to attain belief in his own individual resurrection. The same consideration of the course of nature which led him to conceive of the personified gods as dying and arising again can bring him also to the point of making the corresponding application to his own fate. If, now, dead vegetation blooms again, ought not dead persons likewise to come to life again? To be sure, the poet of the Book of Job (14:7 ff.) considers the fate of the tree for the purpose of putting it in contrast with that of mankind:

For there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again,
And that the tender branch thereof will not cease . . .
But man dieth and wasteth away,
Yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he?

But though the solution here be a negative one, the noteworthy thing in the passage is that the problem of the analogy of plant life

¹ Cf. the corresponding picture of the resurrected ones: "They possess their heart, they possess their mind, they possess their mouth, they possess their feet, they possess their arms, they possess all their members" (Erman, *op. cit.*, p. 99).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 96 ff.

and human life is prominently brought to view; and why should its solution not just as well result in the opposite way? Thus a narrative of the Bahnars of Eastern Cochinchina tells that the first men who were buried under a tree of life were accustomed to rise as full-grown men and women.¹ The author of Isa. 66:14 knows the figure that the bones sprout forth like grass; and Jesus Ben-Sira also mentions the sprouting of the bones of especially pious and holy men (46:12; 49:10). Arabian poets long for much rain upon the graves of their beloved ones, and in the mourning-poems of the neo-Hebraic poetry, at the conclusion of a poem, very frequently the wish is expressed that God may send dew upon the bones of the deceased.² Rain and dew further growth. "The dew of the stars of heaven" revives the bones (Isa. 26:19). We can see how such lines of thought resulted in a belief in the resurrection.³ We must also recognize how easily these ways of thinking must have fused with the thought of Mother Earth, upon the great significance of which for the popular religious belief we have learned to lay stress, especially since Albrecht Dieterich's investigation.⁴ The seed is laid in the bosom of the earth and thence sprouts forth a new plant. The well-known figure of the seed (I Cor. 15:37 f.;⁵ cf. John 12:24) is too self-evident to permit of its not having appeared elsewhere aside from early Christian literature.⁶ We find it in talmudic,⁷ as also in Parsi, literature. For an example of the latter cf. Bundahish 30:5: "If the corn is created by me so that when sowed in the earth it grows therefrom and manifolds itself, . . . just so the creation of each one of these grains was more difficult than bringing about the resurrection." But corresponding thoughts, developed in one way or another, may be traced

¹ Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 74.

² I. Goldziher, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XIII (1910), 45.

³ Cf. among others also the etymological connection of the Greek ἀνθεστήρια (that is, the feast of the returning dead) with ἀνθος = bloom.

⁴ *Mutter Erde* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1905).

⁵ Paul uses the figure in such fashion that it serves him as a special proof for the difference between the resurrection body and the former body.

⁶ For example, I Clement, XXIV, 4 f.; Acta Pauli, 3:26 ff.

⁷ Sanh. 90b; Kethub. 111b; Pirke of R. Elieser 33.

back to the primitive stages of culture. So in the following example:²

Some of the Fijians accounted for human mortality as follows. When the first man, the father of the human race, was being buried, a god passed by the grave and asked what it meant, for he had never seen a grave before. On hearing from the bystanders that they had just buried their father, "Do not bury him," said he, "dig the body up again." "No," said they, "we cannot do that. He has been dead four days and stinks." "Not so," pleaded the god, "dig him up and I promise you that he will live again." Heedless of the divine promise, these primitive sextons persisted in leaving their dead father in the grave. Then said the god to these wicked men, "By disobeying me you have sealed your own fate. Had you dug up your ancestor you would have found him alive and you yourselves, when you passed from this world, should have been buried, *as bananas are*, for the space of four days, after which you should have been dug up, not rotten, but ripe. But now, as punishment for your disobedience, you shall die and rot."

That in this case mankind does not actually attain the fate of the banana is incidental. The important thing about this story is that it shows us how a primitive consciousness was led through the comparison of the human fate with that of plants to the thought of resurrection.

By observing the rising and setting of the stars we arrive at the same result. This may be read between the lines of very many stories about the origin of death which Frazer classifies as belonging to the "type of the waxing and waning moon." One of the most instructive is furnished us again by the Fijians:³

Once upon a time the moon contended that men should be like himself (for the Fijian moon seems to be a male); that is, he meant that just as he grows old, disappears, and comes in sight again, so men grown old should vanish for a while and then return to life. But the cat, who is a Fijian god, would not hear of it. "No," said he, "let men die like rats." And he had the best of it in the dispute, for men die like rats to this day.

Of similar stories there is a whole series upon African soil.⁴

Thus the Namaquas or Hottentots say that once the moon charged the hare to go to men and say: "As I die and rise to life again so shall you die and

² Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 75 f.

³ Cf. John 11:39!

⁴ Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 65 f.

rise to life again." So the hare went to men, but either out of forgetfulness or malice he reversed the message. There are traces of a similar story among the Bushmen. Again, the Masai of East Africa say that in the early days a certain god named Naitern-kop told a man named Le-eyo that if a child were to die he was to throw away the body and say: "Man, die and come back again; moon, die and remain away." Well, soon afterwards a child died, but it was not one of the man's own children, so when he threw the body away he said: "Man, die, and remain away; moon, die, and return." Next, one of his own children died, and when he threw away the body he said "Man, die and return; moon, die and remain away." But the god said to him: "It is of no use now, for you spoilt matters with the other child." That is why down to this day when a man dies he returns no more, but when the moon dies she always comes to life again.

Finally, two examples from Australia:¹

The Arunta of Central Australia relate that before there was any moon in the sky, a man died and was buried. Shortly afterwards he rose from the grave in the form of a boy. When the people ran away for fear, he followed them shouting that if they fled they would die altogether, while he would die but rise again in the sky. He failed to induce them to return. When he died he reappeared as the moon, periodically dying and coming to life again; but the people who ran away died altogether. And the Wotjobaluk story runs that, when people died, the moon used to say: "You up again"; but an old man said: "Let them remain dead," and since then none has ever come to life again except the moon.

Here again also the final dissimilarity of the fate of men and of the moon is less important than the fact that the fates of both are most closely paralleled. Therefore we shall not wonder when we see the thought of resurrection on the third day arise among these primitive peoples. Thus in the narrative of the origin of death, told by the Nandi of British East Africa:²

They say that when the first people lived upon the earth a dog came to them one day and said: "All people will die like the moon, but unlike the moon you will not return to life again unless you give me some milk to drink out of your gourd, and beer to drink through your straw. If you do this, I will arrange for you to go to the river when you die and to come to life again on the third day." [The people, however, made fun of the dog and the result is here also negative.] In the Caroline Islands they say that long, long ago death was unknown, or rather it was a short sleep, not a long, long one, as it is now. Men died on the last day of the waning moon and came to life again on the first

¹ Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, IV, 412b.

² Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 66.

appearance of the new moon, just as if they had awakened from a refreshing slumber. But an evil spirit somehow contrived that when men slept the sleep of death they should wake no more.¹

The same curious notion of death and resurrection after three days is entertained by the Unmatjera and Kaitish, two savage tribes of Central Australia.² Frazer adds significantly:

Nor does this association of ideas end with a mere tradition that in some former age men used to die with the old moon and come to life again with the new moon. Many savages, on seeing the new moon for the first time in the month, observe ceremonies which seem to be intended to renew and increase their life and strength with the renewal and increase of the lunar light. For example, on the day when the new moon first appeared, the Indians of San Juano Capistrano in California used to call together all the young men and make them run about, while the old men danced in a circle, saying: "As the moon dieth and cometh to life again, so we also having to die will again live." Again, an old writer tells us that at the appearance of every new moon the negroes of the Congo clapped their hands and cried out, sometimes falling on their knees: "So may I renew my life as thou art renewed."³

The star from whose reappearance men infer their own resurrection can, however, just as well be the sun as the moon.⁴ Hence, therefore, both in Judaism and in early Christianity, the rooster that announces the day appears as the symbol of the resurrection.⁵

Observation of plant life and of the stars is, however, not the only thing which may lead mankind by the way of naïve reflection to a belief in the resurrection. First, there is the fact of a similarity between particular individuals among men and beasts. Are not the latter simply the re-embodiment of the former? Primitive philosophers, in their childish statements, have stumbled upon something like the law of the conservation of energy. This law involves even more, in part at least, than the widespread belief that

¹ Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68. Cf. also that, according to the letter of Professor Dr. Küttner in the *Schwüb. Merkur* of November 12, 1900 (No. 528), the Chinese Boxers were strengthened in their contempt of death through the belief that they would rise again after three days.

³ Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 68.

⁴ Cf., for example, I Clement, XXIV, 3.

⁵ *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XIV (1911), 23; *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde*, XVI (1912), 73.

the souls of ancestors return again in the newly born.¹ Thus Livingstone tells how he was regarded by a chief magician as a resurrected Italian named Siritomba. Evidently the chieftain could not explain the existence of a second white man otherwise than on the supposition that the first, having died, had simply returned. Furthermore, we hear² that certain dark-skinned groups, at least in Australia, had so seldom come across the phenomenon of white men that in them they supposed they saw their own dead bodily restored in accordance with the statement: "Black fellow tumble down, jump up white fellow." From this point of view may be explained what the Australian traveler George Grey tells us³ of the way in which he was rapturously caressed by an Australian woman as her deceased and restored son.

More frequently, of course, the very great similarity of the type itself will have suggested the idea of bodily return, and this holds true in much greater measure of animals than of men.⁴ In the case of animals it is more difficult for man to distinguish between the individuals of a single species. No wonder then that in primitive civilizations we frequently meet the belief in the resurrection of animals, and in so far as man is dependent for his nourishment upon the growth of these animals would he do the utmost possible in order directly to further their resurrection. A careful treatment of the bones is the best of all means to this end. Thus:

After feasting on a dog, the Dacotas carefully collect the bones, scrape, wash and bury them, partly, as it is said, from the belief that "the bones of an animal will rise and reproduce another." Among the Esquimaux of Baffin Land and Hudson Bay, when a boy has killed his first seal his mother gathers all the bones and throws them into a seal-hole. They think that these bones will become seals which the boy will catch in later life. The Yuracares Indians of Bolivia are at great pains to collect all the bones of the beasts, birds and fishes which they eat and to throw them into a stream, bury them in the depths of the forest, or burn them in the fire, in order that the animals of the sort killed may not be angry and may allow themselves to be killed again.⁵

¹ Cf., for example, Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 315.

² Cf. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (German edition), II, 5.

³ *Journals of Two Expeditions in . . . Australia* (London, 1841), I, 301 f.

⁴ Even on into the higher stages of civilization the belief in the return of special individuals persists; cf. Matt. 14:2; 16:14; the return of Nero and others.

⁵ Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild* (1914), II, 256 f.

. . . . Many of the Minnetaree Indians "believe that the bones of those bisons which they have slain and divested of flesh will rise again clothed with renewed flesh and quickened with life, and become fat and fit for slaughter the succeeding June." Hence on the Western prairies of America the skulls of buffaloes may be seen arranged in circles and symmetrical piles, awaiting the resurrection.¹

In line with this belief in the resurrection of animals lies the myth of the Phoenix which deserves mention all the more since early Christian apologetics used it as proof for the Christian belief in the resurrection.²

The cases cited above refer to the resurrection of animals in the present world, but the Laplanders, for example, entertain a similar expectation regarding the next world.

In sacrificing an animal they regularly put aside the bones, eyes, ears, heart, lungs, sexual parts (if the animal was a male), and a morsel of flesh from each limb. Then after eating the remainder of the flesh, they laid the bones and the rest in anatomical order in a coffin and buried them with the usual rites, believing that the god to whom the animal was sacrificed would reclothe the bones with flesh and restore the animal to life in Jabme-Aimo, the subterranean world of the dead.³

It is noteworthy that in the examples cited the bodily resurrection is thought of as dependent upon the care of the material substratum of the dead, in whole or in part. This is a belief which persists with remarkable tenacity. We are well acquainted with the Jewish legend of the bone *Luz*, "the *nut* of the spinal column, which, being indestructible, was supposed to form the nucleus for the resurrection of the body."⁴ Possibly there is here ultimately a disguised connection with an old Egyptian belief.⁵ One of the most sacred symbols of the religion of Egypt is the Osiris token, namely, a pillar honored in Bubastis, which was interpreted by the

¹ Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, p. 256.

² I Clement, XXV.

³ Frazer, *Spirits*, etc., p. 257; in the same work further material regarding corresponding usages and ideas, pp. 183 f., 196, 200 f., 250, 254, 256. Cf. further Spiegelberg and Jacoby, "Der Frosch als Symbol der Auferstehung bei den Aegyptern," *Sphinx*, VII, 215-28.

⁴ See *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, VIII, 219.

⁵ As I have since seen, H. K. Brugsch (*Religion u. Mythologie der alten Aegypter* [Leipzig, 1888], p. 618, 634) has already expressed this supposition.

Egyptian theologians as the spine of the god buried in this place.¹ Fundamental to this is the opinion that the resurrection of the god is dependent upon its preservation. In popular narratives animals and men come to life if only their bones are preserved—or at least if only one is lacking. Hence, it is important that no bone should be lost; also, that the bones should not be broken or otherwise destroyed.² In a printed address delivered by a certain Dr. Schneider, even as late as the year 1875, upon the theme, "To Bury, Not to Burn," I read:

Only if the dead are laid in the sarcophagus in the state of entire preservation and are sunk in the grave is there any hope present for the mourners that they will remain preserved for life eternal and that we shall again find them. Of this comfort, however, those who remain behind are robbed if the body is taken from them and burned.

The number of sources for the origin of belief in the resurrection which we think we have discovered in the foregoing need not surprise us. In thus treating so irrational a problem as that of widespread belief in human resurrection,³ we shall be fundamentally more correct than if we were to strive to form a single principle. We shall have to go farther indeed in search of these sources. Then it must not be forgotten that if we are correct in tracing back belief in human duration primarily to the primitive interpretation of dream phenomena, we are at once struck by the idea that men in the next world preserve the form that characterized them in this life. The dream phenomena actually exhibit the deceased in the form in which they were known in this life. They are very frequently, indeed, as is well known, represented, so to speak, as

¹ Erman, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

² Cf. also Ada Thomsen in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XII (1909), 474 ff. Of course, similar lines of thought lead to the deliberate breaking or destroying of bones by which men strive to hinder the dead from a bodily return. Cf. Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, II, 791b; Frazer, *Spirits*, etc., II, 260; *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 153.

³ Cf. as to this, for example, Frazer, *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, pp. 279 ff.; *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 147. Carlo Pascals, *Fatti e leggende di Roma antica* (Firenze, 1903), wherein is a noteworthy chapter, "La resurrezione della carne nel mondo pagano," has been inaccessible to me. Cf. A. Dieterich, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, VIII (1905), 498.

uncorporeal shadow existences: we have only to think of the *εἰδωλον* of the Greeks. But, finally, if the dead appear and we speak with them and handle them as in former times, are they not still bodily existences endowed with flesh and blood as when alive in the body? This experience is in extraordinary contradiction to the hard fact that the body is seen to decay after death. Does there not lie in the simple logic of primitive thought the demand for a miracle by means of which the body shall be suddenly restored from the more or less ruined remains of its earlier form? If we consider the resurrection in connection with the ideas of life after death which man creates for himself, then it is conceived of, like translation, as a strictly miraculous spontaneous means of attaining the future goal which men otherwise attain in the course of a more or less lengthy journey of the soul. And perhaps indeed this miracle does not appear quite so great, for at this point still another method of observation is involved, in accordance with which death is thought of as closely related to sleep (cf., for example, the fable of the "Dornröschen und Sneewittchen").

Are not death and sleep quite alike? Death is indeed the brother of sleep.¹ Therefore, should not the dead wake again even as the sleeper does?² In sleep as in death the soul leaves the body. After sleep it returns; after death—of course, not immediately. The Koran expresses it splendidly in the 40th sura: "God takes the souls of men unto himself at their death and also the souls of those who do not die does he take during their sleep; and then he retains those whose death he has decided upon. The others, however, he sends back until a certain definite time." Is it, however, absolutely impossible to bring the latter back? In China, just as soon as anybody dies, men go on the roof and call to him, saying, "Halloo, N.M.; come back."³ Of course, the one called does not come back. But although the ordinary man does not succeed in waking the dead from his profound sleep, a word from an expert may accomplish the wonder. Quite generally, this power is credited

¹ Cf. *Iliad* xiv.231.

² In the foregoing narrative from the Carolinas, it actually so happens (see p. 15).

³ Liki, *Li-yün*, I, 7.

to the man of God, the saint, the wizard, etc.¹ And if their word has so much power, the more so does contact with the body of the saint who has been gifted with this power,² even if he be dead; thus, for example, in the narrative of II Kings 13:21, which the author of the Acts of Paul (4:32, 33) adduces as one of the evidences for the Christian belief in the resurrection. However, there are also circumstances which are so cataclysmic that in and of themselves they arouse the dead from the sleep. Thus after the battle of Actium and the piercing of the Isthmus of Corinth the dead are said to have arisen in masses;³ and the resurrection of many saints at the moment of the death of Jesus belongs in the same category (Matt. 27:52, 53).⁴ The presupposition underlying such an "awakening," namely, that the dead "are asleep," was peculiarly at home on Jewish soil.⁵ The growing belief in the awakening of the dead through Jesus and his followers was favored by all this.⁶ A like presupposition is, however, naturally so widespread⁷ that we may see in it a not unimportant source of the belief in resurrection.

One last consideration is of a purely religious sort and carries us back in a certain way to the beginning of this section, viz., *the connection of man with his god necessitates the god's bringing man to life again*, the only difference being that here the thought there indicated, that the arousing god was himself a dying and rising deity after the manner of an Osiris, is in itself excluded. Precisely upon Jewish soil is such a development found in the Book of Job. In general, indeed, his expectation of the future is a hopeless one, as

¹ Cf., for example, Sib. Or. III; 66 (Beliar!); and P. Fiebig, *Jüdische Wundergeschichten des neutestam. Zeitalters* (Tübingen, 1911), pp. 36 ff.; E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Tübingen, 1910), II, 191, note; O. Weinreich, *Antike Heilungswunder* (Giessen, 1909), pp. 46, 171-74, etc.

² Cf., for example, I Kings 17:21; II Kings 4:34; Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* iv. 45.

³ Cf. also Ovid *Metam.* vii. 206.

⁴ *μετὰ τῆς ἔγερσιν αὐτοῦ* is a secondary insertion in order to establish harmony with I Cor. 15:20 (see above, p. 11).

⁵ Cf. Jer. 51:39, 57; Job 14:12; Dan. 12:2; Isa. 26:19; Enoch 91:10; 92:3; 100:5; IV Ezra 7:32, etc.; the *κοιμᾶσθαι* of Paul. See also P. Volz, *Jüd. Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba* (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1903), p. 134.

⁶ Cf. Matt. 11:5; Luke 7:11 ff.; John, chap. 11; Acts 9:40; 20:10 ff.

⁷ Cf., for example, in Frazer's *The Belief in Immortality*, pp. 61 f., the story told of the Akamba, a Bantu tribe of British East Africa.

the citation given above (p. 12) shows. But it has been said¹ rightly that the very persistency with which Job constantly recurs to the comfortless idea, that with the dead everything is at an end, awakens in observant readers the suspicion that he thereby suppresses a hope constantly arising within himself that it might be otherwise. "O, that a man might die and live again," says Job (14:14). Then might Job indeed experience the moment when God's wrath, which sooner or later must indeed come to an end, would change. God would call him and Job would answer. If this might be so, then Job, comforted, would endure the hard service of this life until release should come to him! Thoughts of this kind gleam forth repeatedly like a flash of the divine grace (cf. 16:18 f.) until Job at the climax of his spiritual struggle in visionary anticipation is suddenly overcome by the conviction, "But I know that my avenger lives and will at the very last raise himself above the dust. The witness of my innocence will be with me and my vindication shall I see for myself. With my own eyes shall I see him and no stranger" (19:25 ff.).² Somewhat similar is the tone of two passages in the Psalter, namely 49:16 and 73:24,³ in which is seen (perhaps as a newly arising esoteric teaching of a small circle) an expectation born from a consciousness of imperishable fellowship with God, the expectation, if not of a resurrection, then of a sort of transport to God.⁴ In connection with the idea here suggested may be brought at once two New Testament passages, in which the thought of a resurrection appears to be completely passed over in favor of a conception which makes mankind attain immediately through death to the place of his permanent abode in the beyond.⁵

¹ B. Duhm, *Das Buch Hiob* (Freiburg, 1897), p. 42.

² The basis for the text here presupposed is presented in my *Bibl. Theologie des A.T.* (Stade II) (Tübingen, 1911), pp. 112 f., note.

³ Ps. 16:10 does not belong here (in spite of Acts 13:35), for the passage speaks merely of rescue from the danger of death, as does also Ps. 30:4 (see above, p. 9). On the other hand, perhaps, Isa., 53:7 (cf. Duhm on the passage) does, although in the present condition of the texts of Isa., chap. 53, we cannot say with certainty exactly how the author conceived of the glorification of the martyr.

⁴ עֲלֵי stands in both passages (also Isa. 53:7) as in the stories of Enoch (Gen. 5:24) and Elijah (II Kings 2:9 f.).

⁵ In view of the sense of the entire context I hold it impossible to regard the question as one of a mere intermediate state, as does, for example, C. Clemen, *Die religions-geschichtliche Erklärung des N.T.* (Giessen, 1909), p. 130.

These passages are Luke 23:43, Jesus' word to the thief, "Today shalt thou be with me in paradise," and Luke 16:22 f., the parable of the Rich Man and the Poor Lazarus, whom the angels carried into Abraham's bosom.

These two cases of an expectation of the attainment of individual immortality immediately after death stand remarkably isolated in the midst of ordinary New Testament expectation of a general resurrection on the "last day."

III

The belief in a general resurrection as over against the belief in an individual one marks a long step in advance. Whether it occurs among primitive civilizations wholly apart from all Christian influences appears to me uncertain. I believe that it is found only on American soil. "In the Mexican territories of Guazacualco and Yluta, the bones of the departed were deposited in baskets and hung up on trees that their spirits might not be obliged to grub in the earth for them at the resurrection";¹ and, in corresponding fashion, the Peruvians explained their observances to Garcilasso: "We, in order that we may not have to search for our hair and nails at a time when there will be much hurry and confusion, place them in one place, that they may be brought more conveniently, and whenever it is possible we are also careful to spit in one place."² In both cases, if I understand correctly, there is presupposed, where it is not general, at least a common resurrection of the dead. If Christian influences have had no part therein, I should be inclined to express the following supposition regarding the origin of this belief. It is a fact that over a wide area, for example, even in American primitive cultures, the dedication of youth appears as the death and resurrection or the rebirth of the individual concerned.³ Frazer

¹ Frazer, *Spirits*, etc., II, 259. *of the Soul and of the World* (1904).

² H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, I (1876), 179. Similar usages are cited by Frazer, *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, pp. 279 ff. Of a different sort is the extraordinary custom which Frazer describes in *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 145: "In some parts of Western Australia the natives detached the nails from the thumb and forefinger of the corpse and deposited them in a small hole beside the grave in order that they might know their friend at his resurrection."

³ Cf. again the *renatus* in the Isis-worship; *in aeternum renati* in the Mithras-cult; the "twice born" in Brahmanism. From the point of view of the history of religion, the thought of the rebirth in the New Testament is not to be separated from these.

has brought together in support of this an abundance of examples to which we need simply refer.¹ Now this rite of the dedication of youth, as is well known, is performed upon a whole class of the same age, or on several classes of the same age, at once, so that simultaneously a multitude "arises." May they not have arrived exactly from this standpoint at a belief in a resurrection of the many and thereby under certain circumstances finally at the belief in a general resurrection?

The faith in a general resurrection received its classic expression outside of the Bible, in Parseeism. Of course, aside from some more or less questionable allusions,² the Avesta offers us therefore only a few sure points of support. It is emphasized pre-eminently in the later passage, Yasht 19:88 ff.,³ and in a fragment,⁴ the meaning of which is in dispute. Much more extensive is the evidence from the Bundahish, which, however, is not older than the ninth century, but was perhaps created largely from old sources now lost. According to its 30th chapter, at the conclusion of the 12,000 years, which, for the Persians, is the set time (in contrast to the later unlimited fancies), first of all the primal man⁵ and the first human pair will arise. In fifty-seven years⁶ will the Soshyans (the Savior) with his helpers restore all the dead to life. Just and impious alike arise, each and every human being on the spot where he died. In the brilliant light, men will recognize each other, saying, "This is my father, this is my mother,"⁷ etc. Thereupon the assembly for judgment occurs, at which the godless become as conspicuous as a white sheep among jet-black ones. The righteous are designated for paradise; the godless are thrown back into hell,

¹ *Balder the Beautiful*, II, 225-78; cf. especially the clearly evident passages on pp. 236 f., 245, 250 f., 253 f., 262 f., 267, 269 ff., 275; *The Belief in Immortality*, I, 253 ff., 302, 434 ff.

² Cf. E. Böklen, *Die Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der parsischen Eschatologie* (Göttingen, 1902), pp. 75 ff.

³ Cf. my *Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch* (Tübingen, 1908), p. 355.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 355 f.; N. L. Westergaard, *Zendavesta* (Copenhagen, 1852-54), p. 332.

⁵ Cf. Apoc. Mos., § 41; I Cor. 15:23.

⁶ On this number cf. Fr. Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Studien* (Berlin, 1863), p. 242, n. 1.

⁷ Cf. the Syriac Apoc. of Baruch 50:4.

but only temporarily; for after three days and nights everything, through a great purifying judgment, goes over into the eternal world-fulfilment.

The similarity of these ideas to the Jewish expectation of the future attracts attention.¹ Here as there the resurrection faith is in connection with the expectation of judgment and the dawn of the eschatological salvation-era. Here as there the resurrection is a deed of God or of his Savior² and is grounded in the wholly divine creative might.³ The passages Dan. 12:2 and Isa. 26:19 are the first clear testimony to the Jewish belief in resurrection. The first passage carries us to the year 165 B.C. and the second is perhaps still later. On the other hand, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius and Aeneas of Gaza, Theopompus, the contemporary of Alexander the Great, already knew of the Persian belief in the resurrection; indeed, Herodotus (iii. 62) even knew it.⁴ The Jews from 538 B.C. on were under the domination of Persia and undoubtedly took over various Persian conceptions. Let us remind ourselves, for example, merely of the fact that the Asmodi of the Book of Tobit is none other than the Persian Aēthma Daēva.⁵ What then is more natural than the supposition that the Jews were indebted to the Persians also for their belief in the resurrection? Actual dependence is indeed placed beyond any sort of doubt through agreement in specific details. When, for example, according to the Talmud (Succa 52a) fifteen anointed ones arouse the dead, this is precisely the number of the companions who come to the aid of the Persian Soshyans (Bundahish 30:17);⁶ when further according to some rabbis the resurrection lasts 114 years, this extraordinary number is but the

¹ See E. Böklen, *op. cit.*, 102-15; furthermore, for example, Lawrence H. Mills in *The Monist*, XVII (1907), 583 ff.

² Cf., for example, Enoch 51:1 ff.; John 5:28 f.; 6:39 f., 44 f.; 11:25.

³ Cf. II Macc. 7:11, 23, with Bundahish 30:5. The same grounding occurs also in the Koran at the conclusion of the 75th sura. Cf. also Matt. 3:9!

⁴ Cf. *εἰ μὴ οὐκ οἱ τοῦτον ἀποστράσῃ*; N. Söderblom, *La vie future d'après le Mazdéisme* (Paris, 1901), pp. 244 f.; C. Clemen, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XVI (1913), 120 f.

⁵ See, besides, especially W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutest. Zeitalter* (Berlin, 1906), pp. 546 ff., and Index, s.v. "Eranische Religion."

⁶ Böklen, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

doubling of the 57 well known to us in Bundahish 30:7;¹ or when finally in the prophecy of Eldad and Modad the blessed Jews are to participate in the ox which was prepared for them from the beginning,² this agrees precisely with the Persian expectation that Soshyans and his companions give the blessed ones of the fat of the ox Hadhayosh as nourishment (Bundahish 30:25).³

In spite of this, however, a simple derivation of the Jewish belief in the resurrection from the Persian only is not quite self-explanatory. One thing particularly gives us pause, upon which, as far as my knowledge goes, Baudissin⁴ first laid his finger. (Among the Jews the resurrection appears as an awakening from a sleep in the dust of the earth. Precisely this thought, however, is foreign to the Persians; for their manner of funeral is not the burial, but the exposure of the bodies. The carcasses are thus dissolved in the elements and, as the Bundahish (30:6) logically represents, are again demanded from the elements—the bones from the spirit of the earth, the blood from the water, the hair from the plants, life from the fire.⁵ We cannot escape the knowledge that the belief in the resurrection stands in so slight an organic connection with the Persian manner of funeral that it is scarcely possible to trace both back to a natural growth from a common root; and thus the supposition must lie near at hand, either that the Persians have derived their belief in the resurrection itself from some foreign source, or that the exposure of the body is only a secondary element in their funeral rite. The latter seems to me the more probable.⁶ However, even if it were fitting we cannot make too much capital of it; for we may by no means underestimate what we may call the Jewish antecedents of the belief in a general resurrection. At this point, Ezek., chap. 37, comes into consideration. To be sure, an older dogmatic erred when it claimed the chapter as the *locus*

¹ Böklen, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

² Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*, p. 327.

³ Cf. Scheftelowitz in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XIV (1911), 38 ff., and notice further Bundahish 30:26: the generation of children no longer occurs = Matt. 22:30: ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀναστάσει οὐτε γαμοῦσιν οὐτε γαμίζονται.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 419 ff.

⁵ Cf. the Slavonic Enoch, chap. 30.

⁶ Cf. Herodotus iii. 62: ἡ θάψις μὲν χειρὶ τῆσι ἑμμενυτοῦ, in the mouth of a Persian!

classicus of the belief in the resurrection in the Christian sense. If a belief in the resurrection had been in force in Ezekiel's time, then to Yahweh's question whether the bones could come back to life again the prophet must have answered otherwise than he does in vs. 3. The requickening of which he speaks, it must be borne in mind, is only allegorically meant—a figure for the political renovation of the people; for the “dead bones” of his vision are not actually dead, but living things, namely, the scattered members of the people now in exile. As a people, therefore, is Israel to rise again. We should do well, however, to hold fast to the fact that about the year 586 B.C. this thought was so clearly expressed under the figure of the resurrection. In this connection it is difficult to say whether this figure was original with Ezekiel; that is, whether it was presented before his eye in the form of a visionary experience as a completely new thing. In his visions usually there is mingled so much of the scholastic element, that it may be supposed that in the background of our passage stood the memory of Hos. 6:2, which words Ezekiel understood from the point of view of the resurrection-thought which was originally foreign to them (cf. above, p. 9, n. 2). However this may be, *the people as a whole are to rise*: here lies for the Jews the starting-point of the belief in the common resurrection of the many. That in itself the thought of a return to life after death was a conception quite attainable for them, the first two parts of this discussion have shown. Further, we may not leave out of consideration the gradual influence of a vigorous belief in retribution—the development of the Job problem set forth above (p. 22) establishes that for us. When, therefore, in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes the distress of the pious reached its climax, then it seemed that retribution in the form of an eschatological change could no longer be deferred. But if then the kingdom should be intrusted to “the people of the saints of the Most High” (Dan. 7:27), at its coming would the pious martyrs come out empty-handed and, vice versa, would the renegade Jews be in no way different from the deceased pious? Considered in connection with such thoughts, the expectation of Dan. 12:2 gains so much in logical sequence that we must ask ourselves whether it was not first in the common course of the

development of Jewish and Persian conceptions that the point was reached at which an influence of the one upon the other set in.

By the conception of the heavenly brilliance of the risen ones (Dan. 12:3) we are carried perhaps beyond the purely Jewish thought-circle. While for this conception specifically the natural premises fail in Judaism, they may very well have been present in Parseeism, whose god is praised as the shining one who has the light as his element. It may be asked indeed whether or not in the setting aside of the risen ones to an eternal glory of light on the one hand and to everlasting horror on the other, the Persian dualistic principle influenced the Jewish conceptions. Genuine Jewish experience has given sufficient consideration to the thought of the sudden destruction or the eternal oblivion of the godless, while the righteous must rise again as members of that people in order to be able to participate in the future deliverance of the people. At least, such a point of view lay in the straight-forward development of the thought of Ezekiel. Actually we find even then in Judaism, in great measure, the expectation of a resurrection of the righteous only.¹ Josephus² ascribes it to the Pharisees³ and it became a characteristic school-dogma of the older rabbis. On the other hand, Parseeism expected the resurrection, not merely of the Mazda believers,⁴ but of all men.⁵ Does there not lie here a further point at which we must concede an influence of Persian conceptions upon the Jewish in so far as among the Jews—contrarily enough—the belief in a general resurrection is confused with a belief in a resurrection of the righteous only,⁶ in part, indeed, within one and the same writing?⁷ It is precisely this uneven-

¹ For example, Enoch 46:6; 90:33; 91:10; 92:3; 100:5. II Macc. 7:14; 12:43 f.; Ps. Sol. 3:12; 14:10; cf. Luke 14:14.

² *War*, II, viii, 14; *Ant.*, XVIII, i, 3.

³ In opposition to them the Sadducees positively denied the resurrection (cf. Enoch 102:6-8; Acts 23:8; 4:1 f.); indeed, the First Book of Maccabees, which consistently assumes a Sadducean standpoint, says not a word of the resurrection even where there was occasion for so doing.

⁴ *Contra* Isa. 26:19: יְקִיאוּתָם.

⁵ Yasht 19:89; Bundahish 30:7.

⁶ For example, IV Ezra 5:45; 7:32; cf. John 5:28 f.; Acts 24:15.

⁷ For example, in the Test. XII Patr. (general resurrection: Testament of Benj., chap. 10; partial resurrection: Testament of Judah, chap. 25; Sim., chap. 6; Zeb., chap. 10); and in the Syriac Apoc. of Baruch (general: 42:7; 50:2; partial: 30:1-3), Apoc. of Moses X, 41 presupposes a general resurrection; on the other hand, in chap. 13 it says, "all flesh from Adam on to that great day will rise—all who are of the holy people!"

ness of the Jewish conception of the resurrection which always makes probable the supposition of its having been influenced from the side of some foreign circle of ideas.

At the same time, the fact of this unevenness set before the Jewish theology of the day a definite task, namely, to bring the conflicting conceptions as much as possible into harmony with one another. From this point of view, for example, we may understand Rev. 20:5, 13, where we meet the attempt to combine the resurrection of the righteous with the general resurrection, in that the eschatological drama is laid out in several acts. Also, on another side, the theological need of mediation was presented. There were in circulation alongside of more spiritual conceptions of the resurrection,¹ to which the Book of Daniel with its expectations of the heavenly glory of the risen ones already pointed the way, more material conceptions according to which all emphasis fell upon the thought of the complete restoration of this earthly corporeity.² Thus the Apocalypse of Baruch in chaps. 49-51 struggles to combine the diverging views with one another. Of course, the earth gives the dead back again unchanged as a proof for those still living at that time that it is a matter of an actual resurrection. However, thereupon the condition of the risen ones will be changed, that of the godless into pain, that of the pious into a different form reaching as far as the glory of the angels and even farther.

In one respect the Jewish belief in the resurrection never followed the Persian. It was not able to raise itself to the reconciling conclusion which the Persian expected with his supposition of an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν πάντων.³ In Judaism the partisan opposition between the righteous and godless was too deeply rooted to permit the former to concede the possibility of final salvation to the latter.

¹ For example, Enoch 51:4; 104:4, 6; Syriac Apoc. of Baruch 51:10; the risen ones are *ισάγγελοι*; cf. Luke 20:36; Enoch 108:11: a transfiguration of those born in darkness; cf. further my *Biblische Theologie* (Stade II), pp. 462, 464.

² For example, II Macc. 7:11, 23; 14:46. The scribes rack their brains over this point whether the clothing of this corporeity in the other world would begin with skin and flesh and complete itself with veins and bones (thus the school of Hillel), or vice versa (thus the school of Shammai).

³ On the other hand, the thought, as is well known, recurs in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa.

The New Testament is a faithful mirror of these different conceptions of the resurrection in Judaism. We cannot here follow this out farther, for on the threshold of Christianity our investigation comes to a halt. What it may show, however, on its part is this: namely, how the conceptions of the Christian circle of faith in the last analysis were rooted in the circle of the religious conceptions of humanity. And this fact does no injury to the religious character of the Christian belief in the resurrection; for its true greatness is measured by the greatness of the God, to indissoluble communion with whom the Christian hopes to attain through victory over bodily death.

HINDUISM AND WAR

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1. *Hinduism as a separate historical religion arose in a state of war.*

The earliest literary document among the sacred scriptures of Hinduism is the Rig Veda, a collection of 1,028 hymns which were used in worship by the Indo-Aryans at the time when they were invading India in the period about 2,000 to 1,500 B.C. The Vedic hymns reflect a state of society which was in constant warfare, even down to the very end of the period. Sometimes those early Hindus were engaged in war among themselves; but more frequently they were at war with the dark-skinned aborigines, who gradually became subjugated.

The hymns of the Rig Veda contain many references to the details of the warfare of the time. The bands of attacking Aryans marched with leaders carrying banners. The soldiers on the march sang and shouted both of the victories of their ancestors and of the aid which had been granted by Indra and Brihaspati and others of the Vedic gods. The leaders usually drove in war-chariots. The main weapons used were bows and arrows and darts. Sometimes the aggressive tribes of Aryans would slay all the population of the villages of the aborigines which they conquered. If the Aryan settlements were attacked by the aborigines, barricades were hastily made out of available trees, and the gods were called upon to give aid. Some of the expeditions of the Indo-Aryans are explicitly described in the Rig Veda as reprisals for the attacks of the indigenes. Sometimes the expeditions were only forays for the purpose of getting cattle. One of the Sanskrit words for "warrior" is *goṣu-yudh*, meaning etymologically "fighting for cattle." One of the Sanskrit words for "battle" is *gaviṣṭi*, the precise etymology of which is "desire for cattle." The early connection of

war and Hinduism may be observed in Rig Veda 1.91.23, where prayer is offered to the God Soma as follows:

Do thou, O God Soma, with thy god-like spirit,
Victorious, win for us a share of riches!
Let none prevent thee! Thou art Lord of valor!
Provide for us in the battle [*garīṣṭi*]¹

It is noteworthy that in the Rig Veda the work of cattle-raiding is expressly likened to the doings of certain of the deities, viz., the deities of the torrential rivers, which so often in India overflow the banks and carry away all movable property; appropriately then is divine assistance invoked by men in such activity (R. V. 10. 30.10-11):

The winding Streams . . . with their double current
Like cattle-raiders seek the lower pastures.
Send forth the hymn and prayer for gain of riches!
Give gracious hearing to our call, O Waters!

The aid of the heavenly Ashvin gods is similarly sought and acknowledged in the same kind of marauding border-warfare (R. V. 1.112.22):

Ye speed the hero as he fights for kine
In hero-battle in the strife for land . . .
Ye safely guard his horses and his car.
Come hither unto us, O Ashvins, with those aids!

The famous Weapon Hymn (R. V. 6.75) apostrophizes the various weapons of the warrior with praise and prayer as if they were personal assisting deities:

1. The warrior's look when, armed with Mail,
He seeks the battle is like a thund'rous rain-cloud.
Be thou victorious with unwounded body.
Let the thickness of thy Mail protect thee,
2. With Bow let us win kine, with Bow the battle.
With Bow be victors in our hot encounters.
The Bow brings grief and sorrow to the foemen.
Armed with the Bow, may we subdue all regions.

¹ The only complete English translation of the Rig Veda is by R. T. H. Griffith, *The Hymns of the Rig Veda*, translated with a popular commentary, 2 vols., Benares, 2d ed., 1896.

16. Loosed from the Bow's string, fly away,
Thou Arrow, sharpened by our prayer.
Go to the foemen. Strike them home.
And let not one of them be left alive.
17. There, where the flight of arrows fall,
E'en there may Brahmanaspati and Aditi¹
Protect us well.
19. Whoso would kill us,
Whether he be a strange foe or one of us,
May all the gods discomfit him.
My nearest closest Mail is prayer.

The contents of the Rig Veda clearly show that the religion of the Hindus took its historical rise in a state of intertribal and inter-racial war at the time when the earliest of the so-called Indo-Aryans invaded the Punjab (i.e., the Land of the Five Rivers) from the northwest, and gradually subjugated the Ganges basin, and still further extended their dominion southward through the land of Hindustan. In that period the Hindus lived by war and worshiped gods of war, and Hinduism unquestioningly sanctioned and assisted war.

2. *It was on the basis of successful war that the essential religious-social organization of Hinduism was effected.*

The professed and unquestionable basis of Hindu society is caste. However, when the ancestors of the modern Hindus first entered India, they did not possess the present caste system. Before the Indo-Aryans separated from their cousins, the Iranians, both those racial branches possessed the threefold form of social organization which in general recognizes "priests," "warriors," and "commons." But the distinctions then were probably not exclusive, unchangeable, hereditary. There is definite evidence that the position of king among those early Indo-Aryans was not always hereditary. Furthermore, it was sometimes the king, and not a priest, who offered the customary sacrifices to the gods before a battle, although sometimes the king would direct a priestly singer to offer the sacrifice. Both the common "cow-boys" and the select "kings-men" would participate in the fighting.

¹ Two of the Vedic pantheon.

Only after the migrating Aryan invaders of India had successfully conquered the new land and had settled down into a permanently agricultural mode of life, and, too, only after they had enslaved the racially different indigenes, did Hindu society become organized into the form of the present caste system. The traditional theory in Hinduism is that caste is an eternal divine institution. But the Rig Veda shows only the beginning of this particular fourfold system. A warring condition of affairs continued for centuries. Perhaps it was for a thousand years that the Aryans fought both Aryans and aborigines before they settled down into a state of society which was determined by varied social and economic, as well as military, influences. However, it is evident that the fourth caste was composed of the autochthonous people, who had been conquered in war, and who thenceforth became incorporated into the new empire of the Hindus on the lowest level. In sharp contrast with them were the three upper castes, who were distinctly Aryans, and who, though socially differentiated among themselves, stood on a common higher plane religiously.

After the conquest the organizing Brāhmins and the fighting Kshatriyas regarded themselves more than ever as superior to the mass of the common people; yet both those upper classes recognized the third estate as being of the same racial origin and also as being needed for a base of supplies. Although those priests and warriors prided themselves on their ability as being the spiritual and military protectors of the body politic, nevertheless they felt both the need of, and an affinity for, the great numbers of husbandmen and artisans, fellow-Aryans who composed the Vaiśyas or third caste. But all the lighter-colored people of the conquering race felt only a common contempt for the dark-skinned conquered people of the land. These hostile aborigines were designated in the Sanskrit of the Rig Veda as *dasyu*, i.e., "enemy." Some epithets which are applied to them are: "prayerless" (*a-brahman*), "godless" (*a-deva*), "inferior" (*adhara*), "inhuman" (*a-mānuṣa*), "unthinking" (*a-mantu*), "flat-nosed" (*an-ās*), "opposed to religious rites" (*apa-vrata*), "stingy" (*a-prṇat*), "unbelieving" (*a-śrāddha*), "not observing religious rites" (*a-vrata*), "not offering sacrifices" (*a-yajña*), "impious" (*a-yajyu*), "easy to be slain"

(*su-hana*), "wicked" (*vrjina*), "deceitful" (*māyāvan*), "unkind" (*a-śiva*), "the black skin" (*kṛṣṇā tvac*).

Twice (R. V. 7. 21. 5 and 10. 99. 3) these contemptible defeated aborigines are called *siṣṇa-deva* (meaning "whose god is the phallus"). But those early Indo-Aryans, whose own objects of worship had been the superior nature-deities, like the heaven, the sun, the moon, wind, rain, fire, dawn, etc., became one of many instances in the history of international intercourse where a people which had first conquered in a contest of military strength have later succumbed to the force of the ideas, the ideals, the practices of the vanquished. Beyond the peradventure of a doubt those early Vedic Hindus were not idolaters. But under the influence of their despised opponents, viz., the Dravidian aborigines of India, a large proportion of the Hindus gradually became, and still are, idolatrous in their religion. The intelligent educated section of the Hindu community today would repudiate the idolatry which entered into victorious Hinduism from the conquered low castes, and which still prevails, not only among the low-caste people, but also among the women and the ignorant portion of the higher Aryan castes. However, relatively few Hindus today repudiate the system of caste itself.

Both in the long history of Hinduism and at the present time the system of caste has been the main stronghold of Hinduism. With few exceptions, viz., among the progressive modern social reformers, the breaking of caste is the crucial practical test of ceasing to be a Hindu. This characteristic system of caste arose after a successful period of warfare in India had added a despised helotic element to the pre-existent threefold social organization which the Indo-Aryans had shared with the Iranians. In Persia no such religiously obligated caste system arose as in India. Just what was the difference in the two closely connected countries, we do not know. But we do know that in India the complex military, economic, and social enslaving of one people by another more powerful body of invaders was sanctioned religiously; and therefore the entire organization of society became fairly rigidly fixed on what was professed to be a divinely ordained basis.

Neither warfare nor the intricate processes of the differentiation of the existing social groups ceased after the reorganization of the

huge population of India under the skilful invaders. Many details of the present-day caste system were developed much later. For example, the originally four main castes have been increasing in number until in India today (as recorded in the last government census of 1911) there exist one hundred and eighty "main castes"; among this number there are at least sixty-four castes each containing over a million souls. Even the highest and most exclusive caste of Brāhmans have become subdivided into more than seventy exogamous groups, which can no more intermarry or even interdine with one another than they can intermarry or interdine with other non-Brāhman castes. However, it is evident that the main outlines of the present religious-social system of hereditary and mutually exclusive castes arose as the practical outcome of the intricate process of organizing a large population of diverse racial stocks under a common religious and military domination. Whatever subordinate changes have ensued during the growth of the population to the present number of 217,000,000 Hindus, the prevailing system of caste in Hinduism bears upon its very face the early historical fact that caste is a religiously sanctioned form of social organization in which the warring element was next in importance to the acknowledged leading religious element. The astute priestly caste of Brāhmans is first and highest. The powerful warrior caste of Kshatriyas is second. Both these castes stand higher in the hierarchy above the husbandmen and artisans (Vaiśyas), who form the third main caste. These three main divisions recognize themselves as jointly forming the body of the "twice born" (*dvi-ja*) who are far superior to all the rest of the population. This last fourth class of practical outcastes were historically, and still are virtually, slaves. They are not the chattel-property of individual owners, nor are they attached to any particular landed estate, as in feudalism; but they are practically in a state of serfdom, being debarred from all social and religious privileges and from many economic privileges ever since the time of the early successful war of the invading Indo-Aryans into India.

3. *Among the numerous sacred books of Hinduism those which have been the most available to, and the most influential upon, the*

masses of Hindus have been the two Epics, which, in spite of some beautiful human touches, are in the main a glorification of war.

Although a permanent genetic influence has been exerted on subsequent Hinduism by the complex military, social, and religious situation which is reflected in the Rig Veda, the literary influence of the Rig Veda and of the next chronological groups of sacred scriptures down to the Upanishads has been considerably limited by the fact that all those documents remained the exclusive property of the Brāhman priests. Indeed, when the sacerdotal and other castes became thoroughly differentiated and established posterior to the Vedic period, the priests quickly and carefully guarded their sacred texts as peculiarly esoteric. Three of the Upanishads in their concluding section each contain an explicit prohibition against divulging the Secret Doctrine (such is the meaning of the Sanskrit word *upaniṣad*) to the uninitiated:

Let no one tell this to anyone except to a son or to a pupil [Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad 6. 3. 12].

Let no one preach this most secret doctrine to anyone who is not his son or else his pupil [Maitri Upanishad 6. 29].

This highest mystery, delivered in a former age, should not be given to one who is not a son or who is not a pupil [Shvetāśhvātara Upanishad 6. 22].^{*}

Accordingly, the contents of the earliest group of documents in Hinduism, viz., the Vedas, and also of the next important subsequent group, viz., the Upanishads, have not been directly divulged to the laity in Hinduism. That is: the original documents, containing the war-origins and the first speculations of Hinduism, have not been known directly to the great body of Hindus. So, in any historical exposition of the relation of Hinduism with war the significant fact next comes into view that, of all the sacred scriptures of Hinduism those which are best known to the Hindus at large are a group of documents which are even more warlike in their contents than are the lyric Vedas and the speculative Upanishads. Only within the last century have these last-mentioned

^{*} These translations are from Max Müller's two-volume translation of the twelve most important Upanishads in the "Sacred Books of the East Series," Vol. I (1879) and Vol. II (1884). There does not yet exist a thoroughly reliable English translation of all the classical Upanishads. A splendid piece of scholarship is the translation into German by Professor Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, (1897, 2d ed. 1905).

earliest two groups of Hindu scriptures been translated from Sanskrit into any other language whatsoever.¹ Indeed, so far as I know, both the Vedas and the Upanishads were translated into European languages by Western scholars before they were made available for the Hindus themselves in any of the modern vernaculars of India.

The sacred books of Hinduism which have long been known and best enjoyed by the Hindus are the two Epics, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. These Sanskrit poems have been translated into many Indian vernaculars. There is nothing in their contents which is esoteric. They delight the common people with their color and movement, their myths and their fighting. Both of these popular sacred books of Hinduism are martial epics. They narrate at great length the wars of gods and men. The theme of the Mahābhārata is the great internecine war between the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas, two branches of the descendants of King Bharata, who is revered as the ancestor of all the Hindus. The theme of the other great epic in India, the Rāmāyaṇa, is the career of the god Rāma. (Probably he was a historical man who through his valorous exploits proved himself to be so much of a deliverer and savior of his people that the Hindus have generally regarded him as an incarnation of deity.) This Rāmāyaṇa narrates the love of Rāma for the woman Sītā, the wily capture of Sītā by Rāvana, the king of Ceylon, and the consequent war which was carried on by the injured husband and which ended in the destruction of Rāvana. But after Sītā was re-established as queen of Ayodha, Rāma became jealous and banished her. The whole story, while it contains some beautiful touches of human affection, is based on rapine and conflict.

Thus the mental and religious pabulum upon which Hindus have been nourished by their best available religious literature continues in the same war spirit in which Hinduism took its historical origin. The *Indian Social Reformer*, of Bombay, which is perhaps the most influential progressive weekly newspaper conducted by an Indian, contained in its issue of August 31, 1914, a

¹ Except the translation of a few Upanishads into Persian, which translation was again rendered into Latin by Antequil Duperron, this latter being the very first means whereby the Upanishads were brought to the knowledge of the West.

striking paragraph on the subject "Rules of Warfare in Ancient India." In contrast with the fearful outburst of war which appeared in that fateful month of August, 1914, among six of the leading nations of Europe, progressive Indians were recalled to the methods by which war used to be conducted in the good old days of India (when, it might have been noted, India was almost incessantly engaged in war). The historical reference, somewhat idealistically interpreted, is as follows:

The Bhishma Parva of the Mahābhārata opens with the question by King Janmejaya to Vaishampayana who is describing to him the story of the Great War. The question is, "How did the heroes, the Kurus, the Pāṇḍavas, the Somakas, and other valiant kings who had come to Kurukshetra from various countries, fight the battle?" Janmejaya tells him that all of them came to the great field of battle, encamped themselves, and, before the battle commenced, made certain rules for the conduct of warfare. Janmajaya says: "They said to one another that the war was inevitable, and they had to fight it out, but they ought not to forget that they were Aryas, and ought not to allow their conduct throughout to be other than fair and manly, so that after the war was over, nothing would rankle in their hearts, and no shock would be given to their feeling of respect and admiration for one another. Let the fight be between equals. Let it be a rule, they said, not to strike those who have withdrawn from the fight. Let a warrior standing in a chariot fight only with another similarly standing; let one riding an elephant, similarly seated; let a horseman fight with a horseman, and a foot soldier with a foot soldier." These rules made them, the Kurus, the Pāṇḍavas, and the Somakas; and they and their soldiers became filled with joy and pleased with one another.

Not the propriety of war as such, but only the propriety of certain methods of war, is the moral issue raised by this modern progressive Hindu journal. The Great Epic of India can indeed be cited for moral exhortations to clemency; but far more numerous are the exhortations to win success at any price, even to the extent of committing crimes for the sake of winning. Perhaps the most exact generalization may be formulated thus: Expediency forms the ideal of Hindu morals. Says the Mahābhārata: "When the time comes, make peace with a foe; when the time comes, make war against a friend" (Sabha Parva 55).

The continuance of war is the normal state of society, and the appropriateness of war is unquestioned, in those highly esteemed

scriptures of popular Hinduism, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana.

4. *The question of the propriety of war has never been raised in the whole history of Hinduism, so far as I know, with one possible exception.*¹

That one approach to an exception occurs in the same Epic of the Great Bhārata War in the twenty-fifth chapter of the sixth canto. This episode of about 700 stanzas forms perhaps the most famous single literary production in all India. The Bhagavad Gītā² is a philosophical disquisition curiously set in its context of war. At the moment when a great battle is about to be fought between the two families of the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas, who had been carrying on the feud which fills the whole Mahābhārata, one of the warriors, Arjuna, becomes suddenly touched with compunction over the impending slaughter of kindred and friends. Arjuna's charioteer, Krishna, undertakes to counsel and console him. In the midst of war and bloodshed occurs a question, not concerning the propriety of war as such or war against aliens, but only concerning the propriety of war against fellows. It is presented in the form of a dialogue, somewhat after the manner of the Hebrew Book of Job or one of the dialogues of Plato. The interlocutors are Arjuna, the bravest and yet the most tender-hearted

¹ A remarkable instance of this attitude is to be seen in an article, entitled "War Philosophy, Hindu and Christian," in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1915, by a prominent contemporary Hindu writer, who closes his comparisons and general discussion on the subject of war with the following conclusion (p. 764): "Human action appears practically in sympathy with Moltke's dictum: 'Perpetual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is an element in the order of the world ordained by God. Without war the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism.' Force guided by expediency still seems to rule mankind, and when the Law of Nature asserts itself, the Law of Nations becomes a dead letter."

² There exist more translations of this "chief scripture of India" (as some of its admirers characterize it), both into English and into the various European languages, as well as into the numerous vernaculars of India, than there are of any other Sanskrit writing. Perhaps the best translation into English, one which represents the quaint archaic style of the original, is by Lionell D. Barnett (keeper of books and manuscripts in the Oriental Department of the British Museum) in the *Temple Classics* (1905). The following extracts are taken partly from the aforementioned and partly from *The Bhagavad Gita, or The Sacred Lay*, translated with notes by John Davies (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. [1893]).

of the five sons of Pāṇḍu, and Krishna, a divine incarnation, who here appears as a charioteer. After an opening description of the situation at the impending battle, Arjuna is represented in the first chapter of the Bhagavad Gīta as saying:

28. "As I look upon these kinsfolk meeting for battle, my limbs fail and my face withers.

29. "My body trembles, and my hair stands on end. The bow falls from my hand, and my skin is burning. I am not able to stand upright, and my mind is whirling around.

30. "I foresee no good from slaying my kinsfolk in the fight.

31. "I desire not victory nor dominion nor delights. . . .

34. "I do not wish to kill—though I myself be slain—even for the sake of dominion over the three worlds, how much less for that of earth!

35. "If we slay these, what joy can then be ours? It is not meet for us to slay these our kinsmen.

36. "Even if they whose minds are stricken by grief see no evil in the destruction of a tribe or in the oppression of friends, . . .

38. "Should we not resolve to turn away from their sinful deed? . . .

44. "Alas, we have resolved to commit a great sin—we who are striving to slay our kindred, from the lust of dominion and of pleasures.

45. "It were better for me if the Dhārtarāshtrians, with arms in hand, should slay me, unresisting and unarmed, in the fight."

46. Thus having spoken, Arjuna sat down on the seat of his chariot in the field of war; and he let fall his bow and arrows, for his heart was heavy with sorrows.

Thus ends chap. i, entitled "The Despondency of Arjuna." Here is a noteworthy expression of the high moral sentiment of willingness even to be killed rather than to do a certain wrong. Chap. ii continues:

2. The Lord spake: "Wherefore, O Arjuna, hath come upon thee in a difficulty this vile depression, unmeet for one of noble race?

3. "Yield not to unmanliness. It becomes thee not. Cast off this faint-heartedness, and arise, O destroyer of foes."

Still Arjuna objected to fighting, urging:

6. "We know not which is the better lot for us—that we should conquer them, or that they should conquer us. If we should slay these, we should not wish to live.

7. "I am stricken with pity and with guilt, confused in mind. Pray tell me, which is the better course?"

Now begins the philosophical part of the poem on the meaning of life and the Hindu ideal of duty. Remarkable indeed is the way in which the ethical problem of the propriety of killing people is answered by a discourse on the immortality of the soul:

11. Then the Lord spake: "Thou grieveest for those who need no grief, though thou speakest words of wisdom. The wise grieve not for the dead or the living. . . .

18. "These bodies are called the mortal bodies of the eternal, the imperishable soul. Wherefore fight, O son of Bharata.

19. "He who thinks this (soul) to be a slayer, and he who thinks that it can be slain—both are undiscerning. This (soul) slays not, nor is slain.

20. "It is never born, and it never dies. Unborn, undying, eternal, this (soul) is not slain when the body is slain. . . .

22. "As a man, having cast off his old garments, takes others that are new, so the embodied (soul), having cast off the old bodies, enters into others that are new.

23. "Weapons cleave it not, nor does the fire burn it. The waters wet it not, nor do the winds dry it up.

24. "The soul is undying, eternal.

25. "Wherefore, knowing it to be such, thou oughtest not to grieve for it. . . .

31. "Regarding too thy proper duty, thou oughtest not to falter; for to a Kshatriya [i.e., a warrior] nothing is better than a lawful fight. . . .

38. "Accounting pain and pleasure, gain and loss, victory and defeat as equal, gird thyself for battle. Thus wilt thou not bring sin upon thee.

39. "When by means of this teaching, thou hast become devout, thou wilt cast off the bonds of work [or action, *karma*]."

This then is the answer which is given by Krishna, the most popular incarnation in Hinduism, to the conscience-stricken Arjuna when the latter stopped to consider the bloody deed in which he was about to engage: Do your traditional caste duty, irrespective of killing anybody. According to the pantheistic theory, which is the prevailing type of philosophy in Hinduism, empirical distinctions like killing and dying are not applicable to the eternal soul. Therefore pity need not be wasted on the soul of an opponent lest he be injured in a fight. On the other hand, from a practical point of view, it would be most sinful for any Hindu to fail to discharge all his caste duty. In the case of the inquirer, who was a member of the Kshatriya or warrior caste, his appropriate duty is evidently to engage in death-dealing warfare.

Thus the only time that the question of the propriety of war is even approached in the literary history of Hinduism the most sacred handbook of devotion in that religion, the unrivaled gem of Hindu philosophy, ethics, and religion, viz., the Bhagavad Gita, justifies war with a speculative as well as with a practical justification.

5. *The most authoritative code of law in Hinduism enjoins warfare conducted with every available form of injury, as being not only the expedient self-interest, but also as the proper religious duty, of a Hindu ruler.*

A progressive modern Hindu social reformer is troubled by some of the atrocities of war (though not by the fact of war), and an episode from the Mahābhārata can be cited reporting some precisely retaliatory methods which were adopted in one of the wars in past Hinduism. But for the formulated enactments of Hinduism with regard to war there exists a more authoritative code than an epic poem, viz., the Law Book of Manu. The seventh chapter of the elaborate "Mānava-dharma-śāstra" sets forth, among the duties of a Hindu king, the following:¹

87. A king who is defied by foes must not shrink from battle, remembering the duty of Kshatriyas [i.e., the second, or warrior caste]. . . .

89. Those kings who, seeking to slay each other in battle, fight with the utmost exertion, and who do not turn back, go to heaven. . . .

102. Let him [i.e., a king] be ever ready to strike, his prowess constantly displayed, his secrets constantly concealed. Let him constantly explore the weaknesses of his foe.

103. Of him who is always ready to strike, the whole world stands in awe. Let him therefore make all creatures subject to himself, even by the employment of force. . . .

110. As a weeder plucks up the weeds and preserves the corn, even so let a king protect his kingdom and destroy his opponents. . . .

171. When he knows his own army to be cheerful in disposition and strong and that of his enemy the reverse, then let him march against his foe.

180. Let him arrange everything in such a manner that no ally, no neutral, nor foe may injure him: that is the sum of political wisdom. . . .

¹ Quoted from pp. 230 ff. of *The Laws of Manu*, translated by G. Bühler, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1886 (= Vol. XXV of the "Sacred Books of the East Series"). The same text has been translated by Jolly in Trübner's "Oriental Series."

The *Mānava-dharma-śāstra* in its present form probably dates from about 200 A.D.

195. When he has shut up his foe in a town, let him sit encamped, harass his kingdom, and continually spoil his grass, food, fuel, and water.

196. Let him likewise destroy the tanks, ramparts, and ditches. Let him assail the foe unawares, and alarm him at night.

197. Let him instigate to rebellion those who are open to such instigation.

200. Let him, duly exerting himself, fight in such a manner that he may completely conquer his enemies.

201. When he has gained victory, let him duly worship the gods and honor righteous Brāhmans.

Such are some of the historical connections of Hinduism and war as set forth in the sacred books of Hinduism.

In addition to this historical résumé of the connection of Hinduism with war as indicated in the sacred books of Hinduism itself, there is one more important associated fact which may be cited on the subject.

6. *Except for Buddhism there has been no formal denunciation of war among the religions of India.*

The most successful of several indigenous protests against Hinduism has been Buddhism. One of its cardinal virtues is non-injury (*a-himsa*). The first Buddhist ruler in India, Asoka (reigned about 264-228 B.C.), came to believe that war in itself is unholy. Late in life he wept for the thousands whom he had slain. For some centuries after the repentant Asoka there followed a relaxation in India of the characteristic Hindu belief in the divinely ordained right to kill. But subsequently Hinduism succeeded in evicting Buddhism from what is now British India.¹ With this one exception Hinduism has met no indigenous rival religion in India which has ventured to denounce war.

Thus Hinduism and every other ethnic religion in India, except Buddhism, has maintained a religious sanction for war.

¹ The Census of the Indian Empire shows ten million Buddhists, but they are mostly in Burma, which is only administratively a part of the Indian Empire. "The only survivors of purely Indian Buddhism are the small community in the Orissa States known as Sarāk, of whom nearly two thousand claimed to belong to that religion."—*General Report of the Census, 1911* [1914], p. 125.

INCARNATION: AN ESSAY IN THREE PARTS

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I. A MODERN SUPERSTITION

What is superstition? What is it in general? An answer to this question, however brief, seems to be an appropriate, if not even a necessary, introduction to this first part of the present essay.

Some superstition, I venture to say, always attaches to human life, although in many instances it may not be obtrusive. Not only are men somehow given to it by nature, but also life gets from it a quality which life can ill afford to lose. It is a fault, of course, but some faults are at least half-lovable. In form, not in substance, not in respect to its real place in life, superstition is very like religion. Indeed, according to some, even in substance the two show very little if any difference. Certainly both show men accepting as real something for which there is no positive evidence or at least no sufficient positive evidence. So, for example, have both ghosts and gods, strange visions and great ideals, been real in the life and experience of men. As to any difference between the two I suggest that, whatever else may have to be said of it, superstition makes life picturesque, at times almost beautiful, while religion—by which I mean something bigger and more vital than either theology or ecclesiasticism—makes life sublime. Superstition, again, prompts only an active life; religion, a productive life. Men move, sometimes very busily, under the former; under the latter they achieve and progress, entering into a new life instead of just moving about in the old life. This suggests, I think correctly, that religion belongs at the very battle-front of life, where adventure and discovery and creative achievement are the issue; that superstition, if related to religion, names rather what at any time in a people's religion is outgrown than what is immediately interesting and vital; in a word, that superstition is traditional and

even formal, perhaps with a touch of conservatism, or the obstinacy of habit, while true religion, being boldly superior to all positive evidence, actual or possible at the time, is not traditional, but creatively present, living, even—thanks to its great faith—future. Is not the present reality even of the unseen future the real motive of religion? Of course religion seems to depend on objects of superstition for its emotional expression and cultivation, just as new life generally must find its mediation, the medium of its expression, in old forms, but I would here insist that religion itself, vital religion, is, in its own distinctive character, one of the pioneer forces of life. If life is ever vitally religious, it is already alive with the future.

Whether such be the difference between superstition and religion or not, one fact about superstition lends support to it. Thus there always clings about the word "superstition," perhaps as a part of the at least half-lovable picturesqueness, a certain suggestion of offense. A "superstitious" man is lazy, inert, idly proud. He takes for real not merely, with his fathers before him, something for which there is insufficient evidence or even no evidence at all, but also something against which evidence, available to him, out of reach of his fathers, has been discovered. To ignore existing and available evidence against something is surely very different from that splendid adventure of men, the adventure of true religion, wherein for larger life, for new life, men hopefully press forward beyond what, with their best powers of vision, they are able to see. The adventure of religion is honest, squarely facing and boldly trusting a real mystery, but superstition—I would say this only very gently—is dishonest. Superstition, then, may have the form, but it does not have the substance of religion. It may even supply religion with the medium of expression, but in itself it is not religion.

In the sense, then, of superstition, as I have now represented it—let me hope not unfairly—in the sense of superstition as not the courage of the invisible but the obstinate blindness to the visible, I wish here to call attention to a certain modern superstition. I wish to call attention to the modern superstition of a morally external, distant, natural world, and, doing this, I would make a plea, in what I believe to be the interests of greater spirituality in

life, for a closer intimacy of man with the world immediately around him, of spiritual life with natural life. Indeed the three short parts of this essay: "A Modern Superstition," "What Ideals Are Made Of," and "Some Practical Values of Mystery," are all designed to give emphasis to this plea. Also as a single title for all three I have chosen a word on whose historical associations and wealth of meaning I do not need to dwell: "Incarnation." Has not the life of the spirit been long in need of more, ever more, of the substance of nature?

The superstition of an external natural world? I mean the superstition of men holding themselves aloof from nature, of regarding nature as at best an unavoidable evil, an unpleasant or dangerously pleasant compulsion, an unsympathetic necessity imposed upon their moral and spiritual life from without. But, objects someone at once, in these days there is no such superstition. Evolution has quite dispelled it. A pharisaical "holier-than-thou" aloofness, the degenerate survivor of the mediaeval cloister, there may still be some among us. But no longer do men seriously think that man and nature are in any respect exclusive of each other. I am not, however, speaking of what men just think. Theoretically, thanks to science and evolution, man and nature are become one, man in loyalty to his origin belonging, body and soul, quite within the life and unity of nature. Apart from theory, too, thanks now to poets and essayists, many of them in their own visionary way even outstripping the discoveries of science, there is a great deal of nice sentiment about nature and her humanity, her messages to the human heart, her spiritual values. Still, in spite of theory and in spite of art and sentiment, practically nature is kept at too great a distance. In fear and misunderstanding, now a needless misunderstanding, we still hold ourselves aloof. Her life or force is not our will. Her character—material, physical, only "natural"—is not our character—immaterial, spiritual, in some sense even supernatural. Her law, while indeed we know we may not escape it, while it is even self-executing, is not our conscience. And all this, because in our modern superstition we defy existing evidence and for our practical living still treat her as something foreign; as something, if in any

way in our lives, to be outgrown; something primitive perhaps, as when we speak of the primitive passions, but primitive, or primary, only in time, not in value.

In our aloofness are we possibly making too much of visible distances? Truly nature's various objects, her rocks and her trees, her seas and her islands or continents, are at distances, often at very great distances, from us, that is, from our bodies, and at least in the past there has been great enchantment in distance. Far things were strange things, adventurously sought, fearsomely shunned. In them dwelt the magical and occult, working good, working evil. But nowadays how insufficient is distance as evidence of an external and mysterious nature! Have we not learned to measure and appraise even the distance of the stars? Distance measured and appraised may still keep the far things external to our bodies, but even makes them internal to our lives. Doubtless in the Middle Ages before the centuries of measurement and appraisal there was ample cause, even good strategy, in the cautious aloofness from nature. The cloister did mankind a very large service. Nature was then a mystery waiting to be explored and conquered. But now we are not living, or at least need not live, in the Middle Ages. Why, then, should we betray our own later time and its heritage, its splendid heritage? Why should we betray what even the mediaeval religion, thanks to its great faith and to its courage in overcoming an external mysterious nature, did for us? Why, following its example, showing not a lazy cowardice in a blindness we can help, but confidence and boldness in a blindness we cannot help, do we not ourselves press on to the battle-front of our own day? Why still fight the already won battle?

A little church history and a very little theology may not be amiss at this point. The Western or Roman church of the Middle Ages, as too few appreciate, did indeed, for reasons not less strategical than theological, hold to the aloofness of the spiritual from the physical, of the ideally human from the natural, but who can read history fairly and fail to see that from the beginning it was actively and courageously concerned with conquest of the physical, with assimilation of the natural to the spiritual? What else but this

can be the meaning of its early interest in temporal power and of its separation from the more intellectualistic and abstractly spiritual Eastern church? How else can we give full significance to the insistence—as result of the controversies of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries—on the Son, symbol of the spiritual in the natural, being possessed of the Holy Ghost equally¹ with the Father? What stronger reason can Charlemagne, at once favorite son of the Roman church and ambitious champion of the Holy Roman Empire, have had for preferring the Western to the Eastern church? How can we account for the candor of the image-worship? for the Mariolatry? the adoration of saints? the patronage of fine arts, architecture, sculpture, painting, music? the schools and the ever more and more independent thinking? How explain what with shallowest appreciation, or rather with intent of abuse than of appreciation, men have so often called the idolatry and materialism? True, the material and sensuous too often got the better of the church and its followers, high and low, and protest had to be made; but, when all is said, the very idolatry and materialism were in a positive sense what made Protestantism possible. Was Protestantism more than a splendid fruitage or—lest this suggest finality—a fruitful continuation of that Roman Catholic “materialism” by which—this being the true motive of Protestantism—the natural was held to be “of one substance” with the spiritual?

Protestantism surely has done much, not merely as a matter of faith and dogma, but as a matter of actual life, to realize the equality of the human and natural with the spiritual. Protestantism, I say, has done much, translating the symbolism of the mediaeval creed, as prophetic as it was dogmatic, into the practical relations of human life; but in my present plea for a greater intimacy of the spiritual with the natural I am simply suggesting that the Protestant motive, really only continuing Catholicism, has not yet gone far enough, that the time has come for a new and forward Protestantism, perhaps a neo-Protestantism, under which man will find himself even more fully and freely, more

¹ The particular creed reads: “And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life, Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son.” And again: “And in the Lord Jesus Christ . . . being of one substance with the Father.”

spiritually, in nature. There can, I think, be little doubt that Protestantism's rather obstinate misunderstanding of the Romanist's materialism, a misunderstanding of course for which Rome herself has been to blame in no small measure, has acted as a check upon advance. So to speak, the Christian church has seemed determined not again to be burned by the material and sensuous. Now, however, with their clearer vision Protestants must at once show more candor and more appreciation toward Romanism and, fulfilling the prophecy of Catholic dogma, move forward by effecting a still greater intimacy with nature. Let me say, however repetitiously, that Christendom's conquest of nature, the first battles being successfully fought by Rome and the strife being then taken up by Wittenberg, has at last been such as to make possible both, first, cordial recognition of Rome's great work in expressing and partially realizing the incarnation and, secondly, another advance in the process of its realization, Christendom being now ready to outdo even Luther in equation of the spiritual with the natural. Truly the second head of the Trinity has been a splendid symbol, and as a dogma it has been a great force. Splendid it still is. It stood and it still stands boldly for an idea, seen afar, a religious faith; not for anything less. But today the prophecy of it is being fulfilled, or may be fulfilled, as never before. Today we have more than the symbol or than the Christian's faith in it; we have also, at least as possible, the actual life. And the fulfilment, the realization in actual life, can come only with the passing of the superstitious aloofness still surviving in man's attitude toward nature.

Forgetting Romanism and Protestantism and "consubstantiality,"¹ whether in religious symbol or in actual living, and returning to the evidence, what in the light of the now available evidence is the natural world from which man must no longer hold himself aloof? Would that I knew how best to answer this question. I do know beforehand that I shall not succeed very well in my attempt at an answer to it. For the task a poet were better fitted than a philosopher. Already I have referred to the natural world

¹ Referring, of course, to the Son, or the human and natural being, "of one substance" with the Father, the spiritual.

with its rocks and trees, suns and stars, as at the present time a world of measured and appraised distances and, adding that the distances, the spatial properties and relations, of molecules and atoms have also been measured and appraised, I would say, what I said before, that such a measured world, however external to our bodies, cannot be external to our living. Still, pertinent and suggestive as so much is, much more needs to be said, and I shall speak of three now manifest attributes of the natural world which seem to me to be of special significance: (1) its essential justice; (2) its deep, warm intimacy with human life; and (3) its great mediation.

As to the first of these attributes, the justice, there is the fact, not less humanly historical than biologically evolutionary, that in character or quality environment, only another name for the "external natural world," has not been a fixed thing, arbitrary and independent, but has changed relatively and pertinently with the progress of living creatures. The two developments, that of environment and that of the creatures, have not been two independent developments at all, but, quite to the contrary, have been two mutually supporting phases of one process. In human history the recognized character of the natural world has been whatever it has been at any time, only coincidently with a certain human attainment at that time. We have, for example, or till recently have had, to reckon with, a physical, mechanical, external natural world. In the near future, if not today, thanks especially to biology and chemistry, that world certainly must be seen, not as a merely mechanical world, but—only I am at a loss for the right word—as supermechanical. In our centuries of mechanicalism man has constantly shown himself a mechanical genius, skilfully devising and using with startling results wonderful machines, so that he would be a strange creature indeed, if, while himself such a successful mechanic, he claimed that the mechanical, natural world was external to his life. The very food he eats would then have to be said to be external too! And before the centuries of mechanicalism there was a different world and a different human genius. Erratic, given to extremes, dependent on chance or miracle, temperamental, man met a world quite in kind, a world

of strange adventure and romance, alive with spirits and powers of all sorts. So we may conclude, man's history being one of continuous conflict with nature, that the external world has maintained a most admirable sportsmanship. It has not taken unfair advantage. It has confronted man, so to speak, in like size and kind. As thus in history, so also in personal life we may see an essential justice. The child's world is, and so properly is, very different from the man's. Can we, then, with good grace think of nature as external to us? The creatures of one life, twin-born and, if I may so put it, twin-growing, man and his natural world may never be put asunder.

The intimacy of nature as expressed in the "external" world may be a subtle intimacy, a reserved, to ordinary hearing inarticulate, familiarity; but, subtle and quiet though it be, it is very real; a very real intimacy or familiarity with all things human. The natural world is man's whole past as a memory outwardly recorded in all the various forms of nature and in their arrangement and sequence. To meet nature with any appreciation is to find in her a veritable Mnemosyne, although one may never have believed in this daughter of Heaven and Earth before. Can anyone be more intimate than the goddess of memory? Any book we may read, passing from word to word, from line to line, from page to page, especially if the reading be, as we may say, to ourselves, if it be not aloud and also be controlled in other ways, the rapidly following suggestions and values of all the printed symbols and their relations being taken only for their meaning in consciousness, not for expression in outward acts, is also a dwelling-place, indeed one of the favorite groves, of this goddess, and so, thanks to her presence, is intimate with us, however quietly. But, still more subtly and far more comprehensively than any printed book, nature as manifested to us in all her visible forms holds the meanings and memories of our long human past and the deep familiarity of them. Sedately the mature man walks along the street and passes the trees, the climbable trees, and the stones, the throwable stones, and, quietly unconscious of the boy in him that once climbed the one and threw the other, thus prosaically accepts the world around him, unmoved, reading it quite to himself; but surely the values which things

once had for him and the activities of which he now controls so well have much to do with the easy, comfortable familiarity that he feels as he moves along and, if the goddess does not occasionally appear to him, he is a sedate person indeed. Only, the controlled climbing and throwing tell but a very small part of the story. No street surely is made only of trees a boy once climbed or stones a boy once threw and very much as the mature man walks the street, holding himself aloof, or rather under control, so generally men follow the ways of the whole world. In truth that world can be at least no more external to man than his memories, which, however subtly, must be present in all the meanings and values, values of form and structure as well as values of color or of any sense quality, which the world holds.

Besides the justice of nature and the intimacy of nature, in order that still further I may dispel the superstition of an external natural world, I have, thirdly, to speak of the mediation, which also may be called the liberative power, of nature. So many see bondage and necessity in the natural world about them, whereas the real meaning of it is mediation and consequent liberation. To have a familiar street to walk in, a world to follow all the intimate paths of, is the very essence of freedom. Can anyone possibly exaggerate the value, for purposes of free living, of a world, the *milieu* of one's life, whose very substance, as I venture to say, is memory supplemented by self-control? But here let me be—perhaps only seem—a bit fantastic. I can imagine men feeling grateful to the earth-clods and stones, to the plants, and to the animals of the world for maintaining their lower ways of being or living that men themselves, these lower ways being now past in the sense of being under control, may have the leisure or freedom of a higher life. As to the life of men being higher, it is so just in the sense of the lower having, like all memories, ceased to be of immediate value and become only mediate. Free men, I submit, if the freedom have any substance, are still even of the earth earthy, but in their lives the ways of the clod and the plant and the beast have been put under foot and so have been made mediate. So, looking out upon the natural world, seeing its dead but materially useful clods, its stupidly growing but life-supporting plants, and its only

sensuously free but productively living as well as often, in meaning well beyond one's first understanding, domestic animals, he must indeed even gratefully exclaim: Behold the world of my life's mediation; the world of my liberation! Similarly a leisured and upper class in the narrower human society might feel toward the environing lower classes which by their various labors maintain the more commonplace activities which the leisured class has put aside. What the lower do the higher are thus saved from doing—except mediately—and the principle manifested here and also generally in the mediation and liberation of the natural environment is certainly a principle not less of moral than of economic significance. In the social environment and in the natural environment there is maintained vicariously the life from which men have come to stand aloof, which they have got under control, which has become only subordinate or mediate to their real interest. Instead, then, of speaking merely of the mediation and liberative power of nature, we might even speak of her redemptive power. The external natural world saves us by taking upon itself the life of our past, the life of our self-control. Wherefore in our external world there dwells, just because it is "external," more than the goddess of memory; there dwells also a spirit that is ever setting us free; so that, once more, although that world is at a distance, external to our bodies, it cannot be said, without superstition, to be external to our lives. Also, now with greatly enhanced meaning, to be able to view it as not external, to feel its justice, its intimacy and its liberation, is to understand the Incarnation, dogma, historical fulfilment, Catholic materialism, Protestantism and all, as never before. The Catholic dogma was indeed a great prophecy.

I must conclude this first part of my essay quite abruptly. What does such an evident intimacy, that must almost be called a personal intimacy, of nature with man lead to? It is, I think, very little to say that materialism is quite robbed of its sting. Nature is essentially spiritual. But quite properly the call is for something more immediately practical than this. What does nature's even personal intimacy mean in practical life? In the two parts of this essay which are to follow: "What Ideals Are Made Of" and "Some Practical Values of Mystery," I shall try to answer this question at

some length, but I remark one thing now. As never before, with a new candor, even with a religious conviction, men must equate conscience with the laws of nature, duty and all spiritual opportunity with natural necessity. Of course for some time feebly, sporadically, in personal and domestic affairs and in affairs of social life men have shown a disposition, leading to many acts on their part, to find their duty in what the present knowledge of nature and her laws has revealed. The great movements in preventive medicine will illustrate what I mean. The growing dependence of legislation on commissions, statistics, laboratories, will afford further illustration. But surely the equation of conscience with natural law has at best been lagging and grudging, and our new Protestantism, that would bring man close to nature, demands real as well as confident equation. Too long have we misunderstood nature and her necessity. No longer may we imagine or need we imagine that the natural, "material" world can be rendered unreal or at least innocuous by a pious aloofness or exorcised by any spoken or written words. No longer may we suppose even that in exceptional situations the laws of nature, which can stand only for the law and order of the street by which, if we be self-controlled, we walk, of the way by which we advance to better things, will not operate or ought not to operate.

II. WHAT IDEALS ARE MADE OF

In the first part of this Gallic essay I have spoken of the modern superstition of a spiritually or morally external natural world. It is, as I have said, superstitious to persist today in a mediaeval aloofness of man's spiritual life from the natural world, now that, thanks even to the conquests of nature undertaken by mediaeval institutions, the real conditions of life and consciousness afford available evidence against the spiritual and the natural being necessarily opposed. Not only is the life of the spirit greatly in need of more of the substance of nature, but also, as I have tried to show, nature may now be regarded as herself essentially or immanently spiritual and fully capable of expressing or mediating the spiritual life. Thus, her distances being now accurately measured and appraised, although external to our bodies, she can no longer

be external to our lives. Also, even more significantly, as manifested in the so-called external world, she has been seen to be possessed of the quality of justice, of a deep though quiet intimacy, the intimacy which memories, kept real and outwardly present, must always impart, and of a liberative or redemptive power. And, finally, as I have suggested, turning to the practical meaning of a world so intimate and so helpful, conscience must be candidly and confidently equated with natural law. When all is said, can natural law, as now so intelligible to men, possibly stand for anything but the orderly arrangement of the familiar street, the way, in which at last they have acquired the power, the self-control, of walking erect and of walking, if not yet altogether easily and freely, at least sedately? It has taken men centuries to acquire this power and the well-ordered way of a manifestly lawful world for its expression. Why, then, should they not enjoy the opportunity so afforded? Why timorously stand aloof? Why not enter confidently upon the great adventure of realizing the spiritual in the natural?

But all this, says someone, is to rob life of its long-cherished idealism. Henceforth may we no longer look above and beyond for our ideals? Must we now taint them, compromise them, with what is here and present? How can they be made of anything so real as the natural world and the life of the natural world we find immediately around us? To these questions I reply that certainly no robbery has been intended. In intention, instead of being robbed of its long-cherished idealism, life is to be freed from a no longer productive and vitally satisfying expression of its old and never-old idealism. Of course there are ease and complacency in setting one's ideals aloft and afar, where they may not be too immediately and insistently urgent upon one or in danger of any other kind of contact with one's world, but in point of fact, as the achievements of history bear witness, true idealism among men has never been so abstract and so lacking in heroism. An idealism for things near must indeed be more difficult than for things afar, demanding more faith, more vision, more real will, more heroism; but difficulty is hardly an objection. Indeed a conveniently far idealism, lazily and confidently even perfectionistic, is not a real

or dynamic idealism at all, but sentimentalism, conservatism, inaction clothing itself with a more or less diaphanous self-righteousness.

How unorthodox and unconventional I am! In spite of my appeal to history, how inaccurate historically! Do we not owe to the Christian vision, to which men were awakened centuries ago and which has been cherished by them down to the present day, the most commanding idealism, a far idealism, an other-world idealism, of all history? Waiving any better reason, I answer just for the sake of argument, if there is to be any argument, that we do. I insist also, however, that Christian idealism at its source and in terms of the life of the time was really, in spite of its "other world," supremely near and practical and heroic. It found the then present conditions of that Hebrew-Roman, Greek-Roman, and from so many other Mediterranean quarters hyphenated Roman life spiritually ideal. Thus, if in some sense it was far, other-world idealism, we have only to remember that the world was then a world of unmeasured distances, of far, unexplored regions; that the different peoples, their own civilizations passing, were naturally looking beyond and afar, perhaps across the seas to new shores, perhaps even behind the stars or under the earth, and that accordingly in its vision their idealism followed the imagery of a distant world. If, as thus an other-world idealism, it exalted self-denial and the unselfish brotherhood of men and an implicit faith in whatever might happen, we have only to remember that the passing nations and their civilizations were giving up what they had, losing their whole worlds; that universal empire, taking all men into its fold, was the active purpose as well as in striking degree the actual event; and that, might being ascendant, faith rather than reason or understanding was man's only resort. If, finally, the Jews were the people who proved able, although not without all the pangs of such birth, to produce the leader who in his personal life could express heroic self-denial, universal human brotherhood, and great faith, thus wonderfully idealizing the hard, very near facts of the time, we have only to remember that the very people, whose life was notably one of many captivities, was fitted by its own history and the deep experience of that history, so oft repeated, as no other

people, to "take captivity captive," if I may quote the Psalmist, or to teach to the variously hyphenated Mediterranean life the needed lesson of the hour, equating spiritual opportunity with the hardest kind of near, present, worldly necessity. Surely, then, understood by the life that gave it birth, Jewish or Mediterranean, Christianity must nowadays look to its ways and its attitudes, offensive and defensive, lest it fail any longer, as so truly and so heroically in its youth, to be vitally idealistic. As then, so now its ideal must be found in what is present and real.

But now, to recite what is become almost a refrain of this essay, the world's distances have been measured and appraised. There is left no westward trend of empire. No regions remain dark and unexplored, the homes of strange creatures and stranger happenings. Civilization no longer has the frontiers that for centuries have greatly influenced the valuations of the life at hand and inspired the human imagination of something beyond. Even the region beneath the earth or behind the stars is not the mysterious region it once was. So, if the real spirit of the old idealism is to continue to live among men, the letter must pass, or at least such terms as "beyond" and "above," as "the hereafter" and "the other world," every one of them, I doubt not, representing something that is essential to a living idealism, must be freed from their traditional imagery of distance and space generally. As to this liberation, I ought to add that what exploration, which has of course been more than geographical, being often very minute as well as very scientific in other fields, has done for the world in space, history and evolution have done for the world in time. The past, in other words, has been explored and even the future as the interval, short or long, following on the heels of the present, holds nothing but a continuation of what has been from the beginning. Wherefore for the new idealism the old time-imagery as well as the old space-imagery must give way to something new. How can either the far-off or the yet-to-come, the future, now that the regions of space and time have been so thoroughly opened to view, mean what they used to mean? But, the distances of space and time overcome or, as the newspapers sometimes boast, annihilated,

under what new imagery can idealism envisage its beyond or its hereafter?

This question is not easily answered, although the call for the new imagery is very clear. Certainly I may not here introduce any of the day's metaphysicians, asking them to tell of their new time and their new space. I might, I suppose, go so far as to suggest that today's beyond and hereafter must get their meaning in the fourth dimension, which the papers jest about and which, as the public has to assume, the mathematicians and philosophers discuss as wisely as seriously; but my present readers may not yet have accustomed themselves either to a fourth-dimensional vision and imagination or to a fourth-dimensional way of moving about, of passing from a present to some future position or condition. So I say, instead, that the new imagery must be imagery in intension in place of the old imagery in extension. Is this substituting the fire for the frying-pan? Then once more and very simply, today's idealism, if it would be vital, must emphasize quality, not quantity; it must, in other words, seek to make this world different, not to enter another; to live into a new life today and here, not tomorrow and yonder; to revalue what is, not—spurning what is—to seek something else. Putting my meaning, at last, as simply as I know how, I would say that the new idealism, instead of beginning at a distance in space and time, must begin, with a candor and a directness never realized before and doubtless never possible before, immediately at home. It must still be idealism, more idealistic than ever, but relatively to the old imagery an immediate idealism; for, the distances being now measured and appraised, this life, no other, is the ideal life and mutation of it, not translation to another—is just that to which men, who have good red blood, must apply their full strength and their whole faith. Henceforth difference, not distance, must separate the actual from the ideal.

If anyone now protest that again I have been unfair to traditional Christianity, implying, as I certainly have implied, that Christianity by its far ideal, by its other world, has exalted quantity above quality, another or second life above this life, I need only explain that most assuredly I have not meant to deny to Christianity an interest in quality, or character, but only, now that

the times are so ripe for the change, to ask that the interest be both quick and direct. That other world has indeed been different, *but also distant*, and this world as a way to the other has been valued primarily only for its quantities. Now, however, what matters how long one lives, how far one travels, how much one gets, whence in a far past one came, whither in a far future one is going? All that can now matter is what one is here, what one does now, what present value one's world has, and what difference one can find and realize in it. In short, Christianity under what has been called neo-Protestantism must, once more relatively to its traditional imagery, be direct, immediate, intensive in its idealism. Being this, moreover, it will really only continue loyal to its great past, proving itself adaptive to the changed conditions. Failing to be this, it will simply have to give way to its own original idealism under some new name.

The immediacy of the ideal, its presence in what is actual, its here-and-now character, on which I am insisting with so much iteration and which would make a near instead of a far idealism, an inward instead of an outward idealism, has had a certain recognition in a saying, often heard, rather subtle but very significant, that a man's vices are also his virtues and, contrariwise, that his virtues are also his vices. Years ago men might not, without very general shock and protest, say such a thing as that. Years ago rogues were rogues, thoroughly bad; saints were thoroughly good. But today one may neither totally damn nor totally elect anybody. Again, showing in a striking way how near materially and spatially the actual even at its worst and the ideal are, if being natural has in it all the dangers of offensive selfishness, brutality, and sensuality, also it holds, as is nowadays often represented, the supreme opportunity for whatever may make men spiritual. Risk there surely is in exhorting men to be natural, but at this time, according to a view getting more and more hold, there is nothing more ideal. In a word, which must show anew what Incarnation, the general title of this essay, is designed to mean, good and evil, however different, are no longer materially far apart; indeed, as specifically in the case of a man's vices being also his virtues, good and evil are made from one and the same materials. Could I state better the great prin-

ciple of a here-and-now idealism? of an idealism no longer treating the ideal world as another distant world? Consider, in additional evidence of the principle, how the very noblest adventure of life, even that of great martyrdom and low gambling are both ways of acting on chance. Sensuality and great moral victory and leadership both show distinct assertion of self. Weakness and strength both depend on power outside. Lawlessness is the way not less of the reformer than the transgressor. Sex is the source alike of what is best and what is worst in life. Money is by no means only the root of evil; great good also comes through it. Also, be any of these things, as so often happens, an object of hate, it is well to remember that in point of fact men can hate only what they might and even would love.

Yet subtleties like these, except for their being so true to the new spirit of the day, may only puzzle many who are following or trying to follow me. So, to present today's would-be or should-be here-and-now idealism in another way, the general history of human ideals tells really a great story. In the whole realm of possible human interest is there anything, low or high, that has not at some time been held ideal by somebody or by some group? that has not been worshiped? and even personified and deified? This historic plurality of human ideals, the polytheism—implied when not candid—of most if not all religions and the comprehensiveness by which in either case nothing in human nature, not even what is low and dangerous, has been overlooked afford emphatic indication of the nature and rôle of idealism. They show how imperialistic it is. They show, although the procedure has been very piecemeal and often has involved large not to say disastrous risks, as in the recognition and worship of gods of theft, intemperance, passion, and war, how determined human nature has been to control and spiritualize itself and its world at every point. They show how loyal to living human nature and to the natural world idealism has always been.

So, what are ideals made of? Ideals are made of real things. They are rooted, not in unreality, but in reality. The things about us, the powers within us, are all material for what is ideal. Ideals are not given to life from outside of life, but are in and of the life

itself, natural products of it, its own urgent motives to it. If they came from outside, as if strange visitors from Mars or rather from some more distant quarter not in the recognized universe at all, do but think a moment how meaningless they would be to any human being, how service of them could be only blind and aimless, dead in the language under which they might be adored and lifelessly formal and ritualistic in the deeds by which their realization might be supposed to be accomplished. Real success, too, in their realization could come only through absolute chance or a wholly miraculous intervention. Only with help from Mars could men of this earth in thought or in act follow a Martian. Only a power quite outside could ever raise man to the new life demanded and then, the raising accomplished, I cannot see how so great a lifting would be at all worth while. But, when ideals, instead of being strange visitors from outside, are natural, being born even as all things are born, of life itself, even as the Son of Man humbled himself to be born of woman, then instead of depending on blind ritual and dead language and outside intervention, their realization depends only on direct, well-controlled and enlightened action. Thus natural, nature-born ideals are ideals whose realization one can plan, as one plans any common action, and execute with the same interesting adventure and, if success come, the same satisfying success. If this seems to anyone to make the moral life too easy and too commonplace, I have only to say that any suggestion of ease that my words may have given is a most complete illusion. Naturalism is a more difficult idealism than supernaturalism of any sort has ever been.

Again, what are ideals made of? Mark the plural. A far idealism can set up one thing which men are seeking. The distance somehow lends a hospitable generality, as well as the usual enchantment, to the thing selected; but a here-and-now idealism may never be quite so single-minded. For it what is ideal must comprehend any recognized condition of life. As said before, then, ideals are made from actual things. They are not those things, however, as so much raw material; they are *made*; and the making is *in the recognition of things as conditions of what one is doing*. Life, then, gets as many ideals as it has recognized conditions; as it has things

found to be essential to it. So may pleasure, pain, dirt, food, law, conflict, mistakes, cleanliness, study, punishment, trees, chance, an automobile, a church, death, and anything else you please, provided only it be found to be a condition of some action of the finder or of his life in general, make true ideals. Any one of those things, subject to the proviso, has ideal value. Not one of them, moreover, can be the *summum bonum*. If I had to give some account of the *summum bonum*, interesting to the old-time moralists and peculiar property of a far idealism, I would simply speak of it, not as an ideal or the ideal, but as life among ideal things or as the world of things having ideal value. The *summum bonum* is thus a sort of home furnished with things and occupied by people that one has found essential to one's living, with which accordingly one feels a certain warm familiarity and which one naturally cherishes and cultivates. Sometimes, as must be admitted, the things and the people are cherished too much for their own sake, too much in the spirit of idolatry, but generally and primarily for their value as belonging to the life one is leading. So parents cherish their children. So a child cherishes its toys, even at night taking one or more of them to bed. So an artisan cherishes his tools. So—for it must come to this—in the true spirit of a near idealism, the only vital, as well as the only historic idealism, man cherishes and today as never before must cherish the external, natural world, manifestly the home of us all. Too long has it seemed only a real world. Now, thanks to the conquests of the past, thanks to the work of institutions, cultural and practical, thanks to art and literature, thanks to science from mechanics through biology to psychology, it may be seen as an ideal world, in its different parts and in its law and order warm with all the values of life.

What are ideals made of? Of anything incident to life. But the most commonplace things, from dish-washing or wood-sawing to love and personal devotion, will best show the real material of ideals; since the more commonplace a thing is, the more it is a condition of life. Who does not know that the old, old stories stir most deeply human interest in the life of ideals? For God, country, and home, men have explored and conquered the earth. For God, country, and home, as near idealists, men will continue to live

and die, still bent on what is ideal, on transfiguration of the commonplace. I do not say that commonplaceness is ideal, but this: the greatest ideals are made of the commonplace. Nothing will emphasize, moreover, the real nature of true idealism better than such an answer to the question as to what ideals are made of.

Now in much that I have been saying I am almost sure to be misunderstood. Trying to make idealism, even Christian idealism, still more vital, to deepen it, I shall probably appear to many to have done just the opposite thing. By my near or naturalistic idealism I shall, in spite of all I have said, seem to have destroyed the ideal altogether. But have I not made it clear that the effect of bringing idealism home and to earth, of supplanting the far idealism of the past with a near idealism, now that civilization has no frontier, is not to betray idealism, but to revive and perpetuate it, turning the ideal efforts of men into a new field? Changing the field of human endeavor, as I have concisely expressed the change, from distance to difference can hardly involve any loss in idealism. On the contrary, there must be gain, real advance. Not only does it make idealism timely and so vital, but also it sets life to still richer and more romantic adventures, to harder tasks, to greater strains on will and faith, than any that history has so far held for mankind. Is not real difference always harder to effect than distance? And, as it is harder, more mysterious? Another world may be only a sublimated edition of this and be mysterious only because afar off, but this world as different, which is the demand of today's near idealism, is, if I may so express myself, a much more serious matter, a harder and nobler adventure and a greater mystery. Christianity turning with full candor to naturalism will not lack occasion to use the faith that is in it.

Of mystery, however, of the quality of mystery attaching to the near idealism of today and especially of the practical values of mystery I shall speak in the next part.

III. SOME PRACTICAL VALUES OF MYSTERY

In the first part of this essay on the general subject of "Incarnation," the word made flesh, the ideal and spiritual expressed in and through the natural, I have called attention to the present-day

superstition of a morally or spiritually external natural world. Under now available evidence the natural world is no longer external to human life and in its relation to human life it is essentially just, intimate—as memory is intimate, and in a substantial way mediative and liberative of human activity. Wherefore, as a need of our time, I have suggested a more candid and confident union of the life of the spirit with the life of nature and, as one of the practical ways to such a union, the equation of conscience with the knowledge of natural laws. Then, in the second part under the caption: “What Ideals Are Made Of,” I have tried to show the meaning of this union to moral idealism, the conclusion being as follows. The world of distances of space and also of time having been at last measured and appraised, Christendom’s traditional idealism, a far, other-world idealism, must now give way to a near, this-world idealism. Even the traditional supernaturalism must give way to what, but only relatively to the passing idea of the supernatural, is naturalism. Such surrender, moreover, as has been pointed out, would really express only a continued loyalty to the original spirit of Christianity; for, if I may so express myself, we are today entering upon a deepened supernaturalism, an immanent, an inner or inward supernaturalism, that cannot but be at once more Christian and more vital than that of the past. But also, in further explanation of my meaning, I have said, that quality instead of quantity, here-and-now difference instead of distance, must be with fullest candor the new interest of men. Life no longer having any frontier, instead of going somewhere else in order to realize their ideals men have now themselves to become different and to make the world immediately around them different. Nor, let me say again, should I be understood for a moment as implying that never before have men been interested in quality; only that hitherto there has been a certain aloofness in this interest, a certain indirectness about it, and too much confusion of it with the interest in quantity; whereas now the call seems unequivocal for candor and directness.

And may I repeat or reword even more of what has been said? The whole history of Christendom certainly may be read as the history of the spiritual conquering the natural, physical world;

winning this world to itself; and so fulfilling that great vision, that great prophecy, expressed in the second head of the Trinity. At first, through the Middle Ages spiritual man held aloof from nature. Amid greatest dangers and frequent disasters he was then exploring and conquering the world and, as was suggested, there doubtless was good strategy in the aloofness. During this first period, too, and indeed so long as exploration and mere conquest were unfinished, as life continued to have a frontier, nothing was more natural than that man should think of the ideal life as a distant life, a life apart, the life of a far country or another world. What I have been calling a far or other-world idealism was his inspiration and gave its peculiar quality to all the adventures of his life. But now, the surface exploration and conquest being finished, the ever-receding frontier in time as well as in space having at last disappeared, man's idealism must change; from being a far, other-world, beyond-the-frontier idealism it must become a here-and-now, a near, a this-world idealism, urging man to difference in this life instead of to another life at a distance. True, intervening between the far idealism of exploration and conquest and this near idealism, which I have been urging, there have been the attitude and interest of an age of settlement and organization, to which I shall have occasion to refer later; for Christendom's long history, the spiritual winning its way in the natural, has been something like the very familiar enterprise of winning a home. First, man finds a place and takes possession; then follow settlement and economic organization; lastly, real life; and each period has its own attitude and interest, its own idealism. To the last, as man really begins to live, belongs a *near*, or *home*, idealism.

In its central idea, then, this essay would enjoin on Christendom today a home idealism; for Christendom seems to have reached its third period, the period of real life, creative life, at home. Until now, through the centuries of the first two periods human effort has been largely on the surface, moving about and exploring and settling the earth; so much on the surface, in fact, that some people, reading their history, are able to see only the movement and accumulation and no real progress; but progress there has been. Only, now, the surface things having been largely accomplished,

real life can begin. Human effort can at last apply itself as never before to the changes that, instead of being on the surface, really *strike in*; in short, to the changes of a near idealism, dependent not on distance but on difference.

Now, however, to come at last to the special topic of this third part, the change from a far to a near idealism, from progress by distance to progress by difference, must bring to life new adventure and, writing of the "practical values of mystery," I must consider even at some length this new adventure. Adventure and mystery are of course inseparable. To many a near idealism may seem like a fatal blow to them both. Similarly may any support of naturalism seem fatal to all religion. All things, however, are relative; especially "fatal blows." Adventures of travel and distance are indeed past, unless one may now think or dream of hazardous journeys to the moon and Mars and the sun and any of the "way-stations." The far-journeying discoverer and explorer and the intrepid pioneer, that so long have stirred the human imagination and given manner and spirit to human endeavor of all sorts, can no longer make their wonted appeal. Neither waiting on the duly coming future in the old-time way for whatever that mysterious future may bring nor boldly penetrating new regions of the earth is any longer the vital interest it was. Whatever remains of such life is only pleasant pastime, not serious living; a simulation of the old adventure, not the real thing; or, if serious, only utilitarian, not romantic. Yet, I must insist, life still holds plenty of real adventure. Mystery still confronts it. In a near idealism there is no real loss of romance. Distance may have been in the past a source of enchantment, but possible difference of life here and now lends an enchantment not easily exaggerated. Thus now life has for its romance adventures in difference; adventures of character and quality; of new life at home, not of new places.

But what may an adventure in difference, an adventure of character or quality, really be? Some, waiving all difficulties about distance but being troubled over quite another matter, will almost surely exclaim: Here is a great fall indeed! Here the old-time courage of men, whose achievements up and down the seas and over strange islands and continents have given so much to literature

and life, is degraded to what looks quite too much like weakness and sentimentality! Far better go back to the old ways even at their worst, to bloodshed and plunder, to that splendid superman, the savage, so gloriously naïve and noble as naïve in all his ways, than lose human vigor and courage in stay-at-home adventures in character and quality! Is it, then, so that I have been understood? Have I expressed myself so poorly as to deserve such misunderstanding? Perhaps my words, character and quality, as words in the language, are still weakly sentimental, however unfortunately. Perhaps the life itself, to which the words are now addressed, is still at pause, too bewildered with having its old adventures taken from it to turn with any full appreciation to the new that are now, as never before, possible to it and urgent upon it. If such be the case, then the recent seeming wholesale recall of the savage is not altogether strange and may even, as often with reactionary movements, be a hopeful sign, the very desperation of it insuring the quicker vision and feeling of the new life now so ready to be undertaken. Alas, that real vision must come with so much real agony! But, as for there being no chance for courage and manly vigor in these new adventures of character and quality, have you ever traveled "the Oregon Trail" with Parkman? Or followed Lewis and Clarke on their westward journey? Men journeyed with great adventures to the Pacific in those days. Today they speak with each other between New York and San Francisco; touch an electric button in Washington and set in motion vast machinery at the Panama Exposition; even, wherever they are, through pictures that reproduce figure, color, and motion with wonderful accuracy, see what is there and what transpires there or, for that matter, as a recognized possibility, what is and what transpires in any other part of the world. Surely the days of the Oregon Trail and of all it may symbolize here are past and their activities, adventures and all, can now properly belong only to pleasant pastimes or playful, however vigorous, sports. Surely, too, in the world of the new West and the new East and the new South and the new North, no one of which is any longer far or strange anywhere, there must be plenty of chance for adventure as well as an emphatic, urgent appeal to manly vigor. If only the

youth and the vigor of men would wake up to the call! Those words, character and quality, may be unfortunately chosen, under the circumstances, but I have found no better and, words aside, what I mean is the important thing. I am very far indeed from meaning anything namby-pamby or goody-goody or stay-at-home. In those new points of the compass, which instead of standing for the four quarters of a mysterious world are now only so many distinctly felt "local signs" in the consciousness and the activity of modern life, is there not such suggestion of new power as must make the blood course in men's veins? Is not even the home in which one may stay become a world-wide locus? When, as in this essay, speech is of a here-and-now idealism, it should be kept always in mind how big the here and the now in which men live have become, measured as they are by the whole round of the known world and the whole course of known history. At the present time for anyone with living interest and imagination to say: "I am now here" is—how feeble language is!—no small experience and no light responsibility. That new compass, in other words, must affect all the adverbs of place and time tremendously. But, again, as to courage and vigor, are men courageous and vigorous, does the blood course, only when they strain their senses and their might, personally or collectively, in direct physical combat with the elements or their fellows? May activities of mind, activities in the day's here and now, that are matters so much more of thought than of direct sensation, and the subtle, skilful control of the will have no place or only a subordinate place in the lives of real men? All so-called spiritual values aside, is a world-wide life, such as the new compass makes possible, not even more stirring physically than the life of the old days when vigorous adventure depended on surface movement and physical contact? The call of history, I think, is unequivocal. The change which henceforth challenges manly courage and makes vigorous adventure, not being determined by distance and the hardships of travel or campaign, can be only the change—to use the best phrase I can find—that, however much men may still move about on the surface, really *strikes in*. Change has been superficial and external or from outside long enough. Surface exploration and adventure and the

far idealism of them have done their great work. With full allowance of time to men to get used to having no frontier, to being—to all intents and purposes—not of course bodily, but in their interests and activities everywhere and even always, whenever and wherever they may be, in short with full allowance of time to them to get ready, as it were, to let change, so long on the surface, at last strike in, the day cannot now be far off when vigor and courage will respond fully and generally to the new call, the call of history, the call to vigorous adventure in the world of quality. With full measure of charity, too, or of admiration—which should it be?—for the latest way, outwardly so reactionary, of meeting today's call for vigor and courage, the real outcome cannot be doubted for a moment, if there be any truth in history. Inward change must win over outward; character over sheer force; creative life over conquest; difference over distance. If what I mean by inward change, by change striking in, be still in doubt, I may add that hereafter, when men really act, they must do so with the whole world, so to speak, acting with them or through them. Their consciousness well informed of the world—remember the compass of the four “local signs”—and their will guided by the meaning of it, they have no choice but the action that best expresses it and its wholeness. Expression, however, under such conditions, is what is intended by change striking in. Such expression explores depths, not distances.

Now what the outcome will be, or already is beginning to be, specifically in economic and political life, where recent interest has been so much in “values”; in art, where men have already revealed wonders beneath the surface of the sense qualities and the sense forms; or in science, which is getting dangerously near to something as penetrating as metaphysics, now that among other feats it has exploded as well as explored the atom, I may not undertake to say, interesting as such an inquiry would be; but, to turn to a simpler and a more general matter, the illusion that many still have about force, vigor, and the like and that makes them heed rather the call of the savage than the call of history, must always suggest the illusion often had about size. Not long ago a learned priest of Buddha in India was visited by two young men, an

American and a Japanese, both students of the oriental philosophies and religions, and after discussions of the special problems interesting to them all, they fell into less formal conversation. The priest's only journey by water had been on a small ferry-boat, a side-wheeler, across the Ganges and, learning of the long voyages of his two visitors, he exclaimed in great wonder: What enormous paddle-wheels your ferry-boats must have had! Enormous indeed! Even several miles in diameter, if you reason with that priest under the illusion of size; but, if you follow the facts and take their short cut to size, enormous only by indirection, the paddle-wheels having given place to something quite different, much smaller in size, much bigger in achievement. And so it has been and must be in the long run in the world of facts. As demands increase, size gives way to something different and, like size, force, and vigor, as manifested in some traditional mode, must give way to some distinctly new mode. Novelty, in a word, has ever been a short cut to greater power; the new thing, in fact, being only a product of change "striking in," instead of just depending on expansion. Nor can I help adding that the change, besides striking in, also somehow takes size and expansion in with it! Such humor, however, may only bewilder. But the illusion, under which men become reactionary, resorting to mere expansion of old ways, can never be without a certain pathos for its obviously real inefficiency. Also the radical novelty or difference of life, for which history now calls, must foreshadow an age of power even beyond all present imagination. There will be no lack of what makes the blood course in men's veins. The superman will have no need of deluding himself with savagery.

Have I succeeded at last in suggesting real adventure in the life of inward change; in the life whose increase of power is to come, not by increase of size, but by difference? Have I succeeded in showing that this life must make an even still stronger appeal to men of courage and good red blood than the life it must supplant, the life of the old frontier, the life of far dangers and opportunities, of extensive exploration, physical prowess and conquest? Then, so much done, I may turn directly to consideration of some of the practical values of mystery so indispensable to all adventure.

Real difference, I would recall, being harder to effect than distance, is not only more adventurous but also more mysterious; so that in their new life men will have need of the greatest courage and of every power and every faculty which their past has developed.

The practical values of mystery, which I shall consider, are three: Mystery is, so to speak, the background of real opportunity. Mystery imparts to life a saving humor. Mystery can refer to something real, it can leave the land of dreams for the land of reality, only if made an object of will. As the background of real opportunity mystery is well known to everybody. A young man accepts a position and is interested in it for the opportunity it opens to him. The opportunity, however, in his feeling embraces and must embrace, besides the position itself, to which too often he gives too little attention, a hidden future of promotions and of giddy heights of success that neither he nor anyone else can measure. And suppose, whether in little things or in big, man's life were without the unmeasured heights or depths; suppose the life he found himself in were just a position without any wonderful possibilities beyond it and its kind, is it likely that man would accept his employment with any interest whatever? I ask this question, because from what so far has been very commonplace I wish to pass to a very large idea that the question implies. The actual and the possible are elements in everyone's life, but not all appreciate real possibility. Not all appreciate how big with opportunity possibility, at least as it may be conceived nowadays, makes the world men live in. So many still treat possibility as if it meant only more or less. The illusion of size again! They seek to realize it by accumulation, repetition, routine, and their lives, accordingly, suggest the orderly mathematical series that has indeed no end to its possible terms but also that will never really rise, so to speak, above the position in which it was first employed. There is, in other words, such merely formal possibility, the possibility of keeping on indefinitely in the same old kind, worth its regular salary and even from time to time stated increases on account of age, but nothing more, and there is, besides, a real possibility, the possibility of something new and different, not to be measured by any price. Men are too prone—perhaps much in the training of an age, over

nineteen centuries long, of expansion and accumulation first of territory and then of economic wealth has made them too prone—to think of the old and the new, the past and the future, the actual and the possible, as commensurable, as capable of being judged or expressed under the same formal measure or manner; but they are not commensurable. Decidedly, unless the possibilities of life may be exhausted by accumulation and routine, they are incommensurable. Can any way of thinking or acting ever be an adequate measure of all that life holds? Then sooner or later, as certainly as that men live, really new things must follow the old things. Creation, in other words, is as true and essential to our present world as the possibilities of it are real, not formal. Life and evolution, as biology is coming to view them, are bigger with creation than the old orthodox creation which they have supplanted ever was. Once more a great dogma has proved to be rich in prophecy. But, in manner less philosophical, more secular, so large is the opportunity for which mystery provides a background, that it matters not what position in life one may hold; always not mere increase of the old returns, but promotion, the rise to something different, is possible, and whoever secures such promotion may rightfully feel a part in the creative life of the world. That the promoted fellow seldom if ever fails to assert his right to this feeling is matter of common observation! Although the world was never so small as it is now, its distances in space and time being overcome, it was never so big, so alive, with real possibility, with opportunities of creation and promotion. Let the narrow specialist, in life or thought, take notice. Let youth, the world over, take notice.

Of the world of real possibility or opportunity, which is also the world of adventure and mystery, at least two things more should be said. Thus with regard to any plan that anyone may make and try to carry out, it is always necessary that there may be failure; for, somehow on the possibility of failure depends both the value of mystery and the value of success. Recognizing this, then, I would simply add that in life's higher adventures into the possible, as in those that are lower, in adventures of character and quality, as in those of trail and campaign, the creatures who fall or fail should

not be treated as henceforth outside the pale, beyond pardon and hope; and this most emphatically, now that Christendom must face squarely the harder as well as higher adventures of near idealism. A people's heroic "wounded, missing, and dead" have too long been largely, if not only, those who have suffered the misfortunes of war and all like adventures on the world's trails. From a far idealism, which has fostered such adventures and exalted the heroes of them, the fallen in the adventures of character and quality, the immoral and the unsuccessful, the unpromoted, have so far had little human consideration, except as theology and law and social convention have made provision for them. Morally, legally, and socially they have been dealt with under principles of an abstract view, always as brutal as impractical, of righteousness and worth. But now, idealism being no longer far-sighted and beginning at home, the natural and the present being immediately alive with the ideal, human sympathy and romance for those who fall must rise to the new level. Losses there must always be in the struggles of life, whatever the nature of the adventure, and the new feeling, just now proposed, for the losses in the new adventure, is very surely one of the greatest opportunities of the mystery of life today. As to losses, death being the great loss and being sometimes physical, sometimes economic, sometimes moral, we have always heard much of the unity of life; little of the unity of death. Yet the latter is as real as the former. Physically, economically, morally, men live and die together; no man does either to himself alone. There can, then, be no putting the creatures who fall beyond the pale.

There remains, in discussion of the opportunity given to life by its mystery, some direct reference, however brief, to the never-failing challenge to greatness. As matter of course, in all its interests and relations human life has three notable expressions—the ordinary and commonplace, the professionally developed and expert, and the great. Most men are, so to speak, employed in the ordinary rank and file, although there are many who add to a life that in other respects is ordinary a professional skill in some one relation, and these, the ordinary men and the specially expert, experience their allotted drudgery and discipline, their adventures

and their possible promotions. Far be it from anyone to undervalue their life, even that of the wholly ordinary, if such there really be. Not only is the ordinary life near and dear to us all, being the material of all that is worth while, but also in particular through the appeal that special expertness is always making to general commonplaceness, it makes great life possible. So often the very ordinary man, catching the meaning of some special attainment or expertness, becomes the great man, revealing to all what he has found; and, in view of this, it is well to remember, as if in justification of it, that the two creatures among men who are born, not made, are the very ordinary man and the genius. For the rest, the challenge of greatness is ever present. It is felt sometime in his life and with some power by every man. So not to have mentioned it here had been almost like leaving Hamlet out of his own play. Above all, to every man must come the challenge of greatness in the new adventures in quality which would, as never before, achieve something, not through distance or size, but through difference. Atlas certainly has a very large world to bear on his shoulders today; large of course in the actual position which it offers any man, but large especially in the real and great opportunity, in the possible promotion.

Besides being the background of real opportunity, mystery was said, secondly, to impart to life a saving humor. Humor has many qualities and grades. It is the companion of many degrees of intelligence, appreciation, and self-control. But always the unexpected, a herald from the world of mystery, or the incongruous, only another name of the same herald, is what provokes it. Nor can I imagine how men would ever have a chance to laugh, were all things clear and also orderly and harmonious as clear. On the same condition, I suppose, they would never have a chance to grieve; for, say what one will, grief and laughter are children of the same uncertain life, of the mystery of life; they are two inseparable sisters. Perhaps no phrase better expresses what laughter, I mean laughter that has any spirit or character or vision in it, really is than the phrase, often heard: Laughter through tears. Indeed has anyone a right to laugh who might not cry or who has not been crying? The relation of the two, I suggest, is very much like that

of success and failure, no success being really worth while where there has been no failure or no real possibility of failure. So, while I would not too much sadden anyone's joy, I must insist—almost with a humorous persistence—on some tears behind all honest laughter. Moreover, it is a saving humor, not an idle one, that I am writing about.

Thus to associate laughter and humor with mystery and with the possibility of sorrow is to make it at least a possible attitude, and natural as possible, in religion. Surely many people have recognized and felt the joy of religion, but their actual joy—only one more mark of a far idealism—has not found expression in much natural laughter and all too often has been only a joy to come, their life here and now, at least when in religious mood and atmosphere, being even heavily gloomy and morose. Today, it is true, this gloom may be more manner and tradition than honest feeling; but, if such be the case, there is all the more reason for Protestantism or neo-Protestantism, in this field. Thus, as I have to believe, with the new candor toward nature, with the spiritual frankly intimate with the natural and idealism accordingly near instead of far, even open laughter will no longer be foreign to religion and the joy of religion will actually become a power, a saving humor, in natural, everyday life. That nice humor, for example, born of course of some mystery, of the rain falling, for good or for ill, on the just and on the unjust must be wholly lost on all whose ideal life is afar off and for whom the fortunes of storm or shower are determined by a power wholly outside; but it comes richly and deeply into the lives and the laughter of those who take the falling rains as only a normal part of the day's work and adventure. There is a humor of good sportsmanship that will suggest my meaning, I think, very well. Finally, as to the humor that saves, may I say that for me, as probably for many others, the "laughter of the gods" has always had a peculiar fascination. I know that it must suggest an offensive paganism to many. Still the paganism is not my meaning, but this. Were I a painter, undertaking to portray the face of God or of any of his saints, I should feel that I had failed signally if I should not get some natural laughter, laughter telling of vigorous life, of dangers and difficulties met, in

short laughter of the really "saving" quality, at least in the eyes. Without that I do not see how men can meet all the hardships and risks of today's near idealism.

The admission of natural laughter to religion because of religion being an attitude toward mystery and of mystery being today a matter of possible difference here and now instead of a matter of aloofness and distance brings this essay back to its starting-point and this part of it to the third of the three values of mystery. Religion, associated with superstition but very unlike it, was said to be one of the pioneer forces of life; to belong at the very battle-front, where discovery, invention, and creative achievement are the issue; to be even boldly and actively superior to the existing evidence of things; to be, in short, a courageous and confident plunge into the dark. Here, then, we see the third value of mystery. Mystery can refer to reality, it can leave the land of dreams for the land of reality, only if made an object of will. A more practical value than this, the challenge of the will, would be hard to imagine.

And this third value is, I think, pre-eminently a religious value. Some, I know, would say that religion's first appeal was to feeling, not will. Others, certain theologians as well as certain advocates of a "religion of science," would say intellect or reason. But, at least for the present day, the appeal of religion must be directly to the will, feeling with its art and reason with its science becoming only the will's acolytes. Moreover, when in the past feeling has appeared primary in religion, there has been in reality an appeal to the will, but to what I would call the far will, the will that assertively waits on the future or that seeks successes in distant unseen places, and, again, when religion has seemed to put reason first, the will challenged has been the will of skilful formulation and mechanical invention. If the former of these has discovered and explored the world, the latter has, so to speak, settled the world, organizing its life, institutionalizing and standardizing its methods, making the machinery through which the distance traversed by the explorers has ceased to be limitation, in a word effecting that change from the old compass of mysterious points or directions to the new compass of familiar "local signs." The former will, too, the far idealist's will, the explorer's will has been said to proceed from a self or soul

that, although in, was not really of the body and so was safely superior to the accidents of a very stormy physical world; and the latter, the practical, carefully measuring and skilfully organizing settler's will, say the will of Christendom since 1700, has finally become so skilfully mechanical as to suggest the automaton rather than anything else and to make mankind almost if not quite indifferent to the soul, as something apart from the body, that men once cherished so earnestly. But today, as if the great industrial automaton and the mysterious power of it were really to come to life, the challenge is, not to the will that explores and conquers nor yet to the will that settles, but to the will that at last lives and creates; to the will, as I should like to say, come at last fully to its own, feeling and reason being indeed only its attendants.

What may this creative will be? The creative will can belong only to a soul that has given up all spiritual abstraction and aloofness; that also, although comfortably established on earth, refuses to be put to sleep by an orderly routine or system; and that, entering fully and immediately into the world's life and there recalling the former aloofness and the idealism of it and putting to real use the order and routine, applies the very life and force of nature to making the world different. That the creative will in the world of the new compass can be no local will, selfishly personal, national, or racial, should go without saying. Also, not nature's life or force, since this is only childhood or savagery, but *willing* nature's life or force, this being maturity or civilization, is in general the secret of the creation; and today, nature's regions explored and her distances measured and appraised, to will her life must bring, in a measure never even dreamed of before, new life.

Now as for specific changes that willing nature's life would seem to call for, I may repeat, once more, that the human conscience must equate itself candidly and confidently with the knowledge of nature's laws. Certainly, were this done, the difference to life would be suggestive of nothing less than a miracle. No one can foresee what would be realized out of the real but mysterious possibilities. Pure foods, honest wares, direct and vital teaching and preaching, physiologically as well as socially, naturally as well as conventionally legitimate marriages, and in general direct responsi-

bility to the known facts of life would make such a difference as the human imagination cannot now compass. Among the now known facts of life are things specially connected with matters under discussion in recent paragraphs. Thus, as a fact, the frontier has passed and the days of productive exploration and conquest are no more. As a fact the economic settlement of the world, if not complete, is at least sufficient to warrant attention to the next great step. His house settled, man may begin to live. As a part of the responsibility to facts, then, the will of today should apply itself to removal of such things in life as retain the attitude and manners of life still having a frontier. Thus, if political divisions there must still be, they should be on racial, not on military, grounds, or, better still, only with the consent of the parties concerned. In general, militarism must be cast out as no longer efficient, as an anachronism, as belying, what the life of the peoples is already become, an international life. And sectional differences and privileges must be reduced, and in particular the very acute sectional difference between city and country. What is the great modern city but a product in much of its life of the frontier, a sort of counterpart of the frontier, a result of its back-action, an ingrowing or centripetal frontier, a frontier of the intensive expression of life? Which of the two frontiers, the city or the other, has exhibited the more lawlessness, the more violence to culture, the more irresponsibility in general, it would be very hard to say. Both bear the marks of a far idealism, always a near irresponsibility. But willing present facts calls for the disappearance of the frontier. And, as to what is becoming a tyranny of the economic settlement and industrial organization of the world, now that men would begin to live, the will of today should apply itself to a change in the recognized equal rights of men. Those old rights, life, liberty, and safe enjoyment of property, were only anti-militaristic. Even to begin to live in the world of today men must be granted more inclusive rights, rights that are even in some sense anti-industrialistic; such rights, I suggest, as useful occupation to take the place of the old right of mere life, an education that will develop skill to take the place of mere freedom of person, and enjoyment of the means of communication and transportation to take the place of the mere

safe enjoyment of property. Say, concisely, work, education, and commerce. Only with these more inclusive rights, I am sure, recognized and extended among men, can the industrial organization, under which the world has been settled, be finally put to productive or creative use. If industrialism, the great "ism" of the settlement of the earth, has already, in spite of much instability and some reaction, greatly transformed the life of men under the earlier militarism, the great "ism" of exploration and conquest, these changes may be counted on to produce a still greater transformation; great enough at least to stir men today to the adventure of them.

I set out to speak of the values of mystery. There were three, to which I wished to call attention. Mystery was the background of real opportunity. Mystery brought to life a saving humor. And mystery could make its object real only by making it an object of will. A world of untold opportunity, if nothing less than the opportunity of incarnation, realizing the spiritual in the natural, finding the ideal in the actual, stands before the will of the present day.

THE LOGIC OF RELIGION

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Reflection is evoked by the discovery that "things are not what they seem." Serious speculation as to the nature of the reality underlying the world's appearances began with Thales's crude cosmology and ran a free and vigorous course to the time of Plato's idealism and Democritus' atomism. But one who could review with some degree of impartiality the various conclusions of all these metaphysical speculations found a new problem in the fact that their results were marked by such a glaring lack of agreement. Such divergence as culminated in the antipodal differences between Plato and Democritus surely proved the failure of speculation to arrive at truth. Naturally then this activity of thought became itself a problem of investigation. Greek thought had come to an *impasse*. It was time for someone to inquire as to the processes of thought whereby truth was being sought. This was the work of Aristotle, the creator of logical science. There had, of course, been foreshadowings of it in the need felt by Socrates and Plato for more exact definition of ideas and terms. It remained for Aristotle to see and attempt to solve the general difficulty in a large and permanent way. "Aristotle made the great step in advance . . . the ripe self-knowledge of Greek science. . . . He offers an examination of the thinking activity on all sides, a comprehensive examination of its regular forms."¹

So much for the original occasion of logic in the narrower sense as a branch of philosophy. In general, a similar situation is involved in the development of any department of human activity. When we come to a point where our technique, our intellectual tools, our philosophy of the conduct in question, breaks down or involves us in serious embarrassment, we instinctively turn back upon that philosophy, that technique, to inquire what is wrong

¹ Windelband, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Engl. trans. by Tufts, *History of Philosophy*, 2d ed., pp. 132, 133.

with it, that it now fails to solve our problems or accomplish our tasks. This examination, or its results as an organized system of principles, is the logic of the activity in question, be it the logic of thinking, or the logic of science, or the logic of morality, or the logic of religion.

I. THE NEED OF A LOGIC OF RELIGION

The logic of religion is needed at the same strategic moment as is the logic of any other department of human development, namely, when, on the one hand, after much groping, successes and failures become gradually sifted, main lines of movement become distinguished from side issues, and, in general, the conditions of successful experimentation become more and more clearly recognized; and when, on the other hand, the need of strong, united, and unhesitating advance has become urgent. In religion we have now somewhat adequately taken stock of the past few centuries of action and reaction, confused groping and occasional clear glimpses of larger perspectives, and with increasing conviction realize the imperative social need of confident and comprehensive progress. Hence our greatest immediate need is a clear apprehension of the logic of the task we are undertaking.

We need religion, probably, as much as any age can have needed it. The prevalent confusion, "the tumult of the time disconsolate," is felt in every mind not wholly inert as a greater or less distraction of thought, feeling, and will; and we need to be taught how to live with joy and calm in the presence of inevitable perplexities. A certain natural phlegm is a great advantage in these days, and better still, if we could get it, would be religious assurance. Never was it more urgent or more difficult to justify the ways of God to men. Our material betterment is a great thing, and our comparative freedom a greater, but these rather increase than diminish the need of a higher discipline in the mind that is to use them profitably; the more opportunities the more problems. Social betterment is like the advance of science in that each achievement opens up new requirements. There is no prospect that the world will ever satisfy us, and the structure of life is forever incomplete without something to satisfy the need of the spirit for ideas and sentiments that transcend and reconcile all particular aims whatsoever. Mediaeval religion is too unworldly, no doubt, for our use, but all real religion has its unworldly side, and Thomas à Kempis and the rest were right in holding that no sort of tangible achievement can long assuage the human soul.

Still more evident is the need of religion in the form of "social salvation," of the moral awakening and leadership of the public mind. Society is in want of this, and the agency that supplies the want will have the power that goes with function—if not the church, then some secular and perhaps hostile agency, like socialism, which is already a rival to the church for the allegiance of the religious spirit.¹

This is not the first time in the history of Western thought that men have attacked the problem of clarifying the logic of religion. The great work of Thomas Aquinas is significant from the viewpoint of present-day progressive thought, chiefly for its crystallization of the logic involved in the religious thought of the Western world up to his day. Others, to be sure, had attempted the same task, and indeed, somewhat less clearly, attained the same result.

Hitherto there had been no formal distinction between the domain of philosophy and that of theology. Thomas laid down a clear line between theology and philosophy, between natural and revealed religion, and the province of reason as regards both, which has remained in force among thinkers of all creeds ever since. Philosophy passes from the consideration of the creatures to God; theology passes from God to the creature.²

But now we come upon evidence that this Thomist contribution to the logic of religion is no longer valid. That it has been, up until recently, is, to be sure, quite true. But theological pioneers today are claiming that theology, as well as philosophy, must pass "*from* the consideration of the creatures *to* God," that theology must be *inductive*, that doctrine must be formulated empirically. We are demanding a

theology, which in all sincerity asks the questions which are pressed from the hearts of men; which in its questioning uses fearlessly the best methods which critical science can furnish; which insists on no aristocratic privilege of definitely limited authoritative doctrines, but admits gladly to its precincts anything which compels the moral adoration of men; which learns gratefully from the past, but looks to a better future; which appreciates the service rendered by those conceptions of God and of salvation which have emerged in history, but confidently believes that the borders of our knowledge may ever be enlarged.³

¹ Cooley, *Social Organisation*, p. 379.

² Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, p. 231.

³ G. B. Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, p. 243.

On the one hand, this is demanded by the spirit of the age, and, on the other, by the exigencies of the theological situation. For the formerly credible method of arriving *at* a consideration of the creatures *from* the consideration of God has been discredited by modern knowledge beyond all repair. The logic of the Thomist system needs no further elaboration. The system itself is utterly obsolete.

Now from the point where Catholicism loses connection with the advancing thought of Modernism, religion, in the progressive sphere, has moved on instinctively, without a conscious logic of its own movement. For several centuries it has been groping its way, marked by inconsistencies and reactions, but surprisingly vital in many directions. But more and more the inconsistencies have become embarrassing. More and more we have wanted a new theology that should be in fact as new as the new world of Modernism. More and more is felt the need of apprehending the deepest logic of the modern religious task. To put it baldly, we modern men are striving to make ourselves at home, religiously, in this new world of modern knowledge. We have tried to move much of the intellectual furniture of the Old World, the mediaeval home, into the new, only to find it increasingly incongruous. It will not fit. We have not made ourselves at home. Just what is it we are trying to do? We feel the religious craving within us; we get help from this or that suggestion; we seem to make some progress, but feel much perplexity. The whole task is as yet tragically incomplete. We are thrown back on ourselves. Just what is it we need to do? In a word, What *is* religion?

Furthermore, we are beginning to see that the logic of a modern religion must rest upon the logic of all religion. We understand the logic of the Catholic system. We understand also the logic of secular Modernism. But through both eras men feel religious needs and find religious satisfaction, and what we do not yet clearly understand is the logic of religion which is involved in both these eras and underlies both, the complete system of Aquinas and the nascent system of Modernism. It is not enough to seek for the logic of a modern religion. We have come to a place where the very life of religion is threatened by the sickening sense of relativism

which modern historical research so largely and increasingly fosters. If we are but seeking one sort of religion to replace another, an obsolete sort, this self-conscious relativism threatens the very heart of religious power. What we need, before we can have any sufficient confidence in our modern religion, whatever it may prove to be when matured, is a knowledge of the logic of religion *as a whole*. We are confronted with three vast eras, Paganism, Catholicism, Modernism. As we believe in the continuity of experience, we are compelled to understand the principles which underlie all three. We may be satisfied to understand the logic of other phases of human experience in a more or less disjointed way, to know, for example, the logic of ancient science, the logic of mediaeval science, the logic of modern science, but the very heart of religious satisfaction is gone if we thus separate the religious experience of one age from that of another. For the logic of Mediaevalism and that of Modernism are so disparate, the former seems so unreal, so futile, as compared with the latter, and yet the religious experience of the mediaevalist was so profound, so powerful, that our effort to establish a modern religion is likely to seem to ourselves a mere *tour de force*, and futile at that. Yet in spite of the self-consciousness of our effort, we feel that the same great forces are driving us forward which compelled the mediaevalist and the ancient to develop their systems. It is an understanding of these forces on the most inclusive scale that we need. It is the logic of religion that we must discover, and not merely the logic of Paganism or the logic of Catholicism or the logic of Modernism, if our experience is to be relieved of the oppressive self-consciousness which now disheartens us.

We have a modern religious spirit or attitude or conscience, but as yet practically no modern religious doctrine. To be sure, it is only slowly and with great difficulty that this strictly modern attitude has come to clear expression. It is as yet hardly more than an awareness of the moral challenge of the scientific spirit and a desire to meet that challenge if possible. It is not yet clear how this strictly modern attitude can produce a strictly religious content. Science and religion have been at odds so long that now, when a truce is felt to be desirable, it still remains doubtful whether

it is really feasible. Paganism made religion the affair of commerce with an invisible world, Catholicism made that invisible world a stricter "other" world, and with this "other" world, for fifteen centuries, religion, as the chief business of man, had entirely to do; and now, when modern knowledge has dissolved that "other" world into utter unthinkableness, and has made cogent the demand for an inductive, an empirical, theology, has, in a word, thrown the religious nature back inevitably upon "this" world, the religious thinker is for the time being embarrassed. Before we can go farther, we must find a satisfactory answer to the question, What is religion?

II. THE TYPE OF LOGIC NEEDED

There is so much fundamentally the same in Catholicism and traditional Protestantism that the logic of the two systems may be considered identical, at least in the most important elements.

There is a remarkable unity in the history of Protestant thought in the period from the Reformation to the end of the eighteenth century. There is still more surprising unity of Protestant thought in this period with the thought of the mediaeval and ancient church. The basis and methods are the same. Upon many points the conclusions are identical. There was nothing of which the Protestant scholastics were more proud than of their agreement with the Fathers of the early church. They did not perceive in how large degree they were at one with Christian thinkers of the Roman communion as well. Few seem to have realized how largely Catholic in principle Protestant thought has been. The fundamental principles at the basis of the reasoning have been the same. The notions of revelation and inspiration were identical. The idea of authority was common to both, only the instance in which that authority is lodged was different. The thoughts of God and man, of the world, of creation, of providence and prayer, of the nature and means of salvation are similar.¹

Now a dualism, "this world" and "the other world," is fundamental to this logic of Catholicism and traditional Protestantism. This dualism has been in process of dissolution for a long time, and in degree as this process becomes more advanced, we should expect to find the question What is religion? coming more and more strategically into prominence. And this is exactly what has happened. The last century witnessed the culmination of that process

¹ See E. C. Moore, *Christian Thought since Kant*, p. 2.

of dissolution, and it was Schleiermacher, at the dawn of the century, who laid the foundations for a new epoch in theology by asking the crucial question, What is religion? Kant had practically retired the age-old dualism and so had felt compelled to attempt to re-define religion. But both definitions retained, though with necessary vagueness, the sense of an "other" world. For Kant, religion was a sense of duty, duty with, as it were, overtones of a divine imperative, the categorical imperative "within," which somehow has the intelligible "other" world back of it. For Schleiermacher, religion was a feeling of dependence upon a God who is for the most part immanent in "this" world, and yet is apprehended through the God-consciousness of Jesus which has, in the final analysis, some sort of alien source. Ritschl also wrestled with the problem of defining religion, spurning both metaphysics and mysticism as the sphere or channel of its operation, and yet striving to save it from being swallowed up by secularism. The discredit of metaphysics and mysticism was essentially the discredit of the "other" world. The vast change going on in the world-view of the century is reflected in the most characteristic contribution of Ritschl, namely in his doctrine of justification and reconciliation, according to which salvation is essentially a matter of "this" world—a matter of reconstructed character, not of "other-worldly" rescue. Ritschl defines religion as a sense of "values." Theology rests upon "value-judgments," whereas science and the secular life in general rest upon "existential judgments." But in Ritschl also there lurks, in the last analysis, the old ontological dualism.

The "other" world, from the days of its creation by the genius of Plato, has been a "given" world, an a priori world, and while, and in so far as, it remains valid for religious thinkers, the definition of religion will naturally be an a priori conception. Kant's, Schleiermacher's, Ritschl's definitions are all of this a priori sort. As the very expression "origin of species" is the final stroke in the retirement of Platonism,¹ so the very expression "a psychology of religious experience" is the final stroke in the retirement of the habit of conceiving religion as a bridging of that gulf which the old dualism involves. When, about a decade ago, William James published

¹ See Dewey, *Influence of Darwin*.

his *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, a most significant milestone was reached. In place of a priori or arbitrary definitions of religion, the attempt was begun of finding an inductive definition by the application of psychological study to the phenomena of religious experience. While some psychologists of religion are careful to defend their attempt by disclaiming to believe that religion has no extra-scientific or preternatural reference, this apology cannot hide the real issue, for the application of scientific method to the study of religious experience logically implies the end of the old dualism. The "other" world is *not* "other" if it can be reached by a religious experience which is itself a part of "*this*" world's life—comes, that is, really under the cognizance of science.

It is noteworthy that the phraseology of the title of this epoch-marking book¹ is suggestive of the most obvious character of the whole field of religious experience, most obvious and perhaps most discouraging to the investigator who desires to find a definition. The "varieties" of religious phenomena are indeed bewilderingly numerous. The whole field of pagan, Catholic, and modern types stretches before us, subjective and objective, feeling, fact, and fancy, social custom and individual idiosyncrasy, emotions, activities, beliefs. It is little wonder if this branch of science hesitates, is hardly yet sure of having a really scientific method of procedure. Indeed the initial difficulty is to say what is rightful material for investigation. What is religious experience? What is morality—what is mere crass custom—what is primitive science? Obviously some tentative conception of the essential character of religious experience must be entertained before the selection of material can be even begun. And in this connection it is noticeable that while so far there is no unanimity of definition, there yet is a very large consensus as to what experiences are and what are not religious. Any working conception of the essence of religion must first of all demonstrate itself in this field of unquestioned religious phenomena. The final test of the definition will be the clarity with which it makes differentiation possible in the large margins of debatable material. More explicitly, the two chief requirements which we must make of any definition offered are these: First, it must account for the

¹ James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

varieties of religious experience; that is, it must offer a simple and satisfactory clue to the infinite differences of expression of the religious life, in all lands and in all ages, and thus reveal their functional or dynamic identity. In the second place, it must serve to differentiate religion from morality, science, aesthetics, or any other department of custom or culture. Of course it may be supposed by some that the identity of religion is not merely functional or dynamic, but that there is an identity as it were of content. Leuba, for instance, holds that the essential mark of religion is a belief in some supernatural or superhuman agency, i.e., the *deity* content. But the majority of the psychologists of religion claim that this is not tenable. Again, it may be supposed that no ultimate differentiation between religion and, say, morality, is possible. Ames's conclusion is practically that.¹ But as there is an almost universal feeling that while religion and morality are indisputably very intimately connected, they nevertheless are essentially different, surely no definition of religion which does not explain both their difference and their intimate connection can be considered adequate.

The first of these two requisites of a definition calls for further comment. It means that the Hegelian rather than the Aristotelian logical viewpoint must be held, that a "concrete" rather than an "abstract universal" must be discovered.

Definitions fall into two general types, for a definition is a "universal," and logic recognizes two broadly different sorts of "universals," the "abstract universal" and the "concrete universal."

The universals of the traditional subsumptive logic are found by analysis and abstraction, the discovery of identity by elimination of differences, the classification of species under genera by attention to similarities and disregard of discrepancies. It gives the "abstract universal," the quality or group of qualities which account for or include the similarity of the various species in the genus. It was the service of Hegel to formulate a theory of "concrete universals." It is significant that this revolutionary logical innovation came just at a time when Darwin's *Origin of Species* was about to give the final blow to the Platonic world-view which

¹ E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.

was the metaphysical background of the Aristotelian logic.¹ Whereas the "abstract universal" dealt with species generically, the "concrete universal" deals with them genetically or at least organically. The former is based on identities, the latter is based on differentiation. The former looks for a means of classification, the latter for a means of control. The one depends upon analysis of a "given," the other seeks for the secret of creating new experience. The first looks for the common elements in similar results, the second looks for the *reason for the differences*. The one belongs to a static world, the other to a changing, growing world. The one deals with completed structures, the other with living functions. The one relies upon authority, whether the authority is a "given" of the philosopher's insight, as Aristotle thought, or of the prophet's vision, miracle-attested, as the theologian claimed, or of a system of truth, as the ecclesiastic held. The other relies upon experiment, exploration, discovery; it is the logic of science. The one talks of essence, substance, "nature," being. The other talks of activities, uses, functions, life. Principal Caird gives the following description of Hegel's concrete or organic universal.

This deeper and truer universality is that which may be designated ideal or organic universality. The idea of a living organism is not a common element which can be got at by abstraction and generalization, by taking the various parts and members, stripping away their differences, and forming a notion of that which they have in common. That in which they differ is rather just that out of which their unity arises and in which is the very life and being of the organism; that which they have in common they have, not as members of a living organism, but as dead matter, and what you have to abstract in order to get it is the very life itself. We do not reach it by first thinking the particulars, but conversely we get at the true notions of the particulars only through the universal.²

In the first place, the "varieties" of religious experience are so infinitely various that if the method of abstraction is used, there is little or no hope of finding the residual identity; and in the second place, if such could be found, it would necessarily be so vague, so utterly "abstract," as to furnish no valuable clues in attacking our

¹ See Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, chap. i.

² Caird, *Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*, 1891, p. 218; see also Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 222 ff.

own peculiar twentieth-century reconstructive problem. Leuba's abstraction of a bare "deity" content, as the mark of all religious experience, even if it were defensible, is impotent in our present situation. The validity of theism is the very crux of our reconstructive problem. It is no help to be told simply that to be religious we must have a God. Those who have had their theism dissolved by modern knowledge are thus thrown back upon the alternative of irreligion, while nevertheless, in the agonies of their enforced atheism, they feel themselves to be poignantly religious. What they need is such an understanding of their religious hunger as will afford some clear line of attack upon the very heart of their problem, some immediately workable line of procedure which they may patiently and without embarrassment explore.

It would not be surprising if among the earliest attempts to define religion inductively a mixture of these two viewpoints should result—an "abstract" universal which is superficially "dynamic." And indeed this is what we find in a definition which has had considerable influence in recent discussions—Höffding's characterization of religion as "the conservation of values." This view regards religion as a function of society whose nature is seen in its most general results. That is, after reviewing the whole field of religious activities, the conclusion is reached that the only thing which can be said of religion which is true in all cases is that these various religious activities tend to "conserve values." But the abstract and impotent character of this definition is evident the moment we ask what such a conception means when applied to our present reconstructive task. What is religion for us? It is a conservation of values. What shall we do? We must practice such religious exercises, hold such religious beliefs, as shall tend to conserve the "values" of life which are regarded as in some way involved. Now if it be felt that all traditional forms of religion have become impotent to conserve our felt "values" (and this is just the core of our modern difficulty), we are accordingly forced to consider the invention of such forms of worship and such doctrines as may prove effective in the situation. But surely the artificiality of such a position, the self-consciousness of such an undertaking, is utterly embarrassing. Moreover, it is not apparent

how religion differs from any other department of life, for surely science and morality are no less truly means of "conserving values." In spite of the apparently "concrete" character of this "universal," its dynamic appearance, its evolutionary, functional terminology, Höffding's definition is really an "abstract" universal, it deals fundamentally, not with the cause of differences, but with residual similarities. It is essentially static. It reviews results rather than concrete motives, it deals with consequences rather than impulses. It is an abstraction from finished systems, rather than an insight into underlying motivation. No doubt it is entirely true that, as James¹ at the outset of this whole investigation pointed out, there is no specific religious "nature," no peculiar "religious instinct"; nevertheless we do not profoundly understand either religion or any other human experience unless we see it from its instinctive side rather than from that of its overt activities and achieved results. There is a great practical difference between the questions, What is the function of religion? and Of what is religion the function?

The author of this study believes that he has to suggest a definition of religion entirely different from any that have hitherto been put forward, and one which (1) is broad enough to include practically all the phenomena which the various psychologists of religion have fastened upon as religious; (2) is practical enough to suggest a natural method of differentiation in those marginal regions where religion seems indistinguishable from morality, or science, or art; (3) is "concrete" enough to explain the endless variation, in form and content, of religious experience; and (4) is so dynamic as to simplify our present reconstructive task and to suggest the most promiseful lines of advance.

But before stating it, let me further describe the "abstract" method in contrast with which this definition will be proposed.

The deductive, merely descriptive character of this "abstract" method is most clearly seen in the results of Professor Wright's analysis.² He points out that there are three types of definition thus far proposed; the first following the general direction of Höff-

¹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

² "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 385.

ding's solution; the second insisting on the supernatural or super-human agency as an ever-present factor; and the third giving the chief importance to the "feeling" element. Professor Wright argues that each of these is correct with reference to some large mass of facts, and that if we are to find a definition which shall disregard no single religious fact we must include each of these three factors. He therefore defines religion as "the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence on this agency."¹

Now Dr. Wright himself seems to feel the abstract and merely descriptive character of this generalization though not willing to admit its futility. He says: "Perhaps the reader now feels that after all the definition merely affords a descriptive formulation of religion and assists in placing it in a classification along with other disciplines, but that it does not throw much light upon the questions in which he is most interested."²

Now the "abstract universal" is just as legitimate in its place as the "concrete." The Aristotelian logic has had such a long life because it is just the everyday attitude which we take toward the well-known and familiar. It sums up experience in useful and concise concepts. It is at home in the periods of authority. The major premise is, as I believe Dewey somewhere suggests, essentially the epitomized custom of the group.³ The "abstract universal" is useful when what is wanted is a more facile use of accumulated experience or a reinforcing of a long-accepted custom or truth. And that just that is the problem which Dr. Wright has in mind becomes evident in the latter part of his monograph. He holds that the use of such a definition will enable us to discover that religion has always been more or less successful in conserving social values (though to be sure it has oftener than not done so unconsciously by other means than those which it was explicitly

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 388, 392.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 402.

³ Cf. "The Concept in its very generality . . . is the conserver of the experience of the past. It is the custom of the past put into capitalized and funded form to enable the individual to get away from the stress and competition of the needs of the passing moment" (Dewey, *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 293).

employing, "suggestion" rather than the deity being the real agency); has generally produced a certain amount of social and moral solidarity and conservatism within the group; has often fostered a less sordid type of life than otherwise might have prevailed; and has helped to enrich and expand the personal life. And so he is interested in showing the importance of preserving, for the sake of general social usefulness, the function of religion as a conservational force tending to maintain our higher values. His remarks on the metaphysical validity of religion reveal the same attitude. On any one of the three types of philosophical foundation which contemporary thought affords, religion, he thinks, can claim to be dealing with reality in general and so is worthy of confidence and support. "In a word, the social and personal usefulness of religion once established, the question of its metaphysical validity will largely take care of itself." In short, the present need seems to this writer to be to deduce the social value of religion today from the generalization that religion is a useful social institution. This is so characteristic of contemporary apologists that its significance for the logic of the situation should be carefully noted. If the continuance of religion as a social institution is the heart of our problem, then the deductive logic must have its way, and an abstract universal is the sort of definition that we need. But if the problem is actually much more acute than that, if it is expressed in its most crucial form in a widespread need of individuals rather than in a general social indifference; if the core of the difficulty for a multitude of the most earnest and thoughtful persons is, not "Shall we continue to be religious?"; but rather "*How* can we continue to be religious?"; if the metaphysical question is, not of the validity of religion in general, but of the validity of the individual's beliefs and practices in particular; then surely the logic needed is an inductive logic, and the abstract definition is not adequate to the present situation. Moreover, it is impossible to find an abstract definition without retaining some one or more of the elements of the content of the religious experience of the past from which the generalization is made, if at least the definition is to have any semblance of real working value. Höffding's definition, for

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 409.

instance, does not help us on our way in the explicit religious perplexities which confront us. It simply gives us a broader acquaintance with religion as it has been; it does not discover anything new. This weakness is apparently overcome in Wright's definition by the addition of the element of belief in the other-than-merely-human agency which is evoked by the religious activity. This is simply some deity or its equivalent. But this is a pure *a priori*, as far as the poignancy of the present situation is concerned. Everyone admits the helpfulness of believing in the co-operation of some deity. But that only adds to the embarrassment of the present problem, for the very crux of the difficulty is, "What God *can* I believe in?"

III. A "CONCRETE UNIVERSAL" PROPOSED

In its simplest statement, I would say that *religion is a social attitude toward the non-human environment*. The *quality* of religion will of course vary with the degree of organization of the social attitude and with the dimensions of the non-human environment; with the degree in which the various social attitudes are habitual and customary, or purposeful and conscious; with the extent to which the non-human environment has been personified by the social imagination or depersonalized by the rational processes induced by failure of habitual adjustments.

Or to state it otherwise: Broadly speaking, the most far-reaching and important distinction which we make regarding the world we live in is that line which we draw between "man" and "not man"; while our relations to environment fall into two classes, first, social adjustments, mostly made toward our fellow-men, and, secondly, mechanical, manipulatory adjustments, which are mostly made toward the things about us. The first constitute the sphere of morality, the second constitute the sphere of science. But, of course, these spheres are not water-tight compartments; there are endless cross-currents. For example, we may take the mechanical attitude toward men, and treat them as *things* (which is either non-moral or immoral). On the other hand, it is inevitable that sometimes we take a social attitude toward the non-human environment. *Within this latter general set of relations is the sphere of religious experience*. Violent or sudden stimulus tends to arouse

the whole organism to activity, so that any situation which transcends the efficiency of our acquired mechanical attitudes tends to call forth the larger organic response, or social attitude.¹ The mechanical attitudes are attitudes of only parts of the organism, whereas the social attitudes are attitudes of the whole organism. The most mechanical activity may develop into one genuinely social, as difficulty is encountered and vital needs are at stake. For instance, a savage is trying to lift a log. At first the action is merely muscular, quite mechanical, and devoid of emotional interest. But the log is heavy, or it rolls out of the arm's grasp, or it falls back on the man's foot and threatens to crush that member. In other words, as the difficulty of the enterprise increases, as the struggle proceeds, it becomes dangerous to his very life. Gradually or suddenly the whole organism becomes more and more involved, so that at last the savage regards the log as he would regard his bitterest foe, with hatred, anger, suspicion. This *social* attitude is expressed in a curse or a final kick, fear or grinning triumph. It is not otherwise with a civilized, sophisticated human. We stoop mechanically to pick up some slippery object, but say things under our breath when it eludes our grasp with the appearance of diabolic cunning. So one may curse the loose board of a plank sidewalk which trips him up; or one may apostrophize some object in nature, as I heard a friend do recently, on a fine morning in the Rockies, "O! you grand old mountains!" *In this realm of social attitudes toward the non-human is the sphere of religion.* We

¹ It is not meant of course that the mere muscular exertion of the whole body is necessarily a social attitude. What is meant is that the more the resources of the entire organism are challenged, the more the response tends to assume the social quality. Briefly, the reason for this is the predominance, both in number and in importance, of the social instincts. The social environment of primitive man is composed of both animals and men. Wild beasts and savage foes require alertness of the whole organism to escape or overcome danger. Moreover, the welfare of childhood, both in primitive and in civilized life, depends much more upon successful social adjustments than upon mechanical adjustments. The power of the gregarious and sex interests is obvious. Further, the mechanical adjustments are developed and controlled largely by the reflex equipment, and hence unconsciously, whereas the more important social adjustments require continuous attention. Hence, in general, the more vitally our physical environment stimulates us, the more is our whole, fundamentally social, nature aroused. A social stimulus awakens what I may call the pan-organic response. On the other hand, the pan-organic response, even though aroused by physical stimulation, is social in its tone. This, very briefly, is my defense for using the expression "the larger organic response or social attitude."

do not, today, of course, dignify by the name religion the anger which one may feel toward the door which the wind slams in his face, but the same attitude in primitive man we call animism and feel that if animism is not exactly religion, it is at least the stuff out of which religion is evolved. Neither do we call it religion when someone of a poetical temperament breaks out in speech to a mountain or the moonlight; yet the very same attitude, if organized into a social habit, elaborated more or less in ritual or defended by doctrine, we should not hesitate to call a religion, "a sun-cult," or what not.

It is admitted that a very hard-and-fast line of distinction cannot be drawn between the two types of attitude, the social and the mechanical, nor between the two types of environment, human and non-human. There are, to be sure, mechanical phases of every social attitude, as in the handclasp of friendship some of the same motor reactions take place as in the use of a hammer or saw. On the other hand, the social quality never seems to recede very far from the surface of mechanical adjustments, as in the use of tools and materials the workman is not always utterly indifferent to them—he is likely at any moment to exhibit a sort of fondness for them or impatience with them. So too with the human and non-human environments. We bestow affection upon our favorite dog or horse, we talk to the bird or the cat. Every employer feels the power of the "economic man" theory, in his temptation to treat workmen as so many tools, mere "things," to be hired, used, cast aside; in the crowded streets we pass most passers-by as indifferently as we step aside to avoid a lamp-post or other non-human obstacles. What is claimed in this study is not that these lines of distinction can be drawn with unwavering definiteness and secure fixity, but that these are the poles, as it were, about which our activities cluster, these are the foci about which our life swings, the contour of action being apparently closer now to this, now to that center of control. Indeed, to push this last suggestion a little bit, one might say that as the one focus of the ellipse and its more adjacent curve may represent social responses toward the human environment, and the other focus and its more adjacent curve may represent mechanical responses to the non-human environment, as

the curve is never, save at two bare points, obedient to the one or the other focus exclusively, so our life is never, save at two bare, logically but hardly empirically real points, obedient exclusively to either the social or the non-social, never either starkly mechanical nor utterly social; and it is just this cross-reference, so to speak, this response of the curve at one extremity to the focus at the other, this rising and falling stimulation of the social responses by the non-human environment, *that constitutes the realm of religion.*

Having roughly outlined the logical limits of religious experience as being "social attitudes toward the non-human environment," some further explanation is now necessary. Obviously much falls within that general scheme today which we should not call religious, although, as I suggested above, any example of similar attitudes, found in the dim primitive past, would probably be considered religious. It will throw light on this phase of my task to look at morals and science from the general viewpoint suggested. There are the two types of environment, the human and the non-human, and the two types of reaction, or attitude, the social and the mechanical. Within the general sphere of social attitudes toward the human environment, morality develops; within that of the mechanical or non-social attitudes toward the non-human, science; *within that of social attitudes toward the non-human, religion.* Now in all these there are two chief considerations which must be kept in mind. The first is the fact that specialization or development throws some activities into prominence, and *the importance of these is the criterion as to how far they are worthy of the adjectives moral, scientific, or religious,* respectively. Special activities are at first elicited by problem situations and are at that stage imbued with emotional interest. Often these same activities tend to become merely habitual, the emotional interest in them wanes, and they gradually fade into that vast mass of routine which is comparatively colorless. For instance, any deviation from the group custom is primitive immorality. But deviation today is not immoral unless it refers to actions which still retain or have come to have emotional interest. An eccentric mode of dress will be an idiosyncrasy or an immorality according to the degree in which it arouses the emotional interest of the group. Similarly, a new

method of registering fares on a street car will be regarded at first as a scientific device, but later will be so commonplace and uninteresting as to seem unworthy of the name scientific. So, too, it is the common criticism of the perfunctory observance of religious rites that such mere habit is unworthy the name of true religion. It is therefore necessary to discover what are the factors that make any experience or activity within the general logical sphere of religion more or less religious. And no extraneous principle must be brought in to vitiate the fundamental simplicity of the logical situation. The explanation lies first of all in the implications of the expression, "a social attitude." "Social" attitudes vary all the way from the instinctive automatisms of animals in their group behavior, the mating of robins, the scout duties of the lookout crow, the snarls of quarreling dogs, the admonitory paw-slaps of the maternal cat, up to the rhetorical flights of the patriot, the exquisite solicitude of a noble parent, the sympathetic handclasp of a loyal friend. But the element which makes the latter human rather than merely animal is the emergence in a man of a "self"-consciousness. This "self"-consciousness varies in organization, sensitiveness, and other qualities from the quasi-animal beginnings in the child or the savage up to the noblest character of Christian maturity. Now this is the key to the problem of the specifically moral action within the general sphere of social attitudes toward the human environment. (We say that any action is moral rather than non-moral in so far as the self is actively and consciously present therein. To turn to the similar religious problem, we would say that in any social attitude toward the non-human, the attitude is more or less religious according to the degree in which the "self"-consciousness is organized and active. But even as morality depends for its degree of moral-ness not only upon the self factor but also upon the quality of the human environment within which the self is active, so any experience is more or less religious in proportion as the non-human environment with which the self makes adjustment is large or small, important or trifling. Even as we say that the highest morality is incompatible with provincialism, that a man is not thoroughly moral if he neglects the ballot, that though charity begins at home it cannot stay there, that the

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business man who has never seen beyond his factory walls is as yet to that extent non-moral, so too the greater the scope of the non-human to which the self, the moral organism, adjusts itself, the more is that adjustment worthy the name religious.

A further word of explanation is in order here. Every vital situation has two chief stages, the problem stage in which active readjustment is demanded and the solution stage in which the activities which emerge through reflection or experiment go on until some new problem arises. Now the tendency of activities once established to become habitual is useful so long as the situation continues which called them forth and in which they are efficient. This situation, however, may cease to exist, while the habitual activities go on of their own momentum. So long as the situation lasts, the activity is, though habitual, worthy the name "moral" or "religious," as the case may be, but when the situation ceases to exist the habitual activity becomes mere meaningless routine, and less and less worthy the name "moral" or "religious." The point is that "moral" and "religious" are essentially vital terms in that they imply a situation of great interest and importance and are more and more applicable within their respective logical spheres in degree as the adjustments contemplated or achieved are of profound and far-reaching significance.

Again, the expression "non-human" will readily be understood to refer in general either to nature or the supernatural, the so-called physical universe which we directly experience or the so-called spiritual world which we experience by faith or imagination. A *social* attitude to such a world beyond the sensuous as Christianity has conceived is, of course, natural and inevitable, since it is just as truly a social environment as the human. A social attitude toward nature so long as there is this divine social environment beyond nature is for the most part unnecessary and unnatural, since nature is *ipso facto* comparatively devoid of importance. The heart of the modern religious situation is just this, that historico-psychological research has of late increasingly revealed the processes by which that other or divine world, that social environment beyond nature, was built up by the social imagination of primitive man, philosopher, and saint, while at the same time scientific

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technique and scientific theory have revealed the unexpected importance and vast but inescapable horizons of this world. Our non-human environment is now, at least in our critical and non-traditional moods, not the supernatural, but nature. Much confusion has resulted from the fact that the traditional adjustments have gone on of their own momentum, after the real situation was vastly changed. But it is not enough to point out this fact, as so many have been so busy doing, and conclude that since our largest environment is now no longer social, we need no longer take a social attitude toward it, or, in other words, need no longer be religious. Whereas the divine social environment in which man has so long lived has immensely fostered his growing sense of selfhood or moral self-consciousness, both democracy and science have taken up and carried much farther this thing that the traditional other-worldliness had been doing. Modern life is much more self-conscious, man is much more aware of himself with the historical background which Darwinism suggests than with the scheme of the Book of Genesis. Over against this self-conscious modern man is nature, with its vast unplumbed significance; and a moral reaction, a social attitude, a "self"-adjustment thereto is no less inevitable, though apparently vastly more difficult, than in the "ages of faith," when man's all-inclusive horizon was a divine society.¹

¹ For the suggestion of the general idea of the distinction between the social and non-social environments, and between the social and mechanical attitudes, I am indebted to Professor G. H. Mead's lectures in social psychology.

It may seem to the reader that a social attitude to the non-human, if that non-human be "nature" or the "world," that is, a social attitude toward a non-social environment, is a contradiction in terms, and religion consequently impossible or an absurdity. This is of course the crux of the constructive problem, which waits for some further investigation of the whole matter of our social and mechanical adjustments out of which have probably come, respectively, our apparently contradictory sets of teleological and mechanistic concepts.

[To be concluded in the April number]

MIRACLES AND THE MODERN PREACHER

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In all religions, so far as I know, there are stories of wonderful occurrences that transcend the limits of ordinary experience. In unscientific ages and for unsophisticated believers, these stories of remarkable occurrences occasion no difficulty. They appear, on the contrary, as quite the natural thing. Most men share with all children the idea that in the olden days things did not happen as they do now. Nobody, for many generations now, has believed that in his own time water would run up hill, or an ax swim to the surface of a spring, or a wooden stick turn into a snake; but the same man who would not believe that these things could happen in his own time and in his own town has generally believed that long ago, in a far-away place, all these things were quite possible and to be expected.

The possibility of these supernatural events being thus settled for the uninquisitive thinker, he accepts the actuality of them on two grounds:

1. They are recorded in his sacred Scriptures; these Scriptures he has been taught to regard as supernaturally guaranteed; to raise the question whether they are in fact different in their origin and authority from other ancient writings, and therefore whether things naturally incredible should be believed upon their testimony is a proceeding that would seem to him at once unprofitable and undevout. Even were the question forced upon him, he has neither time nor means for a settlement of it. He takes miracles, therefore, upon the testimony of his sacred Scriptures.

2. He accepts them also because they seem to be a guaranty to him of the truth and reality of his religion. If there was a time when God talked face to face with men; if, in the critical points of the history of his "chosen people," God intervened and by the

strength of his naked arm put the enemy to flight and rescued the just and persecuted people; if he spoke with audible voice; and if, especially, he committed into the hands of the founder of Christianity such powers as set him quite aside from human comparison—all this seems to make the foundation of religion objective and secure. So the uninquisitive man, as I have called him, never has had, and does not now have, any trouble about miracles. They are a natural part of the entire system which he takes upon authority—or, as he would probably prefer to say, on faith.

Time was when practically all men took this simple and easy attitude. Here and there a man, probably, in every generation, had his doubts, or saw more or less clearly that the truth of the matter was quite other than the assumption of the uninquisitive man. I do not know that there is yet any general uneasiness or inquiry about the whole matter. But at least there have been a few more men in every succeeding generation who have occupied the skeptical attitude toward it; and there are now whole classes of persons who find it quite impossible to believe in miracles of any sort. This change of mind has been going on in all parts of the educated world, in Mohammedanism, for instance, as well as in Christianity. But in Christendom it has been going on most rapidly since the days of David Hume. Not that most men who have experienced it have ever read Hume's famous argument on miracles, but because at about the time of Hume there began to come conspicuously into vogue that view of the world which has been gradually making a belief in miracles obsolete.

The individual man, if he moves at all from the traditional acceptance of the miraculous, does so, generally, by a good many slow and almost imperceptible steps. He begins as a child with the implicit acceptance of miracles. His first question about them is perhaps the query as to why they do not happen nowadays. This question is settled for him by an explanation of the great differences between modern and biblical times. But though the answer may satisfy him for a time, it does not leave the question in the same security as it originally enjoyed. He begins to draw a distinction between miracles in the Bible and miracles outside the Bible; he can believe in one, but not in the other. He draws the

further distinction between different miracles in the Bible; he can believe in the miracles of the New Testament, but not in those of the Old—in the raising of Lazarus, but not in the magic power of the prophet's mantle. He follows this with distinctions between miracles within the New Testament; he can believe that Jesus turned water into wine, but not that the people upon whom the shadow of the apostle fell were cured of their diseases. He gets rid of the miracles of the Pentateuch by learning how long a period elapsed between their alleged occurrence and the writing of the books that tell of them. Even in the New Testament he gets rid of particular miracles by the process of biblical criticism. He learns that the story of the miraculous birth of Jesus was not a part of the original tradition, and he sets it aside as a later growth. He is not prepared, however, to do the same with the story of the resurrection, which seems to have for him a far greater religious value, and to go farther back historically.

Meanwhile he is met by the statement that the whole story of the life of Jesus has so many miracles in it that to take them out leaves the whole history crumbling—and he does not want it to crumble. He falls back upon the idea that he can discard all other miracles, but can hold to the miracles of Jesus, because, he says, Jesus was a unique personality, and it is only reasonable to believe that a unique person should have had unique powers. He sees a little later, however, that he is here reasoning in a circle; he assumes that Jesus was a unique person and therefore could work miracles; but he rests that assumption upon the stories of the miracles themselves; the stories of the miracles give him his basis for his picture of Jesus, and he then infers from this picture of him that he could have worked the miracles. He may stop, of course, at any one of these steps which I have outlined, not knowing how to get farther; or he may go on to discard the miraculous altogether. But if he does go on to do this, it will not be simply because biblical criticism has got rid of one miracle and another, nor simply because any one argument, like that of Hume, has convinced him that miracles are impossible or incredible; but it will be (and I consider this important) because by his study of history and criticism, perhaps also of philosophy and science, and perhaps quite without

these, by the gradual infiltration into his mind of scientific and modern presuppositions, he has gradually come to a total view of the world in which there is no need and no room for miracles.

There are many thinkers—and good thinkers too, as far as they go—who will try to save him from this last step. “We must not be too hasty,” they say, “in deciding what is possible and what is impossible. The discoveries of scientific men are constantly reminding us that things long thought impossible are not at all so.” To which I reply that it is a question not primarily of what is possible or what is impossible, but of what happened. The question is not, Could a man who had been really dead for three days begin to live again? but, Have we sufficient reason to believe that he did? About what is impossible or possible we must all have our opinions, and these will affect our attitude toward miracles; but what we are chiefly concerned with is to know, as nearly as we can, what actually happened.

“Neither must we allow ourselves to be confused,” say these thinkers who would save some vestige of the miraculous, “by the talk about contradiction or infraction of natural laws. We do not assert that natural laws are broken; they are merely set aside by the operation of some natural law higher than they. When Lazarus came to life, this was not that a natural law was broken, but that some higher natural law was brought into operation.” There is no light in this explanation. It is a natural law that dead people stay dead; and with this law we are entirely familiar. What we are asked to believe is that there is some higher natural law which upon special occasions drops in to interfere with this natural law. Now the alleged higher natural law must be the law that given certain conditions dead people come to life again. Of such a natural law we have no knowledge. What we are asked to do, therefore, is to believe in the existence of a natural law of which we have no experience, above the natural law which we know so well, and to believe that upon special occasions this natural law of which we know nothing takes precedence over the natural law which is elsewhere universal. And not only so, but we are bidden to believe in two natural laws, direct contradictions of each other; the one, that dead people stay dead; the other, that they

come to life. It is plain that this labored explanation of how miracles may occur can be of no service to the man who is asking whether they occur; it can be of service, if to anyone, only to one who is quite without misgivings as to their actual occurrence. But the question how they occur—whether in violation of one natural law or in obedience to a higher natural law—has never been anything more than a scholastic question. Let a man be in trouble about the raising of Lazarus, for instance, and go to him with the statement, "You don't have to believe that this happened in violation of natural law, but only in obedience to some higher law of which we are ignorant," and what would he say in reply? He would say, "That is not the point with me. The point with me is, Did it happen? And do I have to believe that it happened, in order to be a Christian man and to think honorably of Jesus and the New Testament?"

At one other point, but equally inefficiently, those who would save some belief in the miracles of the New Testament come to our aid. "You can certainly believe," they say, "in the healings of Jesus. And the more easily," they add, "since these were done in accordance with psychical laws which are now known and used by healers of our own time." To all of which I reply, "Certainly." It is easy enough to believe that Jesus healed many cases of nervous disorders; hard, in fact, to believe that he did not. But if these cures were wrought by a simple instinctive use of the power of the mind over the body, or if they were merely the by-product of an unusual personality, they were not and are not in any proper sense miracles. They stand entirely aside from such occurrences as the turning of the water into wine or the withering of the fig tree. Nor can the healing miracles all stand quite upon the same plane. It is easy to believe in the cure of Mary Magdalene, because there is nothing miraculous about it. But a case of congenital blindness is quite another thing.

If I should try to say why it is that I cannot believe in the occurrence of any of the miraculous events of the Bible, Old Testament or New, it would be somewhat as follows. I should not, in the first place, believe that things of this sort happened in my own times and my own neighborhood. No matter who told me

that a man in my own town had been raised from the dead; no matter how many apparently competent witnesses agreed in the statement; no matter if I saw it, or thought I saw it myself, I should not believe it. I should say, "There is some mistake about it. Either the man was not dead, or our eyes have deceived us, or there is something else about it that we do not understand." And even if the correct explanation of the occurrence was never discovered, I should persist in thinking that there was some such explanation, rather than believe that a man who was actually dead had come to life again.

It is sometimes said that we should believe anything if we only had sufficient testimony for it. Without contending whether we should or not, I may say in a word, that the reason we do not believe in the biblical miracles is that the testimony for them is not good enough. I have said we should not believe in the resurrection of a dead man today in our own town, no matter who attested it for us. And if the testimony of our best friends, and even of our own eyes, would fail to convince us of this occurrence, shall we believe in the occurrence of the same sort of event two thousand years ago, upon the testimony of men whose very names are for the most part unknown to us? To this men replied, until recently, "But these events of two thousand years ago are attested by inspired writers." The answer was once sufficient, but it means nothing now. Attribute to the men who wrote the New Testament a supernatural guidance in the accumulation and the writing of their material, and perhaps we should have to believe the miracles of the New Testament upon their testimony. But put them upon a par with other writers of their own times; give them the same presuppositions, the same methods, the same infallibility and no more, which their contemporaries had, and they are simply so many unknown men, testifying to events whose occurrence we should not believe from the mouths of our best and most trusted friends today. And shall I believe, upon the testimony of these men whom I did not know, and whose very identity is not only in dispute but largely past finding out, things which I should not believe upon the testimony of my own best friends? In other words, the belief in the biblical miracles lasted so long as it did because it was built

upon the assumption that the Bible was an infallible record. This assumption is gone, and with it the ground upon which rested the belief in the miracles of the Bible.

"So you think," it may be asked, "that the people who thought Jesus raised the dead, and walked on the water, and fed five thousand people with five loaves and two fishes, were mistaken?" No, that is not the way out. I do not believe that anybody, in the time of Jesus, thought he raised the dead, or did these other miraculous things. It was forty years, at the least, between the death of Jesus and the writing of our earliest Gospel. Forty years is long enough for these stories to have grown up. During that period they did grow up—not consciously invented by any one man, but growing unconsciously as they passed from mouth to mouth and got farther from the times and the immediate associates of Jesus. They are not "lies" nor conscious inventions of any kind; they are simply the product of a loving imagination, playing freely, in an unhistorical and an unscientific age, around the memory of Jesus. Here appear the fallacy and the futility of the argument that has so often been used to quiet doubts about the resurrection. "Do you believe," runs the argument, "that four hundred persons could have an illusion, or see an apparition, of precisely the same kind, all at the same time?" Not at all. But I believe that in a miracle-loving and a myth-making age the story that four hundred people had seen the risen Jesus would be just as easy as the story that one man had seen him. So it has often been asked, "Without the physical resurrection, what do you do with the empty tomb?" I do not do anything with it, nor with the body of Jesus. It is merely an item in the whole story, and the whole story is the growth of a later time.

I want to ask, now, in closing, two practical questions.

First, if one is compelled to give up his belief in miracles, is this any loss to him religiously? Does it leave him with less evidence of the power and presence of God? In particular, does it leave him without revelation? Quite the reverse—if only one has the proper idea of God. Given a God who lives outside the world, and has no necessary connection with nature or man, and miracles are a necessity. It is by a miracle that such a God reveals himself. It

is only by a miracle that such a God can break into this world to which he is naturally a stranger. But given a God who dwells in nature and in man, and he is revealed in the orderly processes of nature and of human life. But if he is revealed in these orderly and ordinary processes, then an interruption of these can be no addition to his revelation. It can be only a confusion and an interruption of it. One reason, therefore, why one discards the old belief in miracles is that, since he has come to a better idea of God, miracles stand in his way. It is not merely a difficulty to believe them, but it would be a calamity to him if he had to. For one cannot really believe that God is revealed in nature and the orderly processes of nature and of human life, and at the same time believe that he is revealed in miracles.

Secondly, if any preacher has come to this position in regard to miracles, what shall he do with it in the pulpit? In one way, little or nothing; in another way, a great deal. I do not conceive it to be necessary that ordinary people should be plunged into doubts which they do not have, except as this may sometimes be unavoidable in the attempt to teach religious conceptions that shall have an enduring quality superior to that of purely popular religious ideas. I should think it would be very foolish, therefore, for a man to go specifically into this matter of miracles before his congregation. His people would not understand him, and they would derive no benefit from his exposition.

But, on the other hand, if a preacher does not believe in miracles, he should preach a religion which, as manifestly as possible, has some basis other than the miraculous. He need not eschew, in his public reading of the Scriptures, all passages that have a miraculous element in them; but he may properly, and will naturally, avoid such passages as have the maximum of miracle with the minimum of religious instruction or spiritual value. He need not read, for instance, the story of the miracle at Cana, nor the raising of Lazarus, much less the story of the Gadarene swine or the awful operation of Peter upon Ananias. But, much more, he will preach a God who is revealed in the processes of nature and the development of human life, who speaks in the reason and conscience of all men, and in whom we and all things live and move and have our being. He

will have done with the old distinction between nature and the supernatural, and with the pious dualism that has been based upon it. If he has enough else to preach, nobody will miss his reference to the miracles in which he does not believe. The religious philosophy of his hearers will gradually shift itself to a rational basis, where it will rest much more solidly than ever before. He may, if he thinks wise, take up occasionally some particular miracle, like that of the virgin birth, or some group of miraculous stories, like those that have gathered around Elijah and Elisha, and show their real origin and character, allowing people to draw what conclusion they can and will concerning the miraculous in general. If anyone asks him a serious question about miracles, he will answer it honestly. But for the most part he will let miracles alone—not, however, because he is afraid of them, but because this is the easiest way to get rid of them. Whatever is seen to be unnecessary drops away of its own accord. What we want is a living God; and to such a God, in our day, nothing could be more unnecessary than miracles.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

A LAYMAN'S COMMENTARY¹

There lie before the reviewer the last seven parts of the latest commentary upon the entire Old Testament, or, rather, upon representative portions of the entire Old Testament. These parts contain (1) chaps. 13-21 of Judges, the Book of Ruth, with indices and map, completing Gressmann's volume on *The Beginnings of Israel*; (2) 11:4-17; 12:9-14; 13:1-6 of Zechariah, the Books of Daniel and Esther, a few selections from Chronicles, and an introduction concluding Haller's volume on *Judaism*; (3) Nahum, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Lamentations, Jonah, selections from the Deuteronomic Law, and a 72-page introduction to the prophets, concluding Hans Schmidt's work upon *The Great Prophets*. Editors and publisher are to be congratulated upon the completion of this important task of interpreting the Old Testament for the "common man." The work began to appear in 1909 and has been completed within a reasonable time for such an enterprise. The price of the seven volumes in which the entire commentary is organized ranges from M. 32 to M. 44, according to the style of binding selected. This certainly brings the work within reach of a large number of people. The plan of the work comprises a new translation of the biblical text, printed in poetical form wherever the material is poetic, a careful analysis of documents showing the various literary strata, brief introductions to the various books, maps to illustrate the history, and concise comments accompanying the text. The product is a marvel of skilful condensation. The reader can quickly discover the significance of a passage and not be buried in a mass of detail.

The greater part of these final instalments is occupied by Hans Schmidt's treatment of the prophets. The introduction to Schmidt's volume is written by his teacher, Gunkel. Schmidt himself contributes a preface written from under the sound of the Russian cannon in Eastern Prussia, where he was serving with the German army. The war prevented his writing the introduction himself. Gunkel has contributed a good discussion of three topics, viz.: (1) the historical situation amid

¹ *Die Schriften des Alten Testaments in Auswahl neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt.* Von H. Gressmann, H. Gunkel, M. Haller, H. Schmidt, W. Stärk, und P. Volz. Lieferungen 25-32. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913-15. M. 7.

which the prophets lived, (2) the psychological and spiritual characteristics of the prophets, (3) the literary characteristics of prophecy. The first two of these are given somewhat summary treatment; the third is handled at considerable length. This is in line with Gunkel's previous recognition of, and emphasis upon, the importance of a right understanding of the literary categories that apply to the prophetic utterances. Among points maintained by Gunkel to which many will take exception we may cite his claim that the denunciations of Amos, Micah, *et al.*, were called forth in behalf of the Canaanitish population that had long been subject to Israel but had by this time come to feel themselves one with her and resented the oppression and humiliation under which they still suffered. Likewise, it is very questionable to urge that the northern Israelites had maintained their integrity in Assyria and were amalgamated with the Jewish exiles after 597 B.C. Gunkel's denial of the popular theory that Hebrew prophecy was of Canaanitish origin seems, on the other hand, a sound contention.

Schmidt's exposition of the prophetic sayings is vivid and sympathetic, displaying keen insight into situations and motives. His critical position is more generous to the prophets than is the wont nowadays. For example, he denies to Jeremiah, to be sure, the oracles against foreign nations; but he leaves him in possession of 31:29, 30 where the important teaching of individual responsibility before God is formulated, and of 31:31-34 which speaks of the "new covenant" engraved upon the heart. He rightly gives more credit to Baruch for character and strength than is ordinarily done and, indeed, cites his friendship for Jeremiah as one of the best evidences of Jeremiah's own greatness. The newest thing, perhaps, to the readers of this commentary will be Schmidt's interpretation of Jonah. He assigns the book to the days preceding the downfall of Jerusalem and sees in it a protest against the message of such men as Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The author of Jonah is not concerned about the heathen world in general nor Nineveh in particular, but about Jerusalem. And he declares that Yahweh's love for that city will not permit him to see it destroyed. He will rather bring it to repentance and deliver it. Nineveh is thus an equivalent of Jerusalem. This is very clever, but it fails to carry conviction.

The method of the work as a whole is admirable, in that it brings, in as far as possible, each piece of literature into direct relation with the historical situations out of which it sprang. In the prophets, for example, the records from the historical writings are cited and explained in connection with, and as a background for, the messages spoken upon the

occasions in question. It is to be hoped that the completion of this commentary in the midst of this paralyzing war may not cause the publishers too greatly diminished a sale.

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THE LATEST HEBREW DICTIONARY¹

The sixteenth edition of the historic dictionary started by Wilhelm Gesenius in 1834 is easily the best work of its kind in the field at the present time. Its editor, Professor Buhl, announces that this, the fifth edition prepared by him, will probably be the last from his hand. It would be difficult to find an editor better equipped with the necessary capacity for unremitting industry and sound philological judgment. Under Dr. Buhl's editorship the dictionary has made great progress, keeping well abreast of the improvement in the science of Semitic philology during the last fifteen years. The eleventh edition, the first one edited by Dr. Buhl, was distinguished from its predecessors by greatly increased attention to the cognate Semitic languages for illustrative and explanatory purposes. To this end, the co-operation of Professor Socin and Professor Zimmern was secured. Professor Zimmern has continued to be responsible for the Assyriological phase of the work up to the present. Dr. Weber succeeds Socin in the responsibility for the Arabic; and the new science of Egyptology has been recognized by the addition of W. Max Müller's name in the last two editions. There has been a steady increase in the size of the dictionary in the last five editions. This last issue has fifty pages more than the eleventh edition; the pages are five-eighths of an inch wider and one-half inch longer; and the type is appreciably smaller. The type-page is a trifle wider and one-half inch longer than it was in the fifteenth edition. This has kept the dictionary from looking much larger than its immediate predecessor; but nevertheless it contains much more material. Dr. Buhl puts himself on record in the Preface as believing that a dictionary on the scale of the present issue is the more practicable type as compared with a proposition to issue a small and cheap edition for students and accompany it by a large, exhaustive work of the type of Gesenius' *Thesaurus* for more advanced workers. This judgment seems to be sound. A thesaurus

¹ *Wilhelm Gesenius' hebräisches und aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament.* In Verbindung mit Prof. Dr. H. Zimmern, Prof. Dr. W. Max Müller und Prof. Dr. O. Weber, bearbeitet von Dr. Frants Buhl. Sechzehnte Auflage. Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1915. xx+1014 pages. M. 22.

cannot be kept up to date; the cost of frequent editions is prohibitive. It soon becomes a graveyard of words. The student in his earlier stages is also better off with a fairly adequate lexicon, such as this now is, than he is with a mere word-list.

This edition reflects the progress of scholarship adequately. It does not adopt every new suggestion that has been made, to be sure; but it shows discretion in its treatment of new material. If anything, it errs probably on the side of caution. But this is the only safe course for a dictionary-maker. Anything that meets with Buhl's approval carries excellent credentials. The literature of the last five years is well represented in bibliographical references. Among the new materials in the dictionary it is pleasing to find acknowledgment made of the correctness of George F. Moore's contention that the pronunciation of the divine name as Jehovah did not originate with Galatinus in 1518 A.D., but can be traced back at least as far as the preceding century. The identification of the terms *Habiru* and "Hebrew" is also accepted for the first time; likewise, W. R. Arnold's proposal in *AJSL*, Vol. XXVIII, to interpret בִּרְחֹרֶן of II Sam. 2:29 as meaning "the forenoon." Under the words פִּתְיוֹר and פִּרְיָה, it is disappointing to find no special mention of the Phaestos disk and the archaeological evidence it presents for the Cretan connections of the Philistines; see my *ICC* on Zeph. 2:5. The caution of the editor is apparent in such cases as that of אִפְּוֹר, where he refuses to decide definitely for or against its application to an image of the god.

We may close our notice of this admirable piece of work by offering some *addenda et corrigenda* for the consideration of the editor of the 17th edition. P. xib, Driver's *Samuel* reached a second and enlarged edition in 1913. P. xiiia, l. 9, l. Hölscher. P. xviib, l. 6, l. חֲרָם. P. xviiib, l. 8, l. 396a. On p. 73 the treatment of the particle אֲשֶׁר is woefully belated; the articles by Dr. Carl Gaenssle in *AJSL*, Vol. XXXI (1914-15),¹ have made necessary the re-writing of the dictionary and grammar articles on this word. P. 122a, l. 24, l. *JQR*, 1911. P. 238b, l. 29, l. *himti*. P. 249b, l. 9 (bottom), l. Mic. 7:18. P. 262b, l. 31, נָחַר of Jer. 6:29 is placed here under חָרַר as Niph. and again on p. 498b as Kal perfect of נָחַר; the latter is the better. P. 362, פִּרְיָה is associated rightly with Assyrian *karābu*; Dr. L. Waterman's article on "Bull-Worship" in *AJSL*, XXXI (1915), should be consulted here. P. 431b,

¹ Now published separately by the University of Chicago Press as *The Hebrew Particle אֲשֶׁר* (1915).

מִצִּי, Sir. 31:8, should be added here. P. 485b, l. 37, *l. Gen.* 19:9. P. 513a; with נֶפֶשׁ = "corpse," may be compared its use in Nabataean in sense of "gravestone." P. 573b, s.v. טֵר, on Hab. 3:9, cross-reference is made to נֵטֵר II Niph., where no allusion to the form is found. P. 607b, s.v. עֶבֶל II, comparison should be made with Assy. *uplu* = "boil"; see H. Holma, *Kleine Beiträge* (1912), and S. Langdon, *AJSL*, XXX (1913), 79. P. 634b, l. 10, on פִּים in I Sam. 13:21, reference should be made to the weight recently found at Silwan in Jerusalem stamped with these letters; see Pilcher, *Pal. Explor. Fund Quart. Statement*, 1914, p. 99. P. 668b, l. 13, add Sir. 42:8; cf. Tobit 8:15. P. 883b, s.v. חֲנֹה II; *l. pi.* imperfect יִחַנֵּה, *m. d. acc.* besingen Ri. 5:11, so wohl auch inf. חֲנִיחַ *m. l.* Ri. 11:40, u.s.w.; cf. this *Journal*, XIV, 448.

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RECENT PATRISTIC LITERATURE

In 1911 Diobouniotis of the University of Athens noticed in a manuscript at the Meteoron monastery a series of scholia on a large part of the Apocalypse, which he thought might come from the hand of Hippolytus. He sent a copy of the text to Professor Harnack with a view to publication and Harnack soon identified it as the work of Origen on the Apocalypse. It had not been known that Origen wrote a commentary or even scholia on the Apocalypse, but in his commentary on Matthew, written between 246 and 249 A.D., he expressed his intention of writing such a work. The manuscript gives the Greek text of the Apocalypse (1:1—13:18; 14:3—5) interspersed with thirty-nine scholia. Thirty-seven of these Harnack ascribes to Origen, and the last two he has traced to Irenaeus' great work *Against Heresies*, Book V. The manuscript seems to have been copied from one in which the text of the Apocalypse was written continuously and the scholia occupied the adjacent margins. The breaking off of Origen's comment at Rev. 12:2 Harnack tentatively explains as perhaps due to his arrest and imprisonment in the Decian persecution from his sufferings in which he never recovered.

Students of early Christian literature are indebted to Diobouniotis for a valuable discovery and to Harnack for one more highly interesting identification. The method of publication adopted by the editors exhibits after a brief introduction the Greek text of the thirty-nine sections of the Apocalypse, and then that of the scholia with the necessary textual notes. A discussion of the character and authorship of the

scholia follows, and an investigation of the type of text of the Apocalypse used by the scholiast concludes the work. The quickness with which this first edition of a long-lost work of Origen was prepared must explain its editorial shortcomings, which have already been skilfully dealt with by Dean Armitage Robinson in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, XIII, 295-97. In particular the interpretation Harnack puts upon a scribal comment on Scholium XXIV in which he finds a remarkable independent confirmation perhaps from Pamphilus or Eusebius, of his own identification of Origen as the author of the scholia, vanishes entirely with a slight change in accentuation (ὡς οὐ for ὧ σου) and the abandonment of the textual changes Harnack's interpretation of the note involved. The note thus conservatively understood as Origen's comment on Rev. 3:22 ceases to have any bearing upon the authorship of the scholia and the ingenious literary argument so confidently reared by Professor Harnack (p. 55) collapses. But his brilliant identification of the scholia as the work of Origen and probably the last work from his pen stands unaffected by this unlucky excursus and adds another item to the great debt patristic studies owe to him.¹

The effort to provide the writings of the Fathers with adequate commentaries embodying new methods and the materials now available is producing valuable results in various quarters. Ganschinietz at Münster has put forth such a commentary on chaps. 28-42 of the fourth book of Hippolytus' *Refutation*.² It will be remembered that Books II and III are missing, but Ganschinietz, partly following an investigation of Alès, makes it probable that in these chapters of Book IV the bulk of Book III is really preserved. The suggestion of Hermann that Lucian in his *Alexander* and Hippolytus in these chapters were both dependent on the work of Celsus on the Magi is rejected by Ganschinietz who maintains that the lost work entitled Θρασυμήδους τέχνη, "the Art of Thrasymedes," mentioned in the Book VI, chap. 7, is a more probable source for both. Ganschinietz gives some evidence for a date between 200 and 230 A.D. for this lost work. Careful textual notes accompany the commentary which is designed to explain the bizarre performances of the magicians Hippolytus is discussing, and to relate the practices he reports, to similar

¹ *Der Scholien-Kommentar des Origenes zur Apokalypse Johannis nebst einem Stück aus Irenaeus Lib. V Graece*. Entdeckt und herausgegeben von Constantin Diobouniotis und Adolf Harnack. (Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXVIII, 3.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 88 pages. M. 3.

² *Hippolytos' Capitel gegen die Magier: Refut. Haer. IV 28-42*. Erklärt von Richard Ganschinietz. (Texte und Untersuchungen, XXXIX, 2.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. 77 pages. M. 2.50.

proceedings in the papyri and the magic literature. Students of Hippolytus will find this decidedly useful. It is especially agreeable to learn that we really possess in these chapters of Book IV all but the beginning of Book III, so that what is actually missing from the Refutation is now reduced to Book II and the opening part of Book III. Ganschinietz' occasional references to Dieterich's *Mithrasliturgie* suggest the suspicion that he regards that work as a genuine document of Mithraism. Of course that is not the case, for there is nothing distinctively Mithraic about it, and to refer to it by title without qualifying its extreme claims tends to perpetuate an unfortunate misconception.

The uncanonical gospel material preserved in Syriac, Coptic, and Arabic presents literary problems of much intricacy. Some of these have been investigated by Dr. Felix Haase of Breslau, and he has published his principal results.¹ The Strassburg Coptic gospel fragment published by Jacoby he would refer to a non-heretical document probably of the third century. Certain Coptic fragments published by Revillout as belonging to the Gospel of the Twelve Apostles Haase connects with a late Gospel of Gamaliel, basing the identification upon the words "I Gamaliel followed them [meaning Pilate and the rest] in the midst of the crowd." Haase puts this Gospel late, perhaps between the fifth and seventh centuries. Revillout's Coptic fragment of the Gospel of Bartholomew identifies itself with the words, "I Bartholomew the apostle of the Son of God have seen the Son of God." It is clearly gnostic and belongs to the third century. Jerome is the first writer to mention this Gospel, but it is spoken of in the Gelasian decrees and by Bede.

The materials entering into the Gospel of the Twelve Apostles published in 1900 by Rendel Harris from a Syriac manuscript in his collection are separated by Haase into apocalyptic and gospel elements. The gospel material he holds originated in Syriac and belongs to the end of the third or the beginning of the fourth century. The Coptic text reported by Schmidt in 1895 and believed to be from a Gospel of Peter, Haase thinks is a document composed by one gnostic sect in its conflict with another, not, as Harnack had maintained, a non-heretical work. Haase prefers Harnack's date, 150-80 A.D., to that of Schmidt who put it before 150. The various forms of the Gospel of Thomas, longer Greek, shorter Greek, Syriac, and Latin, seem closely related. The Latin is evidently derived mainly if not wholly from the long Greek

¹ *Literarkritische Untersuchungen zur orientalisches-apokryphen Evangelienliteratur.* By Dr. Felix Haase. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. 92 pages. M. 3.

form, but the resemblances of the two Greek forms and the Syriac can only be explained as due to the use of a common source now lost.

Haase further discusses the history of the Protevangelium of James, the recensions of the Acts of Pilate, and the fourteen forms of the Transitus Mariae, among which last he holds the Syriac to be the most original. Useful bibliographies accompany his discussions, but there is no index and the frequent English citations are rather negligently printed. But these are minor defects in a very helpful treatment of some of the most confused and intricate problems of Christian literature.

Professor Harnack has made many significant contributions to the history of the New Testament Canon in his *History of Dogma*, and smaller works, and perhaps no one has seen and stated its problems more clearly than he. He has never before presented his views on the rise of the New Testament collection in a book devoted wholly to that subject, although in his *Das Neue Testament um das Jahr 200* he dealt with what he regards as the vital stage of the whole process, in the form of an answer to Zahn's *Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons*. In the short space of little more than a hundred pages he has now put forth¹ the chief elements entering into the formation of the New Testament collection and the far-reaching consequences of that process. Too many writers on the Canon quite overlook these problems and content themselves with collecting and describing the historical materials. But Harnack, perhaps because he is so expert a historian of dogma, has always struck at the heart of the problem. For, as he points out in his preface, the history of the rise of the New Testament collection is not a problem in the history of literature but in the history of worship and dogma.

In considering the historical forces that led to the creation of the New Testament, Harnack distinguishes five leading problems which demand solution: How came the church to develop a second authoritative collection side by side with the Old Testament? How came the New Testament to consist, as it anciently did, of two halves, gospel and apostle? Why does it contain four gospels instead of one? Why does it contain one Apocalypse and only one? Was the New Testament a conscious creation and how did the churches come to possess a uniform New Testament? All Professor Harnack's researches in the history of dogma, the history of early Christian literature, and the spread of

¹ *Die Entstehung des neuen Testaments und die wichtigsten Folgen der neuen Schöpfung*. By Adolf von Harnack. (Beiträge zur Einleitung in das neue Testament, VI. Heft.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914. vii+152 pages. M. 4.

early Christianity serve to equip him in an extraordinary, even a unique, degree to deal with these problems.

The rise of a New Testament side by side with the Old is ultimately due to the great respect felt by Christians from the very first for the teaching of Jesus and then for the records of his teaching, in which the Old Testament prophecies were shown to be fulfilled. The consciousness of a new covenant led men to look about them for the documents that sanctioned it. The authority necessary for the formation of such a collection was found in the spiritual endowment enjoyed by apostles, prophets, and teachers. The writings of such men carried with them a certain authority. But it was the work of Marcion and the conflict with the Gnostics and the Montanists that brought into vigorous operation these latent forces tending toward an authoritative scripture.

In the fourfold Gospel Harnack rightly sees a compromise designed to reconcile adherents of the earlier Gospels and those more progressive Christians of Asia who accepted the Fourth Gospel. Thus Marcion with his Gospel and apostle, and Ephesus with its four Gospels, played leading parts in the preliminary stages of the shaping of the New Testament. But it was Rome that fixed the character and the scope of the first New Testament as catholic-apostolic and it was Alexandria that, out of the host of books it revered, increased it to the twenty-seven books that we know. Harnack develops these and kindred points with skill and vigor and with the widest learning. The last quarter of his book is devoted to the consequences of the creation of the New Testament, which he describes in a series of striking antitheses. The New Testament immediately began to be looked upon as the gift of the Holy Spirit and to influence Christian life and the development of doctrine. It subordinated to itself the historical Christian revelation and also the Old Testament which had now to be understood in the light of the New. It preserved the most valuable part of early Christian literature from destruction, but in so doing suffered many other Christian writings only less precious to perish. It has ever again led back dogmatics to history. With such consequences of the creation of the New Testament Harnack thinks writers on the subject should concern themselves since these results spring directly from the essential nature of the new collection.

Harnack thinks the formation of the New Testament was practically finished by the middle of the third century, when, in the persons of Origen and Hippolytus, Alexandria and Rome had come to accept the same list of New Testament books. A number of appendices conclude the work but many readers will regret the absence of an index. On the

whole the book is probably the most clear, incisive, and helpful sketch of the rise of the New Testament collection that has appeared.

Recent students of Justin have had much to say of his actual ignorance of the philosophies he attacked and of the illogical and miscellaneous character of his writings. The study of the *Dialogue* and the *Apologies* has convinced Hubík¹ that Justin is far more intelligent and logical than his critics have been willing to allow. He traces the course of the argument in the *Dialogue with Trypho* and concludes that it is capable of a reasonably clear and logical analysis. The *Apology*, too, upon examination proves more systematic and orderly than its critics have admitted. In this latter judgment Hubík had been anticipated by Wehofer (1897). A more novel part of Hubík's discussion is his treatment of the so-called Second *Apology*. It is a curious fact that in the Paris manuscript this stands before the longer *Apology* usually called the first, and that the longer *Apology* is in the manuscript entitled the Second *Apology*. It is likewise curious that Eusebius sometimes refers to the shorter *Apology* as the first, and more than once quotes the longer one as the *Apology* addressed to Antoninus. But on one occasion Eusebius refers to the longer one too as the first (*H.E.* ii. 13. 2). Hubík suggests that in Eusebius' time, as ever since, the shorter *Apology* stood in the manuscripts of Justin before the longer one, and was consequently quoted by Eusebius as the first (ἡ πρώτη) *Apology*. This is promising but not altogether convincing in view of Eusebius' quotation of the longer one as the first, in *H.E.* ii. 13. 2, and of his assignment of material from the shorter one to "the same" work to which material from the longer has just been referred (*H.E.* iv. 8. 3-5). Hubík replies that Eusebius describes the longer one as the "first" in *H.E.* ii. 13. 2, in the chronological sense, and that "the same" (ταὐτῃ) in *H.E.* iv. 8. 3-5 means the same roll or volume, not the same document. Yet skilfully as he contends for the entire independence of the two *apologies* it is difficult to escape the prevalent conviction that Eusebius really knew and quoted but one, and that his allusion to a second one is a mistake on his part. In the present state of our knowledge of the problem it is most reasonable to suppose that the shorter *Apology* is neither the first *Apology* as the manuscript virtually calls it, nor the Second *Apology* of most editors, but an appendix belonging to the long *Apology*, which last is therefore alone entitled to be called the *Apology* of Justin.

¹ *Die Apologien des Hl. Justinus des Philosophen und Märtyrers. Literaturhistorische Untersuchungen* von Dr. Karl Hubík. (Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft, 19.) Vienna: Mayer, 1912. viii+383 pages. M. 7.

But Hubfk goes still farther. A comparison of the Second Apology, as he considers it, with the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix satisfies him that both are answers to the same attack. It has been supposed with a good degree of probability that Minucius Felix was answering an address directed against the Christians by M. Cornelius Fronto, the tutor of Aurelius. Hubfk concludes that the so-called Second Apology, like the later *Octavius*, is a reply to Fronto's work. Hubfk would accordingly date the longer apology addressed to Antoninus, in 156 A.D. and the shorter addressed to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in 164-65. An interesting excursus on the persecution under Marcus Aurelius concludes this able and elaborate contribution to the study of Justin.

Professor Michael Rackl¹ of Eichstätt has subjected Völter's somewhat fantastic theory of the origin of the Ignatian letters to a criticism perhaps unnecessarily elaborate, and arrived at the conclusion that the seven Ignatian letters mentioned by Eusebius and the letter of Polycarp to the Philippians are genuine documents of the early years of the second century. The main task undertaken by Rackl, however, is the investigation of the Christology of Ignatius. In this inquiry he makes abundant use of a wide range of authorities, often quoting them at length. But he does not escape the tendency not infrequent with Catholic writers to read back into primitive documents doctrinal subtleties of which their authors can hardly have dreamed. That Ignatius was familiar with the Gospel of John and assumed that his readers were, is far from certain, and the especial familiarity he does evince with the Gospel of Matthew is rather blurred when he is made to seem equally well acquainted with Mark, Luke, and John. Syrian and even Antiochian Christianity in later times proved curiously slow and reluctant, as compared with the church at large, about accepting Christian writings, and such was probably its tendency from the first. One feels a certain hardness of treatment and a lack of historical perspective in Professor Rackl's work, but he has gathered into it a mass of useful material which students of Ignatius' Christology will welcome. A very extensive bibliography is prefixed to the work, and writers of all schools are freely though perhaps somewhat indiscriminately quoted in the argument and the footnotes.

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¹ *Die Christologie des heiligen Ignatius von Antiochien. Nebst einer Voruntersuchung: die Echtheit der sieben Ignatianischen Briefe verteidigt gegen Daniel Völter.* By Dr. Michael Rackl. (Freiburger Theologische Studien, XIV. Heft.). Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1914. xxxii+418 pages. \$2.20.

A NEW EDITION OF THE APOLOGISTS

Investigators in the New Testament field who employ the historical method are aware that they may not limit their study to the literature included in the New Testament canon. The proper date for the New Testament period is in the neighborhood of 180 A.D. All the Christian productions of the pre-Irenaeus epoch must be considered by anyone who would adequately appreciate the New Testament. But it is just this primitive patristic field which has been so little tilled. Until recently it was difficult to find critical texts covering the apostolic Fathers, the Antilegomena, the early apologists. Our lexicons paid scant attention to them. Our concordances offered even less information. In English translations one might discover Justin and Irenaeus sandwiched between the apostolic Fathers and then in the ninth volume come upon the Gospel of Peter, the Diatessaron, Aristides, Origen!

Fortunately this condition of chaos no longer exists. At present the student of the New Testament period has at his disposal critical texts of the New Testament, the apostolic Fathers, the Antilegomena, and the primitive apologists. To Professor Goodspeed belongs the honor of having published an exact concordance of both the apostolic Fathers and the primitive apologists. His *Index Patristicus* and his *Index Apologeticus* have materially lightened the labors of New Testament scholars and church historians. And he has now completed the series of critical texts of the pre-Irenaeus period by publishing *Die ältesten Apologeten*.¹

The apologists included are Quadratus, Aristides, Justin, Tatian, Melito, Athenagoras. The author's desire was to publish a text suited to the needs of the average student. He therefore precedes each apology with a brief historical introduction and a statement of the principal textual facts. The apparatus is sufficiently brief to prevent aimless meandering, sufficiently complete to direct attention to important variations. Citations and reminiscences of biblical and classical literature are indicated by underscoring and their sources noted in the footnotes. The text is based on the best critical editions of the various apologists, such as those of Otto, Geffcken, Krüger, Schwartz. The author's own extensive work in textual criticism entitles him to independent conclusions. Moreover he was at great pains to secure photographs of important manuscripts. Often he prefers to abide by the text of the manuscripts rather than to accept the brilliant conjectures of his

¹ *Die ältesten Apologeten, Texte mit kurzen Einleitungen*. By Edgar J. Goodspeed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. xi+380 pages. M. 4.80.

predecessors. Thus we have a calm and careful review of the decisions of others. In both Tatian and Athenagoras, in harmony with the method of the *Index Apologeticus*, he adopts a division of paragraphs into sections of a hundred words. The text is of such size and clearness as to make its perusal a delight, and not least serviceable are the reference lists to names and citations.

What one misses in this student's manual is an explanation of the abbreviations and the notation of both the text and the apparatus. An English translation of the brief German introductions to the various apologies should also have been added. In this day of continuously decreasing interest in linguistic study, when it is all the more essential that the results of the latest textual reconstruction should be made available to students who refuse to acquire or employ the Greek, one task remains for Professor Goodspeed—a new English translation of the apologists based on the corrected text. Many of us are hoping that it may soon appear. The new rendering should prove all the more serviceable, if the Greek text accompanied it.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL TREATISES

Professor Stalker's latest volume¹ is a modest attempt to show in one particular area how the preacher may make larger use of the material with which the college furnishes him. The lectures which constitute the basis of this book were delivered in the United States, at the Union Theological Seminary (of Richmond, Virginia) and Auburn Seminary. Professor Stalker has read widely in the field of psychology, and makes large use of recent more popular discussions of the subject. In the use of the term "Christian psychology" he intends to limit the area of his discussion and to distinguish it from biblical psychology and from recent so-called psychology of religion, which restricts itself so largely to the phenomena of conversion. Dr. Stalker's style is clear and straightforward, and there can be no doubt that the book will make a contribution to the psychological knowledge of many ministers. At the same time, the discriminating reader will be likely to feel that the system of theology to whose illumination this body of psychology is brought is by its very assumptions detached and unrelatable thereto. In other words,

¹ *Christian Psychology*. By James Stalker. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. 281 pages. \$1.25 net.

if Professor Stalker makes consistent use of psychology as an instrument of interpretation, it will carry him a great deal farther than he has gone in this discussion; it will modify his biblicism, it will emphasize genetic and social factors which he has largely omitted, and it will suggest modifications of theological formulas which seem not to have occurred to him.

T. Rhondda Williams is not a novice in theological popularization. In the volume just at hand¹ he gives us the faith by which he lives, a faith whose content he preaches in his ministry at Union Church, Brighton. It is rightly urged that "it is not from those who are indifferent to the old that God chooses the apostles of the new." As a product of the older system, Mr. Williams would become a reformer of it. Thus it is in a reverent and constructive spirit that he discusses "Authority," "Inquiry," "Faith," "Realization," "Practical Spirituality," "Salvation," "The Hereafter," "The Church," and "Christianity and Social Ideals." All external authority is brushed aside with the observation that a final code would destroy initiative and progress. The whole soul of man—not intellect alone—responds to an inward urge which faith defines as personal, or—if not as personal—as superpersonal because it includes all personal values while not limited thereto. The deepest insight is that of the mystic who discovers the unity of all in God; yet many fail of this vision of God without thereby being rendered irreligious. However, the world needs the practical mystic, whose faith is not a blind alley but a thoroughfare. What appears to be a pretty vigorous pantheism is revealed in chap. vii, where the author speaks of "the illusion of separateness [from God] which is the source of all our sins." Jesus is world-Savior through his unique power of revealing truth and kindling love, etc. Whether consistently or not, the author pleads for faith in the survival of death by the individual. He holds that the church will survive while it continues to be useful and no longer. The liberal church cannot insist upon any one form of confession as a basis of membership, nor can baptism and the Lord's Supper be made obligatory. While there is much that is suggestive in this discussion, it suffers at vital points from a measure of homiletical haziness.

In *The Present Relations of Science and Religion*² we have a discussion by one who—as ex-president of the British Association—is presumably a competent scientist. The author holds that the recent advances in

¹ *The Working Faith of a Liberal Theologian*. By T. Rhondda Williams. London: Williams & Norgate, 1914. xiii+264 pages. \$1.50.

² *The Present Relations of Science and Religion*. By T. G. Bonney. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1913. x+212 pages. \$1.50.

science have in no way made theism more difficult. The first two chapters give us the evidence for a great process of evolution in the inorganic and organic world; and it is in this part of the discussion, it may be said, that the author speaks with greatest authority. He then argues for a revelation through which God has led men "gradually onwards and upwards, giving them such knowledge as they could bear"; for the possibility and place of miracles—as happenings beyond the measure of current human knowledge; for the credibility of Christianity, as involving the miraculous birth of Jesus and a physical resurrection; for the doctrine of the Trinity, which science illustrates through analogies from the fields of chemistry and zoölogy. The discussion closes with an apt admonition of the clergy, and a plea that both scientist and clergyman recognize the God of nature as one with the God of revelation.

Charles H. Brent, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, sets forth in nine brief chapters a popular apologetic for a very conservative theological position.¹ The book gains its title from the first chapter, and this title can scarcely be said to be apt for the body of the discussion. The commonplaces of experience are treated as the chief Christian evidences; the Apostles' Creed is construed as a supreme declaration of the greatness of love and an evidence that God is triune because he is love; the apparent dimness of the spiritual world is interpreted as an evidence of God's love; if we admit that God is love, the incarnation follows of necessity; we are assured that the Virgin-birth is a remarkable deviation from nature, although in itself parthenogenesis is a commonplace of nature; the Virgin-birth is a "standing index pointing to the unique personality and character of our Lord"; from the Virgin-birth the discussion takes us to the Jesus of the passion and of the resurrection, in this matter following closely the subject-matter of the Apostles' Creed and overlooking the important fact that the things most vital to the Christian conception of Jesus are the things which the Creed wholly omits.

In *The Faith of a Christian*,² we have a shilling edition of a volume of apologetics which appeared first in 1904, and which found a wide reading. The discussion covers the usual field of general apologetics, and, while conservative, is thought-provoking and affords an excellent example of the older type of evangelical apologetic. A somewhat similar, though

¹ *The Revelation of Discovery*. By Charles H. Brent. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915. 129 pages. \$1.00.

² *The Faith of a Christian*. By Bernard Lucas. London: Macmillan, 1914. vi+216 pages. 1s. net.

slighter discussion, we find in William Temple's volume, *The Faith and Modern Thought*,¹ which appeared first in 1910, and has since appeared in frequent reprints. While this discussion is less extended than the preceding, it makes a more modern approach to the field. The writer is abreast of modern thought in the critical and philosophical realms, and has an admirable ability to present his argument compactly.

A question which every human generation repeats is discussed by John Haynes Holmes in his recent volume, *Is Death the End?*² Mr. Holmes contributes nothing new to the argument for immortality, but the volume is an interesting and well-written *résumé* of the standard arguments. The style, the abundance of allusion, the frequent quotations betray Mr. Holmes as preacher and rhetorician rather than as logician and philosopher. Nevertheless, he has read widely in the literature of this subject, he has organized his material well, and he is the preacher of a great hope.

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THE SEARCH FOR SALVATION

Taylor's *Deliverance*³ is a charmingly written sketch of various attempts which have been made by the human spirit to deliver itself from nature's limitations and to establish "an adjustment between the instincts and faculties of human nature and the powers conceivably controlling its accomplishment and destiny." The beginnings of this struggle for spiritual deliverance are found in Chaldaea and Egypt. In the former land the means employed toward this end are chiefly ceremonial, but in Egypt the notion of morality as a basis for rewards and punishments seems to have held a larger place. The Chinese sages sought deliverance by following the path of duty, or by detaching themselves from life's entanglements. In India annihilation of individuality was made the goal of achievement; while Zarathushtra advocated a militant dualism in which man by devotion to the Prince of Righteousness triumphed over evil. The prophets of Israel based their hope upon

¹ *The Faith and Modern Thought*. Six Lectures by William Temple. London: Macmillan, 1914. xi+172 pages. 2s. 6d. net.

² *Is Death the End?* By John Haynes Holmes. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915. xi+378 pages. \$1.50.

³ *Deliverance: The Freeing of the Spirit in the Ancient World*. By Henry Osborn Taylor. New York: Macmillan, 1915. vii+294 pages. \$1.25.

God's choice of a select nation which should serve him faithfully. Among the Greeks the spirit sought freedom in different ways, but mainly through two channels, viz., practical activities of which heroes are the ideal, and philosophical speculation. The notion of divine intermediaries who effect deliverance for mankind is especially prominent in the oriental religions which spread over the Graeco-Roman world. Jesus and Paul fixed their gaze upon the future, looking for the consummation of salvation through a catastrophic end of the present world. But by the time of Augustine the establishment of the Kingdom of God upon this earth has become a fixed ideal to be attained through a properly organized church, a correctly ordered life, and an accurately defined dogma; the end of all being a blessed eternal life. Thus the ancients prescribed ways of deliverance—but has the solution of the problem been reached even yet? The author is disposed to answer affirmatively by adopting the course pursued by Jesus, namely, an unqualified surrender of one's self to the power of God.

The book must be read with the author's intention constantly in mind. He eschews all discussion of the many perplexing critical problems involved and touches only such topics as are absolutely essential to his cursory treatment. Moreover, he does not discuss the ever-important question of what stimuli within the life of these ancient peoples prompted the phenomena he has described. But he is quite well aware of these omissions, and so has treated his subject selectively—and in the main representatively—rather than superficially. And, above all, he is often suggestive and always entertaining.

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SOME PROBLEMS OF THE CHURCH

In his monograph on *The Church, the State and the People*¹ Professor Konrad Meyer discusses the problems growing out of the relation of church and state, problems which in Germany are growing acute. As a local "inspector" of the Prussian state church, Meyer has had ample opportunity to study the problem there at first hand.

The book contains four sections treating, (1) the principles involved; (2) the origin of the present relation; (3) the significance of this relation; (4) a forecast of future developments. We have here a concise history

¹ *Kirche, Volk und Staat*. By Konrad Meyer. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. 54 pages. M. 1. 20.

of the steps by which the present status of the church in its relation to the state in Germany was reached, and a clear statement of the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship. The significance of the current movement away from the church (*Los von der Kirche!*) is estimated quite judiciously. The question as to what the situation demands receives the chief attention; and the author's conclusion is that the tendency of modern developments points to an ultimate dissolution of the relationship between state and church in its present form, but that the time for the separation has not yet arrived. Meantime it is recognized to be the duty of the church to prepare itself for the coming change by a careful study of the problems involved, and especially by the development of a form of administration which shall enable the church to stand eventually on its own feet while it preserves the positive character and advantages of a *Volkskirche*. The book is trustworthy and valuable in its field.

One of the problems of the church in every country is to find worthy means of interesting youth in religion. To aid pastors, teachers, and parents in German churches, schools, and homes is the object of a new edition of Caspari's *Geistliches und Weltliches*¹ which is a popular commentary on Luther's shorter catechism. The present edition is the twenty-third, indicating the wide esteem in which the book is held. Luther's smaller catechism still constitutes the chief textbook on religion in large sections of the state church in Germany. The object of Caspari's book is to illuminate the questions and answers of the catechism with popular stories, spiritual interpretations, and homely proverbs fitted to the comprehension of boys and girls. The wealth of genial comment in story, folk-tale, poetry, and proverb, all suffused with the stimulating spirit of a lover of youth and a friend of the people, accounts for the continued popularity of a book first issued over sixty years ago.

Carey's *My Priesthood*² points to some apparent trouble in the minds of Anglican churchmen because of the dangers which threaten from the lack of consecration among their priesthood here and there. The author is one who has frequently officiated at ordination services and evidently understands the trend of things unusually well. There are those who simply drift into the priesthood, perhaps because "they were not clever enough for the civil service or rich enough for the bar." Even at its best

¹ *Geistliches und Weltliches*. By Karl Heinrich Caspari. Leipzig: Werner Scholl, 1915. xxx+402 pages. M. 1.40.

² *My Priesthood*. By Walter J. Carey. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1915. xi+155 pages. \$1.25.

estate the priesthood offers many difficulties and temptations. This book represents an attempt to inspire the clergy, and especially its younger members, with a higher ideal of their office.

The author is a high churchman and holds the sacramentarian views characteristic of that section of the Anglican church. This implies a cast of feeling which is foreign to a majority of Protestant Christians in this country. Nevertheless, the book is full of suggestion and is worth reading by all who are for any reason interested in the calling of the ministry. Within its lines it is honest, straightforward, and illuminating. The table of contents includes the following: "The Motive of Ordination"; "How Does One Become a Competent Priest?" "The Sort of Characters We Want to Produce"; "The Clergyman as Pastor, Priest and Missioner"; "The Priest's Difficulties and Temptations."

As a practical question of duty, all religious bodies are interested in the problems of philanthropy. Disease, poverty, unemployment, the care of criminals and incompetents, all these present problems so large and important that they call for the special treatment of experts. But what is the relation of religion and the church to the forces which help and heal, or the development of the qualities which shall forestall trouble in individuals or society? These are large questions which are not yet as clearly understood as they should be.

In his study of *Early Methodist Philanthropy*,¹ Eric M. North has made a valuable contribution to the study of this important subject. Tracing the philanthropic activities of the early Methodists from the first efforts of the Holy Club at Oxford to the later establishment of schools, poor-houses, orphanages, and hospitals, and the care of the infirm, the poor, and the inmates of prisons during the age of Anne and the Georges, Mr. North not only reveals the effect of the Wesleyan revival on the spirit of benevolence, but he gathers much valuable material which illuminates the relation of that age to the rapidly growing scientific charity of the present day. In addition to the five chapters which deal with the history and significance of early Methodist philanthropy, there are appendices which throw light on such subjects as the philanthropy of the Holy Club, Wesley's ideas on visiting the sick, the poor, and prisoners, the use of money in charity, Whitefield's Orphan Home in Georgia, etc.

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¹ *Early Methodist Philanthropy*. By Eric M. North. New York and Cincinnati: The Methodist Book Concern, 1915. viii+181 pages. \$1.00.

DISTURBING THE CHURCH

Dean George Hodges, Dr. Paul Moore Strayer, and Professor Henry C. Vedder have recently written a book each with the avowed purpose of awakening the church to her social duty. The first writer attempts this task under the title *Faith and Social Service*,¹ which serves as a general caption for eight lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. The subjects treated are: "New Forces," "Indifference," "Doubt," "Poverty," "Labor," "Moral Reform," "The City," and "The Divided Church."

The new forces which have determined our present problem are found to be powder, printing, steam, electricity, and the evolutionary view of the world. Indifference is presented as the besetting sin of a practical, money-bent age which needs the inspiration of the Christian message. Doubt is analyzed and the solvent found "in the word of Jesus Christ." Through a consideration of the inability of charity to abolish poverty the author passes to a treatment of the labor problem.

Here, although beautifully draped in a charming style, one gets a hint of the complacency with which the faithful regard the labor movement and how confident they are that the gospel "will make people more considerate one of another" and so solve the labor problem. Needless to say, the solution hangs not so much on compassion as on an increase of justice. Similarly, granting the importance of that inner moral reform which the gospel achieves in the individual, the conviction remains that the need of such reform would be mercifully lessened were the gospel of Jesus earnestly applied to the present social injustice which breeds moral failure.

The principle which the author applies in his consideration of the city is rather more advanced and adequate than the theory expounded in the preceding sections of his book. Here he shows the necessity of religious people entering into the democratic method of reform and improvement and of laying hold of those conditions which circumscribe the possibilities of every actual and prospective citizen. Finally attention is given to the problem of the divided church with closing emphasis upon co-operation to save the souls of neglected people; and it is this interpretation of the church's purpose which is, perhaps, least understood and most resented by the unchurched. The soul, being considered as an entity apart from the living conditions in which it is achieved,

¹ *Faith and Social Service*. By George Hodges. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 270 pages. \$1.25.

does not interest the masses. They demand more heroic proof that the church has a passion for righteousness and cares for people.

The second book, by Dr. Strayer, while entitled *The Reconstruction of the Church*,¹ nevertheless presents a vast amount of incisive criticism and is representative of the social attitude of such writers as Ross and Rauschenbusch. Soundly based as it is and frankly critical, it sets forth at the same time a great worth of practical suggestion for the use of the modernized church.

To some small matters one may take exception, as for example the assumption of "an ineradicable religious instinct." However the instincts of man may integrate into religious attitudes and activities it is to be doubted whether psychology ever finds a religious instinct as such. But laying aside this caveat on terminology, the book moves straight on in a forthright consideration of facts and without any obvious bias of special pleading. Naturally the final theme here is also church co-operation. It would be difficult to find a more useful volume for young ministers and for those in preparation.

The third book² is of the out-and-out sort. The author comes to grips with the church and goes straight to the concrete problems of modern life. Social justice, the woman problem, the rights of childhood, the slum, vice, crime, disease, poverty, and lawlessness are taken up in order and with the vehemence and passion of the thoroughgoing socialist. If the following is his estimate of modern *Christianity* what epithets could be found to describe the *church*? "That bastard, cringing, sycophantic thing that our age calls Christianity is nothing else than the organized worship of Mammon."

The situation is made rather more hopeless by the author in that he has evidently as low an estimate of the working man as of the respectables in the church. "So long as they get fodder and a stall they manifest a bovine content with their life. Add thereto a mate, and it is a difficult thing to awaken their intelligence and rouse them to make an effort to better themselves. Deprive them of fodder and stall, and they seem unable to do more than bellow and paw the ground."

The reviewer, having spent some years in observing how mammon crushes life and morality out of children in a great city is able to share somewhat the author's estimate of the present industrial system, but is

¹ *The Reconstruction of the Church*. By Paul Moore Strayer. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 303 pages. \$1.50.

² *The Gospel of Jesus and the Problems of Democracy*. By Henry C. Vedder. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 395 pages. \$1.50.

hardly prepared for the paralysis which must follow despair as to the reserves of moral power resident in the great labor population. The policy of concerted political action on the part of labor, which the author advocates, demands a faith which the avalanche of woe and injustice seems temporarily to have swept away or buried.

Not to make light of this candid and brave attack upon established institutions and property rights we feel that books written under the juniper tree often need to be revised by that still small voice which reveals unmeasured and unexhausted reserves making for righteousness. One thing, however, is evident: ordinary Christian faith produces today no such earnestness as does the socialism of this book. When a man believes a thing in this way what can he do but "cry aloud"?

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RITUAL AND BELIEF

Modern functional psychology has had much to do with the trend of our present-day religious thought toward a fuller recognition of the value of ceremonial observances in the practice of religion, and we are indebted to the anthropologists for gathering from peoples in all parts of the earth, and of various grades of social culture and intellectual development, the *proofs* of the evolution of religion and of the essential rôle which ritual has played in its history.

The three books before us,¹ though widely different in size, scope, and method of treatment, have as their common purpose the setting forth of some phase of this development.

The work of Rev. D. C. Owen is the most general in its treatment, and contributes the least in the way of originality, or first-hand knowledge, purporting to be nothing more than a summarized statement of other men's investigations. Hardly has one entered on the perusal of this brief treatise, however, before the question of the *interpretation* of the facts set forth forces itself on one's consideration. Primitive man is said to recognize in nature a force superior to his own and to know "that it

¹ *Ritual and Relief: Studies in the History of Religion*. By Edwin Sidney Hartland. New York: Scribner, 1914. xiv+352 pages. \$3.00.

The Infancy of Religion. By D. C. Owen. London: Milford, 1914. vi+143 pages. 3s. 6d.

Die volkstümlichen Feste des Jahres. By Martin P. Nilsson. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher für die deutsche christliche Gegenwart. III. Reihe, 17.-18. Heft.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 76 pages. M. 1.30.

is wielded by a living being stronger than himself. Since he is naturally disposed to the recognition of supernatural beings, any extraordinary feat of nature displayed before his eyes stimulates into activity his sense of their presence" (p. 25). It is always very easy for us to assume that a thing is natural because it seems so to us, and in this connection we may notice the further assumption that *our* natural endowment is superior to that of the savage, an idea that is not as popular among students of psychology today as it once was. The child of civilized parents if contrasted with the "rude man of uncivilized regions," and we are told that "from the mind of the child after it has been properly trained and educated you can hope for worthy results, but not from the mental apparatus of the savage. The soil of his nature is well-nigh barren. The memory of the child is a better instrument for its purpose, his imagination is more vivid and productive than that of the child-man of the undeveloped races." One is tempted to ask if barrenness in this instance is a characteristic of the soil, or is due to the unfortunate lack of the seed of experience.

A striking example of divergence in interpretation is found in the explanation of the sacredness of some stones (p. 35) where this is attributed to the shedding of the blood of a sacred animal upon the stones used in sacrifice, in flat contradiction to Farnell who attributes the sacredness of the animal to contact with the stone.¹

The essence of prayer is well said to be "the soul's unsatisfied desire, combined with a belief in a power able to set that desire at rest" (p. 92), and further: "When rude man has a dangerous business on hand, such as war, the sense of the danger he incurred is poignant in the extreme. The occasion is just the one for prayer" (p. 93). The conclusion of the book is that if man had been "deprived of the support of religion in his arduous ascent, he would continually have slipped back to the level whence he had started."

In *Ritual and Belief* we have a contribution to the discussion of the evolution of religion "from the point of view of one who has been convinced that the emotions and imagination—and not merely the individual, but the collective emotions and imagination—have had at least as much to do with the generation of religious practises and beliefs as the reason, and that for the form they may have assumed, physical, social, and cultural influences must be held accountable" (pp. xiii, xiv).

The greater part of the book is given up to a discussion of "The Relations of Religion and Magic." This has been expanded from two

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, II, 313.

presidential addresses before the Anthropological Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. The author tells us that, in his opinion, we shall find the key to primitive philosophy in the relation of the personal and the impersonal, and we are at once plunged into the very midst of the dispute as to *interpretation*, for on the supposed distinction between the two hangs the contention of the Animistic school of exponents. The difficulty lies in the fact that the savage has no such clear-cut consciousness of personality as we have, nor does he seem to have the equally clear-cut and opposing conception of things being *im*-personal. There is no doubt that primitive peoples think of almost everything as being imbued with some sort of life, as was pointed out in the work of Dussaud reviewed in these pages nearly a year ago (XVIII, 636). This Dussaud speaks of as a *principe de vie*, and Lévy-Bruhl calls it *la loi de participation*.¹ The only dispute is whether this life is actually conceived of in terms which we should call personal, as the "Animists" maintain, or whether it is only a sort of mechanical force, to use present-day terminology, as the "Dynamists" maintain. Hartland cites instances of the belief that personality—human personality—adheres to or persists in the possessions of a person (and has civilization entirely banished this idea from our own minds?) which he thinks "exhibit a concept of personality imperfectly crystallized. It is still fluid and vague, only to become entirely definite under the influence of trained reason and larger and more scientific knowledge. But, such as it is, there is behind and around it the still vaguer, the unlimited territory of the Impersonal, because the Unknown" (p. 34). He then passes on to consider the *orenda* of the Iroquois, the *manitou* of the Algonquin, and the *wakonda* of the Omaha, all of which point to the same reality.

What we appear to have, among the North American Indians, at least, is two distinct conceptions: the possession of what Hartland calls a "potentiality or atmosphere" of its own, by the individual personality—human or non-human; and a mysterious, undefined reservoir of an apparently impersonal power in the universe as a whole. But our author says that "these two conceptions are not mutually exclusive, for the impersonal power is often held to be the source of the personal power or potentiality" (p. 45), and so we find ourselves no nearer an understanding of the *difference* than we were before!

We have noted these variations of what appears to be a single idea, rather to call attention again to the difficulty of interpretation, than with any intention of attempting to distinguish between them, but also

¹ *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, pp. 68 ff., Paris, 1910.

because they form the background of the author's discussion of the relations of religion and magic. He concludes the first section, which he calls "The Common Root," with these words: "I venture to suggest that in man's emotional response to his environment, in his interpretation in the terms of personality of the objects which encountered his attention, and in their investiture by him with potentiality, atmosphere, *orenda*, *mana*—call it by what name you will—we have the common root of magic and religion" (p. 66). He finds, as does Shrader,¹ that they differ only in their method of approach. The spells of magic are "drafts upon heaven, for which the gods cannot refuse payment" (p. 87), while the gods of religion "are personal, are endowed with free will, are to be approached with true worship, and may or may not grant the prayers of their suppliants" (p. 88).

The rest of the essay is given up to the development and the differentiation of these two ways of dealing with the mysterious power in the universe.

The relation of ritual to both magic and religion is explained on the theory of an emotional reaction, natural and almost involuntary at first, which in proportion to the magnitude of the cause which provoked the emotion, or the extent to which it had affected the individuals, becomes established in memory and by repetition, and reinstatement of the emotion soon establishes itself as a habit. This form of reaction would end in a solemn rite, endowed with the power to produce the effect with which it is now inseparably associated. In other words, "ritual, religious or magical, is evolved long before belief has become definite and cogent" (p. 119).

Professor Nilsson, of Lund, Sweden, says in his preface that he has attempted to "supply a presentation of the Christian year and its history, in which the popular element shall have full consideration," a sort of investigation which he thinks has been "scandalously neglected" by Protestant investigators since the pioneer Usener. The main theme of the exposition is what we should probably call "evergreens" (*Maienzweig*) and their use in popular festivals, in which the author finds the last remnant of an early and widespread cult of trees, which was particularly powerful among Indo-Germanic peoples (p. 6). Because the power dwelling in the trees—*orenda* again, though not known as such—is primarily a vegetation spirit, we find the use of its emblems in connection with the festivals of Springtime and Harvest, and the related ceremonies have come to be associated with many of the festivals of the Christian year.

¹ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, II, 40.

Two interesting pieces of folk-lore connected with the observance of New Year and Christmas must close this brief summary. The festival of the New Year is traced to the entrance into office of the *rex bibendi* of the Saturnalia at Rome, from the year 153 B.C., which led to this day becoming the popularly recognized beginning of the year, and thus gave rise to its name, and its celebration with feasting and decorations (p. 58). This may be the history of *our* New Year, but will hardly explain the same customs in the Orient.

The Christmas tree, we must admit, has, like most of our Christmas toys, been "made in Germany." The first historical mention of it is said to have been in Strasburg in 1605 (p. 17), and it found its way to England with the Prince Consort in 1840, though reaching this country earlier with the first German emigrants. We are told quite seriously that "it is now quite common in London" ("in London ist er jetzt recht häufig") (p. 20).

Whatever may be the correct interpretation of these and other persistent customs and ritual observances, their original and continued association with the religious life cannot be gainsaid. Shall they continue and religion disappear? Or again shall we succeed in preserving religion without them?

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MODERN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN INDIA¹

After his coronation in London four years ago, when King George V of Great Britain was preparing to proceed to the Durbar in Delhi there in person to proclaim and assume his sovereignty as emperor of India, he ordered to be brought to him the clearest, fairest handbook on the chief religion of the foreign country over which he was to rule. The book which was selected was *A Primer of Hinduism* by Mr. John N. Farquhar, M.A. No ardent Hindu and no erudite western scholar had produced a book at once so scholarly, discriminating, illuminating for a summary friendly acquaintance with the religion of the more than two hundred million Hindus.

Two years later the same author followed up that résumé of the historical development and the present condition of Hinduism with another even more notable treatment of the same vast subject. Farquhar's *The Crown of Hinduism* is the pre-eminent Christian critique of the chief factors in Hinduism and of the system as a whole.

¹ *Modern Religious Movements in India*. By J. N. Farquhar. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xvi+471 pages. \$2.50.

In the midst of pressing and growing administrative work, yet with reserve and foresight for the amplest service in the future, Dr. John R. Mott and the International Committee in New York arranged with the National Council of the Young Men's Christian Association in India and Ceylon that their special Literary Secretary should be set free to spend half the year in continued literary production in Oxford and the cold season in lecturing and teaching in India. Shortly afterward Mr. Farquhar was invited by the Hartford Theological Seminary to come to America and deliver a course of eight lectures on "Modern Religious Movements in India" on the Lamson-Hartford Foundation on "The Religions of the World." For eleven years Mr. Farquhar had been a professor in a missionary college in Calcutta, and for five years more he had been a traveling secretary of the Y.M.C.A. directing work for educated non-Christians all over India. Then in direct preparation for this new special task he took the opportunity of visiting seventeen important centers throughout India for securing interviews with the leaders of the various modern religious movements and for gathering abundant first-hand information. The lectures were written amid the literary resources of the Bodleian Library and of the British Museum and in consultation with many men in and about London who possessed special knowledge of the subjects dealt with. After the lectures were delivered, the author again had the opportunity last winter to continue his personal researches in twenty-two important cities in India. The revised result of this long course of indirect and direct preparation is a uniquely valuable compendium of material, both historical and contemporary, presented with a scholarly prophetism, concerning the rise and significance of the numerous religious movements which within the last hundred years have been born in that country which has given birth to more distinct religions than has any other country in the world.

First in chronological order comes the pioneer religious reform movement in modern India, viz., the Brahma Samaj. Its founder, Ram Mohan Ray, who died in Bristol, England, in 1833, "was neither a philosopher nor a theologian. He thought out no system. . . . He believed he was restoring the Hindu faith to its original purity, while, as a matter of fact, what he offered was a deistic theology and worship" (pp. 36, 37). Later in the same movement came another important leader, who uttered some passionate confessions concerning Jesus Christ. "Verily, when we read his life, his meekness like the soft moon ravishes the heart and bathes it in a flood of serene light; but when we come to the grand consummation of his career, his death on the cross, behold he

shines as the sun in his meridian splendor" (p. 59). "Blessed Jesus, I am thine! . . . Son of God, I love thee truly!" (pp. 64, 65). Yet upon Keshab Chandra Sen's life and character as a whole there falls justly the author's discerning judgment: "His deepest theological beliefs were fully Christian, but he never surrendered himself to Christ as Lord" (pp. 66, 67).

Eight other Samajes and similar reform movements, not only in Hinduism, but also in the Muhammadan, Parsee, Jain, and Sikh religions—in all some forty distinct organized movements in addition to the general trends in religious nationalism and social service—are successively traversed. Each is clearly presented in its own individuality as well as in its relation to the larger setting. The facts have been collated with searching thoroughness; their evaluations are keenly discriminating.

Amid the various influences from the West which have stirred these fresh manifestations of religious life in India the most potent has been Christianity. Even where religions and sects have been the most ceremonial and the least moral "it is now universally recognized that no religion is worth the name which does not work for spiritual ends and produce men of high and noble character" (p. 438). The least Christian of these Western importations has been Theosophy, which was organized in New York City in 1875. "When first launched, it was merely an addition of the magic and mysticism of Egypt and of mediaeval Judaism to spiritualism, with a view to stimulating the jaded appetite of the people of New York" (p. 220). Two years later, when her frauds had been exposed, Madame Blavatsky wrote: "I am going forever to India, and for very shame and vexation I want to go where no one will know my name. Home's malignity has ruined me forever in Europe" (p. 226). Nowhere else than in the eighty pages which Mr. Farquhar devotes to this movement can there be found a more judicial condemnation, along with a discerning appreciation of the attractions, of Theosophy.

In concluding this masterly survey of the many stirrings of new religious life amid the ancient religions of India, the author presents a remarkably weighty and apt testimony in support of his main thesis, which is the literal fulfilment of Christ's parable of the Leaven. The leading Hindu reformer of Western India, Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, has said: "The ideas that lie at the heart of the gospel of Christ are slowly but surely permeating every part of Hindu society and modifying every phase of Hindu thought (p. 445)."

Hereafter any foreign missionary society which is alert to the facilities now available for direct preparation will hardly allow a prospective mis-

sionary to participate in the directing of the renascent religious life in India without having made a careful study of this third book by Mr. Farquhar as well as of his previous two. It will be invaluable for any person who seeks information concerning modern religious tendencies in the land of India and especially concerning the influence which has been exerted in our modern times upon the ancient religions by the religion of Jesus Christ.

R. E. HUME

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BUDDHISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

The study of Buddhist psychology is of much interest to us because of the fact that it gives us a carefully worked out analysis of mental phenomena from the point of view of an entirely different "tradition of thought." Its parallelism to and difference from our own psychological thinking opens up many problems which are of the utmost importance in the study of thought in general. A little volume of Mrs. Rhys Davids¹ continues the pioneer work started in her article, "On the Will in Buddhism"² and in her *Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, 1900. Whereas the last-mentioned work gives a translation and analysis of one of the most important texts of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka this volume is of much wider scope. It seeks to analyze the psychological material of the earlier Nikāyas, to describe the "tradition of thought" on which Buddhist psychology is based, and to trace the general development of that psychology through the later Pali texts.

Chap. i deals with general Buddhistic habits of thought. Chaps. ii to vi treat the psychology of the Nikāyas under the following heads: (1) Mind in Term and Concept; (2) Consciousness and the External World; (3) Feeling; (4) Ideation. Chap. vii deals with psychological developments in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka. Chap. viii treats of the psychology of the Milinda. Chap. ix discusses some mediaeval developments.

Buddha refused to speculate on metaphysical problems. He centered his attention on the problem of practical living and well-being (*sukha*), and mapped out a course of practical ethics which should have

¹ *Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature*. By Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914. 212 pages. 2s. 6d.

² *JRAS* (1898), p. 47.

to do with the fundamentals of religion and of life as he saw them. The Buddhist sets up a phenomenalism against the animism and the soul-theory of Brahmanism. He finds in man only states of consciousness without a permanent entity as a substratum. These states of consciousness are caused. There is no mind present as an uncaused entity. This concept is based on the idea that a permanent continuum can exert no force, that cause and effect can be explained only by the theory of a constant succession. Emphasis is laid on psychology because of the necessity for controlling this stream of mental states in order to obtain peace of mind. The thoughts are wayward and hard to control, and on the least slackening of the reins pull like run-away horses or jump from object to object as monkeys leap from branch to branch. The practical ethical doctrine of Buddha discards metaphysics and bases itself on a psychological analysis because mental training is necessary as an ethical discipline. The study of mind becomes all-important.

It is usually said that Buddhism ends in an abject pessimism. This conception is utterly erroneous. Everywhere in the texts is to be found the conviction that the chief aim of the Buddhist discipline is the cultivation of the will. Sloth is regarded as the greatest of evils. The will is, to be sure, directed to different ends from those to which the occidental will directs itself; but it remains will and requires constant mindfulness. There is, however, everywhere through Buddhist thought, as well as through the Brahman systems of philosophy, a formalism which is curiously like the mediaeval scholasticism of Europe. The psychology is almost entirely descriptive. This is due to the lack of progressive experimentation on the external world, which might overturn or modify the original premises and make necessary a change of analysis in order to meet this new knowledge. The fundamental premises remained undisturbed. In India, as yet, a renaissance has not come.

The style of the book is loose and diffuse. The chapters are not summed up in a way which would make clear the most significant features of each and give a clear conception of the progress of thought during the different periods treated. Although after "twenty-three centuries or more, we are still well within sight of our starting-point," there are nevertheless changes of emphasis and some innovations of analysis. These could have been brought out more clearly. A little more interpretation is needed to fill out the description.

One must not forget that the early relation of the Pali texts to the Mahāyāna Sanskrit texts is as yet very uncertain, that scholasticism may have been at work even in the Nikāyas, that the relation of the thought

of Buddha himself to that of the redactors of the Pali Suttas and their commentators, and to that of the authors of the oldest Sanskrit texts is very problematical. The Pali texts represent only one tendency of thought, though that tendency may be closer to the thought of Buddha himself than is that of the Mahāyāna texts; yet it may have emphasized disproportionately one aspect of his teachings. His own attitude may have been more agnostic, his psychology may have been less schematic. The work of Mrs. Rhys Davids will be a powerful stimulus to the psychological analysis of other texts. Much work of the same kind is needed on the early Mahāyāna texts before any general psychology of Buddhism can be written.

The book is of necessity full of Pali terms but it is addressed as much to the general reader as to the professed orientalist.

WALTER E. CLARK

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STUDIES IN JAPANESE CONFUCIANISM¹

Confucianism has played a very important rôle in the development of Japanese civilization. Its influence is particularly marked in the field of intellectual training and of moral culture in Japan. To show this influence of Confucianism, and to create a better understanding, by the West, of Japanese character and life, Dr. Robert C. Armstrong, of the Kwansei Gakuiun, Kobe, Japan, has published his *Studies in Japanese Confucianism*. The book is devoted almost entirely to a historical survey of the schools of Japanese Confucianism in the period of the Tokugawa government (roughly from 1600 to 1868). Under the successive Tokugawa rulers Japan enjoyed an unparalleled peace for more than two hundred and fifty years. It is at this time that several Confucian schools made their influence especially felt in the life and thought of the nation. A few words respecting these schools may answer the purpose of this brief note.

Two main Confucian schools are the Shushi and the O-Yomei. The Shushi School owes its origin to Choo He (1130-1200), a Chinese scholar who sought, under the influence of Taoism and Buddhism, to give a metaphysical ground to the principles taught by Confucius and Mencius. Metaphysically considered, the school founded by him stands for a

¹ *Light from the East. Studies in Japanese Confucianism.* By Robert C. Armstrong. Toronto: Forward Movement Department of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, 1914. xv+326 pages. \$1.50.

dualism of *Ri* or Reason and *Ki* or the Sensible World, the *Ri* being the ground of all existence and the *Ki* its manifestation, yet constituting two dual principles in the universe. A prominent representative of this school in Japan is Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714). He held to the inseparability of *Ri* and *Ki* which were conceived by Choo He and most of his followers in a dualistic fashion. On the matter of ethics, in which he was most interested, Kaibara was one with the other Shushi scholars. He deduced the way of humanity from that of heaven. He taught that men, in accordance with the way of heaven, should love all people. He thus made love or benevolence the foundation of all morality, considering it superior to righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity.

A strong rival of the Shushi School is the O-Yomei School. The O-Yomei School of Confucianism gained its prominence in China under the leadership of Wong-Yang-Ming (1472-1528). This school differed from the Shushi in that it held to a union of *Ri* and *Ki*. The school, moreover, emphasized the intuition, rather than intellectual investigation adhered to by the Shushi School, as a method of getting at the truth of the universe. The first and foremost promoter of the O-Yomei School in Japan is Nakae Toju (1608-48). In common with his school in general, he held to a monistic view of the universe. The world consists of *Ri* and *Ki*, which are metaphysically one with an infinite and real substance, God. *Ri* and *Ki* are manifestations of God, who is not transcendent to, but essentially identical with, the world. Human selves have their unity and origin in this fundamental reality, God. The human self at its best is identical with God. "While the sensible manifestation differs," Nakae Toju writes, "the principle in everything is the same, and as the principle has no quantitative characteristics, we can say that the Infinite and I are one and the same thing. . . . The Infinite is man's true self, and therefore all things are in his mind. To be true to one's self is to be true to God." The method by which one comes to the consciousness of his unity with God is by means of intuition, an examination of his deeper self. Thus the cultivation of the self in matters of morality is strongly emphasized by Nakae Toju. And his influence in the field of morals has been very marked in Japan.

Aside from these two main schools, Dr. Armstrong treats, at some length, of two other schools, namely, the Classical and the Eclectic. The Classical School of Confucianism claimed to teach mainly the principles of the ancient sages of China. Its two prominent advocates are Ito Jinsai and Ogiu Sorai. The former stood for the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, while the latter advocated a return to the sage

kings prior to the two great teachers of China. But the teachings of Jinsai and Sorai were not uncolored by the views prevalent in their times. The Eclectic School is characterized by an independence of thought. The scholars of this school were unwilling to be slavish followers of any of the great teachers of China and Japan. They selected their teaching from various schools of thought and emphasized independent thinking.

This leads us to make a concluding remark upon the book. A critical and systematic examination of Confucianism in its relation to Japanese life and thought is not attempted by the author. He has, however, given, in a very simple and readable manner, as results of his many years' studies, much of the choice teachings, largely in quotations, of representative Confucian scholars of Japan that can be easily understood by the general public. Hence it may be truly said that the author has accomplished, to a great extent, his purpose of making known to the West one of the formative elements of Japanese civilization, and thus contributing much toward a better understanding between the Western and Eastern worlds.

UKICHI KAWAGUCHI

LOS ANGELES, CAL.

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS

The sixth and seventh volumes of this massive work¹ have appeared promptly. These volumes contain many articles of great value for students of religion in general. Several of the topics are treated broadly and comprehensively by various specialists in different phases of the subject. These composite discussions if printed separately would sometimes constitute a fair-sized volume. For example, the article "God" is a historical survey of the conception of deity as entertained in different stages and varieties of religion. The same method of treatment is applied to such topics as "Health and Gods of Healing," "Heroes and Hero-Gods," "Human Sacrifice," "Hymns," "Images and Idols," "Incarnation," "Initiation," "Inspiration," "King," "Law." The sketch of historical data supplied in each case is very valuable. On the other hand there are occasions where the historical method is not employed, as for instance in the article "Immortality." The writer confines himself to arguments for or against belief in immortality and makes no attempt to sketch the history of such belief. This is an unfortunate

¹ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of John A. Selbie and Louis H. Gray. New York: Scribner. Vol. VI, Fiction-Hyksos, 1914. xviii+890 pages. Vol. VII, Hymns-Liberty, 1915. xx+911 pages. \$7.00.

omission, but the lack will perhaps be supplied under "Soul," or in some other part of the volumes yet to appear.

There are several good articles on different ethnic faiths. L. R. Farnell gives an admirable summary of "Greek Religion." "Graeco-Egyptian Religion" and "Hermes Trismegistus" furnish information about the religious situation in Egypt in the Graeco-Roman period. There are also appropriate treatments of "Hinduism," "Indian Buddhism," "Jainism," and "Lamaism."

Hebrew and Jewish religion is represented by an eighteen-page article on "Israel" and a slightly longer sketch of "Judaism." There is also a short note on "Liberal Judaism" contributed by I. Abrahams, and a good biography of "Josephus" written by the late Professor Niese. Certain phases of later Jewish history are discussed under "Kabbala" and "Karaites."

Students of early Christianity will be especially interested in Professor F. C. Burkitt's contribution on the "Gospels" and Professor E. F. Scott's "Gnosticism." Burkitt follows the lines already laid down in his *Gospel History and Its Transmission* and in his *Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*. In expounding the origins of Gnosticism, Scott disagrees with Harnack's dictum that Gnosticism was merely "the acute hellenizing of Christianity" and finds the initial stages of the movement already present in the ancient world before the rise of Christianity.

The article "Jesus Christ," written by W. Douglas Mackenzie is one of the longest in the seventh volume and one to which many readers doubtless will turn with eagerness. But those who are looking for an interpretation of Jesus along the lines of modern critical research will be disappointed. The author's primary interest is in Christology rather than history. He first posits the type of person Jesus must have been in order to found a religion so absolutely unique as Christianity is affirmed to be. Hence it is not necessary to begin inquiry with a critical examination of the extant sources of information; the first step in the procedure is to fix upon a definition of Jesus' personality. When this is done history must of course be so read as to conform to this definition. Thus the crucial historical problems connected with study of the life of Jesus are not merely left unsolved; they are not even clearly perceived.

But this situation is quite exceptional, so far as these volumes as a whole are concerned. The great majority of contributors have treated their respective topics in modern scholarly fashion.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

GAENSSLE, CARL. *The Hebrew Particle אֲשֶׁר*. A dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1915. 142 pages. \$1.00 net.

This treatise is an elaborate and comprehensive defense of the thesis that אֲשֶׁר is of nominal rather than of pronominal origin.

The differences among the leading grammatical authorities on this point furnished an opportunity to do a piece of work which should bring this matter to a decisive issue. This is the task which Dr. Gaenssle undertakes. The subject is treated under two main divisions, Part I as a "Nota Relationis," and Part II, "The Conjunctional Use of אֲשֶׁר and Its Compounds." Part I, after sketching the history of the etymologies so far proposed, including the attempts to find a common origin for both וְ and אֲשֶׁר, proceeds to the defense of the main thesis, first, by presenting the unique usage of אֲשֶׁר when compared with undoubted demonstratives in the Hebrew itself; secondly, by a comparison of the corresponding use of the relative in the other Semitic languages, culminating in the Assyrian; and, thirdly, by the comparative analogy of the use of the relative outside of Semitic in Indo-European. The concluding portion of the first part is devoted to the syntax of the particle and takes the form of an attack upon the position of Baumann as the chief advocate of the demonstrative theory. The criticism of Baumann's interpretation is incisive and thoroughgoing, and by following that writer in detail, discovering thereby inaccuracies of translation as well as application and the omission of many important passages, our author makes an exceedingly strong case against his opponent. The treatment of the conjunctional use of the particle is exhaustive and, in addition to covering this phase of the particle, makes some new classifications, notably the usage in causal relative clauses. The outcome of this section is further to weaken the demonstrative theory.

The author has, we believe, maintained his thesis, at least so far as the demonstrative character of אֲשֶׁר is concerned. Whether its nominal character has been as fully demonstrated may be open to question, but if so it is due to the nature of the data rather than the treatment, and the position is made sufficiently strong to throw the burden of proof upon its opponents. This is a definite contribution to the science of the Hebrew language of which the standard *Grammar* of Gesenius-Kautzsch will need to take cognizance, especially since that work has heretofore sanctioned Baumann's interpretation of the relative.

Mechanically, the work might have been slightly improved by the omission of the "pointing" from the Hebrew quotations, and thereby also a noticeable laxity in the proofreading of the vowel-points would have been avoided. Cases where consonants have been confused are: שָׁאֵר for אֲשֶׁר (Josh. 18:2, p. 62); יִפְלֹה for יִפְלֹא (Exod. 11:7, p. 74); עָרָ for אָרָ (Gen. 13:16, p. 85). The book is provided with a useful index of passages commented upon.

L. W.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

CALDECOTT, W. SHAW. *Herod's Temple: Its New Testament Associations and Its Actual Structure*. London: Kelly, 1914. xvi+395 pages. 6s.

Part I is an uncritical survey, intended for readers of the ordinary capacity of the Sunday-school Bible class, of those passages of the New Testament containing

reference to the temple (the author includes among these the scene of Peter's denial in "the court of the high priest"). Part II adds a description of Herod's temple founded on Josephus, the tractate *Diddoth*, and the Bible. The author has devoted many years to reading, including some good authorities in archaeology and history, but is sadly deficient in scientific method. B. W. B.

GRESSMANN, HUGO. *Das Weihnachts-Evangelium auf Ursprung und Geschichte untersucht*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. 46 pages. M. 1.20.

———. *Albert Eichhorn und die religionsgeschichtliche Schule*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. 51 pages. M. 1.60.

These are two very interesting and useful monographs. The former is a study of the story of Jesus' birth as told in Luke 2:1 ff. The legendary character of the narrative is recognized, and an attempt is made to discover the historical genesis of the legend. The notion of a divine child born to be a king, and styled Savior and Lord, is found to be ultimately of Egyptian origin. Before Christianity arose these originally Egyptian ideas had been attached to kings and emperors and had become widespread in the ancient world, and even the Jews are thought to have formulated a legend about the coming of their Messiah as a royal child to be born in a cave at Bethlehem. Christians inherited these conceptions, but when they heard the stories told about the birth of Osiris or Augustus they were prompted to affirm that neither Osiris nor Augustus, but Jesus, was the true Savior and Lord. Similarly the notion of a virgin-birth is traced to Egyptian legends regarding the birth of the king. In pre-Christian times these stories are supposed to have reached Palestine and to have been applied by Jews to their expected messianic ruler, whence they were later taken over by Christians. Hence these legendary elements of the New Testament are believed to have arisen in Jewish-Christian circles, after christological speculation had arrived at the point of deifying Jesus.

The second brochure falls into two distinct parts. The former is a biographical sketch of Eichhorn; the latter is an exposition of the history, aims, and method of the so-called *religionsgeschichtliche* school. The connection between these two topics lies in the fact that Eichhorn, though he made no substantial literary contributions to the subject, was the man who through personal contact did most to inspire the modern German representatives of this school. On this account the story of his life, uneventful as it was, is of some general interest; but the sketch which follows regarding the school itself will appeal to a still wider circle of readers. S. J. C.

ABBOTT, EDWIN A. *Diatessarica*. Part X: *The Fourfold Gospel*. Section III: "The Proclamation of the New Kingdom." Cambridge: University Press, 1915. xxvi+546 pages. \$3.25.

The purpose and method of this "constructive" portion of Dr. Abbott's work has been described on pp. 289-92 of the previous volume of the *American Journal of Theology* and there is nothing in this latest section that calls for special additional mention. The interpretation has now been carried on to the end of the third chapter of Mark's Gospel. It is contended that when all the data of study "are duly taken into account, they reveal the object of Jesus as being from the first, not the establishment of what men would commonly call a Kingdom, but the diffusion of what we should rather call

the atmosphere of a Family, a spiritual emanation spreading like a widening circle from a source within Himself as its centre." Throughout, an intensely devotional, mystical tone is maintained, which at times vividly suggests à Lapide.

Elaborate indices to this volume and its two predecessors are added.

B. S. E.

FONCK, LEOPOLDUS. *Documenta ad Pontificiam Commissionem de Re Biblica Spectantia*. (Ex mandato eiusdem commissionis collegit et edidit.) Romae: Sumptibus Pontificii Instituti Biblici, 1915. 47 pages.

A sumptuously printed collection of the Papal documents relating to the Biblical Commission and of the various decrees issued thereby. These decrees have attained considerable notoriety; the third affirms the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and the twelfth the Pauline authorship of Hebrews, while the remainder have the same general character. The work of this commission has not improved Roman Catholic biblical scholarship.

B. S. E.

MANSON, W. *The First Three Gospels*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. 100 pages. 6d.

A "Primer for Senior Bible Class Students," written with considerable knowledge of modern synoptic research. The Christology is conservative, being based on Jesus' use of "Son of Man" as a transcendental self-designation. The little book is packed too full of material to have an attractive style but as a syllabus could be made very useful in the hands of a competent teacher.

B. S. E.

PLUMMER, A. *The Gospel according to St. Mark*. [Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1914. lvi+392 pages. 4s. 6d.

MURRAY, J. O. F. *The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians*. [Cambridge Greek Testament.] Cambridge: University Press, 1914. ciii+150 pages. 3s. 6d.

Dr. Plummer has limited himself to an exposition of the Gospel as it stands without endeavoring to go beneath its surface; no serious attempt is made to ascertain the evangelist's limitations and the introduction is inadequate. The bibliography does not cite the works of J. Weiss, Wellhausen, Wendling, Hoffmann, or Bacon, and von Soden's text is ignored altogether. None the less the standpoint is more scientific than in the same writer's *St. Matthew* and vastly more so than in his *St. Luke*.

Dr. Murray's work is very scholarly and thorough, with an elaborate treatment of introduction problems from a conservative standpoint. The book, despite its small size, belongs rather to "scientific" than to "popular" commentaries and is a valuable addition to the English works on the Epistle.

This latter volume completes the Cambridge Greek Testament while Dr. Plummer's replaces the long-obsolete work of Maclear's on Mark. It is to be hoped that a similar replacing of the remaining earlier volumes will not be long delayed.

B. S. E.

CHURCH HISTORY

PARKER, IRENE. *Dissenting Academies in England: Their Rise, Progress and Place among the Educational Systems of the Country*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xii+168 pages. 4s.

The author prefaces the discussion with a brief recapitulation of the history of education in England. Even at the beginning of the seventeenth century this was thoroughly ecclesiastical. Trivium and Quadrivium were still in the saddle. The Renaissance spirit had degenerated into a narrow and lifeless classicism. Education was controlled by a dominant church in a reactionary state and in turn played into the hands of both. Especially was this true after the Restoration, when state and church joined hands to crush democracy, whether in politics, religion, or education.

In such an emergency as this the dissenting academies were born. The broad vision and fine devotion of such men as Hartlib, Comenius, Milton, and their followers prepared the ground. Founded at first by dissenting ministers deprived of their livings by the Act of Conformity, they sprang up all over England. They grew in spite of persecution. They came to be the greatest schools of their day. In contrast to the prevailing educational sterility they were fecund. They came to rival the universities. While these still clung to a narrowing classical curriculum, the academies responded to human need with the study of modern language and literature, history, science, and philosophy. They humanized the method of teaching, as well as its content. Education came to be permeated with the practical purpose to fit men for all the great vocations of life, not merely the learned professions.

Beginning as little groups of students gathered around a Morton, a Frankland, or a Doddridge, they developed into a well-organized educational institution. As our author says, "The academies were the first educational institutions in England to put into practice . . . theories which had found expression in Rabelais, Montaigne, . . . Bacon, . . . Comenius, Milton and Petty." That they contributed mightily to the educational awakening of the nineteenth century in England cannot be questioned.

H. H. W.

MASON, A. J. *The Church of England and Episcopacy*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. ix+560 pages. \$2.50.

The thesis of this suggestive volume is that the doctrine of the apostolic succession has been the consistent teaching of the Anglican church from the Reformation to the nineteenth century. The book grew out of certain discussions within Anglicanism itself which bore on this question. As chaplain of the Archbishop of Canterbury the author has prepared an exhaustive catena of passages culled from the works of Anglican theologians and clerics from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century relating to the question of episcopacy and the attitude of the Anglican church to non-episcopal bodies at home and abroad. He believes unequivocally in "the apostolic and divine institution of episcopacy," and that "to tamper" with it "would be to throw away all that is most distinctive in the character and prospects of the Church of England." Literally a cloud of witnesses, subpoenaed from Anglicanism of the past four hundred years, offer their individual testimony or argument to support these propositions. That the arguments vary in cogency, breadth, sound scholarship, and loyalty to demonstrable facts would naturally be expected. One must be gifted with an

inspired imagination to appreciate the full force of certain lines of thinking. The non-episcopal reader instinctively punctuates the page here and there with exclamation and interrogation points. To appeal to the seven letters of Revelation as a proof for Christ's institution of the episcopate may be termed Mephiboshethan. There are others equally lame in both their feet. The author does not father all the arguments advanced, it should be stated.

No one can read the book candidly without gaining a deeper appreciation of the reasons why the adherents of episcopacy champion their faith. Its antiquity, its strength of tradition, the suggestions—not to say the implications—of the New Testament, the unifying power exerted by it through history, all these make their appeal. On the other hand, one cannot read the book without the conviction that the claims of Anglicanism are based on undemonstrated and undemonstrable assumptions. That episcopacy as it developed in the second and third centuries was in the mind of Christ; that he passed it on to his apostles; that these in turn established it as the only inspired form of ecclesiastical organization; that not a series of unusual historical circumstances merely, but the direct operation of the Holy Ghost led to the monarchical episcopate—these are assumptions which still await adequate proof. In many of the arguments used there is too great an appeal to Old Testament hierarchical considerations. There is too much deductive reasoning based on the later history of the church. There is too little appreciation of Christianity as a religion of the spirit, and of the spiritual freedom which it involved, but which the church made haste to lose in the materializing and institutionalizing tendencies of the age.

It is no criticism of the book to add that if it voices modern Anglicanism the reunion of Protestant Christendom will never be effected until Protestantism everywhere accedes to the divine right of episcopacy and of apostolic succession.

H. H. W.

SELBIE, W. B. (ed.). *Evangelical Christianity: Its History and Witness*. London: Hodder & Stoughton. x+256 pages. \$1.00.

The aim of these lectures is to show the spiritual unity of the evangelical idea "as unfolded in modern times in the history and . . . influence . . . of communions differing in organization but agreeing in their essential view of the Gospel and Church of Christ." Those communions are included whose "emphasis falls upon the experimental and personal rather than the sacramental and institutional aspects of Christianity."

A preliminary lecture deals with the presence and development of the Protestant idea of church and ministry in primitive Christianity. The church began as a community of believers, led by an unofficial ministry whose power lay in charismatic gifts. Afterward arose a ministry appointed and ordained by the local church. Thanks to the legalism and institutionalism of Rome there ultimately developed a hierarchy.

The remaining six lectures deal, in a more or less popular way, with the evangelical heritage and the spiritual contributions of the Anglican, Presbyterian, Congregational, Baptist, Quaker, and Methodist churches to our common Christianity. The discussion of Anglicanism, with emphasis placed upon the essential unity of the Church of England with the reformed churches in matters of doctrine, and of Presbyterianism with reference to recent modifications of extreme Calvinism, and of Puritanism in worship, are far from satisfactory.

Congregationalism is treated more adequately. Its function is declared to be "to reveal and realize the true idea of the church" inherent in Christianity, the idea, namely, of a "redeemed people . . . spiritually equal among themselves," bound by a "covenant of fidelity to their Lord and to one another," and "endowed with all the rights and powers He meant his church to possess." The steps are traced by which this idea found embodiment in the sixteenth century. The Congregational attitude toward discipline, sacraments, polity, the state, and toward creedal affirmation is also considered. "Congregationalism is weighted and held back by no authoritative creed."

Historically, conversion is the central idea in the Baptist movement. Neither baptism, nor the mode of baptism, but individual religious experience is its dominant idea. As a corollary to this there has been developed the principle of religious liberty and toleration, with its inevitable inspiration to political liberty. The Baptist denomination has also contributed that passion for missionary enterprise which ushered in the age of modern missions.

To the Society of Friends we owe the rebirth of the sense of God revealed directly to the individual soul, without the mediation of priest or sacrament. Methodism, born in the soul of Wesley, has uttered its characteristic message of a "full, free, and present salvation, attainable now" by every repentant soul, and sealed with an overmastering assurance. It was this that gave passion and a deathless enthusiasm to the founders and propagators of Methodism.

H. H. W.

O'NEILL, G. V. (ed.). *The Golden Legend: Lives of the Saints*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. viii+293 pages. 3s.

To readers interested in mediaeval thought and feeling this book will prove of special interest. It is a revised and abridged edition of William Caxton's fifteenth-century translation of Jacobus de Voragine's thirteenth-century *Legenda Aurea*. The present volume represents about a tenth of Caxton's entire work, itself containing much material not found in Jacobus' original, but added during the intervening period, partly by Caxton himself. The Golden Legend, as selected and edited by O'Neill, contains twenty-one biographical sketches of Christian saints, from the first to the thirteenth centuries. True to its original, and to mediaeval literature in general, the work is an inextricable blending of fact and fancy, history and legend, natural and supernatural. If Caxton was not so credulous as he might have been had he lived two centuries earlier, his credulity appears none the less marvelous to our own matter-of-fact age. At the same time much of the narrative rests upon a firm foundation of fact, as is evidenced in the lives of Anthony, Augustine, Gregory, Thomas à Becket, Francis of Assisi, Clara of Scifi, and others. The book will serve as one more window looking out upon the mind of the Middle Ages. Some thirty pages of notes appended by the editor help the reader to an understanding of the quaint fifteenth-century English, while historical and biographical references give added value to the work.

H. H. W.

ROBINSON, GEORGE W. *The Life of Saint Severinus*. Translation. Harvard: University Press, 1914. 141 pages. \$1.50.

This suggestive volume presents for the first time to English readers the life of St. Severinus, sometimes called the "Apostle to Noricum," who labored as a Christian missionary and monk in Pannonia and Noricum in the second half of the fifth century.

The work is a translation from the Latin *Life* by Eugippius, together with a letter from the latter to Deacon Paschasius, and the latter's reply. Critical notes are given in the Appendix. When due allowance has been made for credulity on the part of the Latin author of the early sixth century, and for the wholly uncritical use of tales saturated with the miraculous, it still remains true that the personality here introduced is one of great interest to the modern reader. At a time when the waves of barbarism were beating relentlessly and effectively upon the outposts of Roman government and civilization along the Danube, Severinus lived and labored at various places between the modern Vienna and Passau, breaking the force of heathen cruelty, reclaiming captives from bondage, standing "like a beaten anvil" for religion and morality: a man of heroic spirit and deep insight into the turbid political currents that seethed along the Danube valley. Such lives as this render more intelligible that ultimate conquest of heathenism by the church which saved Western civilization from utter and irremediable destruction.

H. H. W.

FREERE, W. H. *English Church Ways*. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1914. x+110 pages. \$1.00.

This book contains four lectures delivered before a Russian audience in the interest of a *rapprochement* between the Anglican and the Eastern-Orthodox churches. The author is an Anglican clergyman imbued with conceptions characteristic of English churchmen, quite oblivious to the religious significance of Nonconformity. In view of the political alignment of England and Russia in the present war, this effort to secure a better understanding in matters of faith has a certain significance. A brief historical survey, including a statement of the fundamental principles involved in the English Reformation, is followed by chapters depicting the life and labors of the "parish priest" as shepherd, teacher, almoner, and administrator of the sacraments; theological education in university and theological college; clerical ordination and appointment; the different clerical orders; the various instrumentalities employed today, including the "mission," for the quickening of the faithful and the winning of Catholics and Nonconformists to "the church."

H. H. W.

GOOD, JAMES I. *History of the Swiss Reformed Church since the Reformation*. Philadelphia: Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States, 1913. xiv+504 pages. \$1.50.

Professor Good has endeavored to present in this volume a religious history of the Protestant cantons of Switzerland during a period of nearly four hundred years. He has arranged his discussion of the subject in four books, each book representing a certain period of time. These books bear, in order of arrangement, the following titles: "The Period of Consolidation," "The Period of Scholastic Calvinism," "The Period of Rationalism," "The Period of Pietism," and "The Religious Events of the Nineteenth Century." Under these headings, the author has attempted to describe the conditions in each canton during each of the five periods. The biographical method has been generally followed, i.e., the events have been presented in connection with biographical sketches of the leading personalities.

It is not to be expected that a single individual could be master of the contemporary sources of a period so extensive as that included in the scope of Professor Good's

volume. The only original materials, however, with which the author seems to have been familiar are those contained in secondary histories. Professor Good has produced, therefore, merely a compilation, and that an uncritical compilation. In the meager footnotes a few secondary but no primary authorities have been cited, generally without reference to specific pages. A conservative theological spirit pervades the whole volume, and indications of religious bias are not infrequent. The work is marred by a number of errors, some of which may be due to careless proofreading, but others cannot be thus explained, as, for instance, the use of "lays" for "lies" (p. 47, footnote). Inasmuch as the main facts have been correctly stated, Professor Good's contribution is not without some value, especially for those who do not read French or German and to whom, therefore, the author's sources would be inaccessible. Although some portions of the story have been told in an interesting manner, yet, generally, the book is exceedingly dull.

A. E. H.

MITCHELL, ANTHONY. *Biographical Studies in Scottish Church History.*

The Hale Lectures, delivered before the Western Theological Seminary, 1913-14. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1914. vi+301 pages. \$1.50.

In seven interesting biographical sketches the author traces the development of the Scottish church, with especial reference to the history of Episcopacy in Scotland. The characters selected cover the period from the sixth to the nineteenth century. The first lecture deals with the familiar story of Columba and his associates at Iona in the sixth and succeeding centuries. Queen Margaret, in the tenth century, represents the transition from Celtic to Roman forms of Christianity. Bishop Elphinstone, in the fifteenth century, serves as a foil to the corruptions of the church prior to the Reformation.

The reader can but sympathize with the difficulties of the author in depicting John Erskine of Dun as the really heroic figure of the Scottish Reformation in the place of Knox. Still, the portrait is finely drawn, and offers much of interest to the student. The story of the struggle, decline, and rejuvenation of Scotch Episcopacy during the past three centuries finds illustration in the lives of Leighton, Skinner, and Dowden.

With rare exceptions the book is penetrated by a fine catholic spirit. Praise and criticism are meted out alike to Scotch Presbyterians and the representatives of Episcopacy in the long conflict ending at last in the revival of Episcopacy in the nineteenth century in Scotland.

H. H. W.

DOCTRINAL

REES, T. *The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience.* New York: Scribner, 1915. ix+221 pages. \$0.75.

This is the latest volume in the popular series of "Studies in Theology," and is one of the more valuable numbers in the series. The author begins his study by examining the various experiences assigned to the agency of the Holy Spirit in Hebrew and Jewish religion and follows the history of the idea within Christianity down to modern times. Four fairly distinct stages in the historical development are noted, viz., the

spontaneous period in Hebrew and early Christian religion; Paul's co-ordination of the Spirit with God and Christ resulting in the subsequent trinitarian emphasis in the baptismal formula and the creed; the philosophical formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity as worked out, for example, by Athanasius and Augustine; and finally the delimitation of distinct spheres of operation by the Reformers and Puritans. The difficulties which modern thought has in finding a place for the traditional doctrine is recognized and lamented, and a cautious attempt to supply a solution is suggested by appealing to the notion of divine immanence.

The writer regrets—and his readers will share his regret—that the limitations of the volume excluded the treatment of similar phenomena outside the Hebrew and Christian religions. One could also wish that he had taken more account of the psychological side of the study.

S. J. C.

HAAS, JOHN A. W. *Trends of Thought and Christian Truth*. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 329 pages. \$1.50 net.

President Haas aims to give a general outline of modern thought in relation to Christian truth. He does two things: he enumerates the leading logical methods, and then puts an estimate upon current philosophies. His discussions of pragmatism and vitalism, including in the latter Bergson and Eucken, are particularly full. While he rejects both types of philosophy as possessing neither the God nor Christ of Christianity, he is not oblivious to their merits. The neo-realism of the day is also weighed and rejected. The conclusion to which the book comes is that while Christianity is neither philosophy nor logic, it needs both to preserve revelation. The work has been done in a mediating spirit, yet without expectation of universal reception. It is intended for use as a textbook in college or theological seminary classes. The chapter headings do not always clearly reflect the subject to be discussed, but the discussions themselves are fair and sufficiently adequate to the use intended.

W. T. P.

SHARPE, CHARLES MANFORD. *The Normative Use of Scripture by Typical Theologians of Protestant Orthodoxy in Great Britain and America*. University of Chicago, August Convocation, 1912. Menasha, Wis.: George Banta Publishing Co., 1912. 77 pages.

This doctorate dissertation includes an examination of the theologies of Charles Hodge, Warfield, Orr, Denney, A. H. Strong, C. M. Mead, and Olin Curtis. It finds in all some dominant doctrinal conception controlling biblical interpretation. As a remedy for the impairment of the authority of the Bible, due to the conflict of systems, the author urges the claim of a functional or experimental authority as a substitute for formal authority. The discussion of the constructive side of the problem, however, is given scant place.

W. T. P.

SNATH, JOHN. *The Philosophy of Spirit*. London, New York, Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. vii+405 pages. \$3.00.

Only to those prepared to accept the finality of the philosophy of Hegel will this discussion appeal. Present-day errors in theology are philosophical. The antidote is Hegel as interpreted by Sterling. From this position the author defends traditional orthodoxy.

W. T. P.

HIRSCH, EMANUEL. *Fichtes Religionsphilosophie im Rahmen der philosophischen Gesamtentwicklung Fichtes*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. vi+132 pages. M. 3.60.

Fichte's philosophy of religion is treated under three periods: the Kantian, the earlier and the later *Wissenschaftslehre*. The first is insignificant. The third is a development from the second under the guidance of a self-imposed criticism. By this criticism Fichte overcomes self-contradictions. *Wissenschaftslehre* became theology and religion was essentially metaphysic. In the earlier period Fichte's absolute lay outside of ethical assurance but now ethics passes into religion. The evidence of religion is immediate consciousness of the absolute, divine life within us. Hirsch, therefore, contends that the later *Wissenschaftslehre* is Fichte's philosophy of religion. It is an excellent piece of work.

W. T. P.

LOCKE, JOHN. *Reasonableness of Christianity (Vernünftigkeit des biblischen Christentums)*, 1695. Übersetzt von PROF. DR. C. WINCKLER in Berlin, mit einer Einleitung, herausgegeben von PROF. LIC. LEOPOLD ZSCHARNACK. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1914. lxvi+140 pages. M. 5.

This translation is the first German translation based directly upon the English original. Previous German versions are based upon Coste's French translation. The introduction is intentionally confined to narrow limits yet discusses at length the relation of this work of Locke's to the better-known "Essay." John Locke's theological connections in general and the influence of this book in particular, not only in England but on the Continent, are also traced. The volume is worthy a place in the "Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus," in which it is published.

W. T. P.

HOUGH, LYNN H. *The Quest for Wonder, and Other Philosophical and Theological Studies*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 302 pages. \$1.00.

Professor Hough has in this volume collected articles which have been previously published mainly in periodicals of the Methodist denomination. They deal with various historical and theological topics and are intended to conserve an essentially orthodox type of religious experience in connection with open-minded freedom in theological method.

G. B. S.

PEAKE, A. S., BOSANQUET, B., AND BONAVIA, F. *Germany in the Nineteenth Century*. (Second Series.) Manchester: University Press, 1915. xvi+254 pages. \$1.50.

In 1912 three English scholars were invited to deliver at the University of Manchester lectures setting forth the contributions of Germany to scholarship in the realms of literature, politics, economics, and education. These lectures were published, and met with such welcome that a second edition was called for. It was decided to enlarge the original series by three dealing with the realms of theology, philosophy, and music. The volume here noticed contains these three lectures. It is scarcely to be expected that a book of this kind will do more than put into semi-popular form a description of a development already known to scholars in the respective fields. Professor Peake confines himself largely to the significance of Schleiermacher and of Ritschl, as is entirely proper. The exposition gives a fair-minded view of the main characteristics

of these great theologians. The controversy which centered in Strauss's interpretation of the gospel narratives is also covered, and a few pages are devoted to the progress of biblical scholarship. The lecture is clearly written and furnishes a good brief survey of the outstanding contributions of German thought. G. B. S.

MORE, LOUIS TRENCHARD. *The Limitations of Science*. New York: Holt, 1915. 268 pages. \$1.50.

Professor More attempts here to indicate certain aspects of modern scientific work which sadly need critical examination. Science really covers two realms of activity. One consists in observation and classification of phenomena. The other consists in constructing hypotheses in order to account for the behavior of things and to increase our practical control of our experiments. It is in the latter realm that Professor More argues for a more profound criticism. The supposed "entities" of scientific hypotheses are really products of metaphysical speculation, and are only indirectly verified through experimentation. Competent criticism of the function and significance of such metaphysical theories can be given only by a philosopher. But such a philosopher must also know science at first hand. Clearly, scientists themselves ought to develop the needed power of philosophical criticism. But they are at present usually content to remain naively ignorant of the philosophical implications of their hypotheses.

In a concluding chapter the author deals with the proposal to construct ethics on the basis of scientific research. He shows that for natural science there can be no "good" or "bad." There are simply facts and causal relations. Natural science can enable us to manipulate environment, but it cannot tell us that manipulation in one direction is better than manipulation in another.

The upshot of the matter is that "the limitations of science are due solely to the fact that there are, in addition to material forces, others of an essentially different kind which may be called, for lack of a better name, spiritual powers." No account of human life is possible without recognizing and valuating the latter.

G. B. S.

TITIUS, ARTHUR. *Unser Krieg; ethische Betrachtungen*. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, V. Reihe, 17.-18. Heft.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. 84 pages. M. 1.

This discussion is an earnest attempt by a German theologian to discuss the great war in the light of ethical principles. It is, on the whole, exactly the sort of book which a loyal patriot with high ethical idealism would write in war time. It is virtually impossible under such circumstances for a patriot to see more than one side of the conflict. Moreover, it is the first duty of a Christian leader to do his best to save what can be saved of moral idealism amid the ruthless barbarity of an armed conflict. This task Titius accomplishes with good success, in that he constantly calls attention to the primacy of those higher attainments which war threatens, and declares that the only possible justification of war is the necessity for defending these higher attainments against forces which threaten their destruction. A defensive war of this kind is a "holy war"; and the present war seems to Titius to be one of holy self-defense.

Much of the argument in the book will in a few years be read with curious incredulity. The characterization of English morality would be laughable, if it were not so

tragic an illustration of the dreadful prejudices aroused by war. He accuses England of hypocrisy and of a deliberate program of lying in order to make the admitted evil of her declaration of war capable of ethical justification. But he can see in Germany's attempt to harmonize warfare with moral principles no such elements of deception. An Englishman would precisely reverse Titius' estimates. Certainly the author's defense of the invasion of Belgium seems labored to anyone not bound beforehand to support Germany's military program. The book is of primary value as a document illustrating war-psychology.

G. B. S.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

SÖDEBLUM, NATHAN. *Natürliche Theologie und allgemeine Religionsgeschichte*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. iv+110 pages. M. 6.

The author reviews the antecedents and preparations for natural theology, outlines the formulated doctrine, after which he discusses the watchword of the eighteenth century, namely, "All religion is natural religion," and the contrary position of the nineteenth century, namely, "There is no natural religion." Today, general religious history has been substituted for natural theology. The scholarly and instructive brochure closes with a chapter in approval of the distinction between "general" and "special" history of religion, according revelation-value to the latter, denying it to the former—the latter being Christianity, of course; the former, folk-religion.

With reference to this chapter, it would not be difficult to show that the distinction in question is arbitrary and unfortunate. Christianity sprang from a folk-religion, incorporated and assimilated diverse elements from other folk-religions—is at best a variation-religion. The qualities which signalize Christianity as consummate are not different in kind from other qualities which are products of the folk-spirit—even as internationalism or supernationalism is the practice of virtues and the appraisal of values which emerged in nationalism. Besides, what is good in Christianity cannot be bad by virtue of its genesis and presence in folk-spirit. In either case, religion is an immediate revelation of the human spirit, which, in turn, we are permitted to evaluate as revelation of the divine Spirit. Especially must we allow—even Christianity teaches us to do so—that "God is not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also, if so be God is one." If God be God of the whole world, the distinction between "general" and "special," whether in religion or revelation, falls away.

If Christian values are indeed good, the Christian should rejoice that they have a wider historic reach than particularism has allowed; and this enlargement of scope should serve the endearment and verification of our faith.

G. B. F.

MOORE, GEORGE FOOT. *Metempsychosis*. [The Ingersoll Lecture, 1914.] Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914. 84 pages.

This is a popular sketch of the doctrine of transmigration of souls as exhibited in various historic faiths. The doctrine prevailed in India, it was also at home in Greece, it was current among Christian Gnostics, it was taken up in certain circles of Jews and Moslems, and it finds exponents even in modern times. An appended list of notes gives the chief source-materials from which the information contained in the essay has been compiled.

S. J. C.

MARETT, R. R. *The Threshold of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xxxii+224 pages. \$1.50.

This "second edition" contains three new chapters and an introduction not to be found in the earlier edition. The volume is composed of a series of independent essays, so that the unity of the book is mainly in general interest and in point of view. All the essays relate to the nature of the experience involved in primitive forms of religion; and in studying these forms the author is disposed to apply the name "religion" to many phenomena which other scholars would designate simply as "magic." He will not concede that animism marks the emergence of religion. Even before man arrives at the animistic stage where he entertains the ideas of ghost, soul, spirit, and the like, our author posits a rudimentary form of religion defined in terms of a feeling of awe in the presence of the mysterious. Thus he is an exponent of what we may call the *taboo-mana* theory of the origin of religion. The book is an excellent introduction to this method of interpreting religious origins.

S. J. C.

GARBE, RICHARD. *Indien und das Christentum: Eine Untersuchung der religionsgeschichtlichen Zusammenhänge*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. viii+301 pages. M. 6.

Of the various books treating the question of possible relationship between early Christianity and the religion of India, the present work is perhaps the most important. The author's familiarity with the materials in question, and his previous studies in the same field, make this last treatise especially interesting. This is particularly true in view of the fact that later study has resulted in the abandonment of earlier opinions. Previously he had denied any Buddhistic influence in the books of the New Testament, though he did detect traces of such influence in the apocryphal Gospels. But now he is convinced that even the canonical Gospels are occasionally indirectly affected by tradition from India, and in fact some of the gospel narratives are held to be of Buddhistic origin. This is affirmed in particular of four incidents: the story of Simeon in the Temple (Luke 2:25 f.); the Temptation of Jesus (Matt. 4:1 ff.; Luke 4:1 ff.); Peter's walking on the water (Matt. 14:25 f.); and the miraculous feeding of the multitude (Matt. 14:15 ff.; Mark 6:35 ff.; Luke 9:13 ff.). Garbe's position now approaches to that of Van den Bergh Van Eysinga and of Edmunds, though he is somewhat more reserved in affirming the extent of Buddhistic influence upon the Gospels. In the apocryphal Gospels, in certain Christian legends, and also in the cultus, further traces of influence from India are detected.

The second main section of the volume discusses the question of Christian influence upon the religions of India. Here the author is much more skeptical than some writers. He believes that Christianity cannot have reached India before the third century at the earliest and its influence can hardly have made itself appreciably felt before the sixth century. But at no time is the extent of such influence thought to be very great.

S. J. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Badé, William Frederic. *The Old Testament in the Light of Today*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. xxii+326 pages. \$1.75.
- Godwin, C. H. Sellwood. *The Anglican Proper Psalms. Critical and Exegetical Notes on Obscure and Corrupt Passages in the Hebrew Text, in the Light of Modern Knowledge*. London: Bell, 1915. xviii+88 pages. 4s. 6d.
- Haller, M. *Das Judentum von der Neugründung Jerusalems bis zur Gesetzgebung durch Esra. (Die Schriften des Alten Testaments. 18. Lieferung.)* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1911. 64 pages.
- Langdon, Stephen. *Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood and the Fall of Man. Vol. X, No. 1, Publications of the Babylonian Section, University of Pennsylvania Museum*. Philadelphia: University Museum, 1915. 98 pages+vi plates.
- Peritz, Ismar J. *Old Testament History*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 336 pages. \$1.50.
- Rogers, Robert W. *Babylonia and Assyria (two volumes). Revised and largely rewritten*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. Vol. I, 568 pages; Vol. II, 628 pages. \$10.00.
- Schmidt, Hans. *Die grossen Propheten. (Die Schriften des Alten Testaments. 30.-32. Lieferung. Schluss des Werkes.)* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. lxxii+986 pages.
- Ungnad, Arthur. *Babylonian Letters of the Hammurapi Period. Vol. VII, Publications of the Babylonian Section, University of Pennsylvania Museum*. Philadelphia: University Museum, 1915. 50 pages+civ plates.
- Gardner, Percy. *The Ephesian Gospel*. New York: Putnam, 1915. xi+362 pages.
- Hayes, D. A. *Paul and His Epistles*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 508 pages. \$2.00.
- Lidgett, J. Scott. *God in Christ Jesus. A Study of St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians*. London: Kelly, 1915. xi+388 pages. 5s.
- Patton, Carl S. *Sources of the Synoptic Gospels*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xiii+263 pages. \$1.30.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Appel, Heinrich. *Kurzgefasste Kirchengeschichte für Studierende*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. xix+712 pages. M. 8.50.
- Cushing, Max Pearson. *Baron D'Holbach. A Study of Eighteenth Century Radicalism in France. (Columbia University Thesis.)* New York, 1914. 108 pages.
- Grosch, Hermann. *Die angefochtenen Grundwahrheiten des Apostolikums*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. vii+118 pages. M. 3.00.
- Lagarde, André. *The Latin Church in the Middle Ages*. New York: Scribner, 1915. vi+600 pages. \$2.50.
- Mercer, Samuel A. B. *The Ethiopic Liturgy*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. xvi+487 pages. \$1.50.
- Rudwin, Maximilian Josef. *Der Teufel in den deutschen geistlichen Spielen des Mittelalters und der Reformationzeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. xi+194 pages. M. 5.
- Rust, John Benjamin. *Modernism and the Reformation*. Chicago: Revell, 1914. 339 pages. \$1.50.
- Schlatter, A. *Der Märtyrer in den Anfängen der Kirche*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1915. 310 pages. M. 10.

DOCTRINAL

- Appel, Heinrich. *Die Echtheit des Johannesevangeliums mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der neuesten kritischen Forschungen*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. 37 pages. Pf. 80.
- Balfour, Arthur James. *Theism and Humanism*. New York: Doran, 1915. 274 pages. \$1.75.

- Buckham, John Wright. *Mysticism and Modern Life*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 256 pages. \$1.00.
- Coffin, Henry Sloane. *Some Christian Convictions*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. ix+222 pages. \$1.00.
- D'Arcy, Charles F. *God and Freedom in Human Experience*. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1915. viii+307 pages. 10s. 6d.
- Flewelling, Ralph Tyler. *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 218 pages. \$1.00.
- Gray, Joseph M. M. *The Old Faith in the New Day*. Abingdon Press, 1915. 258 pages. \$1.00.
- Hastings, James (editor). *The Christian Doctrine of Prayer*. New York: Scribner, 1915. xi+448 pages. \$3.00.
- Heermance, Edgar L. *The Unfolding Universe*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1915. xxiii+463 pages. \$1.50.
- Langham, James P. *The Supreme Quest, The Nature and Practice of Mystical Religion*. London: Joseph Johnson, 1915. xi+224 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Mains, George Preston. *Divine Inspiration*. New York: Doran, 1915. 171 pages. \$1.00.
- Powell, John Walker. *What Is a Christian?* New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxix+201 pages. \$1.00.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The Basis of Morality*. Translated by A. B. Bullock. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxviii+288 pages. \$1.25.
- Sears, Annie Lyman. *The Drama of the Spiritual Life. A Study of Religious Experience and Ideals*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxiv+495 pages. \$3.00.
- Sheldon, Henry C. *Studies in Recent Adventism*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 160 pages. \$0.50.
- Slattery, Charles Lewis. *The Light Within*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915. vi+325 pages. \$2.00.
- Spens, Will. *Belief and Practice*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915. xii+244 pages. \$1.75.
- Stange, Carl. *Die Wahrheit des Christusglaubens mit einem Anhang über die Eigenart des christlichen Gottesglaubens*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. 126 pages. M. 2.80.
- Strickland, Francis L. *Foundations of Christian Belief*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 319 pages. \$1.50.
- Thornton, Lionel Spencer. *Conduct and the Supernatural*. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1915. xiv+327 pages. \$2.25.
- Ward, Harry F. *Social Evangelism*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1915. 145 pages. \$0.50.
- Webb, Clement C. J. *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1915. vi+363 pages. 10s. 6d.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Durkheim, Emile. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xi+456 pages. \$3.75.
- Pratt, James Bissett. *India and Its Faiths*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. xv+482 pages. \$4.00.
- Warrum, Henry. *Some Religious Weft and Warp*. Indianapolis: Hollenbeck Press, 1915. 274 pages.

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

- Mainage, Th. *La Psychologie de la conversion*. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1915. xii+433 pages. Fr. 4.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

- Flewelling, Ralph T. *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 207 pages. \$1.00.
- Hall, G. Stanley. *Thanatophobia and Immortality*. Reprinted from *American Journal of Psychology*, October, 1915. 613 pages.
- Macintosh, Douglas Clyde. *The Problem of Knowledge*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xviii+503 pages. \$3.00.
- Walter, Johnston Estep. *Subject and Object*. West Newton, Pa.: Johnston & Penney, 1915. 184 pages. \$1.40.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP TO MINISTERIAL EFFICIENCY

GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER
University of Chicago

The essentials of a school are teachers and students. According to our new education, the primary office of the teacher is to teach, not thoughts or things, but human beings. He is not a superior being whose aim is to impart authoritative information to inferiors, sustaining to him the appropriate attitude of submission, passivity, and docility. Renouncing aristocratic aloofness, he becomes his students' guide and friend, developing their energy, independence, initiative, and resourcefulness. *Learning by doing* is the slogan in our modern schools as against the old watchword of learning by being told or taught.

Accordingly, pupils are put in direct relation with reality instead of with symbols of reality. The content of life and environment is the subject-matter which they study. It is not that the student is immediately fitted for some trade or vocation or profession, but that the material which he examines and elaborates is drawn from actual life itself. The new education aims to give neither mere "book learning," as was the case with an earlier scholasticism, nor the narrow and technical vocational training, as the present-day secularist craves, but to develop mind and body, to stimulate inventiveness, and to cultivate a judicial temper and habit, in order that the student may be prepared to become

a happy and useful member of a democratic society. In a word, our new general education assimilates itself to the spirit of democracy and to the method of our sciences.

Now, in what respect, if in any, does professional or vocational education differ from our ordinary education? By a professional school is meant an institution where students gain control of one specialized field of knowledge, of one particular industry or profession or calling—such, for example, as engineering, or medicine, or divinity. Professional schools—their history reveals this—have usually fallen into the extremes of an inherited scholastic “bookishness” or else of a narrow utilitarian practiciness. To illustrate in the use of theology, this “discipline” was knowledge dissociated from life, a thing worth while on its own account; or else it was little more than drill in the usages and ceremonies of the church. In ages of rationalism and panlogism, it tended to be the former; it was the latter in primitive and mediaeval times. It may be doubted whether medicine and law are second to theology as exemplars of these extremes.

In opposition to this scholastic education apart from active life or this technical education apart from broad learning, the new education of the ordinary schools unites ideas and practice, work and the recognition of the meaning of what is done, learning and social applications. Happily, the conviction is maturing today that this unity should replace those theoretical and practical one-sidednesses in our professional education; that, advancing into the region of specialism, the matter of most importance is not familiarity with the body of ready-made knowledge, or skill in manipulating a technique, but knowing how to know, skilful in becoming skilful. At bottom, this means the formation of the kind of character and experience which, in their special modification, are required for the enthusiasm and service of humanity in that special profession. Thus, the primary function of any professional school is the unfolding and maturing of the right kind of man for the right kind of work. Both the school's science and practice are simply means to that end. It is neither the knowledge nor the practice in their abstractness, but the *knowing and doing personality* that is society's valuable asset.

Now it is in the light of such considerations as these that the serious problems of our theological education may be approached.

There is a distinction—not philological, but historical and real—between the words “calling” and “vocation.” The significance of this distinction leads to the heart of our problem, so worthy of thus studying in a large way. Historically speaking, calling is providential, vocation is optional; calling is religious, vocation is moral; calling is a man’s by motives deeper than his choice, wiser than his deliberations; vocation is a man’s by his own elective preference. In calling, a minister feels that he is a man of destiny—woe is me if I preach not the gospel; I was fore-ordained and set apart from my mother’s womb for this work, a work in which the power of the eternal is at my disposal, is indeed my power. Without this feeling the minister is sure to be shorn of his strength and robbed of his greatness among men. But in vocation one is looked upon as self-dependent, self-sufficient, self-accountable. To be sure, calling and vocation are not exclusive, but the objective and subjective, rather the divine and the human side, of the same experience. But, historically, they have fallen asunder. At the beginning of the modern world, Luther and Calvin both looked upon a man’s work, no matter what it was, as his calling—as his by the providential will of God. Thus, a man’s work reposed upon a *religious* basis. Men were what they were, doing what they did, by the power and plan and purpose of God. Such a conviction brought strength and stay and contentment. But, in the eighteenth century, the religious basis of all secular¹ callings was undermined. The relative historical justification of this critical dissolution does not concern us here. The fact is that, along with science and art and education, the other orders of life dispensed with their religious foundation, and that capital, machinery, and technique came in to take their place. Accordingly, faith in the fulfilment of one’s daily task came to repose in the latter rather than in the former.

In all this one may see progress in a certain direction. Perhaps the heavens had to be emptied and clouded for a time, if men

¹ Aware of the dualism seemingly involved in the words “secular” and “sacred,” I find it convenient to use them in this article.

were to realize that they must stand upon the earth, develop the resources of the earth, and depend upon themselves. Yet this loss of the religious basis of secular callings is largely responsible for the sorry fruits of egoism and mammonism, of cynicism and pessimism. It may not be too much to say that the world of business needs nothing so much as to add to the confidence in technique and machinery and money, the ancient faith in God, with his providential guidance over men's work, and his peace and power in men's hearts. Labor needs to supply to its notion of vocation its former notion of calling. It watches, but it also needs to pray.

Has an analogous development gone on in the sacred calling of the Christian ministry? Once there was the religious basis without machinery and capital—not even a salary! The ministry was calling, conscious of God's power and will, God's truth and cause, God's providence. The minister spoke with authority to the consciences and hearts of men. There was an accent of positive conviction that could not be simulated or mistaken. Men were made to face the tables of stone, the cross, and the great white throne. A supernatural significance and awe attached to human life as a probationary place of definitive and eternal decisions. The prophet and priest of God was a king among men. What has been going on? The sacred calling is duplicating in its own way the experience of the secular calling. The calling becomes a vocation. To be sure, this is but a "moment" in the total secularization of all life, which seems to be the set program of the modern world. The sacred calling is becoming de-supernaturalized and, in a sense, de-spiritualized. So is its technique. But one sees in this great change the method of the evolutionary process fully illustrated. Life, characteristic of one era, survives, increasingly unproductive and moribund, in the subsequent period, committed to new growths and species. At length, such life of the old order ceases in fact as it had already ceased in principle. This is true in the sphere of the higher life and processes of which we are thinking. Thus, in principle—though not yet entirely in fact—the divinity of the historic sacraments is gone, and of ministerial grace from ordaining hands; gone is the origin of the sermon in the

Holy Ghost—the open-your-mouth-and-it-shall-be-filled theory of preaching—the naïve and primitive trust in divine afflatus; gone is the preacher's living upon the capricious gratuities and donations of a flock who felt that it was their place to keep him poor, God's to keep him humble—both prerogatives now arrogated to themselves. More serious still, the divinity of his church, of the doctrines and morals of his sermons, of the Head of the church, of the specific God of his theology—these too are gone; and with them the old miraculous supernaturalism of regeneration and sanctification and perfection. Indeed, these words are quite unintelligible to the modern man on the street and almost obsolete in the terminology of the theologian. What is taking the place of all this that once constituted the religious basis of the ministerial calling? In part, technique, machinery, capital, especially organization with the correlate of scientific efficiency of the churches in manipulating them. The dream is of a scientific ministry instead of the old religious ministry. The minister is not so much prophet and priest of God as an administrative officer of a philanthropic and humanitarian institution endowed by capital, which he is competent to execute. The church is not a temple, but a "plant." The idea seems to be gaining favor that if men are fed and clothed and sheltered and washed and amused, they will not need to be redeemed with the old terrible redemption. In somewhat harsh antithesis, to be sure, one may say that not supernatural regeneration, but natural growth; not divine sanctification, but human education; not supernatural grace, but natural morality; not the divine expiation of the cross, but the human heroism—or accident?—of the cross; not the supernatural spiritual brother, but the natural bodily brother; not the invisible religious communion of saints, living and dead, but boys' clubs and men's clubs and social settlements, all run in the use of technique, machinery, and capital, with scientific efficiency clinically learned in a divinity school;¹ and not Christ the Lord, but the man Jesus who was a child of his times, not God and his providence, but evolution and its process without an absolute goal—that all this, and such as this, is the new

¹ In a recent volume of essays, Paul Elmer Moore says: A divinity school is a place where they investigate poverty and spread agnosticism."

turn in the affairs of religion at the tick of the clock. It is the change that is going on from the old minister to the new, from the old church to the new.

Now, is this progress? In a sense, yes. It was progress in the secular. The machine makes shorter hours possible, leaving time for possible personal improvement and social intercourse. A larger population can be provided for; and so forth.

The same is true of the church with modern appointments and appliances, money and organization. We have but to think of how much better religion can be taught in the use of modern pedagogy; or of how much more systematically and wisely scientific charities can be administered; of how organized parish visitations can be carried on; of how the problem of the boy can be solved; of how church services can be conducted with beauty and finesse. All this is good and will doubtless grow better. Besides, the beliefs of the church which constitute the substance of the sermon are readjusted to fit more harmoniously into the sum of modern convictions. We shall not be able to go back behind all this in the world of the church any more than in the world of business.

But, for all that, we have the problem on our hands in the secular world as to whether machine and capital are primary, and personality and humanity secondary, or whether it is the other way around; the problem of whether man is for the sake of vocation, or vocation for the sake of man—the problem of man's spirituality and freedom and worth. But this problem can never be solved until there is the restoration of the long-lost religious basis of secular life. It is not science, it is faith, the communion of all men in and with God, that can make man the lord and not the slave of capital and machine and organization. Only so can there cease to be the hard dominion of thing over person. Once again the laborer must return to the conviction that his vocation is a calling—his calling by the will and providence of God.

A similar relationship needs to be maintained in the world of the sacred between the primary worth of personality and the instrumentalities and institutions of the church. The real church of God is a spiritual and invisible communion of religious faith. The real church of God is super-institutional. As man, any man, is more than a "member of society," is super-social from the point

of view of a social organism, that is, is a *child of God*, so the calling of the minister is more than so-called "social service," and has to do with that deep of man which cries unto the deep of the being of God. There was a lonely hour at the brook Jabbok when Jacob's family and flock were out of his mind, the peril of his angry brother forgotten, his heart corroded by no mordant memory—a lonely hour in which he cried: "Tell me, I pray thee, thy name," the Ineffable Name. He wanted to know the eternal mystery and meaning of existence. Not so-called "social service," but the ministry of the interpretation and the satisfaction of this inexpugnable and abysmal need of man, is the supreme and inalienable function of the Christian minister. And this is a work where the peculiar worth of personality, religious personality, entirely dissociated from all the technique and machinery and capital of the whole ecclesiastical entity, is paramount. It were well to realize in thought what a reduction of human nature and human need there would be, were man to be abridged to a point where what could be done for him by "social service" with its instrumentalities could satisfy him. Man has untranslatable wealth, super-vocational vastness and verities and relationships. So has the minister; and it is this super-vocational overplus that is the best part of the minister, and that lends chief charm and value even to the minister's vocational activity itself.

It is in the light of this larger perspective that one can evaluate the most characteristic watchword of the modern world—*efficiency*. The educational and ecclesiastical circles have borrowed it from the commercial world. It must be admitted that there is much value in the maxim. It is opposed to sloth. In the concentration and solidification which it requires, it discourages the spirit that reflectively divides the inner self and leaves it divided. And it emphasizes courage. To be sure, it is the courage to face rivals in the market place rather than the courage that meets one's own spiritual enemies. But, for all that, we know in our hearts that this modern watchword is profoundly unsatisfactory in every sphere of life, particularly in the Christian ministry. What this watchword does not emphasize is the significance of self-possession; of lifting up our eyes to the hills whence cometh our help; of testing the life that now is by the vision of the largest life that we can

image and appreciate. In a way that appeals to a superficial populace with quantitative standards, it emphasizes results rather than ideals, vigor rather than cultivation, temporary success rather than wholeness of life, the greatness of him that "taketh a city" rather than of him that "ruleth his spirit." It points to a shallow pragmatism, missing the pragmatic depths. In its current signification, it is not correlated to man's deepest needs—needs which, from the point of view of this word, are super-efficient. Men are indeed suffering from poverty and dirt and disease, from manifold industrial and social evils. The minister must indeed sustain positive relations to these evils. But the worst evil is not such sufferings. The worst evil is spiritual destitution. Men are suffering far more from the loss of God and of the moral imperative than from the lack of bread and work, of recreation and amusement. What can silence the voice of the heart's pain? What can introduce a man defeated, lonely, bereaved, defenseless, into the region of eternal truth, eternal rest, eternal peace? "Efficiency" cannot answer such questions. These are questions common to all time. But our time is indeed an age of doubt, more widespread and more basic than the premature prognosticators of an age of faith seem to be aware of. The new world began in doubt. First, there was a doubt of the church and of its divine authority. A violent devastating storm swept over popular life. The storm was speedily exorcised. Again—

The sea of faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.

Then from the old doubt a new faith emerged, like sweet waters in a bitter sea, and kept man a living soul.

The sea is calm tonight;
The tide is full.

The tide of the new faith was the faith in the Bible, and in the doctrines derived from the Bible, but this tide went back to sea, and now one only hears:

Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar
Retreating to the breath
Of the night-wind down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.

The human spirit urged a new, mightier protest against the "It is written," which was said to put an end to all doubt. The new doubt, as protestant science, as free inquiry, flung down the gauntlet to the old Bible faith. No page of the Sacred Book remained unscrutinized. Only one certainty spread from this new doubt—the certainty that the Sacred Book was a human book. Therefore allowing and ever rejoicing in the moral and religious value of many a page, the biblical canon as such had no right to rule over man. Man was the book's judge; the book was not man's judge. The book must be measured by man's truth, man's conscience.

How, now, should the timorous heart of man be quieted in the presence of this new doubt? At once new props were offered—for one thing, the state. What the church was to the mediaeval man the state became to the modern man—God manifest in the flesh. Men believed in their state as in their Christ. All power in heaven and on earth seemed to be given to it. What was preached in the name of the state was a gospel. It seemed a sin to doubt the wisdom of the state at all. It was blasphemy to contest the state's claim to omnipotence. Good? What is good if not that which benefits the state? True? But where is there truth apart from the word that is the *ipse dixit* of the state? The political end sanctifies any means.

Then a great change began. Historic study and the doctrine of development, together with the new ideals of personality and humanity, decomposed the old theory of the state. Modern man came to see that the state does not possess eternal life. The state is only a special form in which human social life can exist, not human society itself. There have not always been states. They came to be in the long course of the evolution of a people's life. What comes to be must pay its toll to Father Time. The state will change—and pass. Thus its inerrancy and finality were discredited. If we doubt the church, why not the state, too? Man's tottering life could not be braced up by either.

Then new props were offered man. What science recognized as "true," what morals and *bourgeois* customs recognized as "good"—these were offered him. "Trust the light of science, and you shall indeed have the light of life; do what is 'good' and you shall

indeed be crowned with the crown of life." This was the watchword. Then there stirred in the womb of present-day humanity the last, ultimate, uncanniest doubt. If we doubt faith, why not doubt science too? If we doubt the church, the Bible, the state, why not doubt reason, doubt knowledge, doubt morality? Even if what we call "true" be really true, can it make us good and happy? Is not that which is called "good" grievous impediment in our pilgrimage? Law, morals—are not these perhaps a blunder of history, an old hereditary woe with which humanity is weighted down? Was Stendhal right perhaps in his judgment that "the only excuse for God is that he does not exist"?

Here—here is the agony of the modern world. But what can our current "efficiency" do here—"efficiency" with its technique and machinery and money and organization? At this point the tragedy of life passes beyond the help of such things, and of institutional religion. Is there no help for lost souls any more? The minister who cannot cope with this deepest need of the modern man may organize superficial and often impertinent reforms, but he cannot give the bread of life. He may minister to bodily wants—good enough in its way—but he leaves the soul in its bewilderment and forsakenness. In the end he loses confidence and abandons his fundamental task. Our fathers thought of the Christian minister as prophet, priest, and king. This watchword "efficiency" tends to restrict the ministerial function to that of king. But the need of the times, as of all times, is satisfied more fully by prophet and priest. In sum: the great question is not that of efficiency, but of the *criterion* of efficiency. It would be the minister's sin against the Holy Ghost, which hath never forgiveness, were he to truncate and abridge the nature and need of man so that our institutionalized religion of scientific efficiency could sustain an easy correlation thereto.

Thus conceiving the function of the ministry in the terrible religious situation of the modern world, the utility of the study of theology in our divinity schools may be estimated.

Theology is the science of faith, of religion. Of this statement much more needs to be said than can be said here. While science and religion are both expressions and aids of human life, they are

different in form and function. Briefly expressed, religion experiences, science calculates; religion creates, science discovers; religion ventures, science weighs. Science avails itself of concepts and categories and laws; religion, of symbols and pictures and parables.

Assuming that theology is a science, a practical difficulty at once confronts us. Can theology be at once scientific and ecclesiastical? From the ecclesiastical point of view, the aim of theology has been to clarify and increase the Christian's intelligence as regards the content of his faith; to evince the living power of the Christian religion, and to bring this home to bear upon life through preaching, teaching, and Christian communion. From the scientific point of view, theology seeks to be free from the control and needs of the church, to be determined solely by the truth-interest, by the impulse to know reality, and to regard no law but its own, and no authority save the compulsion of its subject-matter. Since the second Christian century, those two interests, the ecclesiastical and the scientific, have never vanished. But it may be doubted whether they have ever been in equilibrium. Usually the one has been emphasized at the expense of the other. Indeed, theology is usually under a cross-fire from both science and faith—disowned by science, distrusted by faith. One may recall its mediaeval dignity as queen of the sciences, as science was then understood; but since the rise of the modern scientific method, theology came to be but compassionately tolerated by the representatives of the exact sciences, doubted by many of its own representatives, and incriminated by the laity as the primary cause of all the evils with which the church of the present was infested. It was thought that in satisfying the requirements of science theology betrayed the interests of religion. Hence the question became acute: Can theology be at once scientific from the point of view of science and serviceable from the point of view of practicable Christianity? Is the study of theology a sufficient or even a suitable preparation for the office of preacher and pastor? Does theology destroy the preacher's message, lower the preacher's piety, impair the preacher's usefulness?

Facing the problem thus fundamentally, one may be permitted to dismiss certain superficial or captious objections. For example,

it is pointed out that the scientific study of theology in a divinity school has occasionally impelled students to abandon the ministry. Such abandonment may be due to the popular theology and nominal Christianity in which he was indoctrinated before he went to the divinity school; or the student, as was the case with Emerson and Kant and Hegel, may enter upon a larger human service than that which a local church could afford. Besides, the occasional abandonment of the ministry under the influence of scientific theology does not discredit such theology, if it is seen to be in general useful, any more than would be the case in the analogous situation of law or medicine. But if it be true—as sometimes true it is—that now and then a theological student makes shipwreck of faith, even this disaster does not constitute a decisive objection, since this is a world where such shipwreck is possible from many causes, one of them being the absence of sound theological training.

Other objectors ask: Why is it that so many students who have studied scientific theology cannot preach? It might not be amiss to inquire whether they could preach if they had not studied scientific theology. As a rule, the academic and technical character of the young minister wears away as the years bring him experience and maturity, suffering and sorrow of his own, sickness and death of others. His fault is more likely to be a neglect of the theological study than a bad use of it.

But we may pass by such objections, and return to the main issue.

Let us assume that theology is in method a “pure” science, in purpose an “applied” science—avoiding the extremes of academic bookishness and of the narrow practicalism of “efficiency.” Let us grant—as the truth-interest requires us to grant—that the purity must not be adulterated by the application. Pure science is free science and—in Hegelian phrase, not to be pragmatically flouted—has the theoretical self-end of knowledge. Now, by virtue of this very character of theological science, is there some service which it may render the ministry? A science which serves the self-cognition of spirit serves thereby one of the supreme, practical ends of life, which is self-realization of spirit. Only an officially infallible church can do without the aid of such science.

Ministers, like politicians, are especially tempted to debasement of the truth-interest—to sham learning, sham religion. The great sin of ministers can easily be the infraction of the ethics of the intellect. Theological science is developing a fine sincerity in our relation to both theology and religion. Such honesty and sobriety of judgment are among a minister's best assets in our age of doubt. They go toward the formation of personality which is at once the primary need of man and the main concern of all education.

Should theology be restricted to the so-called applied, or, better perhaps, vocational sciences, as some divinity schools seek to do, a problem of no little gravity would arise. Would the new vocationally determined science be any more free and pure than the old authoritatively determined science? Is not a postdetermined science by an end externally imposed as prejudicial to the critical occupation of the scientific spirit as a predetermined science by a cause or authority which proscribes freedom and dictates conclusions? Is the *pull* of an alien finalism any better than the *push* of an alien mechanism? If authority-science gives doctrine and not truth, does not vocation-science give practice and not truth? There is something here that should be borne in mind, lest we impair the truth-interest, so inalienable to our highest life as students and ministers. Extremes meet, and it would be an ugly situation were "authority" and "vocation" to combine upon us in such a way that our natural impulse to know should be wounded and weakened. This evil may be avoided by honoring the study of scientific theology as corrective and supplementation of vocational science, ever inclined to deteriorate to an immediate and narrow professionalism.

But theology in all its branches—historical, psychological, philosophical—as "pure" science does serve the vocational ends of the ministry, even if it does not directly and consciously aim to do so.

For one thing, it is indispensable to a reasoned understanding of what religion really is. In defining anything, one speedily turns to see how it came to be and what it is for. Thus, one knows a religious idea, or a religious deed, only as one sees how it has historically and psychologically emerged, and what function it fulfils

in a people's or an individual's life. Besides, one requires to know the relation between idea and action in religion, the order of the emergence of magic, cult, myth, idea, doctrine, and their relations to each other. Especially does one need to know how to face the problem as to what is primary and what secondary and impermanent in religion. It appears that religion is not exhausted as a short-circuit to the real by way of instinct and feeling. The science of religion shows that there is a deep truth in this. Most of the best things in life are rooted in instinct—which is perhaps just another way of saying that we are still ignorant of their precise conditions and causes. But religion, if it is worth while, is not merely a matter of instinct and emotion. It is a legitimate part of man's rational nature. The substance of religion is not in the ceremonies and creeds and institutions which have been built up in connection with church, but in man's consciousness that the best part of him lies in his ideals and in his earnest and sincere efforts to realize these ideals. It is the recognition that the spiritual center of gravity of his life lies, not in what he is or has been, but in what he feels that he ought to become. The only study that leads us into this most needful insight for our work as preachers is that of scientific theology.

But, for another thing, such study yields impressive testimony to the human cry for God. That cry—whether joyous and triumphant, or painful, pathetic, poignant—reverberates from land to land, and from century to century. The very import of human history is its mysterious and universal urgency and awfulness. Whether it be the vague cosmological gropings of a primitive animism with its crass anthropomorphizing of duty and personification of inanimate objects; whether it be the passionate searching out of concepts or essences by Socrates, Plato, and the Scholastics, with their confident assurance of the existence of an archetypal reality; whether it be the blended love and fear with which the intense and mystical Semites worshiped Jahwe and dared finally in the Greatest of the Hebrews to claim Divinity itself; whether it be the masterful executive ability with which the mediaeval ecclesiastics sought to embody a spiritual world in a temporal, even in a political hierarchy; whether it be the refreshing direct-

ness with which the Protestants sought to re-establish an immediate relation of the believer with his God; whether it be the pathetic attempts of modern apologists to reconcile Genesis and Darwinism, or the wistful admission of the man of science that he has scanned the heavens with his telescope and found not God—whether it be one or all of these earnest and honest endeavors of man to understand his world and his own experience, the study of theology makes us recognize throughout, always and everywhere, the search for the unity and continuity of the life and love of man with an eternal and fatherly God. The value of this world-old and world-wide witness to the minister of religion is obvious. It is quite the fashion in some modern circles to pride one's self on one's unbelief—though *why* what one does *not* believe should be so admirable is not so immediately evident. It is much more to the point, one would think, to pride one's self on the number of truths one had found at the core of current superstitions. But it is only through the study of theology in all its branches that one acquires the judgment and skill to make such discoveries.

With these general considerations in mind, we may very well close by isolating for special remark those specific questions which were raised a moment ago.

The first of those questions is the effect of the study of theology upon the definite message of the preacher.

Biblical infallibility now abandoned, the idea that the source and certainty of the preacher's message are rooted in God's dictation and donation of truth is no longer tenable. The props that upheld him in the old orthodox days are virtually all gone. The easy gift of authoritative truth has been denied him once for all. The study of a deposit of truth must give way to the search for reality.

The case is quite the same in this regard if one turns from orthodoxy to rationalism, which undertook to replace the finished and final truth of revealed and authoritative biblical religion. According to rationalism, the human mind possesses a priori a sum of theoretical and practical ideas, untarnished by the corruptions and contingencies of experiential origin, from which absolute truth may be easily deduced. A religion of reason, consisting essentially

of the ideas of God, of freedom or the moral law, and of immortality, supplemented the religion of revelation at first, but subsequently became a forum before which the truth and error of all positive, historical religions were adjudicated. The task of the old rationalistic clergyman who expounded the parsimonious content of truth inborn in his own reason, and skilfully demonstrated its agreement with Christianity, was simpler and shorter than the task of the orthodox clergyman burdened with the study of biblical languages, with exegesis and harmonizings with creeds and confessions. But the intellectual and critical movements of the modern world have remorselessly demolished this naïve rationalism. As to those innate ideas, John Locke searched the infant mind and reported that he could not find any of them. He found that ideas are of temporal and empirical origin. Thus their fixed and eternal truths were undermined. Kant followed with his proof that the content of the religion of reason could not be objects of rational knowledge, but only of faith. The outcome was that the authority of reason went the way of the authority of the Bible. All finished and fixed authorities fell, even that of conscience, since it too was unfinished and temporally and spatially conditioned. Of all this, earlier mention will be recalled.

In all these ways the task of the minister grew more difficult, more grievous. In the absence of easy donations of truth from an inerrant book, he must seek and try and doubt and test, with an open and candid truth-loving spirit. The study of theology becomes more important than ever. This importance consists not simply in the ascertainment of the truth, but especially in the formation of a religious personality. Through historical and philosophical study of the dissolution of orthodoxy and of rationalism the student recapitulates and epitomizes the terrible experience of doubt, learns that religion is ever changing, ever in the making, and thus becomes personally prepared to meet the needs and difficulties of our age of doubt and transition and growth. It is not simply truth, but the truthful *man*, tried in the fires of critical theological research, that can win the confidence of our bewildered and discouraged religious life. Men who ask whether Christianity is final or transient, even whether religion

is an illusion or a verity, cannot abide an answer from those ministers who have themselves never asked in anguish, and who cannot answer with sincerity out of the earnestness and courage of their own hearts.

Reverting to the question of the influence of theological study upon the personal piety of the student, the possibilities are, namely, the dependence of piety upon theology—in which case theology could conceivably destroy or sustain piety; or the dependence of theology upon piety, faith, religion, with the reverse alternative to the former; or, finally, the complete or partial independence of the two. Representatives of each of these possibilities have been numerous in the history of the church. In the end, theology annihilates faith—so the second-century church maintained against Clement, the Alexandrian theologian, and so Overbeck, for example, argues in recent years. Moreover, many a theological student feels as if the critical work in the classroom of a scientific theologian was a deadly assault upon his faith.

Were this indeed true, there would be no help for it, since science cannot submit to quarantine from any region of reality that is accessible to examination, and since a faith that fears scrutiny is already enfeebled through self-distrust. For all the future, it would seem, the piety that resists research is foredoomed to atrophy. Indeed, part of the purpose of the study of theology is to subject our piety to the laws of survival. But while some divinity students make shipwreck of faith—a possible price to be paid to the right of science—the usual outcome is a destruction, not of faith, but of the inherited *form* of faith. As a rule, the student closes his years of special study with his faith purged and strengthened, and adapted as never before to nourish and hearten him for the battle of life and the fulness of service. Ceasing to be a quantum of past beliefs, his faith becomes an interior attitude of his spirit, which science cannot take away.

The opposite position—advocated strenuously in recent years by Bollinger—is quite out of harmony with the philosophic temper and thought of our new day. Its thesis is that theory precedes practice, that knowledge is the foundation of practical piety, that knowledge of God is the *prius* of faith in God, finally, that

this knowledge is not traditional (in which case there would be no way to decide whether it was true or false), but demonstrative. It is clear that such a contention is a reversion to an obsolete rationalism with its theistic arguments, and the like.

Admitting, as a truth at which it hints, that there is an intellectual "moment" in the religious consciousness, still one of the great merits of scientific theology is its recognition that the way to God is not proof, but prayer; that we know God because we have faith in him, rather than have faith in him because we know him. Modern theology has probably done no more important service than to clarify this problem.

There remains the possibility for which no less men than Kant and Schleiermacher stood, as have many Ritschlians, namely, the reciprocal neutrality of theology and piety.

Extreme as this position is, there is an important distinction between religion and theology, a distinction in form and function. Suffice it to say here that one of the purposes of the study of theology is to acquire a thorough understanding of this whole matter. Otherwise, it would hardly be possible for the student to escape confusion and aberration. Failure to make such an escape would later yield the injurious result of misleading his church into a piety without knowledge or a knowledge without piety, or an identification of the two—an evil to which the pages of church history bear impressive witness. The distinction, for instance, between the living real God and a concept God is vital to peace of mind and to the power of the gospel today.

With reference to this whole question, it may be said that usually the candidate for the ministry—young though he may sometimes be—enters the divinity school as a finished religious and theological product, but that in consequence of his studies there he departs, unfinished, growing, aware that his personality, with its religion and its theology, are alike in the making. A divinity school that achieves such a result has fulfilled its function in the life of the human spirit.

TROELTSCH'S CONCEPTION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS

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It is the purpose of this article to examine certain typical statements made by Professor Ernst Troeltsch concerning the significance of Jesus for Christian faith, and to consider certain criticisms of this position which have been made.

I. THE PLACE OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND ITS CULTUS

"One of the clearest results of the history and psychology of religion," says Troeltsch, "is this, that the essential thing in religion is not dogma and idea, but cultus and community—living communion with the Deity, and, indeed, a communion of united spirits, that has its life-roots in the religious, and its ultimate power to unite individuals in faith in God."¹ Even where full communion with the Deity is mediated through a priesthood, it is still a communion in which the operations of the priest open the way for the community's real participation therein.

Not only is this the case with the so-called nature-religions, but it is true also of the more spiritual religions, though here communion is not through bloody sacrifice and rites, but through worship and edification. "And that is the reason why Platonism and Stoicism, in which the religion of the spirit was already manifesting itself, were absorbed by Christianity; and why Christianity, on its breaking away from Judaism, became a *Christuskult*."²

Now what, according to Troeltsch, was the nature of the primitive *Christuskult*? "It was not the worship of a new god. It was the worship of Israel's God—the Father of all spirits—in his highest, living and concrete, revelation. The God-faith of the first believers in Christ had no dogma and no body of doctrine.

¹ *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben*, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Its religious content was crystallized in the glorified Jesus—glorified through the resurrection-faith. There were no bloody sacrifices and rites, no magic and no mysteries, but only the worship of God in Christ, and living union with Christ in the Lord's Supper."

Far-reaching changes were introduced into the simple cultus of the primitive Christians. "But whatever elements may gradually have worked their way in from Mythology and the Mysteries, heathen and gnostic analogies, they simply gave body to an independent organism, making more intelligible the primitive Christian consciousness that was begotten by the inner logic of the situation." The motive prompting the first Christians to institute a Christ-cultus is clear enough, Troeltsch goes on to say. The revelation of God in Christ was their common possession, and to keep that heritage living and communicable "they simply had no other way than the rallying about the worship of Christ as the revelation of God, whereby the eternal God revealed in Christ was again made truly and inspiringly manifest to the individual soul."

And the motive that prompted the early Christians to construct their Christ-faith, and to propagate their new God-faith by the institution of the Christ-cultus, is the motive that inspires us today to continue the same, though under different forms and conditions. We may take it as a social-psychological law that, "whenever individuals come, in general, to think and feel alike—as they come to do most of all in a highly refined and individualized culture—they cannot go on for any length of time without interaction and interconnection; that, out of the thousand lines drawing men into relation with one another, everywhere community-circles are begotten, with higher and lower ranks, in which there is absolute need of a concrete central point." It is a law which holds also for the religious life. And hence we make bold to assert that, "without community and cultus, there could be no real certainty and power with respect to the Christian idea, the saving knowledge of God."

Again and again Troeltsch utters this conviction. He would refute in particular the contention of the religious individualist who maintains that *Religion ist Privatsache*. He would show the

impossibility of the position of Lessing and Ibsen and kindred spirits, in which it is held that religious faith does not need historical supports, but can express and propagate itself by virtue of its own purifying and saving power, and develop freely out of its inner depths as it touches life in general. "The prevalent tendency," he says, "to disparage religious community and cultus is the real disease of modern Christianity and modern religion as a whole. Because of it religion is more and more taking on a dissolvent and chaotic character; it begets the contingently-personal, enthusiastic, and amateur types of religionists; and in some quarters religion becomes purely intellectualistic and philosophical. There is no dominating rallying-point from which religion can derive its bearings and nurture; there have arisen as many centers as there are feeling and seeking individuals. But modern religion has become not only chaotic and indefinite. It has become also weak and lifeless, because it lacks the reacting influence of a community-spirit, because the individual misses the sustaining and uplifting power exerted by a community, misses the power, too, which sets for him practical community tasks."¹

Surely, Troeltsch keeps insisting, the history of religion must not be ignored by the individualist. In accord with the social-psychological law enunciated above, we see everywhere the rise of religious communities with definitely appointed upper and lower orders of adherents, fixed rallying-points, means of development, and centers of energy, through which religious life and thought are forever renewed. In the nature-religions all this is effected by the very forces of nature and society, and the rallying-point is the ancient cultish tradition. In the great spiritual religions it is the founder and prophet who takes the central place, to whom, in fact, is accorded religious worship. This was already the case in the religious schools of the Platonic and Stoic philosophers, as it was later in Christianity. It does not mean the enlargement of a pantheon, either. It simply means the keeping alive of the prophet in the consciousness of the believers, at the summit of their divine worship, as the concrete expression of divine truth revealed in and by the prophet. This is the fundamental

¹ *Die Bedeutung der Geschicklichkeit Jesu*, p. 25.

basis of every religious community and cultus. And it is highly probable that religion will ever perpetuate itself thus.

The "third gospel" of Lessing, or the "third kingdom" of Ibsen, in which, as regards religion, all depend upon themselves and the spirit implanted within each one freely develops in isolation, without community and cultus, one can be quite sure will never be realized. No more can we dispense with community and cultus in religion than we can get along without the state and organized commerce and science in the more secular spheres of life. In every sphere of life individual minds and interests are mutually related, and develop in interconnection.

"Whether the existent churches"—this question is peculiarly pertinent in Germany—"are capable of meeting the community needs of the modern Christian is a problem *für sich*. It is possible that, by a change in our general political organization, they will be led to fall back and embrace only the groups that still cling to the old ecclesiastical dogmatic. But it is possible, too, that such political changes may lead to the organization of broad *Volkskirchen*, in which the manifoldness of modern Protestant religious thought will be allowed to come to expression. However, no matter what changes come, so long as Christianity continues in any sense, it will have a cultus connected with it, in which Christ will be accorded the central place."¹

This is not, as Troeltsch intimates, the place to discuss conditions in the churches of today, and the question whether the churches are fulfilling, or are able to fulfil, their mission as the expression of the *corpus mysticum Christi*. Yet, by way of parenthesis, the writer cannot refrain from referring to the half-dozen articles that deal with this question, in the second volume of Troeltsch's *Gesammelte Schriften*. Such articles as the ones headed "Religiöser Individualismus und Kirche" and "Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart" exhibit a treatment of this disquieting problem that is highly impartial, penetrating, and judicious. There is, to be sure, a strong plea for greater freedom, and for considerable revision, in view of changed conditions in thought and life in general; but it is recognized that "a thorough-

¹ *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*, p. 29.

going reform of the churches, by way of a uniform revision of their dogmas and cultus, is altogether impossible. They are historical organizations, and, naturally, conservative, making such a revolution unthinkable. Besides, the very life of large groups of people is so inseparably bound up with the old dogmas and forms that it would be manifestly unjust. Furthermore, the whole idea, so often expressed, of a reconciliation of religion and culture is in itself highly questionable. The greatness of religion lies precisely in its opposition to culture, in its distinction from science and a social-utilitarian morality, in its generating of super-worldly and superhuman forces, in its awakening and development of the phantasy, and in its fixing upon that which lies beyond sense and intellect. A religion reconciled with science would, for the most part, be nothing more than a bad science and a superficial morality, and would thereby lose its religious salt."¹ A sentence in the first of the articles cited is especially pertinent at this point: "If we learn to look upon the church as the *Gemeinschaft des Geistes Christi*, then we shall quite naturally hold that the *Landeskirche* must perceive itself to be the expression of the *corpus mysticum Christi*. And when we do that, it will be possible for us to eradicate the intolerable consequences of a radical individualism."

This parenthesis could easily be extended, but we must pass on. Enough has now been said to show the great importance for the Christian religion which Troeltsch attaches to community and cultus, and we will next devote a section to the very important point, already partially covered. ✓

2. THE INDISPENSABLENESS OF JESUS AS HEAD AND CENTER OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

As we have seen, Troeltsch firmly believes that, "so long as Christianity continues in any sense, it will have a cultus connected with it, in which Christ will be accorded the central place." In this section we wish to define more clearly the sense in which Troeltsch conceives this giving of a central place to Christ in the Christian cultus, as well as to emphasize the importance he attributes to this aspect of Christ's significance.

¹ "Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart."

1. *The social-psychological need of Jesus as a rallying-point.*—

When Troeltsch speaks about the indispensableness of Jesus as head and center of the Christian community and its cultus, he wishes it to be understood as a social-psychological indispensableness. Every living religion, we have noted, is dependent on community and cultus, and on a rallying-point, and "the Christian cultus must always therefore have for its center the gathering of the church about its head; the nourishing and strengthening of the members of the church, by immersing themselves in God's revelation as concentrated in the person of Christ; the propagation of the Christian faith, not through dogmas, doctrines, and philosophies, but through the keeping alive of the Christ-picture in its vital religious aspects; in short, the worship of God in Christ." And such giving of a central place to Christ rests clearly on a social-psychological basis—on laws that dare not and cannot be ignored. Individualistic Christianity would ultimately mean the vanishing of a vital Christian religion; and the Christian cultus without Christ as focus would result in vagueness and disunity, as well as lifelessness and fanaticism. Individuals who think otherwise, and refuse to unite with the church, have no conception of the way life in its various phases is propagated; they do not realize, either, to what extent they are indebted to the churches for their own religious life.

With this position churchmen will be in hearty agreement. But many of them will object that it does not go far enough. It does not allow for prayer to Christ. Indeed, there is a sentence in *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu* (p. 30) in which Troeltsch definitely holds that "actual personal communion with the person of Christ is of course not possible." For those who are accustomed to pray to Christ, Troeltsch's position will therefore appear inadequate at a most vital point. And it is to be regretted that he does not give his reasons for holding that prayer to Christ is not justifiable. At least the writer cannot find that he has given them in any of his writings.

But it is likely that Troeltsch would say that communion is possible only with God, the Infinite, the Omnipresent Spirit; that it is inconceivable that a multitude of souls could, at one and the

same time, come into contact with a personality that did not have the attribute of omnipresence. And if it is maintained, as some hold, that Christ's personality was after his death exalted to infinity, are we not driven to the conclusion that there are, in fact, two gods? No other conclusion would of course be possible, unless it be conceived that Christ's personality did not continue as a separate personality, but was absorbed by the personality of God (which would, however, make prayer to Christ meaningless). In any case, as William Newton Clarke says, "with the Christian faith all polytheism, even though it be no more than tritheism [and he might have said, "ditheism"], is absolutely inconsistent. . . . One God, one mind, one will—this is the only form in which any belief in God whatever is possible in the world as we know it now."¹

✓ Dogmatism is entirely foreign to Troeltsch, and one may be quite sure that he has no wish to be dogmatic about the Kingdom of Heaven into which departed spirits have entered, about the present status of these spirits—their capacities, and especially their capacity to hold intercourse with earthly spirits. He doubtless has great respect for the faith of those who pray, not only to Christ, but also to Mary, the mother of Christ, and to the saints. He would recognize, too, that such prayer may have a subjective value of the highest sort. But as for its being prayer in the full sense—that is, actual communion between the praying soul and the departed spirit—that he could not concede.

However divine was the personality of Jesus, however exalted the place he undoubtedly occupies in the heavenly kingdom, it is highly improbable, Troeltsch would likely say, that he was invested with all the attributes of God—that the attributes of his personality, in other words, were exalted to infinity. Certainly the predominant conception in the New Testament is against that idea. "To us there is one God, the Father, . . . and one Lord, Jesus Christ," writes Paul (I Cor. 8:6). The superiority of God is expressed in such passages as I Cor. 3:22 f.: ". . . all is yours, ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's"; and Phil. 2:11: "And that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory

¹ *The Christian Doctrine of God*, p. 237.

of God the Father." Even in the Fourth Gospel, where is expressed the unity of God and Jesus (in the sense of the Philonic Logos philosophy, or, again, as meaning a harmony of will and purpose), there are very striking subordinationist passages, such as: "The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing"; "I can of myself do nothing"; "I seek not my own will, but the will of him that sent me"; "My teaching is not mine, but his that sent me." Now if this be true, that "to us there is one God, the Father"—only one infinite, one omnipresent spirit—then with God alone can mutual communion be held.

Into the psychology of prayer to Christ and other departed spirits we cannot here go. The writer would simply venture to suggest that all the benefits that are claimed to be derived from such prayer can surely be secured from prayer to God. Not to believe this would be indicative of a very meager conception of God. But men crave and need, it is claimed, the concreteness of Jesus. This can, however, be gained in prayer to God, by keeping the picture of Christ vividly before one's consciousness; which is, in fact, just what Troeltsch is contending for. And whatever help and strength Christians are wont to say they receive through being in personal touch with the heavenly Christ (or with Mary and the saints), they can be at least as fully and truly helped and strengthened under the conception advocated by Troeltsch.

Men like Professor Mackintosh would, presumably, retort: "In that conception 'it is not denied that in a real sense our relation to God is mediated by Christ, yet it is a Christ whose direct influence on men ceased at death. . . . He does not act on us from the unseen. . . . His presence is departed, though we can drink in the spirit of his words and thus indirectly have communion with his mind.' And 'Faith's object must be now and here. . . . Faith looks upward, not backward only. . . . Men could not be thus intimately one with a Life that was, but is not. . . . If Christology is to reproduce the Christian certainty, it must define faith in Jesus as faith in him as the living and transcendent Lord. . . . The men and women who made Christian history have been animated by the faith that the exalted Lord can make the limitless resources of his transcendence available for the

humblest of the saints. . . . And anyone who is at pains to analyze the doctrinal implications of an ancient hymn like the "Te Deum," or a modern hymn like "Jesus Lover of My Soul," may satisfy himself as to the futility of supposing that bare reverence for tradition inspires the church's affirmation of Christ's perpetual presence.' Does, in short, Troeltsch's conception afford a sufficient basis for specifically Christian life?'"

A sounding of the depths of Troeltsch's position would not, however, yield such a retort. In the first place, we can be quite sure, from his eschatological hope, that he thinks of the personality of Christ as living on in the heavenly kingdom; that, for him, coming into intimate touch with the person of Christ is not becoming "intimately one with a Life that was, but is not."

Again, Troeltsch's position does not mean rallying about "a Christ whose direct influence on men ceased at death." The God-ordained psychological forces operative in the soul's contemplation of the figure of Christ assuredly produce a direct influence on men. That figure, "full of grace and truth," can and does exert a direct saving power, when men view it "with the spiritual eye." True, though Troeltsch thinks of the personality of Jesus as now existent, what is here meant is a contemplation of the historical figure of Jesus. But, as a matter of fact, they who believe that Christ does "act on us from the unseen"—that he is able to commune with us from "the veiled place where he dwells on high"—must picture Christ when they commune with him in terms of the historical Jesus. As Professor Mackintosh admits, "Certainly the risen Christ is the same person as formerly, otherwise the apostolic gospel, devoid of a *point d'appui* in history, would have become inept, since no one can preach a great Unknown, or ask for loyalty to a formula."² And later (pp. 378 f.) he calls attention to the perils of a Christ-mysticism divorced from the Jesus of history: "Thus the exalted Christ vanishes in a mist of sentimentalism or dialectic." Well, a Christ-mysticism in which Christ is conceived in terms of the historical Jesus can surely yield

¹ Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 364-68.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 363 f.

no more than the *Christuskult* of Troeltsch; the influence of Jesus is in both cases equally direct and powerful.

In truth, however, for Professor Mackintosh as for all Christians who are given to prayer to Christ, Christ is now "omnipotent with the omnipotence of God; to him belongs absolute might to continue and consummate the work begun by his life, death, and victory." And it may be that "short of this the Christian mind is not expressed." But who is so unknowing as not to recognize that the Christian mind has, from the beginning, even as expressed in our hymns, carried within it elements that in the future were shown to be unwarrantable? One instantly recalls the eschatology of the first Christians, notably the time-element therein, which was of vast import for their religious life. "Have we any right to assume," asks Professor Cairns in his review of Professor Mackintosh's book, "that there may not be in the minds of those of us who hold with conviction to the positive position, residues of the past that the future will not justify?"

At all events, one is led to inquire, in the spirit of reverence, what could an omnipotent Christ, from his veiled abode, do for us that God himself is not able and willing to do for us? Is it likely that followers of Jesus who, by the grace of his personality, put their trust in God for the continuance and consummation of the work begun by the Master have a faith less Christian or less efficacious than the one in which Christ occupies the place of God? Are men and women who are conscious of the presence of God and are animated by a Christ-evoked, Christ-interpreted, and Christ-sustained faith that *God* can and does "make the limitless resources of his transcendence available for the humblest of the saints" more impotent in helping to promote the Kingdom of God than those who are animated by the faith that the heavenly Christ can do this?

Verily this is a delicate question. And at no point in our religion more than at this one do we need to heed the injunction of Jesus: "Judge not!" Equally learned and sincere Christians are, as they always have been, coming to different conclusions, even with regard to vital questions like the one we are now considering, and mutual tolerance is in such cases the truly Christian

attitude to take. Prayer to Christ, all must admit, is traceable throughout Christian history, but, so long as men like Professor Cairns come to conclusions like the following, those whose faith justifies them in praying to Christ ought not to disparage the position of those who pray only to God; indeed, they ought to examine well the ground of their faith, for they who pray to Christ must admit that they give encouragement to the people who also feel justified in praying to Mary, to the saints, to the Buddha, and other departed spirits, and foster the perilous mysticism alluded to above. We quote from Professor Cairns's review, already cited: "When all is said, the center of faith in the New Testament is placed in God, and in the Gospels this is quite clearly God the Father. The central motive of Jesus is not, as Seeley said, his enthusiasm of Humanity, but his enthusiasm of God, and his *ultimate* aim is not to awaken faith in himself but in his Father. . . . This, moreover, seems to me the dominant type of apostolic religion. Christians are those 'who through Jesus believe in God,' and this is not 'Godhead' but 'the Father.' Moreover, we have the considerable number of subordinationist passages in the New Testament to consider in this connection. Either we must regard these as 'vestigial survivals' or use them as vital utterances of faith."

Well, then, there would seem to be ground for Troeltsch's holding that "actual personal communion with the person of Christ is of course not possible." Though it is quite true, too, that dogmatism on this point is impossible, either in favor of or in discouragement of such communion. In any case, however, we may accept Troeltsch's conception of the Christ-cultus, resting on a social-psychological basis, as conserving all that is vital for specifically Christian life. On the side of prayer this conception obviously allows for prayer to God "in the name of Christ," or "through Christ"; for communion with God as he revealed himself in and through Christ—a communion made concrete by drawing into it the divine figure of Jesus, letting his thoughts and words and motives and actions color our communings with God. And such prayer no one can reasonably call un-Christian, nor can one doubt that it is all-sufficient for the nurture of the Christian life.

Having then more particularly defined the sense in which Troeltsch conceives Christ to be indispensable, as head and center of the Christian community and its cultus, we must enlarge upon the value he sets on such a *Zentralstellung* of Christ.

2. *Men's need of the concrete symbol of Christian truth and life furnished by Jesus.*—To speak of Jesus as a symbol is, for many, seriously to underestimate the significance of Christ. But that is because the word "symbol" has for them an impoverished signification. Here we are faced again with the difficulty of a term being conceived differently by different theologians. For one group a symbol "illustrates spiritual reality rather than demonstrates it." For another it means "an object, animate or inanimate, standing for or representing something moral or intellectual." The question of demonstration would thus depend on the character of the symbol, as well as the truth symbolized, and is not to be answered by any a priori definition of the term "symbol." In any case, the common notion regarding the impersonality and lifelessness of a symbol obviously rests on an a priori conception of the meaning of this term. For the fact that truth is symbolized by inanimate objects does not prevent its symbolization by a living person.

"The greatness of Christianity is precisely this, that it has constituted as its center and symbol, not a rigid and lifeless dogma or a just as inflexible and benumbed moral law, but the figure of a living, many-sided, and at once uplifting and energizing personality, whose inmost motives form the guiding principles in the religious-ethical tasks that confront Christians from age to age."¹ This sentence gives the gist of what Troeltsch means when he speaks of Jesus as a symbol—the prominent notes about his conception being, clearly, the notes of personality and vitality, as over against an impersonal and lifeless symbolism.

Troeltsch is quite aware that attempts to crystallize the personality of Jesus in a dogma, or to make it an ethical law, have never been wanting. "But the living elements of an indefinable personal life have, despite such attempts, always manifested themselves. And on this fact rests Christianity's capacity for renewed simplification and rejuvenescence. For this reason, too,

¹ *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*, p. 43.

there have always been attempts to completely isolate Jesus, to make him entirely independent of the history that preceded and followed him and hold him to be the exclusive support and basis of faith."

But these latter attempts, like the attempts to compress the person of Christ within a dogma, Troeltsch feels, are unjustifiable. For we dare not blink the fact that "the *Vorstellungswelt* and the *Ethos* of Jesus are bound up with the quite definite situation of late-Judaism, and with the rugged one-sidedness of the purely religious prophet; that, in his preaching of the Kingdom of God, he anticipated a new world and humanity under new conditions, gauged entirely by a religious ideal, and expected the same to be realized in the near future. In view of this fact the faith of the primitive Christians released the spirit of Christ from its historical connections, and treated it as the regulative principle of an ongoing development. Only let us look for this development, not so much in ideal results and systematic views of life, as in a further series of strong religious personalities, who fed upon the person of Christ and out of his spirit brought forth things new and old; just as the spirit of the Hebrew prophets was in Jesus, and new growth was generated in him out of this prophetic seed. . . . And this rich historical development, as well as the person of Christ, must be freely and candidly drawn upon to give definiteness to the Christian idea, and in order to its realization with living power."¹

✕ Troeltsch also vigorously maintains, more particularly in opposition to Ritschlians, that the Christian *Idee*—Christian truth considered in the abstract—does not depend upon the person of Jesus for its verification. The doctrine of God's forgiveness, for instance, is abstractly verifiable (as all truths are) by its reference to consciousness, there to let its own inherent truth find its counterpart in the a priori forms of consciousness. Expressed in Pauline language, Christian truth is verified through the Divine Spirit's "testifying along with our own spirit." The extreme Ritschlian claim, that "without Christ I would be an atheist," and that "only through the fact of the moral personality of Jesus, made perfect through suffering, could God enter once more into

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

communion with men who have sinned," is simply not true to the facts of religious history. "The still small voice" of God has been perceived in all ages, in the souls of men of every race, and the measure of truth vouchsafed to them—even such truths as were championed by Jesus—depended for verification on an inherent truthfulness disclosing itself to "the spiritual eye." To make Christian truth *absolutely* dependent on Jesus would be, furthermore, to make it hinge on the continually changing results of historical study, not to speak about the real externality of such a basis.

Is not then Troeltsch inconsistent when he urges that Jesus must be given a central place in the Christian community and cultus, and that men have need of him as the living symbol of the Christian faith? He would insist that he is not inconsistent. Granted, he would say, that Christian truth is verifiable on the basis of an intrinsic truthfulness; that truth cannot and dare not be separated from the line of prophets and psalmists upon whom he fed, and the series of saints who have fed upon him; and that God has, indeed, in all times spoken savingly to men, either directly or through other servants than Jesus—granted all this, it is also true that *most* men are not of themselves capable of perceiving and appropriating Christian truth (just as they are not of themselves capable of perceiving and appropriating mathematical or philosophical or any other truth); that Jesus is "the personification of transcendent religious power, whose heart-throb permeates the whole of Christianity, just as the vibrations of a ship's machinery are felt in every nook of the boat"; and that, therefore, the keeping alive of Christian truth "is not possible without viewing it in its creative embodiment in Jesus."

It were time, perhaps, to remark, though it ought to be self-evident, that Troeltsch's plea for community and cultus, in which Christ occupies the focal place, contemplates the very highest type of individual participation. It is a plea in refutation of religious individualism that would do away with community and cultus, but not a plea for community and cultus divorced from personal activity on the part of individual members of the community. Without such personal participation the individual would of course

derive no real benefit. In an age which disparages the very idea of the church, which argues that religion is purely *Privatsache* and public worship valueless, the emphasis belongs clearly where Troeltsch puts it, i.e., on the necessity of community and cultus. His thought is rightly echoed by a recent English writer: "The man who does not consciously attach himself to the organized spiritual environment of the nation, but burrows inward to some psychic center remote from the invisible but real social organism, is making for the abysses of insanity, criminal egoism, self-deification, and the primordial slime of sensual occultism. When the leaders of the churches realize this tendency, they will shrink in alarm from every form of individualistic psychology." Still, at this point let the fact be brought definitely before us that, most assuredly, the profoundest sort of personal participation is expected of those attaching themselves to the Christian churches; in truth, a profound Christ-n_em.

But why a *Christ*-mysticism? Why is it not possible to keep alive the Christian faith "without viewing it in its creative embodiment in Jesus"? For the reason that "all the greatest and most characteristic thoughts of Christianity—about a grace that has come to and seized us, about a certainty that has been tendered us, and a transcendent power that has uplifted and subdued us—are inseparably connected with the religious estimation and interpretation of Jesus as the revelation of God. And to break this connection, to separate the Christian God-faith from the person of Jesus, would mean the wrenching of this faith from all its historical roots, from all means of representation and demonstration, from all that greatness of personality which, for the average individual, is indispensable; would mean, in fact, ultimately, the dying out of the Christian faith."

Troeltsch too can speak of "the living Christ," and one has the feeling that, in so doing, he conserves all the healthy spiritual vitality with which that precious phrase has in all ages been filled. It is true, as we have seen, that he does not encourage prayer to Christ, does not speak about Christ as he now lives in the heavenly region—for the reason that we seem to be barred from communication

* Stanton Coit, *The Soul of America*.

with the spirits who have departed to that region (despite the explorations of spiritualists and the Psychical Research Society). But, at all events, it is a living Christ that Troeltsch has in mind for the keeping alive of the Christian faith; the Christ as he lives in the New Testament, made and kept living for us by the psychological forces at the disposal of every human soul. The superior personality that lives in the Gospels need not be less living (not less vital for faith, at least) for us, than it was for those who knew that personality in the flesh. And, while that personality of course blends with the personality of the heavenly Christ; while faith in the heavenly Christ carries with it certain glorious truths peculiar to itself—such as cluster about the resurrection and life after death for all; yet it is primarily the Christ of the Gospels—Christ, that is, as he *lives* in the Gospels—who, in Troeltsch's view, gives vitality to the Christian faith.

Indeed, it is the Christ of the Gospels who alone can give definiteness, as well as vitality, to our thought of the heavenly Christ. For John, and for Christians generally, the vital thing in the life of Jesus consists in a gracious "unveiling of the mystery of the invisible God." Thought of the heavenly Christ, apart from the Christ of the Gospels, would therefore be quite as mysterious as thought of God apart from the historical Christ—yea, more so, for God has revealed himself, in some measure at least, in and through various personalities throughout the history of mankind. And hence it is quite inconceivable why certain Christians should wish to minimize the importance of the Jesus who lives in the Gospels. Their thought being centered quite exclusively on the heavenly Christ, they are almost certain to fall into the perils of mysticism so poignantly described by Professor Mackintosh. "The danger," he says, "which has long shadowed faith in the exalted Christ is that of an unbridled and capricious mysticism. Ideas gained currency respecting his interposition in human lives which have no relation to his known character. The glorified Redeemer has been isolated from the historic Jesus, while the individual soul has in turn been isolated from the vital organic brotherhood of the church. . . . The living Person is discarded, and instead we are offered a dream of passion or a lifeless philosophic principle."¹

¹ *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 378-79.

It is the living Christ of the Gospels, then, that Troeltsch regards as of primary importance for the maintenance of the Christian faith and life. "Only by the contemplation of such a personality as lives in the Gospels can the average individual overcome his spiritual weakness and poverty, and be moved to accept the prophetic-Christian God-faith with power and certainty. But if that is so, then wherever the Christian God-faith is to flourish with full power and might, the living figure of Jesus will remain inseparably associated with it. A Christ-mysticism in which every believer perceives his faith to be a radiation from that central point, and in which believers ever newly unite themselves in the religious interpretation and adoration of Jesus as the revelation of God that lifts us above ourselves, and that increases in potency, through the centuries, as a world-historic force—such a Christ-mysticism will forever remain the kernel of genuine and true Christianity, so long as there will be a genuine and true Christianity. Without it, too, the personalistic God-faith would itself be hard pressed and finally perish."

At first thought it may appear to some as if such a Christ-mysticism is decidedly inferior to the Christ-mysticism of Paul; as if, in truth, there is no real relation between them. A painstaking comparison will, however, lead to a different conclusion. Complete identity they will of course not discover. As J. Weiss has pointed out, in his "Significance of Paul for Modern Christians," to be "in Christ" seems to have meant with Paul "a complete blending with the heavenly Lord into a mystic union, in which, indeed, the sharp outlines of the personal figure become blurred into the notion of an all-pervading Christ-spirit." At least Paul felt that communion was possible between the heavenly Christ and the believer. And this, as we have seen, Troeltsch feels is not possible. He might grant that it was possible for a spirit like Paul's, which could be "caught up even to the third heaven" and "up into Paradise," but who would maintain that the average spirit is endowed with such capacity? And, on the side of Christ, he might grant that the spirit of the exalted Christ on occasion

¹ *Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums.*

² *American Journal of Theology*, XVII (1913), 352.

may come, as in the case of Paul's conversion, into direct contact with a human spirit, but this again is something extraordinary.

Paul could say, and many Christians can say, after Paul, that "the Lord is the Spirit" (II Cor. 3:17), all-pervasive in the same sense as the almighty God, whom Christians like Troeltsch hold to be the one Omnipresent Spirit. But this is an absolute equating of the person of Christ with the infinite *Pneuma*, which rests on a peculiarly fluid mode of conception common in Paul's time; such as is indicated, e.g., in Rom. 8:9 ff., where there occurs the alternation between the expressions, "the spirit of God or of Christ in us" and "Christ in us." It was the same fluidity that made possible the Hellenistic mysteries, and the conceptions of "the Son of Man," "Divine Wisdom," "Logos." And this way of thinking, modernists feel, arose because God very generally was localized in a dwelling-place beyond the earth's limits; whereas the Christian view would seem to be that the one transcendent God is directly in touch with our universe—creatively, sustainingly, and self-impartingly. In Christ the self-imparting God, modern Christians believe, is manifest in spiritual purity and power as he is manifest nowhere else; indeed, they believe that the ethical nature of God is, in principle, wholly expressed in the person and work of Christ. But, since there are elements in God's personality that were not expressed in Christ (notably in the region of intelligence), they still regard God as transcendent over Christ, however transcendent the latter may be over the rest of mankind, And hence they cannot, with Paul, equate absolutely the person of Christ with the infinite *Pneuma*. And therefore there is no problem for them such as faced Athanasius and Arius. There is, indeed, the problem of how the infinite, transcendent Spirit of God can be universally present; more especially, how God can impart himself so fully in a historic personality, that for many the only solution is the complete equation of God and the historic person. But these problems belong to the class of problems that, apparently, are beyond human intelligence, such as: How did the personality of God originate? In the case of any really creative personality, what in it is divine and what human?

However, neither by Paul nor by any of the New Testament writers is Christ always identified with the Spirit absolutely, with the entire fulness of the Spirit, described as the "summing up" of all spirit. As J. Weiss has shown, this absolute identification occurs only in passages of speculative cosmological thought, where Christ's relation to the world is referred to or he appears as the basis of all divine revelation. As spirit is the clear mark of God in the world, and as the Son of God, the heavenly Man, the Logos, is regarded as that side of God which is turned to the world, the complete identification of one so transcendently spiritual as Christ with the Spirit is naturally suggested. "But where the question is not of Christ's place in the cosmos, but of his person, its special quality, constitution, and origin, he is described rather as a personality belonging to the sphere of Spirit; his actual, primal nature is *Pneuma*; he is a spiritual being among other spirits" (see, e.g., I Cor. 12:13; 14:32; 15:45).¹

Then there are the considerable number of subordinationist passages, to which reference has already been made. And as Professor Cairns has intimated, why are not these to be taken as vital utterances of faith? The two strands of passages are there, and they are contradictory—just as there are contradictory strands in the writings of all creative personalities or of all creative periods. If the absolutistic passages are accepted as true, then the subordinationist passages are meaningless. But if the latter are accepted as true, the former cannot be taken as likewise true. Not loyalty to tradition can be the determinant here, for both sets of passages are equally clamant. Nor can the demands of a preconceived idea of atonement be the determinant. Our view of God must be the determinant factor. And if we believe in one God, one mind, one will—one Transcendent yet Immanent Infinite Spirit, transcendent over all other spirits, even the sublime Spirit of Christ—then we must accept the subordinationist passages as true.

And so accepting, we will be entirely sympathetic with the absolutistic passages, as daring attempts to commend Christ to people breathing an atmosphere surcharged with messianic and

¹ J. Weiss, *Christ: the Beginnings of Dogma*.

Logos speculations. Such daring attempts were by no means uncommon in ancient times. Indeed, the deification of important historical characters was a quite common occurrence. But our view of God simply makes all this impossible for us. In view of the subordinationist passages, one may, then, rest satisfied that the absolutistic passages were simply results of the Pauline purpose to "become all things to all men, that I may by all means save some." We too can speak of God in Christ, of the deity of Christ, and not in any empty sense, either; it is our most precious heritage to perceive in Christ the unveiling of the mystery of the invisible God, and to be drawn by him into saving communion with God and brotherly relations to our fellow-men, as we are not drawn by any other self-disclosure of God, but we believe it is in accord with the spirit of Christ (as predominantly portrayed in the New Testament) that, while we call him Lord and Master, we should still regard God as transcendent over him.

The reverent heart, seeing the glory of God in the face of Christ, in moments of devotion makes no distinction between God and Christ, but, as soon as thought enters, faith expresses itself in the terms of the subordinationist passages. In its soberer moments faith perceives that it is vital to distinguish Christ from God, and rejoices that the soul is enabled to launch upon the deeps of God's omnipotence—the same deeps upon which Christ himself was launched, according to his own confession. The imperativeness, the self-assertiveness of Christ, like the imperativeness and self-assertiveness of the prophets and of Paul, does not spell self-sufficiency; and the acknowledgment—"of that . . . knoweth no one . . . but the Father," matching the Johannine "He can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do"—coupled with the spiritual struggles recorded in the Gospels (notably that in Gethsemane), must, if we are going to be full-fledged followers of Christ, cause us to progress with Jesus to the Father.

But again we are reminded of Paul's Christ-mysticism. Surely, it is claimed, Paul was entirely dependent upon the exalted Christ. "My ego no longer lives: Christ lives in me; the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself up for me." But did not Paul also write such passages

as Rom., chap. 8? "For the sons of God are those who are guided by the Spirit of God. . . . And when we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is this Spirit testifying along with our own spirit that we are children of God; and if children, heirs as well, heirs of God, heirs along with Christ. . . . If God is for us, who can be against us? When God acquits, who will condemn?" Here, as in other passages, Christ obviously is the mediator. And should not then such an utterance as "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me" be read in the light of these passages? Paul might feel justified in praying to Christ, as others do, and as others feel justified in praying to other departed spirits; but the real point is: Is the Christian faith at all impoverished when prayer is offered only to God, and Christ is regarded only as mediator? Is the Christ-mysticism advocated by men like Troeltsch any less vital for faith than the Christ-mysticism of Paul, in which God and Christ are apparently (sometimes at least) equated, and therefore prayer to Christ is offered in moments of devotion?

J. Weiss has shown that the mysticism of Troeltsch is essentially the way that the Fourth Evangelist already traveled. For with John abiding in Christ means, in reality, not communion with the heavenly Christ, but a religion of belief in Jesus of Nazareth as the revelation of God, of communion with God in accord with this revelation, and its accompanying moral life; for the fulfilment of which Christ's person, full of grace and truth, is God's gracious gift to mankind. To behold in the ideally transfigured Christ the grace and truth of God, to attain through him knowledge of God, to have him always before one's eyes as leader, leading us to God and to loving relationship with men, to abide in his love, to do his commandments, and to abide as he did in the love of God—this is the essence of the religion of John; and it is the essence of the Christ-mysticism of Troeltsch. As Weiss says, "This concentration of the inner life upon the figure of Jesus, living with him, working with his mind, reflecting his being in one's own life—this is a form of the Christ-mysticism which is possible even for the modern man."¹

¹ Cf. Weiss's *Significance of Paul for Modern Christians*.

The passages in the Fourth Gospel that are colored by the Logos conception do, it is true, contain elements that assert the complete equation of God and Christ, but nowhere else do the subordinationist passages stand out so prominently as in this Gospel. This contradiction has already been harped on, possibly to the point of weariness, but it is unavoidable in a defense of the position which cannot accept the absolutistic assertions. Clearly this position does not rest on arbitrariness. It is adopted in the interests of sober consistency, and not only logical consistency, but the deeper consistency of faith—faith in one God, one Omnipotent Spirit transcendent over all other spirits. The position *may* carry with it a tendency to minimize the significance of Christ and to become negative and unevangelical—as illustrated in Unitarianism—but it need not do so. Because this position *may* and does carry with it a reverence for and dependence on Christ essentially like that of the first Christians those holding it do not see the need of pitching overboard the doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, they feel that that doctrine is a real safeguard against the tendency to depreciate the historic revelation of God in Christ, and the unique historic experience of God as indwelling Holy Spirit.

The speculative aspect of the Trinitarian doctrine never has been the vital element thereof. Neither has the valuation of Christ fully equating his personality with God, which gave rise to these speculations, this valuation resting on thought of God as localized in a particular dwelling-place, and on conceptions akin to those expressed in the messianic and Logos speculations. Even if for many Christians Christ apparently has had the value of God, that does not justify the equation of God and Christ. It simply means that such have not risen to what Professor Cairns, for one, believes to be the dominant type of apostolic religion. "Christians are those 'who through Jesus believe in God,' and this is not 'Godhead,' but 'the Father.'"

The freshness and fulness of God's revelation of himself in Christ, begetting faith in Christ as the Messiah, could easily lead the first followers of Christ to regard him as all-sufficient, and hence practically to equate God and Christ. Their resurrection

experiences would also, and probably chiefly, lead to such equation. But the most ardent apostle of Christ, the one most dependent on Christ, would always come back to faith in a God who is yet transcendent over Christ, to faith in Christ as the gracious mediator in the true religion. "To us there is one God, the Father, . . . and one Lord, Jesus Christ." "All is yours, ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's." "There are varieties of talents, but the same Spirit; varieties of service, but the same Lord; varieties of effects, but the same God *who effects everything in everyone*." The self-sacrificing love of Christ, manifesting itself pre-eminently in the cross, was without doubt the real germinating principle of Paul's Christ-mysticism, and it was simply "a leap beyond the data" (to use Professor Cairns's phrase) to equate Christ and God, upon whom Christ himself felt dependent; as Paul himself would—according to the subordinationist passages—recognize in his soberer moments.

Neither the resurrection nor the sinlessness of Jesus, nor yet the implicates of the true atonement for sin, warrant that leap. Resurrection, sinlessness, atonement, can be given their full place in the Christian system without such equation, and here it must suffice to justify this contention on the basis of belief in but one God, at once transcendent and immanent—a belief, indeed, that has resulted from the paramount revelations of God in history, to which formal recognition is given in the doctrine of the Trinity. And so it is unfair to charge that the equation of God and Christ—to which also recognition is given in that doctrine—is rejected in the interests of an easier solution. For the modernist view is no *easier* than that in which the equation is accepted; it too has its insoluble problems. No, the rejection is solely in the interests of truth, in the interests of Christian monotheism, since no amount of interpretation can allay the conclusion that, to equate God and Christ, to say that Christ was invested with infinity, means in fact two infinite personalities, two gods; and the practical question—asked in sincerest reverence—what could the heavenly Christ exalted to infinity bestow, that God himself cannot bestow, through his self-disclosure in the person and work of the historic Jesus, and in direct communion with the individual soul?

But this is no treatise on the doctrine of the Trinity. Our primary concern was to show that the Christ-mysticism advocated by Troeltsch is *in essence* the same as that of Paul and John; that, at all events, it commends itself as quite adequate for the maintenance of the Christian faith and life.

In opposition to radical critics like Drews and W. B. Smith, Troeltsch places great stress on the historicity of Jesus. The contentions of these radicals, that it is immaterial whether or not our symbol has its roots in historical actuality; that, in fact, believers must free themselves from history, and satisfy their life-hunger with a mythical symbol—well, such contentions show, in Troeltsch's judgment, an utter inappreciation of religion and its practical tasks, however much they may appeal to the aesthete and dilettante. "For one who actually and inwardly belongs to the Christian life-world, it is impossible to hold the center and head of the community, the nucleating-point of all cultus and all perception of God, merely as a myth, be the myth never so attractive. Just as God is for him not mere Thought and Possibility, but Holy Reality, so he wishes also, in the case of his symbol of God, to stand on the firm ground of real life. It is for him of real significance, that an actual human being so lived, fought, believed, and conquered, and that from this real life a current of power and certainty flows that reaches even him. His symbol is a real symbol for him only because there stands behind it the majesty of a transcendent real religious prophet, wherein he not only finds God illustrated, but is able to overcome his own uncertainty and acquire spiritual strength; just as in other respects he needs the anchorage of superior personal-religious authority, and, as a matter of fact, in many instances he experiences."¹

Indeed, Troeltsch goes so far as to say: "Should it come to be decided that such a person as Jesus of Nazareth never lived, or that we cannot know what sort of person he really was, that would without doubt mean the beginning of the giving up of the Christ-symbol among scientifically trained people. And gradually the untrained laity would be overcome by doubt, and moved to abandon their Christ-faith."²

¹ *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*, pp. 31 f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

"It is a mere *Redensart*," he continues, "to want to confine oneself to the Christian *Prinzip*, and let the historical problems take care of themselves. That might be a practical way out for individuals who cannot work their way through difficult obscurities; but it is impossible for a religious and cultish community. . . . Individuals there may be who, by powerful instinct, can look with indifference upon historical research and the question of historicity; . . . but, in general, men need the security of historical trustworthiness that scientific research is able to furnish."

The "fact of Christ," like all other historical facts which come down to us in the form of reports, must be reasonably established through historical research. "Faith can interpret facts, but it cannot establish them." That is, it cannot establish their historicity. Historic facts, like the person and work of Christ, may and do awaken and support faith, but, as before pointed out, it is to argue in a circle to maintain that faith can determine whether such and such person actually lived, or such and such event really occurred; historico-critical study alone can determine this. But the real point that Troeltsch would emphasize in this context is that the vitality of Christian faith rests in a real sense upon the historicity of Jesus. It is of vital importance to faith that the spiritual grace, the love, the righteous will disclosed in the narratives of the life of Christ, were actually disclosed in and by a person who actually lived. Indeed, the religious life of the primitive Christians and their successors would be inexplicable otherwise. Prophets and psalmists had preached and sung about the love and righteousness of God, and called the people to forsake sin and error, but what average mankind evidently needed was an actual demonstration of the things of God. That demonstration, Christians hold, is furnished by Jesus Christ; and they hold that their faith would never have become the living faith it has become for multitudes the world over had it not been inspired by him who, as God's chosen son, as the firstborn among many brethren, really demonstrated faith's content, with fulness, clarity, and power, in an actual and not a mythical life.

This is not saying that the truth of the Christian *Prinzip* rests upon the historicity of Jesus. As stated above, that hinges upon

its own inherent truthfulness. It simply means that the Christian *Prinzip* would never have become the living force it has been, nor would it continue as a living force, did not its roots lodge in the historic Jesus. It is a life-connection, and should it be proved, Troeltsch contends, that Jesus never lived, it would sooner or later mean the disintegration of Christianity and the virtual decease of its *Prinzip*. There would no longer be a trustworthy rallying-point, and without a dependable focus such as Christianity has had in Jesus, Christianity as a living religion could not be propagated.

In thus contending Troeltsch does not mean to say that every little detail of historico-theological research is of consequence for religious faith. "Only the fundamental facts are of consequence: the actual existence of Jesus; the determinative significance of the personality of Jesus for the origin and development of the Christ-faith; the religious-ethical basic character of the preaching of Jesus; and the transformations which his preaching underwent in the oldest Christian communities formed by their Christ-cultus." And it is Troeltsch's conviction that, "despite all the questions that are yet open, the decisive facts of importance are quite certainly verified." The extremely radical contention that Jesus never lived, he thinks, "is unquestionably a monstrosity."

In conclusion, a sentence or two from *Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums* may be quoted as a summary. "The Christology here expounded is by no means identical with the christological dogma of the church, but it does embody the inmost motive of that dogma. It is the Christ-mysticism of an inner union with the Head of the Christian community, from whom power and life flow to the members of the community, and in whose realization as the revelation and symbol of God the Christian cultus is consummated. Without this Christ-mysticism there would be no specifically Christian cultus, and a religion without cultus would be a dying religion."¹

¹ *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 851.

THE GERMAN CHURCH AND THE CONVERSION OF THE BALTIC SLAVS

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Several Byzantine historians¹ and an Arabian geographer² described the eastern Slavs between the sixth and the tenth centuries.³ But the first attempt of a western writer to describe the western or Baltic Slavs, i.e., those in the Elbe basin and along the south coast of the Baltic Sea, was made by Adam of Bremen in the middle of the eleventh century.⁴

¹ Procopius, *De Bello Gothico*, III, chap. 14; Constantine Porphyrogenitos, *De Administrando Imperio*, chaps. 37, 38; Mauricius, *Ars Militaris*, IX, chap. 3; XI, chap. 5.

² Jacob, "Ein arabischer Berichterstatter aus dem 10. Jahrhundert," *Arabische Geographien*, II.

³ For modern literature see Bury, *History of the Eastern Roman Empire*, chaps. xi, xii; *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, II, chap. xiv; Meitzen, *Siedlung und Agrarwesen*, II, 141-64; Beazeley, *Dawn of Modern Geography*, II, 467-514; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (ed. J. B. Bury, 1900), VI, 543-44, with valuable bibliography.

⁴ *Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesia pontificum*: Inestimably valuable as Adam of Bremen is, yet he is often vague and obscure, and his account of the Slavonic tribes between the Elbe and the Oder rivers, especially their geographical distribution, has given rise to extended controversy. According to Giesebrecht (*Nordlandskunde*, pp. 157-66; *Baltische Studien*, VI, 192), Adam was well informed. But the text of Adam of Bremen is notoriously corrupt and Giesebrecht accuses the scholiast of many blunders and alterations. After the great revolt of the Slavs of the lower Elbe in 983, he argues, the land between the Elbe and the Oder was shut off from Christian knowledge and commercial intercourse, so that ignorance and erroneous ideas of Slavonia naturally came to prevail among the Germans. Lappenberg (*Archiv*, VI, 864), on the other hand, finds the chief source of Adam's limitations in popular German prejudice against the Slavs and contempt for their language, which prevented any intimate knowledge of them from being acquired. Slavonic tribal names and the places occupied by them might interest a diocesan historian of Hamburg, but the Saxons were too indifferent to the promotion of Christianity among the Slavs and too contemptuous of them to be interested.

Giesebrecht has endeavored to control Adam's account by Helmold's *Chronica Slavorum*, written in the last half of the twelfth century by one who dwelt long among

The Baltic Slavs formed a separate group, distinct from the Poles and Bohemians as well as the Litu-Slav stems extending around the bight of the Baltic from the mouth of the Oder to the mouth of the Dūna in modern East Prussia and Kurland. They were loosely known as Polaben or Elbslaven,¹ and were divided into four grand divisions—the Obodrites (or Abodrites), the Ljutizi (German: Welataben, or Wilzi), the Pomeranians, and the Sorben, each of these major groups in turn, except the Sorben, being subdivided into lesser stem-groups.² The Obodrites dwelt

the Slavs and knew them more intimately than any other German writer of the Middle Ages. He accepts Adam's testimony when the two agree, provided Helmold has not—as he sometimes has done, especially in the early chapters—slavishly copied his predecessor. The difficulty of clearly distinguishing the tribal names of the Slavs between the Elbe and the Oder and of accurately locating them is very great. Helmold is of better use in amplifying than in emending Adam.

However, it is to be observed that Adam's description of Slavonia falls into two parts, one dealing with the region west of the Peene River, the other with that beyond and eastward of the Peene. The former, which Adam calls Hither Slavonia (*In Slavania citeriori*, III, 18), was comprehended within the diocese of Hamburg. He is diffuse concerning the first, but brief and obscure about things across the river. He knows a good deal of things which happen around Magdeburg, but is hazy about things *ultra Panim* (III, 21). Beyond the Oder Adam's ideas are very nebulous, as the use of words implying indirect knowledge, like *comperimus*, *dicunt*, etc., indicates (e.g., IV, 11).

Adam uses the words *Slavi* and *Winuli* interchangeably to denominate the Slavonic peoples between the Elbe and the Oder. (The latter proper name is a variant of the earlier word *Winedi* used by Einhard. See Pertz, I, 658, where the examples are cited.) The territory he calls *Slavania*, but he is loose in application of the term, sometimes using it in a broad sense, sometimes in a narrow sense (e.g., II, 13, 19; IV, 13, for the former usage; II, 40, 46, 69, for the latter usage. In II, 24, "*ecclesiae in Slavania ubique erectae sunt*" and "*Slavaniam in duodeviginti pagos dispartitam*" undoubtedly refer to Slavonia in the strict sense of the term).

¹ From the word *po*, meaning "by," and *Labe*, meaning "Elbe" (Wendt, *Die Germanisierung der Länder östlich der Elbe*, II, 11).

² Kindred to the Obodrites were the Wagri, or Waarii of Widukind (*Adam of Bremen*, III, 68), in East Holstein, the Lingones on the Elbe (*Adam of Bremen*, III, 19), the Warnabi on the Warnow (*Adam of Bremen*, III, 19; Helmold, I, 87), and the Dravani west of the Elbe in the Hanoverian Wendland around Lüchow, Gartow, and Wustrow (Wendt, I, 11; Brückner, *Die slavischen Ansiedelungen in der Altmark*, p. 8; *Mecklenburg. Jahrbücher*, VII, 156). Akin to the Wilzi were the Redarii and the Uckri (Widukind, III, 54, "Uchri"), whence the name Ucker-Mark; the Lini or Lingones (Helmold, I, 2), the Hevelli (Thietmar, IV, 20; *Annal. Qued.*; *Annal. Magdbg.*; *Annal. Palid.*; Helmold, I, 88). Offshoots of the Sorben were the Lusizi (Thietmar, I, 9; VI, 39, 48), the Milzi, the Glomuzani or Daleminzi, the Siusli,

in modern East Holstein and Mecklenburg-Schwerin; the Wilzi and kindred tribes extended over modern Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Brandenburg, Mittelmark, and Uckermark, in the moor and marshland of the Spree, the Havel, and the Peene rivers; the Pomeranians were in what is today known as Pomerania along the seaboard; the Sorben were in the triangle included between the upper Elbe, the Erzgebirge, and the Saale.¹ The blood affinity between the Obodrites, the Wilzi, and the Poles was close; on the other hand, the Sorben were akin to the Czechs, or Bohemians.² Of these four grand groups of the Baltic Slavs, the confederacy of the Wilzi was most formidable.³ The Redarii were custodians of the great Slavonic temple at Rethra.⁴

The monarchical institutions of the Baltic Slavs were not highly developed. The tribes were not compact entities, nor did they exhibit that capacity for union manifested among the early Germans. Evidences of a closer union appear about 800, when the

the Plisni (Andree, *Wendische Wanderstudien*, pp. 29-38). Ljutizi was the Slav term; Wilzi the German. Adam of Bremen fantastically derives Wilzi from German *wild* and Ljutizi from German *Löwe*. His philology is at least a tribute to their warlike character. Widukind, III, 54, is the first author to indicate the territory occupied by the Wilzi. This German nomenclature first appears in the tenth century. Cf. *Annal. Sangall.*, maj. 955. The earlier German name for the Wilzi was Welatabi; see Einhard, *Vita Caroli*, chap. 15. Adam, II, 18, schol. 17, professes to have learned the early history of the warfare between the Saxons and the Redarii from an old Nordalbingian noble.

¹ See Guttman, "Die Germanisierung der Slawen in der Mark," *Forschungen zur Brand. u. Preuss. Gesch.*, IX (1897), 396-97; Wendt, I, 10-16.

² Guttman, p. 397, n. 1.

³ Adam of Bremen, III, 21.

⁴ Adam of Bremen, II, 18; III, 50, and Thietmar, VI, 23-25, both describe the temple. Adam says it was four days distant from Hamburg. Giesebrecht, *Nordlandskunde*, p. 167, and Lisch, *Mecklenburg. Jahrbücher*, III, 1, locate it near Prillwitz in Mecklenburg-Strelitz; Quandt, *Baltische Studien*, XXII, 214, on the other hand, fixes it at Dimmin at the mouth of the Peene. Guttman, p. 398, places it on the Tollenser See, near Neu-Brandenburg. A still greater Slavonic fane was on the island of Rügen at Arkona, sacred to the god Svantevit, among the Rani or Runi (*Adam of Bremen*, II, 18; Helmold, I, 6, 36; II, 12). Giesebrecht thinks that Adam is in error in locating the Rani in the island and on the mainland, too, since he also locates the Circupani on the lower Peene (IV, 18, schol. 17). But Giesebrecht seems to have missed the force of the word *et* in the sentence in II, 19: "in hostio Peanis fluvii, ubi et Runi inhabitant." Considering how close the island of Rügen lies to the mainland, it would be strange if some part of this powerful tribe were not settled on the coast.

pressure of Charlemagne's conquests began to be felt, and a tendency is noticeable toward hereditary succession in the chieftainship.¹ But no ruling dynasty was ever established among the Baltic Slavs as in the case of the Poles and Bohemians, who early developed a strong ducal power, which with the former even grew into a kingship. Political tendencies among them were centrifugal, and there seem to have been many small chieftains.²

As to social structure: there was a landed nobility,³ a large free class composed of rude farmers, cattle raisers, and bee keepers; fishing, perhaps, was the main source of livelihood, as was natural with a people living in so wet a country as lower Germany was in the Middle Ages; slaves were numerous and were employed as field hands and artisans;⁴ tribe enthralled tribe, and for centuries the slave marts of the Slavonic peoples supplied both Byzantium and the Germans of the West.

If the political institutions of the Baltic Slavs were rudimentary, their religious institutions, on the other hand, were highly developed. The priests were the most influential element in their society and enjoyed almost monarchical power. The temples were supported by tithes and possessed large tracts of land.⁵ The ritual seems to have been elaborate. The Slavs deified the forces of nature, and each tribe had its favorite sanctuary.⁶ A black horse, sacred to the local god, was an object of great veneration in several places. The island of Rügen was the last refuge of the cult, where it was stamped out in 1168.⁷ But it is not altogether an idle fancy which still sees the ruins of the great shrine of Arkona amid the thick beech forests

¹ Einhard's *Annals*, p. 823; Guttman, *op. cit.*, 398, n. 2.

² Guttman, p. 399, nn. 3, 4. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 399, n. 1. ⁴ Wendt, II, p. 9.

⁵ "Extra quorum sententiam nichil agi de publicis rebus fas est, adeo metuuntur propter familiaritatem deorum vel potius demonum."—Adam of Bremen, IV, 18. "Flaminem suum non minus quam regem venerantur."—Helmold, I, 6 (end). "Tributa annuatim."—Helmold, II, 12.

⁶ Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, III, 84–85, has collected all the references to the temples of the Wends.

⁷ See the articles by J. Kornerup in the Danish *Aarbøger for Nord. Oldk. og Hist.*, for the years 1878, 1879, and 1881—especially the last—for the supplanting of Wendish heathenism in Pomerania and Rügen by Christianity, and the founding of Danish Cistercian monasteries there.

which yet cover the island. The semicircular mound fifty feet in height near the little lake of Hertha-See, and the Hochilgord Hill were probably once places of Wendish sacrifice.¹

Modern history both in Spanish America and in North America offers a melancholy example of the contact of a "higher" with a "lower" race.² The history of the long and harsh relations of the Germans with the Baltic Slavs in the Middle Ages is a mediaeval and relatively unfamiliar example of "a phenomenon of familiar occurrence in later history of the contact of nature peoples with a ruling race."³ Considering the fact that the Baltic Slavs had no inheritance of civilization from Rome and the church to help them along as the Germans of the fifth century had possessed, their culture was quite as high as that of the early Germans and promised as much. The utter destruction of their material and moral culture between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries is a fact which every student of the history of civilization must deplore. Henry I, when he captured Jana, put the village to pillage and massacred the adult inhabitants.⁴ After the battle of Lenzen all prisoners were put to the edge of the sword.⁵ Otto I was no more humane. The victory of Racknitz was followed by a butchery which lasted till nightfall; seven hundred prisoners were massacred before the eyes of the conquered Slav chief. Gero, the famous margrave, treacherously slew thirty Wend chieftains whom he had lured to a banquet under pretense of peace.⁶ Henry the Lion and the

¹ Upon the institutions and the religion of the Wends see *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, II, chap. xiv; Hauck, *Kirchengesch. Deutschlands*, III, 69-87; Schulze, *Kolonisierung*, pp. 19-43, 86-116; Lavissee, *La Marche de Brandebourg*, pp. 10-15; Wendt, *op. cit.*, I, 16-18; Guttmann, *op. cit.*, 400-403; Bernard, *De Adamo Bremensi Geographo* (1895), pp. 63-71; Fisher, *Mediaeval Empire*, II, 3-6. Thietmar of Merseburg (ca. 1000), *Helmold* (ca. 1175), *Chronica Slavorum*, and Ebbo, *Vita Ottonis*, ep. *Babenberg.*, especially I, chaps. 21 and 52, are the fullest sources.

² Cf. Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 256.

³ Bourne, *op. cit.*, p. 211, and n. 2. Widukind, II, chap. xx, is interesting as the reaction of a tenth-century German's *Kultur* toward the culture of the Wends.

⁴ Widukind, I, 35.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 36.

⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 55; II, 20. Thietmar of Merseburg, IX, 2, approves of these cruelties. The events here alluded to completely conquered the Sorben, who henceforward were passive. Their further history does not enter into this article.

Teutonic knights in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were no whit less cruel.¹

Neither the German church nor the German nobles were willing to let time work out the problem of race-contact between the German and the Slav, and permit the gradual transfusion of blood between them and the slow transforming influences of civilization to resolve the issues. There can be little doubt that this might have been possible.²

The missionary zeal of the mediaeval German church was hardened with an alloy of worldly self-interest which gave a harsh edge to its pious professions, and the cure of souls was prevailingly subordinated to its hunger for land and its appetite for rich endow-

¹ See Hauck, III, 91. For German contempt of the Slav see *Fredeg. Chron.*, IV, 68; *Monk of St. Gall*, II, 12; Thietmar, III, 17; Adam of Bremen, II, 45 (schol.); Helmold, I, 16.

The comment of Cosmas of Prague (ca. 1045-1125), the first Slavonic historian of the western Slavs, is interesting in this particular: "Perpendit enim innatam Teutonicis superbiam, et quod semper tumido fastu habeant despectui Sclavos et eorum linguam."—*Chron.*, I, chap. 40; *MGH. SS*, IX, 62; cf. *ibid.*, X, 84. For centuries *Wend* and "heathen" were synonymous terms to the Germans (Widukind, III, 68; *Annal. Hildesh. anno 1056*; *Dipl.*, I, 146, No. 65, *anno 945*; cf. Hauck, III, 84).

² The chronicles have preserved a number of examples of cross-marriages between the aristocracy of both races. About the year 1000 a certain Wendish nobleman named Pribislav eloped with Matilda, the sister of Dietrich of the Nordmark, who was a nun in a convent in Magdeburg. Pribislav was assassinated by two Saxons who were hired by the angry margrave; whereupon his brother, who had forsaken paganism and become a priest under the German name Liudolf, abandoned his cowl and set forth to avenge his brother's murder, but was apprehended and returned to the church by Henry II. (See the account in Thietmar, IV, 64.) Matilda afterward fell into the hands of a Slav adventurer named Boliliut, an ex-companion of a Saxon outlaw named Kiza, who took her to wife. Helmold, I, 13, cites the case of an Obodrite chieftain named Billug who married the sister of Wago, bishop of Oldenburg. The border was the home of the German outlaw, who fraternized with the Wends (Helmold, I, 19). The most notorious instance of this is the case of the two nephews of Hermann Billung, Wicmann and Ecbert, who quarreled with their uncle and fled to the protection of two Obodrite chieftains, Nako and Stoinef (Widukind, III, 50-51; *Annals of Quedlinburg*; *Annals of Hildesheim*, 955; Thietmar, II, 6, 12-13). In this connection the observation of Polish historian Dlugoss as to the same process in Poland is interesting " . . . Prefecti castrorum et munitio civitatum cis Albim sitarum ab obedientia deditioque Miecslai regis regnique sui Poloniae deficere ceperunt ignavia desidiaque regis et Almanorum affinitate, qua invicem dando accipiendoque uxores junxerant eis defectionis materiam."—*Hist. Polon.*, ed. Lips, 1711, tome I, book II, p. 184.

ments. As early as 591 the synod of Aquileia, representing the Bavarian church, had complained of the tyranny of the Frankish church.¹ Through the efforts of Boniface, the organizer of four Bavarian bishoprics, the Bavarian law of the eighth century "encouraged" donations to the church to the point of compulsion, and punished the murder of a bishop with an impossibly huge fine, or slavery. In the same century, in Ober-Franken, again through Boniface's zeal, and that of Sturmi his disciple, the see of Würzburg (741) and the monasteries of Fulda (744) and Hersfeld (769) were founded and heavily endowed with manors and tithes.²

The missionary propaganda of the German church in the Middle Ages was largely a money-making proposition.³ Christians had to pay tithes, so the "saving of souls" became a lucrative commercial interest. The border peoples, if conquered but unconverted, were subject only to tribute, and the wealth thus acquired went into secular coffers. But evangelization offered spiritual rewards and declared substantial dividends of a material nature for the benefit of the church.⁴ Alcuin, in the time of Charlemagne, rebuked Bishop Arno of Salzberg for inhuman treatment of the Slavs in Styria and Carinthia, upon whom he cruelly imposed the tithe.⁵ The sordid motives of the German church, in spite of its smooth

¹ Riezler, *Geschichte Bayerns*, I, 90.

² For Würzburg see Kretschmer, sec. 176; for Fulda and Hersfeld, sec. 103.

³ Adam of Bremen, III, 22.

⁴ Lavissee, *La Marche de Brandebourg*, p. 37, caustically remarks: "Charlemagne, en assignant aux sièges épiscopaux qui auraient envoyé des missionaries en pays païen une part des revenus payés par les convertis, avait excité l'avidité en même temps que l'émulation des évêques, et les conflits qui éclataient entre les divers diocèses n'étaient point faits pour persuader aux païens que les prêtres de Jésus-Christ ne voulaient que le salut de leurs âmes."

⁵ *Monum. Alcuin.*, ed. Jaffé, VI, 301, Ep. 64. So, too, in 796 Alcuin, after the conquest of the Avars, asked Charlemagne to "consider whether it is a good thing to impose on a rude people like this at the beginning of their faith the yoke of tithes, exacted in full amount and from every house." Alcuin even had the moral courage and the critical acumen to challenge the whole system of imposing tithes. For he goes on: "It is to be considered whether the apostles, who were taught by Christ himself and sent forth by him for the evangelization of the world, ever ordered the exaction of tithes, or demanded that they should be given to them."—Ep. 67; cf. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, VIII, 149.

language and professions of piety, come out strongly in the correspondence between Boniface and Pope Zacharias in 751. Boniface had propounded the question to the pope whether the tithe should be imposed upon Slav serfs working the church lands. The reply of the pontiff is luminous for the light which it casts upon the inner motives of the church. "Yes," said Zacharias, "for if they do not pay tribute, they will think the land is theirs. But if they are made to pay tithes they will know who is lord of the land."¹

When German history passes from the Carolingians to the Saxons, we find Otto I (936-73) too heavily involved with the church to resist its demands. His father Henry I had dangerously estranged the German clergy. It was Otto's policy to mollify them. At the inception of his reign the chief peril to the crown lay in the great power of the feudal dukes. The bishops and abbots, threatened by their usurpations, inclined toward the crown, while the king, for his part, found one of the strongest features of his anti-feudal policy in elevating the clergy as a counterpoise to the high feudality. The lavish generosity of the Saxon kings toward the German church far surpassed that of the Carolingians. Of the 435 charters which have been preserved of the reign of Otto the Great, 122 are donations to the church.² Henry I had made but 5 donations to the clergy during his whole reign. It has been well said that:

Otto I perceived that under his father the church of Germany was fast becoming the prey of the nobility. The Bavarian duke had obtained from the Fowler the right to nominate to the Bavarian sees. If the example spread, the church in Germany would split into a number of tribal organizations which would intensify national differences, and possibly destroy the free circulation of talent through the kingdom. Otto was not choosing between a spiritual

¹ *Epp. Bonifacii*, No. 80, ed. Jaffé, III, 226: *Boniface*: "An census a Slavis Christianorum terras incolentibus recipiendus?" *Zacharias*: ". . . si enim tributo sederint, ipsam quandoque propriam sibi vindicabunt; si vero tributum dederint, norunt dominatorem ipsam habere terram." Cf. a similar response in *Monum. Boica*, XXVIII, 1, 268 (996), and see Giesebrecht, *Jahrbücher des deutschen Reichs unter Otto II und Otto III*, p. 29, n. 1. It is no wonder that apologists for Boniface, like Fischer, (*Bonifatius*, pp. 204 ff.), endeavor to disprove the genuineness of the letters. Sommerlad, *Die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland*, I, chap. iv, and Stüttz, *Gesch. des kirchlichen Benefizialwesens* (1895), are valuable accounts of the land policy of the church in Germany in the seventh and eighth centuries.

² Hauck, III, 58, n. 5.

church on the one hand and a political church on the other. The alternative was between a church dominated and bullied by dukes and counts, and a church controlled and utilized for the service of the nation by the king.¹

In this policy Otto I had the precedent of Charlemagne, who made large use of the church as an instrument of government. But the Saxon rulers went farther:

These four pious emperors pile donation upon donation. Whereas we have 42 charters of donation proceeding from Louis the German and 37 from Arnulf, we have 122 from Otto the Great. Again, the grants of market rights and toll rights made during this one reign to ecclesiastical foundations exceeded all the grants taken together made by Otto's predecessors. The munificence of the Saxon emperors builds up the territories of the great Rhenish sees, creates the archiepiscopal see of Magdeburg, invests the bishop of Würzburg with ducal powers, creates the new see of Bamberg, endows and founds numerous Saxon abbeys and nunneries, and heaps political and judicial powers upon ecclesiastical foundations.²

Under such privileged circumstances the Saxon clergy, perhaps more hungry for landed possessions than even the lay feudality, was not to be deterred from the lucrative business of evangelizing the Wends across the lower Elbe River, whose "conversion" would pour tithes into their coffers and whose toil could be made to exploit the church's lands. It is charitable to indulge the thought that the missionary tradition of Anskar and the monastery of Corbie inspired the aspirations of the German church at this time. But the facts belie this rosy assumption. Charlemagne's conversion of the Saxons by force of arms had established a precedent fatal to the preservation of the liberties of the Baltic Slavs. The issue of the conversion of the Wends had first been raised by Boniface and the prospect had haunted the mind of the cultured and gentle Alcuin.³ Since then a century and a half had elapsed and nothing had been done. It was high time, argued the church. For it was unthinkable that the theory of the royal prerogative could tolerate rule over a pagan people.⁴

¹ Fisher, *Medieval Empire*, II, 78-79.

² *Ibid.*, II, 65. For detailed information on the Ottonian church policy see Hauck, III, 58 f.; Eggers, *Der königliche Grundbesitz im X. und XI. Jahrhundert*, Weimar, 1909.

³ *Monum. Alcuin.*, ed. Jaffé, VI, 165.

⁴ This idea comes out clearly in the coronation of Otto I. "Accipe hunc gladium," said the archbishop of Mainz, "quo eicias omnes Christi adversarios, barbaros et

In the case of Otto I, his religion was politic and his piety "practical" in the most concrete sense of that term. He was indifferent to the conversion of the Wends, but he could not be indifferent to the demands of the bishops. Accordingly his reign saw a terrible series of military expeditions and missionary forays across the lower Elbe against the Baltic Slavs, by which the land was conquered as far as the Peene River.¹ Precisely as Charlemagne had utilized the administrative system of the church to extirpate the Saxon tribal organization in Saxony,² so the apparatus of the German church was now imposed upon the subjugated Wends in order to crush them.³ "Ex nomine victorum provincias quoque vocabula sortitas." Beyond the Elbe a swarm of bishoprics arose, half houses of God, half fortresses. Oldenburg was the earliest episcopal erection at an unknown date.⁴ It was an ancient Wendish town, so old that it was called Old Town (Starigard).⁵ Havelberg was founded in 946, Brandenburg in 948,⁶ Merseburg in 967,⁷ Meissen and Zeitz (later removed to Naumburg) in 968.⁸

malos Christianos, auctoritate divina tibi tradita omni potestate totius imperii Francorum, ad firmissimam pacem omnium Christianorum."—Widukind, II, chap. i. For comments see Waitz, VI, 163 ff. The same thought is expressed by Frederick I in the *Canonizatio Caroli Magni* in 1166: "In fide quoque Christi dilatanda, et in conversione gentis barbaricae fortis athleta fuit, sicut Saxonia et Fresonia Hispanis quoque testantur et Wandalis, quos ad fidem catholicam verbo convertit gladio."—Harz., *Conc.*, III, 399-400.

¹ Sommerfeld, *Gesch. der Germanisierung des Herzogtums Pommern*, p. 10.

² "Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae," Boretius, *MGH., Leges*, I, 2, No. 26, p. 68; cf. the spurious charter for Bremen in Sickel, *Acta Karol.*, II, 393-94, and the interesting statement of Adam of Bremen, I, chap. xiii: "Huic parrochia decem pagos subiecimus, quos etiam abjectis eorum antiquis vocabulis et divisionibus in duas redigimus provincias, his nominibus appellantes, Wigmodiam et Lorgoe."

³ Cf. Widukind, II, 38; Adam of Bremen, II, 24; Thietmar, II, 20, 22; Helmold, I, 14, 17.

⁴ Hauck, III, 105, n. 5; Dehio, *Gesch. des Erzbistums Hamburg-Bremen*, Appendix XII; Curschmann, *Diözese Brandenburg*, p. 19, n. 3, think the year was 948. For further information see Kretschmar, *Historische Geographie von Mitteleuropa*, sec. 258.

⁵ "Ea quae Slavica lingua Starigard, hoc est antiqua civitas," says Helmoldus the Holsteiner antiquarian of the twelfth century, I, chap. xii. The Germans simply transliterated the name. The derivation is obvious. *Stara* means "old" and *gard* is the same as *grad*, a universal Slav suffix for town. The Serbian today distinguishes a part of his kingdom by the term *Stara Sribiya*—Old Serbia.

⁶ Kretschmer, secs. 270-71.

⁷ *Ibid.*, sec. 267.

⁸ *Ibid.*, secs. 268-69.

Manors, tithes, tribute, were showered upon the new bishoprics in the Slav lands by the Ottos,¹ and the "New Plantation" for a season enjoyed great peace and prosperity.² "Through the mercy of God and the valor of Otto the Great," Helmold piously exclaims, "complete peace prevailed everywhere; the wastes of Wagria and of the province of Schleswig began to be peopled, nor was there any corner left which was not conspicuous for its towns and villages, and also its many monasteries."³

Forcible, wholesale conversion of the Obodrites, the Wilzi, etc., and the imposition of tithes and tribute became the order of the day.⁴ The synod of Tribur in 1036 resolved "quod omnes Sclavi decimas dent."⁵ The synod of Bamberg in 1059 expressly declared that increase of the tithes was a just motive for forcible conversion of the Slavs.⁶ These tithes were generally collected in corn, honey,

¹ "Munificentia principis Ottonis cumulati essent temporalium rerum affluentia, unde possent copiose largiri et favorem sibi populi consciscere."—Helmold, I, 12.

² "Novella Plantacio (Helmold, I, 12, 14) . . . in summa prosperitate."—*Ibid.*, I, 13.

³ Helmold, I, 12.

⁴ "Ipse [Otto I] tanta virtute deinceps constrinxit, ut tributum et christianitatem pro vita simul et patria libenter offerrent victori, baptizatusque est totus gentilium populus."—Adam of Bremen, II, 5. "Pax continua fuit, Sclavi sub tributo servierunt."—*Ibid.*, II, 24. "Tribut und Christentum, so heisst es in charakteristischer Verbindung, mussten sie bieten, damit man sie bei Land und Leben lasse."—Guttmann, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

⁵ "Constitutiones et acta pub. imperatorum et regum."—*MGH.*, I *Leges*, IV, p. 89, sec. 6; cf. Bresslau, *Jahrbücher Konrads*, II, 529.

⁶ Jaffé, V, 497–98, the bishopric of Bamberg was founded by Henry II in 1007, who detached Eastern Franconia ecclesiastically from the see of Würzburg. It was richly endowed by the emperor with the possessions of the banished Babenbergers, whose lands had passed by confiscation to the fisc in the reign of Ludwig the Child (900–911). Otto II gave them to Henry II of Bavaria, through whose accession to the German kingship in 1002 they again became a part of the crown lands. Bamberg was Henry II's favorite place of residence and the cathedral which he built and in which he lies buried is one of the finest examples of early Romanesque architecture in Germany. The see was expressly founded as a missionary base among the Slavs of the upper Main region. "Ut et paganismus Sclavorum destrueretur et Christiani nominis memoria perpetualiter inibi celebris habetur. . . . Per quam [ecclesiam] et de inimico humani generis in vicinas Sclavorum gentes Deo opitulante, triumphabit."—Jaffé, V, 27 and 31. For the founding of the see, see Gebhardt, *Handbuch d. deutschen Gesch.*, I, 277, sec. 4; Stein, *Gesch. Frankens*, p. 85; Loshorn, *Die Begründung des Bistums Bamberg*; *Jahrbücher Heinrichs II*, Vol. II, 28; Bernhard, *Lothar von Supplinburg*, pp. 152 f. For Slav serfs on church lands see Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgesch.*, V, 157, n. 3; *Jahrbücher Heinrichs II*, pp. 28–31.

flax, hemp, and cattle,² data which show the primitive economy of the Slavonic peoples at this time. Helmold, in chap. xii describes with particularity the nature of the tithe and the method of collection in the bishopric of Oldenburg: "Dabatur autem pontifici annuum de omni Wagirorum sive Obotritorum terra tributum, quod scilicet pro decima imputabatur, de quolibet aratro mensura grani et XL resticuli lini et XII nummi puri argenti. Ad hoc unus nummus, precium colligentis. Slavicum vero aratrum par boum aut unus conficit equus."³

What the actual extent of the landed possessions of these, bishoprics beyond the Elbe was, or what the amount of their revenues, it is impossible to say. For they were all swept away, as will be seen shortly, in the great Wend rising of 983. Helmold confesses his inability to tell, save in general terms, the material possessions of the church in the "New Plantation." But judging from his comment, and from what we know to have been the condition in other Wendish territory—for example, in the Sorben land and in upper Franconia, where the bishopric of Bamberg was—regions which the storm of the Slav reaction did not reach, the revenues of the trans-Elban bishoprics must have been considerable.³ The church was a hard taskmaster and exacted heavy service from the Wendish peasantry reduced to serfdom or even slavery upon their own once free lands.⁴ The cynical aphorism of Ekkehard of St. Gall, "servi qui non timent, tument,"⁵ epitomizes

² A tithe in honey in Brandenburg is mentioned in 965: "totam decimam mellis in pagis . . . Plonim, Nicici, Sprewa ex utraque parte Sprewae."—*MGH.*, *Dip.* I, p. 418. So in the reign of Otto II, in 973 a honey tithe is recorded in the same place: "in Ploni . . . et in toto Morkeni totoque Drenzile et Hevelde."—*Ibid.*, II, 40. A tithe in honey or linen from the Slavs of the Main was granted by Arnulf in 889 to the bishop of Würzburg (Boehmer, *Regesta Imperii* [751-918], p. 745; Dümmler, *Gesch. des ostfränkischer Reiches*, III, 356).

³ Cf. I, 14, 88. He uses the words *resticuli lini* in I, 12, and *restes lini* in I, 14. The terms are interchangeable, the latter, sing. *restis*, being more usual in mediaeval Latin. It is used in the sense of a bundle of sticks, of a last of fish, of a roll or bale of cloth, of a measure of grain, etc. Cf. Du Cange, *Glossarium*, s.v.

³ Helmold, I, 18.

⁴ Thietmar several times alludes to this unfree Wendish peasantry: II, 24; V, 6; VI, 37; VII, 15; cf. Jaffé, V, p. 652, 809; Waitz, V, 157, n. 3, and especially Schulze, *Kolonisierung*, pp. 98-116.

⁵ Casus S. Galli, *MGH.*, SS. II, p. 403.

the policy of the hard and worldly feudalized clergy of mediaeval Germany.

Perhaps one must go to Spanish America in the sixteenth century for an adequate parallel to this history of the spoliation of a weaker people by an avaricious priest class backed up by the sword of a powerful government.¹ The pious observations of Bernal Diaz on the benefits conferred upon the Peru of the Incas by Spanish civilization and Christianity have their prototype in the adamantine sanctimoniousness of Thietmar of Merseburg when he reflects upon the "mercies" which the German church had brought to the Sorben.²

In its greed for land the church was even divided against itself. This comes out clearly in the case of the diocese of Merseburg. The see was founded in 967 or 968.³ From 971 to 981 Gisiler was the bishop thereof.⁴ But when in 981 he was elevated to the archbishopric of Magdeburg, he maneuvered so as to secure the abolition of the see of Merseburg under the pretext that Halberstadt had never given its written consent to Merseburg's erection ("sine consensu atque subscriptione canonica"). The bishops of Zeitz and Meissen sustained him in this course, the motive of which was plain. The three coveted the lands of Merseburg and plotted the spoliation of the diocese to the aggrandizement of their own sees. The upshot of the scheme was that the diocese of Merseburg was abolished and its lands partitioned among the three avaricious bishops. It was not restored until 1004, when Henry II, whose bold policy in the face of the bishops will soon be noticed, revived Merseburg again.⁵

¹ For development of this parallel see Bourne, *Spain in America*, pp. 195-201, 259-65.

² Thietmar, IX, chap. iii: ". . . . consuetudines quamvis dirae, tamen interdum laudabiles." See the whole chapter as an example of clerical moralizing and compare the legislation of the synod of Tribur in the year 1036 (*MGH., Const. I [Leges 4], 89, No. 6*). Helmold, I, 84, points to the German substitution of trial by battle or by hot plowshares for the methods of Slavonic administration of justice as an evidence of "progress." "Sed offerebant criminibus pulsatos sacerdoti ferro vel vomeribus examinandos."

³ Kretschmer, sec. 267.

⁴ Thietmar, I, 37.

⁵ For this scandalous affair see Thietmar, III, 16; Gebhardt, I, 272, and Kretschmer, sec. 267, with literature cited.

The church in the Wendish lands was inspired by no genuine religious zeal. Its motives were wholly material. The bishops' seats were simply offices of exploitation. Manorial bailiffs and stewards in the service of the bishops were numerous, but there was no thought of priestly ministration.¹ The only actual churches in the land were in the cathedral places, where the bishop's authority was established and where the center of the system was. Elsewhere there were merely a few scattered chapels, with a single priest, and these were not for the conversion of the Slavs, but to minister to the isolated German communities, chiefly composed of soldiers and wandering merchants. Most of the bishops were intriguing Lorrainers and Flemings like Adalbert of Magdeburg.² Of all the German bishops who sat in these Wendish sees in the tenth and the early eleventh century, there is only one in whom any real spirituality is discernible—Boso of Merseburg, its first incumbent; and even in this case the evidence is somewhat dubious, for it rests on the flattering unction of an official document.³ However, Thietmar has preserved for us an anecdote which is so ingenuous that it has an authentic ring, and shows that this Bavarian monk had some of the milk of human kindness in him. Thietmar records how Boso composed a little manual in the Slav tongue for the instruction of his flock, and that he taught them to chant the *Kyrie eleison*, at the same time "*exponens eis hujus utilitatem.*" But to his bewilderment these barbarian children of the forest mistook the words *Kyrie eleison*, which they naturally did not understand the meaning of, for their own Slav word for elderbush (*kriolosse*) and so sang.⁴

A certain familiarity with the Slavonic tongue must have been not unusual among some classes of the Germans, as military officers, merchants trading across the frontier, and at least some of the priesthood. Otto I spoke Slavonic,⁵ and Thietmar, for all his Saxon scorn of the race, must have understood the language. The

¹ "Aber von Pfarren ist nicht die Rede."—Guttmann, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

² Hauck, III, 95.

³ "Multum jam in eadem Sclavorum gente convertenda sudavit."—Urk. Otto I, in *MGH., Dip.* I, p. 502.

⁴ Thietmar, II, 36–37.

⁵ Widukind, II, 36.

internal evidence of his *Chronicle* proves it.¹ A few of the Wendish chieftains embraced the Christian religion for self-advantage.² But the mass of the Slavs must have accepted Christianity as they accepted German domination, superficially and morosely.³ To most of them for generations the founder of Christianity was the "Teutonicus Deus,"⁴ who, they must surely have thought, had come to bring not peace but a sword. Even as late as the twelfth century the Christianity of the Sorben was very superficial and chiefly inspired by dread of the German power.⁵

The blame for the inhuman treatment of the Wendish peoples along the German border must be divided between the Saxon clergy and the Saxon nobles, especially the ruling house of the Billunger. The feud between the church and the nobles was a bitter one and lasted for years.⁶ The nobles resented the fondness of the Ottos for churchmen. Above all they resented the policy

¹ Cosmas, I, 23, speaks of "Dethmarus Saxo olim, orationis causa Pragam profectus"; and of "Theadagus Saxo, lingua perfecte imbutus Sclavonica."

² A Sorben knight named Zolunta was a member of Otto II's bodyguard in his ill-fated Calabrian expedition in 982 (Thietmar, III, 23; cf. Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, II, 168), and there is mention of some others like him (Helmold, I, 16 [Schol. 30]); "Gesta episcop. Camerac. Contin.," *MGH.*, SS. VII, p. 518. Liutprand, *Legatio*, chap. xxiii, alludes to Wendish hostlers and stablemen.

³ Adam of Bremen, III, 1, distinguishes the Slavs in the archiepiscopal diocese of Bremen-Hamburg into *pagani* and *pseudo-Christiani*. Compare the comment of Wipo: "Liutici vocantur, qui olim semichristiani, nunc per apostacam nequitiam omnino sunt pagani."—*Vita Chuonrici*, chap. xxxiii.

⁴ Ebo, *Vita S. Ottonis episcop. Babenb.*, III, 1.

⁵ *Vita S. Winthar.* (1062-63), ep. Merseb. *MGH.*, SS. XII, p. 246: "Sclavorum genti, quorum copiosam multitudinem error adhuc ydolatriae detinebat"; *Mirac. Heinr.* *MGH.*, SS. IV, p. 816: "vix vel tenuem fidei videntur habere scintillam." The *Miracula* were written at the end of the twelfth century (Wattenbach, *DGQ.*, II, 384; cf. Hauck, III, 135, n. 6). A letter written by a clerk of Liège to Udo of Naumburg (died 1148) is to the same effect: "Ultra non christianam Salam inter agrestem et barbaram Sclavorum nationem" (cited by Hauck, III, 135, n. 7). Thietmar of Merseburg (I, 3) says that the Wends venerated their own temples more than the Christian churches: "Hunc [Glomuzi fons] omnis incola plus quam aeclesias spe quamvis dubia, veneratur et timet." The whole paragraph is interesting for the light it throws upon the Slavonic religion. See Hauck, IV, 555-63, for the general growth of the church in the Sorben March in the twelfth century.

⁶ Cf. Giesebrecht, Otto II, pp. 91 ff.; *Kaiserzeit* I, pp. 604 ff., 850; Giesebrecht *Wendische Geschichten*, I, pp. 264 ff.; Hirsch, *Jahrbücher Heinrichs II*, Vol. III, 183-87; Guttman, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

of converting the Slavs, for the church's tithes reduced the tribute proportionally. They were content to leave the Wends their own religion, their own leaders, their own laws, provided the Wends regularly paid tribute to them.¹ Saxon avarice, both of the nobles and of the clergy, is alleged time and again by Adam of Bremen and Helmold as the cause of German overthrow beyond the Elbe and the arrest of the eastward expansion of German colonization for one hundred and fifty years.² "I have heard," writes Adam of Bremen, "that the honest king of the Danes said that the Slav peoples would long since have been converted to Christianity if it had not been for the avarice of the Saxons."³ And Helmold mournfully records: "The princes divided the tribute among themselves. But no mention was made of Christianity. From which the insatiable avarice of the Saxons may be appreciated. They excel all other peoples in arms and the art of war; but they care more for tribute than they do for the winning of souls."⁴

In 983 the first of three formidable Slav rebellions against the tyranny of the Germans occurred. The bishoprics of Havelberg, Brandenburg, and Zeitz were wiped out; Hamburg was plundered and burned; a German army under leadership of the archbishop of Magdeburg, the bishop of Halberstadt, and the margraves of Lausitz, Meissen, and the Nordmark was beaten at Belkeshim.⁵

Under Henry II (1002-24) the German border policy initiated a new and striking course. At this time Boleslav of Poland was formidable to Germany, for he aimed to unite the whole group of separate and detached Slavonic tribes into one body, and narrowly missed so doing. The danger was a real one to Germany, for Boleslav had friends at the German court, among them Henry, margrave of the Bavarian Nordgau, Ernest of Austria, and the

¹ Sommerfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

² See Hauck, III, 250-51; Hirsch, *Jahrb. Heinrichs II*, Vol. III, 93 ff.; cf. Adam of Bremen, II, 46; III, 22; Helmold, I, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26.

³ Adam of Bremen, III, 22.

⁴ Helmold, I, 21; cf. Sommerlad, *Die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland*, II, 209.

⁵ Thietmar, III, 10-11; *Annal. Sax. anno 983*, MGH., SS. VI, p. 631; Giesebrecht, *Otto II*, 91 ff.; *Kaiserzeit*, I, 604 ff., 850; L. Giesebrecht, *Wend. Gesch.*, I, 264 ff.

king's own brother Brun.¹ In this peril Henry II, adroitly taking advantage of the hostility of the Wilzi and Redarii to the Polish policy of forcible union, promised them the unmolested enjoyment of their pagan religion in return for their support of the German cause against Boleslav.² Henry II was not the supine instrument of the church that tradition has represented him to have been, but a resolute, far-sighted ruler without illusions.³ His statesmanship foiled the probable unification of the western Slavs and diverted Polish ambition eastward toward Russia, while at the same time allowing liberty to the slow process of Germanization of the border peoples to work out the solution through natural contact instead of by compulsory means.

The wisdom of Henry II's course was soon manifested. The bishops of Havelberg and Brandenburg returned to their devastated sees, and they and other former German towns, like Arneburg, were rebuilt. But unfortunately some of the German bishops learned nothing and forgot nothing. Benno, bishop of Oldenburg, instituted an inquisition into the former possessions of the diocese which so exasperated the Obodrites that they declared that rather than submit again to the heavy exactions of the church they would quit the country.⁴ A second Slav rebellion came in 1018, in which Mistislav, the Obodrite chieftain, and his half-Christianized adherents—for there were some Christian Slavs among them—severely suffered, and the trans-Elban bishops were again driven out.⁵

This second Slav revolt completed what that of 983 had left unfinished. The first blow had fallen upon Brandenburg and the

¹ Thietmar, V, 32, 35, 36, 38.

² Anno 1003—Thietmar, V, 21; VI, 23-25, 28.

³ See on this Hirsch, *Jahrbücher Heinrichs II*, Vol. I, 257 ff.; Vol. III, 364 ff. (by Breslau); Matthai, *Die Klosterpolitik Kaiser Heinrichs II*, Göttingen, 1877; Nitzsch, *Deutsche Gesch.*, I, 367; Guttman, *op. cit.*, 419.

⁴ See the detailed account in Helmold, I, 18.

⁵ Thietmar, III, 17 [10]; VIII, 5 [4], distinguishes between the reaction of 983 and 1018. The first was against the German *Herrschaft*, the second against the *Fürsten* and the church. He names the Wend leaders as Mistui and Mistivoli. The names mean two separate persons, and not the same man as Adam of Bremen, II, 40-41, and Helmold, I, 16, who follows Adam, say. Cf. Hirsch, *Jahrbücher Heinrichs II*, Vol. I, 478-86 (excursus of Usinger).

Havelland, but Nordalbingia had escaped. Now it too was devastated with fire and sword. The priests were slaughtered, the inhabitants dragged off to glut the slave marts along the Baltic coast, especially in the island of Rügen. Bishop Benno, the man primarily responsible for the insurrection, was absent from his post when this second wave of Slav fury swept the land. But sixty priests were captured and with hands tied behind their backs were whipped through the native towns and villages until they died of exhaustion. The work of the church for seventy years past in Nordalbingia went down in a twelvemonth.¹ Gottschalk, the Obodrite chief, who at first had been tolerant of Christianity, and whose son was educated in the cloister school in Lüneburg, became the formidable avenger of the wrongs of his people.²

More than a century and a half later, when the labors of Adolph of Holstein and Henry the Lion permanently established German domination across the great river, Helmold, the Holsteiner priest and author of that vivid record of German eastward expansion, the *Chronica Slavorum*, picturesquely described the ruins which still could be seen of churches, monasteries, and tiny German hamlets which were destroyed in these two uprisings of the Slavs.³

But neither the violence of this second Slav rebellion nor the imprecations of the clergy frightened Henry II into renouncing the alliance he had made with the Slavs of the Elbe. Unexpected and ferocious as the insurrection of 1018 was, bitter as the blow must have been to his liberal practice, hostile as the resentment of the bishops was—especially of those who had lost their seats—yet the emperor's confidence in the essential justice and wisdom of his policy was unshaken. He had the justice to perceive that the

¹ "Omnes igitur Sclavi qui inter Albiam et Oddaram . . . absciderunt a corpore Christi."—Adam of Bremen, II, 42; Helmold, I, 19.

² See the interesting conversation of Gottschalk, reported by Helmold, I, 19, with a Holsatian refugee whom he met unrecognized in the way.

³ "Adhuc restant antiquae illius habitacionis pleraque indicia, precipue in silva, quae ab urbe Lutilinburg per longissimas tractus Sleswich usque protrahitur, cujus vasta solitudo et vix penetrabilis inter maxima silvarum robora sulcos pretendit, quibus jugera quondam fuerant dispertita. Urbium quoque seu civitatum formam structura vallorum pretendit. In plerisque etiam rivis qui propter molendina stipandis aquis aggeres congesti sunt ostendunt omnem saltum a Saxonibus quondam inhabitatum."—Helmold, I, 12.

Wilzi, the Wagri, the Obodrites, etc., had been "driven to the necessity of paganism" by the cruel oppression of the clergy and Duke Bernhard of Saxony.¹

Conrad II (1024-39), no friend of churchmen, attempted to adhere to the policy of Henry II. But the prejudice of the clergy and the continual molestation of the Obodrites and the Wilzi by the Saxons jeopardized this statesman-like course more and more. For over thirty years the strong hand of these two rulers sought to restrain both the Saxon clergy and the Saxon nobles. Wipo, the biographer of Conrad, relates an incident which strikingly illustrates the conditions and the difficulties along the frontier. In 1033 the border situation became so tense that the emperor went thither to investigate. The Wends accused the Saxons of continually breaking the peace. The Saxons blamed the Wends. The latter offered to put the determination of the question to the judgment of God in trial by battle. Conrad at first hesitated, having scruples whether a heathen could participate in a process of law in which the invisible presence of God was supposed to be, but finally consented. Each side chose a champion, and the Slav champion won, to the great elation of his compatriots and the chagrin of the Saxons, especially the clergy, whose prestige as dispensers of the will of the Almighty was somewhat injured.²

But the wise plan of the Franconian emperors was increasingly imperiled by the ambition of the Billunger dukes of Saxony and the avarice of the Saxon clergy. Up to the death of Duke Benno in 1011 the Billungers had been loyal, though with diminishing fidelity, to the German crown. But with the accession of Bernhard to the dukedom the Billunger breach both with the crown and with the church widened. As we have seen, the Obodrites were the mildest of the Slav tribes of the lower Elbe, and when the first wild flame of rebellion subsided, Christianity began slowly to recover in Wagria under the active policy of Archbishop Unwan of Bremen (died 1029) and Bishop Benno of Oldenburg, whose tactless

¹ Thietmar, VIII, 4; Adam of Bremen, II, 40, 41, 42, 46; Hirsch, *Jahrb. Heinrichs II*, Vol. III, pp. 93 ff.

² Wipo, *Vita Chuonradi*, chap. xxxiii; for a commentary on the legal technicalities see Waitz, VIII, 30; Breslau, II, 96-97.

inquisition into the former possessions of the church there precipitated the rebellion of 1018.¹

The Saxon duke, jealous of the enrichment of the church, did everything he could to thwart the bishop, and at the same time attempted to double the tribute exacted of the Obodrites.² Four manors, in particular, were a bone of contention between the duke and the bishop.³ The Obodrites, caught between the hammer of the bishop and the anvil of the duke, preferred the bishop's rule as the lesser of two evils, and when the dispute was referred to the emperor, testified to the previous existence of the episcopal tithe and promised to pay it as before.⁴ This was in 1021, and was the immediate ground of the fierce feud which widened into open war between the Billunger dukes and the bishops of Northern Germany, and which reached an acute phase in the war of Duke Ordulf against Adalbert of Bremen in the early years of the reign of Henry IV.

Thus the peace and prosperity of Nordalbingia and Holstein after the second Slav rebellion subsided, of which Adam of Bremen boasts, was actually as precarious as the quarter of a beleaguered town beyond the immediate reach of the shells. Billunger hatred of the church's ascendancy left nothing undone to embarrass it.⁵ Moreover, the new king of Denmark, whose ambition for Danish expansion on the mainland had been nourished by Canute, coveted a wider dominion. Conrad II, Canute, and Archbishop Unwan of Bremen had amicably arranged their somewhat conflicting interests in the North.⁶ But when Canute died in 1035 and Conrad II in 1039, political conditions in Northern Germany were changed. Duke Bernhard's son Ordulf was married to

¹ Helmold, I, 18. Thietmar of Merseburg, when Henry II restored the bishopric and appointed him to it, exhibited the same greed for land and started proceedings to recover possession of the lands which had passed to others in the dismemberment of the diocese. He did not recoil from acts of violence in so doing, and became bitterly involved with Hermann and Eckhard, sons of the margrave Eckhard, as a result (Thietmar, IX, 20-22).

² Wendt, I, 69.

³ Helmold, I, 18, and nn. 4-6, ed. Schmeidler.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cf. Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, II, 619 f.

⁵ Adam of Bremen, III, 22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 54; Brealau, *Forschungen*, X, 612, puts the date as 1035 instead of 1025.

a daughter of Magnus of Denmark. The alliance boded ill for the interests of either emperor or church in the North. Things became tenser than before. The Danish king coveted possession of the mouths of the rivers flowing into the Baltic in the interest of Danish Baltic trade, while the Saxon duke wanted to provoke the Obodrites and Wilzi into a new revolt which would destroy the churches again being established in their lands, use the rising as a pretext for Saxon intervention, and establish his dominion and tribute over them without any competition from the church.

The Saxon-Danish alliance was formed with the object of effecting this double partition. In pursuance of the plan Ordulf and King Magnus, in 1043, fell upon the Wends at Lyrskog Heath, near Hadeby in Schleswig (September 28), a victory which clinched the Danish capture of Wollin, the most important trading town of the Baltic Slavs at the mouth of the Oder River in 960, which the Danes had renamed Jomsburg. The future was to see a bitter strife between the Germans and the Danes for possession of the Pomeranian coast as a result of this intrigue. But of more immediate importance was the effect upon Nordalbingia. Against the double onslaught the Obodrites were powerless. Their capacity to resist was also hampered by their division into a pagan and a Christian group, the latter under another Gottschalk. Probably nothing but the loyalty of these Christian Wends to the faith, in spite of all the abuse of them by the church, saved Nordalbingia and Holstein from a second eclipse of the church there at this time.¹ Unfortunately for Germany the emperor Henry III during this time was warring against the Bohemians and Hungarians, or else in Italy, and could not interfere. Helmold's comment, which echoes Adam of Bremen's doleful observation, is full of depression: "De Christianitate nulla fuit mentio."²

At this critical juncture, when the affairs of the North were full of tension, friction, and peril, Henry III died (October 5, 1056), leaving the crown to Henry IV, who was a little child, and Germany

¹ For the extensive source references and literature to the battle of Hadeby and its results see Richter, *Annalen*, II, 361-63; cf. K. Gjerset, *History of the Norwegian People*, I, 275 (1915).

² Adam of Bremen, III, 22; Helmold, I, 21.

fell upon evil days. The most statesman-like man in the country was the great archbishop of Bremen, Adalbert (1043-72). But he had bitter enemies in the Saxon duke and his son, and, in his rival for the regency, Archbishop Anno of Cologne. Adalbert was of a noble Saxon family and the ambition which, if he had been a layman, would have driven him to strive for the enlargement of his feudal prerogative and the widening of his feudal lands found a broader field of ambition in his ecclesiastical office. His dream was to convert his archdiocese into an immense patriarchate, having ecclesiastical sway over lower Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and even Greenland.¹ For the realization of this dream of creating a gigantic principality covering the whole Christian north of Europe Adalbert actually declined the papacy in 1044.

Under Adalbert's influence Bremen became the foremost city of Northern Europe. It was the center of northern learning, the chief emporium of the commerce of the North Sea and the Baltic. Distinguished foreigners of many nations and many talents met together in Adalbert's court—Italians, French, English, Irish, Greeks, Jews, scholars, musicians, painters, physicians, merchants, travelers.²

The Baltic Slavs were to have formed a vassal state of the German kingdom within this huge orbit,³ with the Christian Obodrite duke Gottschalk, as prince, after the manner of the relation

¹ For the mediaeval church in Greenland see K. Gjerset, *op. cit.*, I, 197-204; Major's ed. of *Voyages of the Venetian Brothers N. and A. Zeno* (Hakluyt Soc., 1873), pp. lxxvii, 17; Beamish, *Saga of Eric the Red*; Crantz, *History of Greenland*, 1767.

² The names of some of these persons have been preserved, as John of Ireland; Gualdo Gallicus (*Hamb. Urkundenb.*, No. 101); Trasmundus the artist-monk (Bruno, *De Bello Saxonico*, I, 4); Guido, an Italian musician (Schumacher, *Brem. Jahrb.*, I, 153, conjectures he may have been Guido of Arezzo; cf. Adam of Bremen, II, 66); Aristo, probably a Byzantine Greek; Adamatus, from the medical school in Salerno; Bovo, a famous traveler who had been three times to Jerusalem and even to Cairo. For larger information see Adam of Bremen, III, 35-38, 44; for Adalbert's revenues see Adam of Bremen, II, 45; Dehio, *Gesch. des Erzbistums Hamburg-Bremen*, I, 175-277; Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, III, 95-138, 153-66; Beazeley, *Dawn of Modern Geography*, II, 516-21; K. Maurer, "Islands und Norwegens Verkehr mit dem Süden im IX. bis XIII. Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie*, II, 446; Riant, *Pèlerinages des Scandinaves en Terre Sainte*, p. 58.

³ "Scavos ita perdomuit ut eum [Adalbertum] quasi regem timerent."—Adam of Bremen, III, 18.

of Poland and Bohemia to the German crown.¹ To be sure, the Obodrites were yet half pagan and the Wilzi wholly so. But Gottschalk's loyalty and organized missionary effort on the part of the church was counted upon to remedy this condition. Adalbert, unlike any former bishop in the North, worked hand in hand with the Christian Obodrites. He divided the bishopric of Oldenburg into three parts, creating two new Slavonic dioceses for them—Mecklenburg and Ratzeburg—and founded cloisters in Oldenburg, Ratzeburg, and Lenzen.² Henry III while he had lived had furthered Adalbert's ideas, for their realization would have spread the power of the empire too. Moreover, the emperor needed the support of Adalbert in Saxony which was now dangerously alienated and even hostile to the German crown. The absence of Anno of Cologne at the Council of Mantua gave Adalbert his chance to take advantage of the favor of young Henry IV, and for two years (1064-66) he had things much his own way.

But the prospect of the speedy conversion of the Baltic Slavs roused the fury of the Billunger, for they had no mind to see the tribute diminished by the extension of the church's tithe.³ "He shall not rest," said Duke Ordulf of Adalbert, "while I or my house last." Both parties assiduously built castles and the north country flamed with war.⁴

The German church was divided into two camps. Anno of Cologne was supported by the archbishop of Magdeburg and the bishops of Halberstadt, Trier, Minden, and Utrecht, as well as by the leading Saxon nobles.⁵ At Tribur in January, 1066, Henry IV was forced to dismiss Adalbert, who fled to Bremen. Then followed four terrible years. The Billunger fell upon Bremen with fire and sword and wrecked the land. Adalbert found refuge in the strong imperial fortress of Goslar, whence he sent the proffer of a thousand manors of his diocese as the price of peace to Magnus

¹ "Gottschalk's Plan war die Gründung eines grossen wendischen Einheitstaates auf christlicher Grundlage und im Bunde mit dem Reich."—Otto Bitense, *Mecklenb. Gesch.* (1912), p. 19; cf. Guttman, *op. cit.*, p. 419; Wendt, I, 73.

² Adam of Bremen, III, 20; Helmold, I, 22; Dehio, *op. cit.*, Exkurs XIX.

³ Adam of Bremen, III, 40, 42.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 43; cf. 47-48. For the earlier history of the feud see II, 69; III, 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 34, 46.

Billung, Duke Ordulf's son. In the end the bishopric was deprived of two-thirds of its possessions, half of the spoil going to the Billunger and half to their partisans. The indomitable Adalbert spent three years in his ruined city, still dreaming of the grandeur he had hoped for and laboring for the reconstruction of the dilapidated diocese.¹ At last Henry IV, who had emancipated himself in 1070 from the control of the combined clerical and feudal opposition around him, recalled Adalbert. But in March, 1072, Adalbert died, as tragically as Wolsey, save for the love of his king for him. Adam of Bremen says that in his last hours he reproached himself for having wasted his life in pursuit of earthly power. But the pious historian's moralizing² does not disguise the fact that Adalbert was a big and forceful personality who wrought strenuously for the enlargement of the life and the history of Northern Germany. In the same year his great enemy Duke Ordulf also died.

Meanwhile what had been the effect of these events upon the border situation? The pro-Christian inclinations of Gottschalk and the Obodrites had slowly provoked the wrath of the other pagan Slavs along the Baltic coast farther toward the east, especially the Wilzi and the wilder Rugians, the guardians of the great Slavonic fane on the island of Rügen. They perceived what was quite true, that the extension of Christianity would carry with it the subjugation of the free Slav tribes and that they were likely to pass under the onerous domination of the Saxon dukes. "They preferred to die rather than to become Christian," says Helmold, "or to pay tribute to the Saxon dukes."³ The sight of the newly established bishoprics of Mecklenburg and Ratzeburg infuriated them, and the pagan priests of their temples seem to have fanned the flame, as the Aztec priesthood inspired their people against the Spanish conquerors in Mexico.

In 1066 a third Slavonic rebellion came, the most formidable and effective of them all. The Wilzi, maddened by Saxon abuse and border aggression, rose in fury and decisively defeated the Saxons.⁴ The Christian Obodrite chief Gottschalk was killed.

¹ See Adam of Bremen's detailed account, III, 48, 54-56.

² *Ibid.*, III, 64.

³ Helmold, I, 25.

⁴ *Chron. Wirzib., MGH.*, SS. VI, p. 31; Wendt, I, p. 75.

Bishop John of Mecklenburg was dragged off a captive to the pagan temple at Rethra and there immolated to the high Slav god Redigast (November 10, 1066). Squads of Christian priests were whipped through the Slav towns till they died of exhaustion. The Slavonic bishoprics of Mecklenburg and Ratzeburg were obliterated; the cloisters at Oldenburg, Lenzen, and Ratzeburg destroyed. Even the bishopric of Hamburg was overrun.¹ Hundreds of the population were carried off into slavery, the castle demolished, the garrison thereof being derisively crucified by the furious victors. "Omnes Sclavi," says Adam of Bremen, "facta conspiratione generali ad paganismum denuo relapsi sunt."² "Thereafter until the end of his life," writes Helmold, "Duke Ordulf vainly fought against the Slavs, but was never able to win a victory. Many times was he beaten by the pagans and was an object of derision unto his own people."

The Christian hero of the border was the fierce Burkhardt, bishop of Halberstadt, who in the winter of 1067-68 made a successful raid across the frozen marshes, devastated the country of the Wilzi, burned the Wendish temple at Rethra, and triumphantly rode back to Saxony upon the sacred black horse.³ In the next winter—winter campaigns were the only practicable method of invasion of so swampy a country⁴—young Henry IV repeated this feat.⁵ But the Wends more than held their own. In 1072 they twice attacked Hamburg. All Nordalbingia was a solitude.⁶

The Pontiac of this successful rebellion of the Baltic Slavs to throw off the German yoke was a Rugian chief named Kruto, who fixed his capital on an island at the confluence of the Trave and the Wochnitz rivers, where later, in 1143, Adolph of Holstein founded the present city of Lübeck.⁷ From his rise to power in 1066 until

¹ Hauck, III, 594.

² Adam of Bremen, III, 49-50; Helmold, I, 22-24.

³ *MGH.*, SS. III, p. 128.

⁴ "Terra etenim illa paganorum aquis et paludibus est plena."—*Annal. Alth.* 1069.

⁵ *Annal. Weissemb.* 1069; *Sigeb. Gembl.*, *MGH.*, SS. VI, p. 362.

⁶ "Pagani victores totam Nordalbingiam deinceps habuerunt in sua ditione, bellatoribusque [i.e., the vassals of the bishop] occisis aut in captivitatem ductis, provincia in solitudinem redacta est."—Adam of Bremen, III, 63.

⁷ Helmold, I, 25, 57.

his death in 1093 Kruto was lord of the North.¹ Hundreds of the German population which had settled across the Elbe forsook the country, 600 Holsteiner families in a body emigrating into Thuringia.

But Kruto's power was a purely personal one. The inherent inability of Slavonic peoples to make large and firm combinations was manifested when he died. He had no successor. Fortunately for the Wends, Henry IV, although he had come forth victorious out of the conflict with the papacy and the revolted German baronage, was friendly to them. Saxony had been the storm-center of opposition to the Franconian house, and he perceived the strategic value of a border state friendly to him and hostile to the Saxons lying along the edge of Saxony. To the wrath of the Saxon clergy Henry IV not only befriended the Slavs, but even favored the continuance of paganism among them and opposed the church's missionary activity. His son Henry V, save for one isolated campaign against the Wilzi, adhered to the same policy.

But the seeming strength and security of the Baltic Slavs was illusory. In the first quarter of the twelfth century it is undeniable that Slavonic paganism was upon the defensive. Although it was true that "*ultra Albiam illis temporibus rarus inveniebatur Christianus*,"² nevertheless Christianity was slowly seeping into the trans-Elban lands, especially in the territory of Brandenburg, where the extension of the church can be obscurely discerned. In 1101 the margrave Udo temporarily recovered Brandenburg.³ There is record of a church at Leitzkau in 1114, and the archbishop of Magdeburg had a Christian Wendish *praefectus* in his service at Loburg in 1115.

¹ "*Invaluitque Cruto . . . obtinuitque dominium in universa terra Slavorum. Et attritae sunt vires Saxonum, et servierunt Crutoni sub tributo, omnis terra videlicet Nordalbingorum quae disternitur in tres populos: Holzatos, Sturmarios, Thethmarchos [Holstein, Sturmarias, Ditmarsch]. Omnes hii durissimum servitutis jugum protaverunt omni tempore Crutonis.*"—Helmold, I, 26.

² *Annal. Pegav., MGH.*, SS. XVI, p. 252.

³ *Annal. Rosenv., MGH.*, SS. XVI, p. 102; *Annal. Sax.* 1101.

[To be concluded]

DEGREES OF TRUTH

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The philosophical thinking of the present time, when its various tendencies are examined, seems to be working along a number of converging lines toward a general view of the *nature of truth*. In the present article it is the author's purpose to state and defend this view, which is clearly of cardinal importance for theological investigation.

The principle is that no truth can be entirely true and no error totally false; that in every case, taken strictly, it is a question of amount, of more or less; that even when we make assertions about what is immediately present to us, our assertion is subject to, and at the mercy of, *known conditions* unexpressed in it, and of conditions *unknown* but none the less real.

I

There are certain considerations of an abstract character which compel us to adopt, in some form, the principle just indicated. We shall deal briefly with these first, and then pass on to considerations of a more concrete character.

It is a simple matter of fact that, in actual thinking, a criterion—we do not say the only criterion—of our possession of truth is the *self-coherence* of a system of judgments or propositions. What is implied in this? A system is self-coherent in proportion as every constituent element involves and is involved by every other, and as these reciprocal implications constitute the significance of the system. Any mathematical proposition, e.g., in geometry, is a constituent of such a system, and derives whatever finality it possesses from its place in this system. This science in its turn derives its truth from its logical relations to other parts of a self-coherent human experience. In this sense it may be said that truth is an "organic whole."

If this is true, then no fragment of knowledge can be known to be theoretically "certain" or absolutely true until all portions have been so extended and developed that they can be seen to be a single, complete, all-inclusive whole. This would be omniscience; and the ideal of omniscience is irreconcilable with a growing, developing personality such as ours.

None the less this result cannot be considered satisfactory. So far as we have it before us, it merely points to the highly abstract conception of a *self-cohering system* as the ideal of knowledge and the defining principle of truth. By supposition it is, in its absolute and complete form, beyond us. And we cannot directly draw from it guidance in criticizing or appreciating the human knowledge which is still "in the making." It supplies us with the general conception of the whole as somehow belonging to every part, and involving the relativity of all distinctions. Its incompleteness as a definition of truth may indeed be affirmed because it is *subject to its own principle*. It cannot in any case be more than one aspect of the defining criterion of which we are in search.

Its inadequacy can, however, be shown by reference to the fundamental consideration that, while knowledge is essentially related to reality, reality is more than knowledge. Every true human judgment presupposes a *system* of knowledge; but however coherent the system may be, it is after all a system of judgments constituting knowledge *about* reality. Mere self-coherence in the knowledge does not cover this relation of it to reality, and therefore cannot be the final criterion. This conclusion may be illustrated by reference to an able essay on our present subject contributed by an Oxford thinker,¹ in which he endeavors to convert the coherence ideal of science directly into a metaphysical conception of reality—"a completely organized experience, self-fulfilled and self-fulfilling." But on his own showing, the conception reached by this questionable transformation fails in every way to account for the fact of error and for the difference between knowledge and reality.

We must therefore go back and look for a point of view from which we can restate our result. We do not reject the coherence

¹ H. H. Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, Oxford, 1906, pp. 76 ff.

ideal; on the contrary, we emphasize the principle of degrees of truth which is almost an immediate inference from it. But we look for a point of view from which this principle may be at once confirmed, expanded, and supplemented.

II

We are led to the required point of view by examining the relativity of thought or knowledge to experience. In experience something real comes home to us directly or immediately.

A formal definition of "experience" cannot be given; we can only, as it were, point to the thing itself. What is meant can be suggested by contrasting the way in which we are related to the *present* and the way in which we are related to the future and the past. Our relation to past or future is entirely indirect, through mental construction—i.e., through our memories of the past, and through the ideas which we form of the future; in both cases the relation is "mediate." But our relation to the present is "immediate," not realized merely through our ideas of it; only because the present is (so to speak) already there can we have any ideas of it at all. In a word, "experience" is the *presence of reality*, as distinct from the mere thought of it.

What then is the range or scope of experience? The word is constantly used in some limited sense or other, in the interest of some narrow system of thought. The most unfortunate and unjustifiable of these limitations is to make it mean only the facts which our bodily senses appear to give us. Yet it is from this arbitrary limitation that current "rationalism" derives all its prestige—from appearing to have a monopoly of "experience" and of the real, solid foundation of knowledge which the word suggests. Experience, far from being a fixed, finite thing, is a seed, a germ, a potency; it may be almost infinitely magnified in capacity and character, in intensity and scope. Thus, in simple sense-experience, such as the perception of a sound or color; in intelligent "observation," as of something that arouses our interest; in the "instinctive" verdicts of conscience, and the social and sympathetic feelings—in these and all other types of experience there is the actual *presence* of something real which touches us, and which we touch,

directly. The kinds and degrees of experience are infinite, for they comprise all the infinite variety of *realized* objects of human thought and action. Hence the type of experience which a man will have depends first of all on the direction which his own activities take; but it depends also on the intensity with which he puts forth the native energies of his spirit into those activities. By this effort and energy his very personality will grow in power as his experience grows in depth of meaning. But if an experience is to be rational, its rational meaning must be consciously apprehended; in other words, before it can teach us any lesson it must be *thought* about; and as human intelligence has in itself infinite varieties of maturity and power, this adds a new set of variations to experience. These things are true of whole ages and races of men as well as of individuals; and the historical forms of belief depend on these two factors, inseparable, yet capable of varying independently: degrees of intensity and scope in experience, and degrees of truth in its interpretation.

It follows, as before, that no truth can be entirely true, and no error totally false. In every case, taken strictly, it is a question of amount, of more or less. Even when we make an assertion about what is immediately present to our senses, this result can be traced. When I make an assertion based on direct perception—for instance, “The sun is setting”—the *meaning* of the proposition, when actually asserted, is not all wrapped up within the statement itself but passes beyond it; and if its meaning is wider than itself, so is its truth. If I say to someone, “There’s the door!” a logician may take the statement to be self-contained and simply true or not true; but in doing so the logician ignores the fact that the door itself and my statement about it are both merely parts of a continuous human experience to which they are essentially related, and on which their meaning and truth depend. The truth of the statement may be trivial or it may be tragic; but in any case it goes far beyond the words employed in the proposition.

Metaphorically speaking, we may say that truth is like a picture of boundless extent and infinite detail, which is obliterated for us and needs to be renewed, and of which we have only recovered different disconnected portions, and these only in vaguest outline. These portions can be correctly estimated only when they are

treated as such. They are fragments of *the whole*, and not illusions; but they are *fragments* of the whole and not self-contained pieces of truth. Or, to vary the metaphor, we may compare knowledge to the view which an observer takes of a tract of country. On the ground his view of it is limited by the conditions of his position; but, though limited, it is a view of a real constitutive portion of the whole district, in which some of the characteristic physical features of the whole may be more or less fully discerned. As his point of view ascends, his observation embraces and transcends the limited field to which it had previously been shut in; and this field itself appears in truer proportions because its relations to the parts that were beyond it are now in view. Yet the first view, though perhaps deeply modified, is not and cannot be done away with. The highest aspects of human experience, then, are the highest points of view to which we can attain—those from which we can take the most adequate views of existence. It must not be forgotten that the usefulness of such metaphorical illustrations depends on their not being pressed too far.

Our "doctrine of degrees" is capable of an immediate application: it places the age-long conflict among human beliefs in a new light. Some observers have supposed that the ceaseless conflict and confusion among religious and other beliefs proves that truth can never be attained by man. This is only to apply to all our spiritual life on its intellectual side a mode of criticism which is constantly applied in particular cases. The assumption seems to be that if those who are investigating the truth in any branch of inquiry disagree in their methods or conclusions, they are proved to be pursuing an illusion. This assumption is not only false as a matter of fact and experience; it is absurd, from the nature of our intelligence. The attainment of truth would be impossible without this mutual struggle. Of truth, as of goodness, we may say *sub pondere crescit*—its growth is possible only through strife and opposition overcome. Let us consider this principle in its ethical aspect for a moment. The higher ethical teaching of today—which is that of Christianity from the beginning—shows that the victory of goodness comes through its work in *transforming* evil: not annihilating the evil, but, as it were, redistributing the energy and turning it to good purposes—in Browning's words, "unmaking to remake." So, in

matters of the intellect, truth is in its own way a transforming power which can be realized only through the conflict of partial truths. This has been finely said by Pfleiderer:

To learn from history aright, we need an insight, penetrating through the confused play of outward events into the reality of men and things, into the deep thoughts which are the controlling motives underlying even the apparent discord of individual passions; we need an unprejudiced appreciation of the necessity even of the oppositions and conflicts, the errors and passions of men, because, as Hegel says, following Heracleitus, strife is the father of all things, and only through the strife of partial rights and one-sided truths can the whole truth of God struggle into existence; we need an intelligent reverence for the heroic figures in history, in whom is embodied the genius of nations or ages, who as instruments of a higher Power have roused the thought slumbering in the souls of all, have given it clear expression, and in mighty deeds have summoned it to life.¹

The conflict of beliefs, then, is not between the true on one side and the false on the other, but between partial truths, each mingled with partial errors. The question is never, Which of these two opposite beliefs is right, and which wrong? but, What is the truth and error in each? And to answer this question we have to find a point of view above *both* the conflicting principles from which to criticize them; that is, we need a principle containing more truth than either of them. Were it not for this contradiction and opposition, the higher principle could never emerge—even the mere need for it could never be felt. The attainment of truth is only possible because different human thinkers defend different people and conflicting beliefs and theories—so that here one thing is upheld, there the opposite. It counts for nothing that this or that individual man gives up the effort, and despairs of real knowledge, falling back on skepticism or credulity; human reason is possessed of immortal energy, and attacks its problems again and ever again, with irresistible, undying confidence in itself and in its power of attaining to real knowledge at last.

III

The doctrine that truth always has degrees and is always growing from more to more in history, and at the best is stained with error, means, as we have seen, that truth is realized only as a per-

¹ Pfleiderer, *Development of Theology* (Eng. trans. 1893), p. 71.

petually renewed interpretation of experience. This implies the relativity of truth to our concrete activities and purposes.

All experience—so far as it consists of distinct events, and is not a vague and formless mass of feeling—depends on our personal activity, and therefore on our *interests*, in the widest signification of the word. Our experience is what interests lead us to notice, and this is what comes home to us as real. Our interests impose the conditions under which reality is revealed; only such features of reality can be revealed as are not merely knowable but are objects of an actual desire, and consequent endeavor, *to know*. All these interests, desires, endeavors, are purposive activities; hence whatever facts we may have discovered, some purposive activity, some conception of an end to be attained, was involved as a condition of the discovery. If our activity had been directed to other ends, *that* discovery would not have been made; if there had been no activity, there would have been no discovery. Thus *the degree of truth a doctrine contains cannot be determined apart from the purpose it is meant to fulfil*.

This prepares the way for an advance in our conception of what the *tests* or *evidences* of truth really are. They have reference essentially to concrete experience, for only there is the working power of ideas to be seen. Thought cannot of itself create evidence, whether in philosophy, science, or common life. There can be no evidence without desire, will, and action. In every case of knowledge the evidence has to be *made* as much as *found*. In physical science the evidence is made by an experiment, which is a practical problem set to Nature to answer, and the experiment would not be made unless the hypothesis appealed to the inquirer as worth trying—as for his purpose “desirable.” But experiment is not limited to the questions asked of Nature regarding the causal connection of physical events, where the conditions are capable of precise quantitative estimation. A moral and spiritual principle may, or rather must, be conceived as a hypothesis to be tested by action and experience. And this is the same in method as the testing of a scientific truth or hypothesis by experiment. Of course in the case of a physical hypothesis we are dealing with something much less abstract than in the case of a moral or

spiritual principle, so that we understand the conditions much more completely and can thus make the experiment quantitatively exact. In a biological or physiological experiment this kind of exactness is much less possible; in the testing of a rational or moral or spiritual principle it is inconceivable. But there is one method throughout.

Hence there are as many forms and degrees of truth as there are forms and degrees of worth in human purposes. If we are able to distinguish purposes as higher and lower relatively to one another, we may say that the truth which serves the highest purpose is most true, and that truths which serve a purpose less than the highest have only a relative validity. Thus we need to judge our beliefs, not only in view of their intellectual coherence with one another, but in view of their working power in life. And we need a standard for comparing the *various purposes which are hindered or promoted* by the working power of our beliefs. If that which serves the purposes of life is true, we need to know what are the constituents of life at its best, and what is the nature of their enrichment, which is to be subserved. Our answer is this: The belief which "works" is true; but it must work all round. It must satisfy our needs, but it must satisfy them all—the needs of reason not less than those of the emotions—the desire for harmony in our intellectual as well as in our moral world. The ultimate standard is the perfect harmony of our whole life, through the ideals that our nature compels us to acknowledge. In Mr. F. H. Bradley's words, "We must believe that Reality satisfies our whole being; our main wants—for Truth and Life, for Beauty and Goodness—must all find satisfaction."¹

Thus, in opposition to what is called pragmatism, we include the needs of intellect and reason among the fundamental and distinctive tendencies of our nature. Reason is as much a distinct and distinctive characteristic of man as feeling and action are; it has laws of its own, governing its germination and growth. The psychological and evolutionary study of the human mind shows that reason is first roused to action by practical needs—in the narrower sense of the word "practical"—and that it gradually

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed., 1902, p. 159.

develops possibilities of a more "theoretic" activity. If through the whole course of natural evolution there has been working a divine principle which has come to be a deliberate purpose in human life, it is through reason alone that we can hold that purpose in view and compare with it all other purposes which are judged in its light; and the demands of reason itself are part of that supreme purpose, forced upon us by the elementary assumption that knowledge is possible. Our conclusion is, then, that degrees of truth in human thought in general, and above all in religious thought, are tested by the criterion of serviceableness for the purposes of life, in the fullest and deepest meaning of these words. Our ideal takes the form of a harmony of our whole life, which includes, but is not exhausted in, the harmony of intellectual coherence.

IV

We do not, as a rule, in common life, regard our beliefs and opinions in the light of the doctrine of degrees. What would be the consequences if we did so? This question demands careful examination. To say that "all opinions contain *some* truth" may seem a lame and impotent conclusion. The criterion of "working power" can be applied only partially and imperfectly in the life that most men have to live. Is everything in the end left "an open question"? Is the resultant mood only that "genial tolerance" of which Browning speaks in his "Christmas Eve," and which is better described as "mild indifferentism"? Are we really saved from the dilemma of "the *zeal* whose heat is hostile to its light, and the *enlightenment* whose intelligence has paralyzed its will"?¹ If such sinister results do flow from our principle, then it literally stands self-condemned. But no such consequences can be attributed to it.

This may perhaps best be understood when we realize that, though the principle may not be consciously applied to any great extent, and cannot be considered part of the conscious intellectual equipment which is called "common-sense," it is clearly part of what we may call an "unconscious common-sense" which is

¹ Edward Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, II, 323.

working largely in life. Ordinary practical life rests on the continual assumption of temporarily ultimate points, temporarily absolute principles, and the like. It may, if questioned, freely confess that they are abstract or partial or one-sided—i.e., “relative”; but it deals with them as though they were final and absolute. This is natural and right, so long as we are immersed in the practical necessities of life, which themselves sooner or later call up *the assertion of the supplementary point of view or principle* and reveal the one-sidedness of the first. This might be illustrated at length from history; here I shall attempt only to indicate the remarkable illustration which it finds in what may be called “proverbial morality,” which, though it is a morality of caution, restraint, and worldly wisdom or prudence, yet keeps close to common experience in its many-sidedness and complexity, and hence embraces the most diverse views. How does it embrace them? Proverbs have the form of general truths, but that is not their real significance. They suggest an idea by reference to a concrete image or metaphor. But when they are expressed as general truths, there is scarcely a popular maxim that cannot be met by a different and opposite one. “A chain is not stronger than its weakest link.” Mr. R. A. Duff, in an interesting discussion of “Proverbial Morality” published in the *International Journal of Ethics*, says:

The essential virtue of this proverb is that it has fused a general truth and a particular image so perfectly that this truth and this image appear not two but one. But the general principle that the strength of a whole is no stronger than the strength of its weakest parts no longer appears self-evident, if we picture the whole, not as a chain, but as a bundle of sticks, or an army of soldiers. The bundle of faggots is stronger even than its strongest part; and under this change of metaphor we find it possible to apprehend another side to the truth; . . . [for] union is strength.

Such examples might be multiplied. The most striking verbal contradiction is between the maxims “Take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves,” and “Penny wise, pound foolish.” In other words, attention to the smaller duties of life sometimes prepares the way for proper devotion to its larger ones; but if this is dogmatically affirmed as a general truth, proverbial morality meets it with the opposite generalization. Does it follow that proverbial morality is divided against itself, speaking

as it does with two voices on almost every question? Or has it, as a matter of fact, been "unstable as water," or promoted an indifference to the lessons of life? It ought to have done so, if the doubts suggested in the queries which were stated above were well founded. But as a matter of fact, proverbial maxims have been of great service in the human endeavor after better and more complete forms of life. Mr. Duff says again:

They have helped to maintain the balance and sanity of man's thought and volition, because they have been able under all conditions to force to the front the aspects and elements of action which have been neglected or crowded out under the pressure of other interests. In this way they have done much to further the development of the moral consciousness, even when they have seemed to be fighting against its unity and harmony. For while they are themselves unprepared with any reconciliation of the discordant features of moral experience, they can bring to play against every partial conception a very effective "dialectic." And in thus quickening the pulse of ordinary thought, and saving it from the stagnation into which its own want of vigour is apt to betray it, they have prevented men from finding rest in those half-truths contentment with which is ever the worst of lies.

Proverbial morality affords an impressive example of an instinctive recognition of degrees of truth by a kind of unconscious reflection which really does deserve to be called "common-sense," and which, though it puts its conclusions as if each were absolutely and completely true in itself, yet makes them all the more effective because it means and uses them for short, sharp appeals to experience, which have none the less of value when it is discovered that they are "mere aspects" of wisdom.

V

We may go farther, and affirm that the very spirit of the age is feeling after the principle of degrees of truth. It is true that the careless reflection which leads to *banal* indifferentism is common enough, though utter superficiality ought to be evident to everyone. "Does it matter what a man believes?" Our whole argument tends to show that it would be more true to say, "Nothing else matters" than to say, "It does not matter"; for it cannot be doubted that a man's life is deeply affected by his real convictions regarding his relations to the moral law, to society, to nature, and to God. But we find in the spirit of the age a growing perception

that openness of mind, even on these supreme questions, is not inconsistent with enthusiasm, nor breadth of outlook with depth of thought. The fanatic—the man who cannot be intense without being narrow, who advocates every cause which seems to him good, as though it were the supreme and perfect good, or the sole surviving fragment of good in an abandoned world, and who attacks every evil as if it were the concentrated embodiment of all that is bad—is of no use in modern civilized lands. Our principle tells us that the growths springing out of the intellectual life are inextricably intermingled; that a “plain answer—yes or no” becomes the less possible, the more important the question in which it is demanded, and “guilty or not guilty” is an antithesis fixed in its application by a social convention; that even those theories and influences which seem to us serious errors may contain enough truth to give them a temporary value. We find, accordingly, in the spirit of the age, a growing inclination to give all kinds of ideas a “fair chance” to hold their own in the intellectual struggle for existence, and to assume that the darkness of ignorance will the sooner disappear if the windows of the human mind are opened wide to every quarter of the sky.

Our principle tells us, again, that even when a man’s political, ethical, religious, or scientific creed is something which he has made for himself and thought and lived himself into—not something acquired by accident or at the dictation of another—still the complete whole of the creed’s subject-matter is not to be apprehended by any single man; for human experience is and must be personal and limited by the limitations of personal activity and choice. We find in the spirit of the age an increasing insight into the importance of the personal point of view in influencing beliefs, and a growing interest in the subconscious and unconscious factors of mental life—the mass of ingrained prejudices and unreasoned sympathies, of instincts and passions, of fancies and feelings, which unconsciously affect both opinion and conduct. This recognition that “every man has his point of view” carries with it a moderation of the intellectual claims of the individual, since this variety is itself part of the reality which all alike are trying to comprehend.

If it be said that the doctrine of degrees simply means that "a plausible case may be made out for *anything*," we reply that this statement simply means that any point of view which can seriously be occupied by a sane human being must have *some* relation to reality; and this is a truism. If there is an "enthusiasm" for truth, which cannot live with the doctrine of degrees, it would be more truly described as an enthusiasm for the infallibility of our own definitions of truth. In this sense only do we "leave everything as an open question"—we affirm that no one may go to work by the light of his own private reason and conscience, and draw up a catalogue of statements, theological, ethical, or philosophical, which shall be inviolable certainties. Such "certainty" is intellectually absurd and ethically undesirable. We can reach only what is relatively the most true for us. Truth is a growing power in our race, and cannot be pursued save by penetrating to the heart of what man has already accomplished in the accumulation of moral ideas and ideals and of intellectual beliefs and systems; while the legacy from the past needs ever and again a new emphasis, a new articulation, a new interpretation. Even St. Paul—the greatest heretic and religious revolutionary the world has ever known, with the single exception of Jesus Christ—took every account of the past. But how? He read it in the light of life—his own life and the life of his countrymen round him; he mingled it with his own experiences and reflections—passed it through the fire of his own personality; and then gave it forth. The ideal of true progressive thought makes a great demand upon us: to give forth the truth as it is in ourselves, not breaking with the past, but showing that in ourselves its force has been regenerated, re-created, redirected, made fruitful for the life that now is. Life is the only test both of truth and of worth; and even life is not final. It is always growing; for it is the great moral and spiritual experiment of humanity. Our beliefs at their best are temporary, provisional, experimental; but the one great Light which embraces all the rest and mingles them into its radiance as the rainbow colors are mingled into white will never be seen by us unless we use our "broken lights" to find it.

THE LOGIC OF RELIGION—CONCLUDED

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I have defined religion as *a social attitude toward the non-human environment*, and have shown somewhat in detail the meaning of this definition.

IV. A COMPARISON OF THIS THESIS WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS

I shall now attempt a fuller description of my position by contrasting it with some representative results of contemporary psychological treatment.

A. First, let me make some further reference to the work of Professor Wright. "The values of religion are all in some sense moral values."¹ True, certainly. But why? If religion is the conservation of socially recognized values, why does it not seek to conserve the vast industrial interests of the land? No values are more fully recognized socially. Yet Dr. Wright's definition does not suggest why these should not today be a matter of concern to religion, nor why the values with which it is concerned should always be in some sense moral. But if, as I have suggested, religion is a social attitude toward the non-human environment, the "self" is always involved; and where the self is involved, the situation is *ipso facto* "in some sense moral." Moreover, whereas ancient industry was very often and very largely a matter of concern to religion, modern industry is not, for the simple reason that the manipulation of the sources of wealth is now a matter of science, inasmuch as non-social or mechanical attitudes have been found by men to be vastly more efficient with reference to such things than the earlier social attitudes were.

Again, "as society advances the general tendency is for religion increasingly to conserve the more important ethical values."²

¹ "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 399.

² *Ibid.*, p. 400.

But why? If my thesis is sound, the reason for the phenomenon here referred to is at once patent. The "self"-consciousness, the moral tone of the group or the individual, at any given stage of development, is the same whether the organism is adjusting itself to the human or to the non-human, and the ethical values which are the more important in one case will also be more important in the other. This statement, i.e., that the "self" is identical in both the human and the non-human situations, of course is not absolutely exact, for the self is ever fluctuating within rather wide limits, shrinking or expanding, waxing or waning in vigor, and this, for the most part, in response to the social environment. There are, however, limits; there is at any period in social evolution, as it were, a "mean temperature" of selfhood or moral tone common to the individual and his group and in large areas of experience. Though, in general, it may be said that the morals of the divine society lag somewhat behind those of the human group whose social imagination has created it (and naturally so, since the constructive imagination cannot work without materials, and those materials must first be produced in the social experience of the group), nevertheless there are more or less definite psychological limits within which the human and the divine codes agree. Herein is the logical explanation of both the truth, and the indefiniteness thereof, in the statement that the tendency is for religion to conserve the more important ethical interests. A selfhood in which, for instance, purity has become integral will demand purity in its divine social environment; and when purity is once established in the divine society, it will react powerfully for the fuller establishment of purity in the human group. Again, the proverbial conservatism of religion is explained by the same facts. For the self must be evolved in the human social *milieu* before it can function in the larger non-human environment. The unseen world is comparatively static because it is changed, not by concrete fact, immediately, but only indirectly by the slow-moving logic of the earthly facts. The construction of a divine world is a slow and arduous process, and is made stable and solid by reason of the very importance of the self's interests which are localized there. Once completed and perfected, it holds the imagination of individuals and of generations in

thrall, and the protests of conscientious iconoclasts make little impression on it. To demand that religion be less conservative is to fail to realize the ponderous proportions of its task. "Rome" may fairly epitomize the general scheme of Western orthodoxy, and "Rome was not built in a day." Various structures in the Eternal City, such as atonement, God, salvation, may be more or less remodeled, with comparative ease (though even here, at close range, the cost in energy and earnestness seems incalculable), but such a wholesale reconstruction as is demanded by the seismic shake-up which modern science and psychology have produced will not be undertaken until all effort to live among the ruins has become too obviously futile, and some consciousness has dawned of the resources of the human nature which builded this city in the past.

Another question which Dr. Wright's essay raises and on which my thesis throws light is that of the relation of religion and aesthetics. For him they are utterly different and distinct. "The differences between aesthetics and religion are so great and their resemblances so superficial that one wonders how the two ever have been confused. The blunder . . . that these features [i.e., music, frescoes, etc.], the merest external adornments and veriest accidents of religion, constituted her heartfelt purpose. . . . The religious endeavor is never an end in itself . . . aesthetic contemplation is interesting on its own account: it is an end in itself."¹ Now, if they are so distinct, how account for their apparent close union? Why is it that some religious persons so vehemently insist that religion is not a matter of aesthetics, while others as earnestly assert that it is? If they are not the same, they are at least inextricably interwoven on abundant evidence. Let me again appeal to my thesis. Religion is an adjustment of the self to its non-human environment. Now in every adjustment there are three logically distinct phases: (1) the initial, "problem" stage, in which emotion, ideation, and volition are all active and preponderant; (2) the smooth working out of the solution, in which emotion dies down into interest, and the actions are automatic and habitual rather than volitional, and the intellectual processes proper are comparatively unnecessary; (3) the appreciative

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 401.

or "economic" stage, in which satisfaction is experienced by means of the successful solution and its actualization. These successive phases may be traced in both physical and social situations, and in any social adjustment whether with the human environment or with the non-human. It extends to large epochal adjustments as well as to the individual's experience. The aesthetic epochs are those in which successful experience tends to symbolize its satisfactions. They are the flowering forth of great cultural or moral or religious achievements. So we have the art of the Greek period, of the Renaissance, of today. Obviously an experience is an end in itself, in degree as it passes into the third, or "economic" phase, of adjustment.¹ Thus in many instances a religious mood is an "end in itself," as some mystical types of devotion so well attest. It is just as impossible to regard the classic Christian mood of "communion with God" as having some ulterior motive as to think of the experience of conjugal felicity or the intercourse of ideal friendship as being a means to an end rather than an end in itself. But so also religious experience may have the general character of the first or problem stage marked by stress and strain and great intellectual and emotional activity, or of the calm but interest-full second stage when the adjustment activity is in process of actualization.

A further quotation from Dr. Wright's essay will help me to make my meaning clearer. "Ages of comparative religious shallowness like the Italian Renaissance have often produced the finest religious art; while, as in the case of the Puritans, movements of deep religious earnestness have sometimes rejected the services of art altogether."¹ My thesis suggests that to call one "shallow" and the other "deep" is to miss the real comparison. The Italian Renaissance is the culmination of a long process of religious adjustment, whereas the Puritan movement is the beginning of another. The first is religious adjustment or experience in the "economic" stage; the latter is religious experience in the "problem" stage. The one very naturally expresses its overripe "satisfaction" or successful accomplishment in the symbols of sacred art. The other in the strenuous period has no sense of ripe accomplishment as yet to symbolize, but has all its energies absorbed in the practical

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 400.

task on hand. To call the one "shallow" and the other "deep" is as inadequate as to say that the relaxed mood at the end of a hard day's work, when one goes over the day's deeds in reverie or in conversation, is "shallow" as compared with the sweat and dust of the hours of toil. They are both normal phases of the total situation. Similarly, periods of moral reconstruction have their strongly contrasting "problem" and "economic" phases. We fight the great fight of slavery and years later express our appreciation of the importance and success of the task in sculpture, painting, and architecture. We undertake vast industrial problems and soon the sense of having made a beginning at least finds expression in a great mural decoration. Important discoveries are lived over again in pageantry. So the artistic impulse is a normal phase of moral as well as of religious evolution. And in passing, it might be pointed out how the individual aesthetic experience may be regarded as religious. (The aesthetic impulse in the individual regarded from the organic functional standpoint is simply the result of racial experience incorporated in the nervous structure of the individual organism. The sense of beauty is organic and instinctive, builded up by many generations. It may, of course, be liberated by education. (The matter of art as a technique of symbolization is aside from the psychological understanding of the aesthetic nature.) But what in its simplest terms is the appreciative attitude which many people instinctively take toward a "beautiful" landscape but the hereditary responsiveness of the organism toward favorable environment? This is of the physical type. The appreciation of a beautiful or noble face is an aesthetic impulse of the moral type. The sensitive soul, however, may gaze upon a beautiful landscape with emotions that he himself cannot define but as religious. What has happened to make the aesthetic moment religious? A sense of selfhood has arisen as he gazes. It is no longer *merely* aesthetic, because the organism is so aroused as to make a total, that is to say, a social reaction, over against the non-human. The aesthetic feeling blends into the religious. Such an aesthetico-religious experience is typically expressed in the lines:

The clouds that gather round the setting sun,
Do take a sober coloring from the eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality.

B. Let us next consider Irving King's *Development of Religion*.¹ This author thus defines religion: "The religious consciousness is a special development of the valuational attitudes. . . . a special development of the valuational type of consciousness."² It is obvious that such a statement involves the necessity, first, of distinguishing between the practical and the valuational attitudes; and secondly, that of differentiating that special type of the latter which is religious from other types of the valuational consciousness.

Now the primary criticism to be made upon Professor King's position is that his distinction between "practical" and "valuational" is entirely artificial. For the larger part of the valuational moments of consciousness are as truly practical as anything else. Indeed, it may fairly be said that the more "appreciation" we have of a situation of danger or object of desire the more intensely "practical" it *ipso facto* is.

The trouble with this term "valuational" or "appreciative" is that it may properly refer to three different aspects of activity. In the first place, any action in its third or "economic" stage is practically a mood of appreciation.³ In the second place, the pleasure-pain tone which accompanies most, if not all, sensations is the organism's instinctive "evaluation" of its stimuli. When this affective tone is very intense, we may sometimes describe it as "appreciative"; for example, one "appreciates" a good square meal when very hungry, one "appreciates" a fire on the hearth after being out in the cold damp night, one "appreciates" a danger when its perilous aspects have fully aroused the instinct of self-preservation. In the third place, the emergence of "self"-consciousness renders any attitude appreciative or valuational in proportion as the "self" is highly organized and explicit. This is of course the most important of the three factors, and it is this which is the real explanation of the importance of social life in developing a sense of "values" on which King so constantly insists. "The sense of value itself is so thoroughly bound up with social activities that it may almost be called a social category."⁴ But he does not see that the most important result of social

¹ *The Development of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1910.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴ See discussion above, p. 247.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

intercourse is the creation of self-consciousness, and hence the real psychological connection between the social *milieu* and the sense of value is lost. It is indeed true that "the particular function of the social element is in giving stability and depth to the values brought to consciousness through the rise of intermediate activities,"¹ but do not these values acquire "stability and depth" just because they become the values not merely of physical organisms but of social "selves?"

Professor King himself seems to admit that he has not made a very successful differentiation. For instance, he says: "It [religion] originates, it is true, to a certain extent in the practical life of a people. . . . It is true that the feelings of appreciation thus gained may be carried over and used in very pressing and practical situations. . . . Prayer and sacrifice, although in a way practical expedients, are also just as truly expressions of an appreciative disposition on the part of the worshiper. . . . One mode of reaction will in many cases be sure to merge with the other. . . ." ² The artificiality of this distinction between practical and valuational attitudes, as such, accounts for some of the strained positions he is compelled to assume. For instance: "Were religion a practical expedient, it would have died out, as magic is doing with the growing sense of inutility."³ But religions do die out, with the growing sense of their inutility. Religion, in the general sense of what the various religions have tried to do, does not die out, and it is equally true that what magic tried to do does not die out. King himself calls magic primitive man's science, and the continuity of the general function which magic attempted is just as real as and no more real than the continuity of the general function of mankind which we call religion.

Passing now to the second task of differentiation which King's position involves, how does he distinguish between those valuational attitudes which are religious and those which are not religious? In general, it seems to be simply a question of the degree of social importance. "As certain of these values stand out and acquire great prominence in the social consciousness, they become in so far

¹ *The Development of Religion*, p. 70.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

religious, and the activities which were before only practical expedients are now transformed into religious ceremonials."¹ Or to put it otherwise, religious values are ultimate values. "That the social organization is practically the *ne plus ultra* of primitive man's life is a most important point for the development of religious values out of those of less degree. . . . Psychologically the values of the group are not only higher than those of the individual, they are genuinely ultimate and universal. This is our argument in a nutshell."² As for modern man, "the religious attitude may be said to be the consciousness of the value of action in terms of its ultimate organization."³ In a word, since religion is "the appreciation of the more permanent and far-reaching values,"⁴ the more permanent and far-reaching the values at stake the more are they to be considered religious. But surely this does not by any means clearly distinguish between religious and moral or scientific values. The very case he cites of the Greenland Eskimo seems to me to expose this.

The social assemblies of the Greenland Eskimos are good examples of "accessory" activities, and their social and aesthetic value is so great and their function as an institution of social control is so evident that they may be considered as religious rites. The Eskimos have, on the other hand, many habits connected with their hunting, but these depend so clearly upon individual skill and painstaking practice and the conditions under which they are called forth are so acute, that they continue almost of necessity quite definably "practical," and hence non-religious.⁵

Now a technique for social control can hardly be said to be of "more permanent and far-reaching" value than a technique for obtaining food, nor can it be said to be less "practical," so that neither King's primary nor secondary criterion for religion seems to be operative in this case. Indeed, the distinction in this case is based upon other considerations than those suggested in the criterion of "ultimacy." "Their social and aesthetic value is so great . . . that they may be considered religious rites." This seems to suggest that religious and aesthetic are very much the same thing, a question to which more explicit attention will be

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101.

given shortly. Meanwhile it should be noted that other criteria are also introduced as well as this aesthetic quality. "That these are ostensibly religious ceremonies is indicated by their definitely prescribed character and by the various symbolic acts which are intermingled with the more useful expedients."¹ Surely fixity of form and symbolical representation are very different from ultimacy of value as a touchstone for the religious quality of any activity. And why might not a purely moral value find expression in a "definitely prescribed" or "symbolic" activity? It is indeed just the powerlessness of this definition and the somewhat similar one of Professor Ames to reveal any logical distinction between religion and morality that I find most objectionable. "Morality, as its etymology suggests, refers also to the customary, and on this ground we may argue with much assurance for the view that primitive religion and primitive morals are but two sides of the same thing."² But if the distinguishing mark of religious values is their ultimacy, how does this separate religion from the aesthetic? It was suggested above that, in the quotation referred to, they seemed to be practically identical. The question of the difference between them King considers on p. 84:

In general it may be said that the difference between them is one of relationships rather than of intrinsic content. Thus the peculiarity of aesthetic values is that they are detached or isolated from the problems of life, while values of the religious type are expressions of these problems in their most ultimate form. But, in any case, there can be no question as to the close connection of the two attitudes, and in all probability they are always intermingled.

King's theory seems to afford no clear differentiation between religion and morality, or between religion and aesthetics.

Before leaving King's treatment of the subject, I wish to illustrate further my own conception of religion by using one of the important instances which he cites in support of his. Referring to the dances of the bushmen, he says:

We pass from these activities in which the sportive element seems to predominate to others of a more religious character. . . . There was certainly no sharply dividing line between the religious and the non-religious in these cases. . . . Their ceremonial dances were specializations from a perfectly

¹ *The Development of Religion*, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

spontaneous manifestation of primitive joyousness. . . . Among other primitive peoples these same activities came in many instances to express to their doers some sort of ultimate worthfulness. That is, the meaning of their lives, as far as they were able to conceive it, was in some way bound up with the moon, with the sun, with certain natural phenomena, such as thunder storms, or with food itself; and as a consequence, the activities which had gradually crystallized about these intense centres of interest, since they were literally the expression of the relation of the people to the things, and were the only means by which they could think of that relation—these activities, we repeat, became religious ceremonials in the true sense.¹

In this quotation the two essential principles which I suggested in my definition are very distinctly though not explicitly referred to, namely, the element of self-consciousness, or feeling of self-worth, and the non-human environment. "The meaning of their lives was in some way bound up with the moon," etc., and hence "these activities, since they were literally the expression of the relation of the people to these things . . . became religious ceremonies in the true sense." In the evolution of the religious dance, out of the mere overflow of animal spirits in the moonlight, the point at which religion appears is the point at which moral consciousness or the sense of selfhood or "the meaning of their lives" emerges.

C. Another conception of religion which I wish to examine is in Ames's *Psychology of Religious Experience*.² Professor Ames thus defines religion: "The social consciousness in its most intimate and vital phases is identical with religion."³ He defends this position on several grounds. First, the traditional distinction between morality and religion was based upon one or other of several dualisms which today have been entirely retired, such as that of the natural and the supernatural which science destroys, or that of the faculties which modern psychology destroys, or even that of the conscious and the subconscious which is also doomed.⁴ Dr. Ames concludes: "Without the definite assumption of this dualism, the line between morality and religion becomes obscure and tends to vanish completely." Now my contention is that while the distinction, which is basic to my definition, between the human and

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 111, 112.

² *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

⁴ See pp. 286, 290.

non-human environment is not a substitute for any of the dualisms referred to, it is a distinction so natural and so important as to be worthy of the prominence I give it and is the real ground of the distinction between religion and morality to which tradition has so tenaciously and instinctively clung.

Dr. Ames's second argument is that as we study morality and religion genetically we find that in their beginnings there is no such clear-cut distinction, and so we may conclude that the distinction is due to our habits of thought and not to the nature of the case. "What have come to be known as the religious observances of primitive peoples were concerned with all the vital interests of the social group. . . . It is difficult and in fact quite impossible to distinguish sharply and finally in primitive life between law, morality, art, and religion."¹ But granted that religion and morality are not clearly separate in their primitive beginnings; granted further that they are continually interfusing even in the most highly developed forms; this is no more than may be said of any motives in human life, for all our interests are inextricably interwoven. Their logical differentiation, however, is of great practical importance for purposes of control and enrichment. My criticism of Professor Ames's treatment is that he fails to note that among the various ritualistic or ceremonial activities of a primitive group which he classes together as religious rites, some are obviously referable to interests which lie within the group itself, and others to interests which involve the relation of the group to its non-human environment. As chief occasions of ceremonial rites Dr. Ames gives the following:² (1) phenomena in nature, such as seedtime and harvest, the opening of the fishing and hunting seasons, etc.; (2) birth, initiation, and marriage; (3) death and burial; (4) war and treatment of strangers.

Now it is quite true that the most obvious quality which such varied rites have in common is the emotional enhancement of common vital interests. But I believe they may be separated into two classes without the least arbitrariness. For instance, the celebration of natural phenomena and that of the dangers and success of war refer respectively to the non-human and the human environ-

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 336.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 73 ff.

ment. Again, death and birth, while having obviously a social reference, nevertheless are outstanding examples of the vital dependence of the group upon the forces of nature, whereas initiation and marriage embody interests which fall almost entirely within the boundaries of the group. The double reference of death and birth does not discount the importance of the distinction which I am trying to emphasize. One and the same event may have *both* moral and religious aspects. Dr. Ames gives as a further defense of the position that morality and religion are practically identical, the fact that "religion in the minds of its best representatives at the present time consciously and frankly accepts as its highest conception the ideal of a kingdom or brotherhood of moral agents co-operative for the attainment of further moral ends."¹ But compare this "kingdom" ideal with a non-religious utopia, such as socialism. Granted an equal moral earnestness in both, why is the one consciously religious and the other consciously and avowedly non-religious? The one believes itself to be *en rapport* with an extra-human power with which it is co-operating. The other explicitly depends upon its own efforts, its program limits itself strictly to social human forces. The first is religious because, while profoundly moral, it is fundamentally an adjustment to a non-human environing power; the other is moral, and merely moral, because its whole attention and interest centers in the social human situation. To be sure, there are many indications of socialism taking on a religious quality, but these very instances only serve the more clearly to illustrate my thesis. Such religious brands of socialism are those in which the thinker's horizon broadens to take in "nature" or "evolution" or some other more or less inclusive non-human prospect, with which his moral ideals make some sort of adjustment.²

Again, from the results of Starbuck's investigation, Dr. Ames quotes the fact that "among the things absolutely essential, the *sine qua non* of religion, conduct was most frequently mentioned."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 286.

² For instance, one cannot but feel the religious tone of the chapter on "The Good Will" in H. G. Wells's *New Worlds for Old*.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

Here again the connection between moral conduct and religion should be obvious. In the higher phases of experience, "social attitudes" because organized and voluntary and not merely instinctive and accidental are moral attitudes. The organism making the religious adjustment is a moral organism, it can give no account of itself without employing ethical categories. A religious experience that has not conduct or moral behavior as an integral part of itself is not from this standpoint thinkable.

It seems to me that the logic of Dr. Ames's position leads to untenable conclusions. The enthusiasm of a political campaign and that of a missionary mass meeting may have very much in common, yet there is surely some deep disparity. A torch light procession is not necessarily a religious ceremony, nor is the final game in a baseball world series, though it seems to me that if we adopted Dr. Ames's criterion of the religious quality we should be forced to consider them as such.

Take the statement that "all moral ideals are religious in the degree to which they are the expression of great vital interests of society." Reform of the currency and tariff revision are great vital interests of society, but no intensity of discussion can make these really religious problems. The high cost of living is a moral or economic and not a religious problem today, whereas the food supply was among primitive men the very impetus to religion; and the reason is that we are concerned with human manipulations of the food supply or with the sources of food in a mechanical or scientific manner, so the problem is partly moral and partly scientific. We are not forced normally to take a social attitude toward the source of the food supply itself, though a great famine would probably inspire in a large part of the population a strictly social attitude toward nature, and many would be likely to pray for rain. I believe we may conclude that it is not merely the greatness of the social interests which are at stake, but the attitude which we take toward the non-human environment with which those interests so closely bind us that determines the religiousness of our ideals. If that attitude is social, and in so far as it is social, we are religious.

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 286.

Furthermore, if the "social consciousness in its most intimate and vital phases is identical with religion," would it not seem that an intensely individualistic religious experience is a contradiction in terms? Of course, there can be no hard-and-fast distinction between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness, yet there can be no such thing as personality without the distinction. But if the primitive man is religious in proportion as his individuality is lost and swallowed up in the group consciousness as it is in these great ceremonial experiences, and if this is indeed the logic of religion, how can we possibly account for the religious experience that is profoundly antipathetic to the dominant group consciousness and is relatively of an extremely individualistic type? Is not the religious genius, on these grounds, an anomaly? "The most important feature of these ceremonials, that which distinguishes them and makes them religious, is the public and social character. . . . The social side is dominant and controlling. . . . It would be no exaggeration to say that all ceremonials in which the whole group operates with keen emotional interest are religious."¹ To be sure, it is a long way from the dance of a tribe of Australian blacks to the meditations of a highly educated white; but it is the logic of the situation we are concerned with, and if it is the social emotional quality which is the religious differentia, how can individualism be religious? But if the conception of religion be adopted which I have suggested in this paper, is not the religious genius logically normal? It is just the dominant self which emerges in the social *milieu* which is apt, when confronting the non-human environment, to react more forcefully, with personal variation, toward it and so to initiate changes in the reactions of the whole group toward the non-human. So also may be explained, and indeed defended, the insistence which the evangelical Protestant tradition has always maintained, that religion is, in the last analysis, a personal affair.

James in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* bases his study of religion not upon rites, cult, or institutions, but upon the subjective or individualistic side of religious experience; not upon the primitive, but upon the modern type of man. He holds

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

that "personal religion should still seem the primordial thing."² He draws his conclusions from a study of "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."³ His conclusion is that "religion is a man's total reaction upon life."⁴ And by total reaction he means this: "Total reactions . . . to get at them you must go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in some degree everyone possesses."⁴ Now to find the whole residual cosmos, a "presence" "intimate or alien," "lovable or odious"—certainly this is to take a social attitude to the non-human environment. But within the limits of this definition we may find "the light irony of Voltaire and Renan, the pessimism of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche," and James admits that these are logically religious, though there seems some incongruity in calling them such. "For common men religion . . . signifies always a serious state of mind"; and pessimists lack "the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth." Now these exceptions are quite in keeping logically with the definition I have suggested. Religion is a vital adjustment, and the more successful and satisfactory it is the more truly may it be called religious. As James says, "the boundaries are always misty and it is everywhere a question of amount and degree."⁵ James feels that religion must have warmth and positiveness:

Morality pure and simple accepts the law of the whole which it finds reigning, so far as to acknowledge and obey it, but it may obey it with the heaviest and coldest heart and never cease to feel it as a yoke. But for religion in its strong and fully developed manifestations, the service of the highest is never felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far behind and a mood of welcome . . . has taken its place.⁶

Here again I submit it is not really a question of morality and religion, but of a more or less successful and complete adjustment on the part of a moral organism to an inescapable non-human

² *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

environment. To "accept the universe in the drab discolored way of stoic resignation to necessity" is to indicate that the self is baffled or frustrated in its effort at adjustment. James admits that morality in this sense and the more successful buoyant type of experience are "both religious in the wider sense."

V. THE VALUE OF THE DEFINITION GIVEN IN THIS DISCUSSION

What of the value of the definition which I have proposed? If it is a "concrete universal," it should serve as a guide to further experience. It should clarify the conditions of any real progress. I believe that it simplifies our religious problem in the following ways:

1. It suggests for the individual the inevitable necessity of some sort of religious experience. The self can never free itself from its encompassing cosmos. For the development of morality enhances the vividness of self-consciousness, and the expansion of science only shifts, never annihilates, the "borderland dim" where "control" merges into mystery.

2. It reveals the underlying harmony of effort in the most divergent religious views and practices. The most primitive savage and the most profound savant are forced to attempt one and the same task, namely, an adjustment of the "self" to the non-human environment. This should change the war of creeds into a co-operative comparison of the relative efficiency of various instruments wherewith the common task is undertaken.

3. It removes the "bottomless subjectivity" which contemporary psychology appears to bring into the religious sphere. For any object of faith is seen in this light to be, not merely the "symbol" of some "value" (which "value" largely evaporates when once its symbol is recognized as mere symbol), but rather an instrument whereby an abiding environment is interpreted or appropriated or controlled. The reality of this environment abides, and the necessary task of adjustment abides. Though the instrument be outworn, even though it be the greatest of all which the past has fashioned, all the validity formerly felt to inhere in that instrument still remains in the vast and vital task for which that tool was forged and in which it was so long and so well used.

The conditions of the task are greatly changed. The task in its ultimate simplicity and necessity remains.

4. It reveals the relation between science and religion. This cannot possibly be anything but some sort of supplementation. The social and the non-social attitudes toward the non-human are not contradictory. Physical, mechanical manipulation and control of the environment only serve to enlarge that environment, and beyond the scope of achieved mechanical control forever reaches the realm of the larger organic attitude, the social attitude. In science meanings are abstracted from departments of experience for the sake of more adequate control, and this control serves in turn to produce richer meanings. A mechanical interpretation of Nature is not an end in itself. It is but a means of solving problems, and problems solved make for fuller and richer experience.

It has been the purpose of this essay to indicate the underlying organic relation between the scientific mood and the religious mood. It is not merely that they are alternating tempers, both compelling in their respective ways. They are not merely different. *Why* are they different? *Why* do they alternate? *Why must* they alternate? And what is gained by their alternation? And what is their respective value to the vitality of the human spirit? What are their relative functions in the organism which they both serve? Such questions as these are as important for an understanding of human life as a vast vital complex as are the matters of anatomy and physiology for an understanding of the individual human body. It is believed that the analysis suggested in this discussion may prove valuable in seeking an answer to such questions.

APPENDIX A. ANIMISM

The general viewpoint of this paper should make it clear that it is a mistake to think of animism as characteristic only of primitive peoples. There are animistic impulses in the most sophisticated of us. It is not necessary explicitly to personify a natural object to be animistic. Indeed, complete personification is but the completely organized and consciously maintained stage of the social attitude. It is less correct to say that such vaguely personal feelings and attitudes which modern grownups often experience toward nature and natural objects are survivals of animism than to recognize that in the lower races and in children the preponderance of social attitudes as compared with mechanical

or non-social attitudes is simply the positive aspect of their lack of corrective experience and mechanical control. The word animism is simply a positive characterization of the tardiness with which the non-social aspects of environment are differentiated from the social. The essential difference between the physical and the social objects in the child's home is the method of control required. The physical object is normally passive and requires only manipulation. The social object is normally active and requires constant readjustment in a ceaseless series of gestures or attitudes or social stimuli or responses. Whenever a physical object behaves in an unexpected or abnormal manner; when, in other words, the customary manipulations or non-social adjustments fail of control, the process of sophistication is arrested, and the social responses or attitudes are elicited. The child is "angry" with the door that slams against him. The savage is "afraid" of the roaring river or the queer-looking rock or the poisonous food. Control breaks down. Habitual adjustments are ineffective. Mere manipulation is inadequate and the whole organism is thrown on the alert. The *dangerous* thing is an "enemy." In the most primitive stages the whole surrounding world of trees, streams, clouds, rocks, storms, winds, etc., being so largely beyond control, evokes the social attitudes because the whole organism is on the *qui vive*. This general social attitude toward nature or the physical environment is animism. As methods of control develop in the race or in the child, the environment becomes differentiated into the social and the non-social. (The question of the differentiation of the social into "human" and "animal" will be referred to in Appendix B.)

Now if animism be understood as the prevalence among primitive peoples of these instinctive social attitudes toward the phenomena of nature, the question whether it is a form of religion will, in the light of my analysis, find a simple answer. Animism is the general field within which develop those more vital adjustments which we call religious ceremonies and beliefs. To try to determine at what stage animism is pre-religious or religion is pre-animistic is an arbitrary proceeding. Logically animism and religion are identical. Practically we are inclined to restrict the name "religion" to the more vital or important examples of the animistic attitude.

APPENDIX B. TOTEMISM

What is the relation between a religious totemism and a possible pre-religious totemism? Now if religion is a social attitude toward the non-human, it may be urged that there never was a time when men were not religious, since the social attitudes are primary. But the beginning of religion will be in the rise of the differentiation between the human and the non-human. "In a pure system of totemism the human and the non-human members . . . are not distinguished" (Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 76). "Every totem clan traverses what seems to us the natural boundary between man and other creatures, and brings a department of nature inside a subdivision of

society. . . . It is only when the dim consciousness of a distinction has dawned and the nature and behavior of (say) an emu begin to appear in some degree different from and independent of the nature and behavior of emu-men that the first step is taken on the road to religion" (Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 91). "This crisis closes the first or pure stage of magic—the birthplace of what is currently called religion" (*ibid.*, p. 92). "In this primary stage we find a pre-religious condition of mankind; for in the definition of religion we include some representation of a power that is 'not ourselves.'" Logically the religious quality emerges, in social attitudes toward the non-human, with the dawn of a consciousness of its non-humanness; or, to put it otherwise, with the dawn of a human self-consciousness. Cornford, however, confuses religion and morality by failing to analyze into its human and non-human elements that "power not ourselves," a consciousness of which he accepts as the test for the presence of religion. "The collective consciousness is super-individual. It resides of course in the group. . . . In so far as this power is not myself and greater than myself, it is a moral or restraining force which can and does impose upon the individual the necessity of observing the uniform behavior of the group. With the first dawn of a distinction between myself and the social consciousness comes the first shadowy representation which may be called religious or moral" (*op. cit.*, p. 81). Is it not much simpler and more satisfactory to say that in so far as that "power not myself" which controls me is the will or custom of my group, the control is nascently moral, and in so far as that "power not myself," even though mediated by group custom, is really a non-human or superhuman force or principle, the control is of the religious sort?

APPENDIX C. MAGIC

There has been much discussion as to whether magic and religion are identical or different. Ames and King hold that magic is of two sorts, group magic and individual magic, and that the former is religious and the latter non-religious. "Not all magic but only such as belongs to group activities enter into religion" (Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 110). "Public magic to all intents and purposes is identical with primitive religion. On the other hand, when religion becomes subservient to anti-social or merely private ends, it is scarcely to be distinguished from sorcery" (King, *Development of Religion*, p. 195). King thus defines sorcery: "The sorcerer is one who deals privately with secret powers, or at least with means not generally known to the group, and the object is almost always private gain or personal vengeance" (*ibid.*, p. 191).

Let me make some further quotations from King, on the basis of which I wish to offer a criticism which will make my own position clearer.

"If these practices [i.e., "the great mass of unreflective spontaneous reactions of the psycho-physical organism"] had chanced to be more closely associated with the evolution of tribal consciousness and tribal interests, they

might have furnished the nuclei of rituals and definite religious ideas. If they had been more closely connected with lines of individual interest, so as to furnish a technique available to the individual for carrying out his personal desires, they would have formed the basis of magic" (*ibid.*, p. 189). "Magic is simply primitive man's science, and there is nothing to hinder the tribe from availing itself of the scientific knowledge in the hands of its members. Many social groups may and have adopted magical practices. Magic furnishes the community with a technique for doing many simple things. . . . In communities of loose organization magic might be so thoroughly taken up by the group as to be indistinguishable from religion." Among the North American Indians, in general, "medicine practices cannot be differentiated from religious rites and observances" (*op. cit.*, p. 203).

As to sorcery: "When a man feels he is capable of becoming a sorcerer, he ventures forth quite alone, until he comes to the mouth of the cave where the spirits dwell" (*ibid.*, p. 198). "Having been instructed by the sorcerer in the mysteries of the Great Mother, the master of divination turns him out into the bush all by himself to the contemplation of the mysteries that lie all about him" (*ibid.*, p. 198).

Now if the criterion for the religious quality is the "public and social" character of any activity, and if magic is "public and social," of course it is, *ipso facto*, religion. But if we should have reason to feel that private magic also may have a religious aspect, what becomes of the "public and social" criterion? Of course, we may argue in a circle and see religion where we are predisposed to look for it. But I must confess that if I were taking a course in sorcery—standing alone in the mouth of the cave where the spirits dwell—or contemplating the mysteries of the Great Mother all about me, if my experience in such a situation would not be distinctly religious, then I do not know what the "feel" of religion is. Has not many a victim been burnt as a sorcerer, only to be recognized by succeeding generations as a martyr to some religious faith? Would it not be more adequate to say that the practitioner of a private magic may be a sorcerer so far as the tribe is concerned, a prophet or priest, a religious person, so far as his relationship with the non-human is concerned? And if his "sorceries," as in the case of North American Indians, should prove beneficial rather than detrimental to the tribe, will he not be recognized as a prophet by his tribe, and no longer called a sorcerer? We have known enough of non-social and even anti-social religion in modern times to enable us to avoid confusing a lack of public spirit with a lack of religion. And when the magic is used by the group, is not its religious quality still due to the same factor as made it religious in the prophet-sorcerer? Moreover, this public magic may be called primitive man's science, if we are thinking merely of the practical results achieved or attempted. Indeed, both public and private magic may be considered as non-religious—a mere customary use of certain formulae or performance of specific acts, out of which the original religious quality has disappeared by sheer weight of habit or absence of cause for emotional interest.

Indeed, many magical acts may never have had any religious origin, being simply the repetition of chance "lucky" movements or methods. When, however, by reason of enhanced emotional quality the group consciousness becomes aware of some other-than-the-group force or power, the magical ceremonies take on the religious complexion.

APPENDIX D. MYSTICISM

The union of functional and social psychology which forms the background of my thesis should serve to indicate the normal place of mysticism in religious experience. The primacy of instinctive organic responses, their organization into habit, the production by habit of cerebral processes which we call ideation, the rise of emotion as the accompaniment of the inhibition of action by reason of conflicting tendencies to act, and the solution of the conflict by means of intellectual or ideational processes or reconstructions, the primary preponderance of the social instinctive responses, the tendency of the organism when on the *qui vive*, when subject to intense or vague stimulation, to exhibit the social attitudes, these briefly are facts which underlie the following statement of the place of mysticism in religion.

Pratt, in his *Psychology of Religious Belief*, contrasts three types of religion: that of credulity, that of rationalism, that of feeling. He can, of course, account for the breakdown of the first two, but believes that the third is indispensable and inevitable. He claims that "the whole man should be trusted" (*ibid.*, p. 27), and the "whole man" will continue to experience "the religion of feeling," in which the "belief in God . . . is . . . a vital rather than a theoretical matter" (*ibid.*, p. 293). (Now if my presuppositions are correct, the "whole man" will react to his environment instinctively, correcting his actions by means of the ideational equipment, which he gradually develops and elaborates; in degree as his actions are inhibited by conflicting suggestions, emotion or feeling is aroused; as successful reactions are established in habit, the accompanying ideas are fixed and feeling dies away; as the habitual reactions are rendered futile by some new situation, the ideational accompaniments of these habitual reactions are rendered useless or "false"; the following period of stress and strain is comparatively meagre in ideas of any settled quality and rich in the emotional element; the less definite adjustments of the new situation will be preponderantly social in their type. In situations of the less definite, less habitual sort, obviously the inarticulate emotional responses will preponderate, and this is the mystical phase of religion. In the more finished, elaborated adjustments the ideational or intellectual element is prominent, and the feeling factor is relatively small. Furthermore, the vague emotional phase will be normally of the *social* instinctive type, so that in the mystical mood we are aware of a "presence" of some vague sort. This inarticulate awareness tends, of course, to become articulate; the mystical mood will probably leave a creedal deposit of some sort; fervor, to the great disgust of the prophet, tends

in the average man to lose itself in a habit or a formula.) So Pratt is quite correct in saying that "the belief in God of the religion of feeling is a vital rather than a theoretical matter"—it is a non-intellectual social response to a vaguely comprehended situation, a social attitude which can find no better explanation of itself than to say that it is aware of a "Presence" in the world, in Nature. But he fails entirely to grasp the relative significance of the three types of religion when he puts them in the order of credulity, rationalism, feeling. It would be more accurate to say, that in every religious experience there are normally three stages: first, the feeling stage, in which adjustment has not yet achieved explicit expression; secondly, credulity, in which the ideational accompaniments of adjustment are comparatively crude and uncriticized, relative to the more immediate situation rather than to the larger implications and connections thereof; thirdly, the rational or even rationalistic, in which the ideational factors tend to become more and more elaborate, the situation so familiar as to fail to elicit any great emotional interest, decidedly *other* than what we mean by a "vital" situation. Our present religious situation, to be sure, is one which seems to suggest that hereafter we can have only the "feeling" type of religion, for the new universe in which modern men are trying to make themselves at home is so vast, so many new factors are being revealed almost every day; in a word, the problem situation is so novel, so varied, so boundless, that a well-articulated, compact, fully elaborated ideational adjustment seems almost beyond the range of possibility. Mysticism seems to promise the fullest satisfaction we dare hope for. We can but trust "the whole man" in his deeper, more instinctive, more emotional parts. But the whole man is a thinking organism, and can hardly be expected to be forever content with mere feeling. Mysticism is sure sooner or later to develop a bony framework of ideas. The demands of modern life upon "the whole man" are so great that both endo- and exo-skeletons are imperatively needed if progress is to be achieved in any definable direction, and if we are not to suffer overlong from the buffetings of uncertainty.)

The mysticism of the traditional type is accounted for on the same grounds. The stimulation of unusually sensitive personalities by the tremendous social or moral appeal of the Christian divine society, in conjunction with the vagueness and uncertainty which an intangible reality necessarily entailed, logically produced a stress-and-strain situation in which feeling preponderates and clear ideas are impossible. This mood is naturally accentuated by inhibition of action which the saint's withdrawal necessarily produced. In a word, it is a situation in which there is a tremendous stimulation to the social nature, but in which no action is either possible or called for, and hence the floods of feeling and ecstatic experience, and the intense sense of a "Presence."

CRITICAL NOTES.

AORISTS AND PERFECTS IN FIRST-CENTURY PAPYRI

What is to be said here will be in no sense an exhaustive discussion of this subject. The aim will be simply to record some observations that may be of interest to others. I believe the opinion has to some extent become prevalent that, the New Testament books having been shown to be written—for the most part—in the “everyday” as opposed to the literary Greek, we must therefore give up the fine distinctions of tense, etc., which commentators since Winer have been prone to dwell upon. In other words, it is assumed that popular Greek must from its very nature be more or less “loose” in its grammatical usage. Obviously the place in which to look for evidence on this point is in the non-literary papyri of the New Testament period. I confine myself to the aorist and perfect indicative, as here if anywhere looseness of usage and “overlapping” should occur. I believe that anyone who will take the trouble to investigate for himself will be astonished at the uniformly accurate use of these tenses in the papyri—even in otherwise illiterate documents. A multitude of illustrations are available, and of these I shall cite a few.

Let us keep constantly in mind that the Greek aorist is an *indefinite past* tense (unless it derives definiteness from the context), and that the Greek perfect is to be distinguished by its function of denoting past action with *present effect*. Whether a given aorist can best be rendered with the English past—or a given perfect with the English perfect—is quite beside the point.¹

Everyone who has browsed through the papyri even a little must have noticed the constant recurrence of certain perfects at the close of contracts and other official and legal documents. In almost every case the true perfect force is at once apparent: *σεσημείωμαι*, “I have signed”—and here stands my signature; *ὀμώμοκα*, “I have sworn”—and the oath holds good; *τέτακται*, “he has paid”—and the debt is canceled; *ἐπηκολούθηκα*, “I have checked” (e.g., a contract)—and here is my certificate to its validity; *ἐπιδέδωκα*, “I have presented” (this notice)—which now lies before you, etc. Examples are numerous, and we need not tarry longer with them. Observe, however, that the occasional occurrence of

¹ On this important subject see Moulton, *Prolog.* 135 ff.; also the writer's article in the *Expositor* (London) for May and June, 1915, on “The Greek Aorist.”

an aorist in one of these formulae instead of the usual perfect does not argue for a loose use of either aorists or perfects. If a writer chooses, for reasons of his own, not to emphasize the existing effect of the past act affirmed, we should not deny him the privilege.

Not infrequently in the papyri—as in the New Testament—an aorist and a perfect are found in close proximity and seem at first sight to be identical in force. But in almost every case each tense will be found to carry its own proper sense—the seeming identity being due to our proneness to apply to the Greek our English canons of style and syntax. A nice illustration of this is found in P. Oxy. II. 299¹ (lines 4 f.): *καὶ Διονυσίῳ προσ[τ]άτη Νεμερῶν κεχρηκα (δραχμας) ἡ καὶ ταύτας οἱκ ἔπεμψε*. The editors translate: “I have also lent Dionysius, the chief man of Nemerae, 8 drachmae, and he has not repaid them.” Thus they render both aorist and perfect with the English “have” tense, which is perhaps as well as can be done, but that is not to say that there is no distinction in the Greek. For my own part I am inclined to credit the writer of this brief “Letter about a Mouse Catcher” with having exercised fine discrimination in his use of tenses. The Greek perfect *κέχρηκα* implies that Dionysius still retains the money which he borrowed—a fact stated explicitly in the latter part of the sentence. On the other hand, the aorist refers indefinitely to the period of time between the borrowing of the money and the time of writing. We might paraphrase as follows: “Dionysius still has the money which I lent him, not having yet repaid it.” Mark 5:19 is a fair parallel: *ὅσα ὁ κύριός σοι πεποίηκεν καὶ ἤλεγξεν σε.*²

Similarly I take the use of the aorist and perfect of *μισθῶ* in a number of lease contracts to be instances of precision, rather than looseness, in tense usage. P. Oxy. II. 277³ is a “Lease of Land.” Dionysius is the owner of the land, Artemidorus the lessee. At the beginning of the contract we read: *Ἐμίσθωσεν Διονύσιος . . . Ἀρτεμιδώρῳ . . . ἀρούρ(ας) . . . κτλ.* “Dionysius has leased to Artemidorus (36½ arourae (of land).” At the close in another hand, evidently that of Artemidorus himself: *[Ἀρτεμί]δωρος μεμίσθωμαι τὴν γῆν . . . [καθως] πρόκειται*, “I, Artemidorus, have leased the land, in accordance with the foregoing contract.” Here again we must avoid the danger of being led astray by our English rendering. The aorist states the contract as a *simple fact*, but when the lessee takes his pen in hand to sign this contract he very properly uses the perfect tense, signifying that he acknowledges

¹ Late first century.

² See also Matt. 13:46; Luke 4:18; John 3:32; Acts 21:28; I John 1:1, 3.

³ 19 B.C. The same usage is found in P. Oxy. II. 278 (17 A.D.).

the property to be *already*, by this act, committed to his care. A perfect would be possible at the beginning, but one can scarcely imagine an aorist at the end.

Many are familiar with the "Letter of Serenus" (P. Oxy. III. 528) in which the writer assures his wife that out of grief for her absence he did not bathe (*ἐλουσάμην*) or anoint himself (*ἠλειμμε*)* for a month. This is a second-century papyrus, but a parallel use of this perfect is found in P. Oxy. II. 294 (22 A.D.): *ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτος οὕτω οὐδὲ ἐνήλεπα*² *ἕως ἀκούσω φάσιν παρὰ σοῦ*. Grenfell and Hunt translate, "I am not so much as anointing myself until I hear word from you." Doubtless in both these cases the "present effect" of their abstinence from ablutions would be quite evident to those who associated with the writers at the time.

The letters of Gemellus (P. Fay. 110 ff.) afford further interesting illustrations. Certainly it was not in grammar—any more than in spelling and penmanship—that this energetic Egyptian farmer chiefly excelled. Yet on the whole his usage of tenses is remarkably free from error. In one of his letters to Epagathus (P. Fay. 112. 8 f.) we find another example of aorist and perfect used together. The letter was written in 99 A.D., when Gemellus was sixty-six years old: *τὼν ἄγμ[ον] τῆς Απιάδος ἕως σήμερον οὐ ἐθήρ[ε]σας ἀλλ' ἠμέληκας αὐτοῦ*, "Up to today you have not harvested the field of Apion, but have neglected it." *ἐθήρισας* is a perfectly normal use of the indefinite aorist (cf. Matt. 27:8), while the true perfect force of *ἠμέληκας* is equally apparent: "The field lies suffering from your neglect." English canons of style perhaps would not permit such a sudden shifting of tenses, but we are dealing here with Greek.

As instances of Gemellus' precision in the use of the perfect note also the following, all from the Fayum Papyri: 110. 16 (94 A.D.): *γνώθι εἰ πεπότισται ὁ [ἐ]λαιὼν δυσὶ ὕδασι καὶ δεδι[κ]ραν[ισται]*, "Find out whether the olive yard has been watered twice over and dug." 112. 13 (99 A.D.): *ἀθήρισ(τον) αὐτὸν ἕως σήμερον ἄφικας*, "Up to today you have left it [the field] unharvested." 119. 3 (about 100 A.D.): *ἠγόρακαί Ἀυνῆς ὦ ὀνηλάτης χόρτου . . . δύσμην σαπράν*, "Aunes, the donkey-driver, has bought a rotten bundle of hay." 119. 16: *[τ]ὴν διαγραφὴν τοῦ χόρτου ποῦ τέθεικας*; "Where did you put the notice of payment for the hay?" Observe that what Gemellus wants to know is not only, Where did you put it? but also, Where is it? 121. 11: *ἐπεὶ [το αὐ]τοῦ κέκοπται*, "Since his [yoke band] is cut." This last is from a letter of Sabinus his son to

* *ἠλειμμε* = *ἠλειμμαι*, per. middle of *ἀλείφω*.

² *ἐνήλεπα* is a peculiar per. active of *ἐναλείφω*.

Gemellus. 123. 15 (Letter from Harpocration to Sabinus—both sons of Gemellus—about 100 A.D.): ἐλήλυθεν γὰρ Τεύφιλος Ἰουδαῖος λέγων, κτλ., "Teuphilus the Jew has come saying," etc.

As we have already seen, the Greek perfect may sometimes be used with precision where the English prefers the simple past. Note, e.g., P. Oxy. II. 259. 4 ff. (23 A.D.): "Bail for a Prisoner": "I swear by Tiberius Caesar . . . that I have 30 days in which to restore to you the man whom *I bailed out* [ἐγγεγήμεαι] of the public prison," etc. (= the man who *is out* on the bail which I gave for him); P. Oxy. II. 286. 2 (82 A.D.): "Claim of a Creditor": "Heron *agreed* [ἑμολόγηκεν] that Zenarion would repay after five years the 2,000 drachmae of silver," etc. The complainant goes on to recite the terms of the original agreement, hence this part is simple narrative, and we might have expected the aorist. But by reading through to the end we learn that it was very much to the complainant's interest to emphasize the *present validity* of this earlier contract, from which fact the force of the perfect at once appears.

Enough evidence has been adduced to show that perfects used properly and accurately are by no means uncommon in the papyri of the first century. But the list of examples cited is far from exhaustive, and we must face the further question as to whether perfects so used as to be indistinguishable in their function from aorists are *ever met with* in these non-literary documents dating from New Testament times. There can be no doubt, I think, but that there are such "aoristic perfects," but they are rare and are confined to a very limited number of verbs. Consult one of the recent New Testament grammars and you will find that they have the same to say of the New Testament. Blass, Moulton, and Robertson agree in ruling out nearly all the supposed examples of this phenomenon, and what remain are practically confined to the following verbs: εἴληφα, εἶρηκα, ἔσχηκα, γέγονα. Such being the status of the case in the New Testament, it is interesting to note that in the first-century papyri—as far as my observation goes—the only perfects found which can confidently be set down as "aoristic" are forms or compounds of εἶρηκα and εἴληφα.¹

For the first example of εἶρηκα we turn again to the "Letter from Harpocration to Sabinus" (P. Fay. 123) already referred to. The complaint of Teuphilus the Jew that he had been impressed into servitude is under discussion. Harpocration writes: οὔτε γὰρ εἶρηξε ἡμ[ί]ν ἀγόμενος ἵνα ἀπολυθῇ, ἀλλὰ διφνιδίως εἶρηχεν ἡμῖν σήμερον, "He did not ask me to

¹ For New Testament examples of these two verbs said to be used in an aoristic sense see Rev. 2:27; 3:3; 5:7; 7:14; 8:5; 11:17; 19:3.

be released at the time that he was impressed, but has suddenly told me today." I think no one will argue that εἶρηχε has a true perfect force here, especially in the first of the two occurrences. The same may be said of an example found in the "Letter of Pisais" (P. Fay. 109. 3—early first century): παρακληθεῖς τοὺς τρεῖς στατῆρες οὓς εἰρηκί σοι Σέλευκος δῶναί μοι ἤδη δὸς Κλέωνι, "Please give to Cleon the three staters which Seleucus told you to give me." One more may be cited from the well-known letter of Gemellus in which he reprimands his nephew (?) for carelessness resulting in the loss of two pigs (P. Fay. III. 9[95–96 A.D.]): Ἡρακλίδας ὁ [όν]ηλάτης τῷ αἰτίῳμα περιεπύησε λέγον ὅτι συ εἰρηχας πεζῶι [τὰ χ]υρίδια ἐλάσαι, "Heraclidas the donkey-driver shifted the blame from himself, saying that you had told him to drive the pigs on foot."

Turning to εἰληφα, we find its aoristic use illustrated in P. Oxy. II. 278. 18 ("Hire of a Mill"—17 A.D.): καὶ μετὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπ[οκα]ταστησάτωι ὁ μάνης τὸν μύλον ὑγιῇ καὶ ἀσινῇ, ὅλον καὶ παρείληφεν, "And at the end of the time the servant [?] shall restore the mill safe and uninjured in the condition in which he received it." Certainly what is meant is that the mill is to be restored to its owner in the same condition in which it *was* when delivered into the hands of the lessee. To suppose the verb to carry a true perfect idea (i.e., "let him restore the mill in the condition in which it *was and still is*") would be meaningless. Somewhat similar is the example found at the close of the well-known papyrus which records the lawsuit of *Pesouris v. Saraeus* over the custody of a child (P. Oxy. I. 37[49 A.D.]). The strategus sums up the evidence and announces his decision as follows: "Since from its features the child appears to be that of Sareaus, if she and her husband will make a written declaration that the foundling intrusted to her by Pesouris died, I give judgment in accordance with the decision of our lord the prefect, that she have her own child on paying back the money she has received" (ὁ εἰληφεν ἀργύριον). What concerned the strategus was the fact—proved before the court—that the woman had *received* the money. There would be no point in his affirming at the same time that she still had it, and as a matter of fact she probably did not.

The cases cited above are the only ones which I have noted in the first-century papyri where the perfect indicative seems indubitably to be used in an aoristic sense. It is not my purpose here to theorize as to the possible explanation of this usage. Burton remarks¹ that "the use of each of these forms in the sense of an aorist [is confined] mainly to one or more writers whose use of it is apparently almost a personal idiosyn-

¹ *Moods and Tenses*, sec. 88.

crazy. Thus the aoristic use of *γέγονα* belongs to Matt., of *εἰληφα* to John in Rev., of *ἔσχηκα* to Paul." But the evidence from the papyri will scarcely bear out that view, at least in the case of *εἰληφα* and *εἶρηκα*. Again Blass¹ speaks of the use of the perfect instead of the aorist "in consequence of the popular intermixture of the two tenses." What we have observed might seem to support this explanation, as the non-literary papyri may be presumed to reflect the "popular" trend of the language. But is the phenomenon entirely absent from the classics? There is an example of *εἶρηκα* in the first philippic of Demosthenes (i. 6) that looks suspicious: *ὑπὲρ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον*. He cannot mean that they were *still* speaking, and it seems unlikely that any other "present effect" was in his mind. Cf. also Xen. *Anabasis* i. 2. 5; *Κῦρος δὲ ἔχων οὗς εἶρηκα ὤρμῳτο*. Elsewhere Blass² notes that these aoristic perfects are "forms in which the reduplication is not clearly marked." Moulton³ has a similar remark: "Since these are without apparent reduplication, they may well have been actual aorists in the writer's view." Perhaps that is about all the explanation that can be offered.

The important point, as it appears to me, is that we have here an a fortiori argument against the hasty assumption of aoristic perfects in the New Testament. If in a large number and variety of contemporary popular documents—some of them quite illiterate—only two verbs are found which can be proved guilty of this eccentricity, and they only in a very few occurrences, we may expect to find the writers of the New Testament to have been at least equally accurate. Moulton⁴ says truly that the case for the New Testament "must be settled on its own merits, without any appeal to the a priora," yet there are not a few individual cases where a perfect *may* be aoristic, but is not necessarily so. In deciding such cases the testimony of the papyri may be remembered with profit. More specifically the investigation may be said to have confirmed a further dictum of Moulton's: "We are entirely at liberty to allow them [aoristic perfects] for certain verbs and negative the class as a whole."

It is a significant fact that in modern Greek the functions of aorist and perfect have united in a single tense. This coalescence was a process of centuries. But it can scarcely be argued that the supposed extension of the domain of the perfect at the expense of the aorist in New Testament times was an initial stage of this movement, for the simple reason that

¹ *Blass-Thackeray*, p. 200.

² *Prolog.*, p. 145.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

it was not the perfect but the aorist which finally triumphed. This fact at once raises an entirely new question. Had this displacement of the perfect by the aorist begun as early as the first century A.D.? It is a difficult question to answer. Plenty of cases may be found where a writer has used an aorist when he *might* have used a perfect, but that in itself is no proof that the aorist tense was displacing the perfect. The recent grammars apparently would answer the question in the negative, for they comment on the large percentage of perfects in the early papyri, as well as in the New Testament. But I think that *the nature of the composition* is the main determining factor—whether the writing in question be early or late, classical or Hellenistic, literary or vulgar. I find, for example, that Plutarch in his *Life of T. Gracchus* uses 8 per cent as many perfects as aorists (ind.), while in his treatise on the *Training of Children* the proportion is 23 per cent—most of the aorists in the latter being found in the frequent anecdotes. Demosthenes is classical enough, yet in the first philippic the perfects exceed the aorists in the ratio of five to three. Very few papyri, and probably no book in the New Testament, would show as large a proportion of perfects as that. On the other hand, in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, book i (nearly all narrative), the perfects are almost conspicuous by their absence—less than 3 per cent as many as aorists.

These figures merely show how impossible it is to determine from the relative number of aorists and perfects used by first-century writers—literary or non-literary—whether one tense was really gaining the ascendancy over the other. Unfortunately I have no more reliable criterion to suggest.

Some years ago Professor Goodspeed¹ called attention to a point that is of interest in this connection. A large proportion of the more than 1,600 texts which Professor Wilcken has published in his *Griechische Ostraka* are tax receipts from Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. Where the payment was made in money the verb ordinarily used to acknowledge its receipt was *διαγράφειν*. What Professor Goodspeed noticed was that from 22 B.C.—the earliest date noted—to 60–70 A.D. the perfect form of this verb is found to the almost complete exclusion of the aorist, while from the last-named date onward the tide turns rapidly—the aorist conquering and holding the ground so completely that after 96 A.D. the perfect seems not to be used at all. Strikingly similar evidence is furnished by the history of the use of *γράφειν* in the common scribe's formula at the end of contracts, etc., seen in many papyri.

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, X, 102 ff.

Doubtless others must have observed this, though I have not seen mention of it in print. The usual formula is something like this: γέγραφα (or ἔγραψα) ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ μὴ εἰδότες γράμματα. The perfect occurs seldom after the middle of the first century, though I find it used once as late as 99 A.D. In a document dated 36 A.D. the formula occurs three times, though from different hands: the perfect is used twice and the aorist once. After the first century the aorist appears to hold undisputed sway.

These points are certainly worthy of notice, but whether much weight should be attached to them as indicating a well-defined tense movement already beginning is open to question. In the case of the verb μετρεῖν (used in receipts instead of διαγράφειν when the payment was made *in kind*) the displacement of perfect by aorist did not occur. The same is true of other verbs used in more or less definite formulae. E.g., in τέτακται, σεσημείωμαι, ἐπιδέδωκα, ἐπιέγραφα, and δώσωμοκα we have instances of perfects which held their own almost unchallenged—in some cases for centuries after the time of which we have been speaking. In the case of γράφειν some interchange of tenses may be observed at a much *earlier* period. P. Teb. 62 (110-118 B.C.) and 63 (116-115 B.C.) are two documents of much the same nature—Lists of Owners of Temple and Cleruchic Land. In the former (line 256) we find ἔγραψεν Π. καὶ Ζ. οἱ γραμματεῖς τῶν μαχίμων, κτλ., which is exactly repeated in No. 63 (line 191), except that γέγραφεν is substituted for ἔγραψεν. Whatever be the explanation of these phenomena, it should be borne in mind that the diction of official and legal formulae is not always fairly representative of the living language of the time. Certainly one would not choose expressions from the lingo of the courts to illustrate the trend of present-day English.

As was stated at the outset, the aim of this article has been to record observations rather than to advance theories or draw conclusions. The evidence must speak for itself. To my own mind it has served to emphasize one important truth, namely, that the popular Greek of the New Testament period was not *ipso facto* "loose" Greek, at least as far as the use of aorist and perfect tenses was concerned. The disciple of Winer may continue to regard the aorists which he finds in Matthew or in Paul as *aoristic* and the perfects as *perfective*, without fear that the "New Light" will reveal hitherto unsuspected stumbling-blocks in his pathway.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

EHRlich'S MONUMENTAL WORK ON THE OLD TESTAMENT¹

There can be no doubt that this is the most important work on the Old Testament that has appeared during the last ten or fifteen years. It is nothing less than monumental. The results of the study of a lifetime are presented here in clear, concise, and interesting form, in "marginal notes," by one of the greatest Hebrew scholars of our day. Ehrlich knows Hebrew as few others; his knowledge of the whole realm of Hebrew literature is amazing, not only on account of its thoroughness, but also on account of its critical and scientific quality. He thinks in Hebrew and detects the slightest offense against Hebrew idiom with almost unflinching accuracy.

Ehrlich is primarily a philologist. His grammatical and lexical contributions are so numerous, so important, so acute, that no grammarian or lexicographer can afford to neglect Ehrlich's *Randglossen*. The syntactical notes, the removal of a number of textual difficulties by pointing out the right construction of the sentence which had been misunderstood, the keen discussion of the force of synonyms, the careful observation of the meaning of phrases as distinct from that of the single words, the new understanding of the meaning of difficult, or sometimes of apparently easy, words on the basis of their usage in the Old Testament or post-biblical Hebrew literature or by comparison with the Arabic—all these give a wonderful wealth of new and valuable knowledge to the careful student of these volumes.

Fortunately, Ehrlich is not a believer in the infallibility of the Massoretic Text, but recognizes its defects and sets out to remedy them with remarkable text-critical skill. His textual emendations are often brilliant and convincing, always suggestive, always in idiomatic Hebrew, always worthy of serious consideration even when they cannot be accepted. Often he is the first to give the true solution of a textual difficulty; often he thinks that he presents it for the first time, when in reality others have hit upon the same solution before him. In one sense

¹ *Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel, textkritisches, sprachliches und sachliches*. By Arnold B. Ehrlich. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908-14. 7 vols.

his complete independence of the work of others, which occasionally assumes the attitude of scorn, is a source of weakness, for it tempts him to make remarks which are unworthy of him. Nobody could regret these blots on Ehrlich's work more than I do, but it would be foolish to allow them to blind one to the really magnificent work that Ehrlich has given us.

It goes without saying that there are many passages where the exegesis is completely transformed by Ehrlich's incisive and illuminating treatment. Nobody could accept everything that Ehrlich writes. As a matter of fact, he frequently provokes dissent. But he himself is constantly ready to modify his conclusions, as the appendix shows.

The higher critic will not get much that is valuable from these volumes. The occasional higher critical remarks, sometimes quite radical, do not belong to the really valuable portions of Ehrlich's work. He is not interested in this aspect of Old Testament study.

I had intended to give a number of illustrative examples of his grammatical, lexical, textual, and exegetical notes in order to give an idea of the character of the work. But I find this almost impossible because of the wealth of material. Almost any page might serve as a good example.

One point should be brought out with special emphasis: the extraordinary amount of light which is shed on all kinds of problems, especially philological, by Ehrlich's wonderful knowledge of the post-biblical Hebrew literature. Here Ehrlich is unsurpassed by modern scholars.

The student—and it is only for students that Ehrlich writes—will find, the more he uses Ehrlich's books, that they are simply indispensable. No matter whether he agrees with them or not, he will always be stimulated by them. I have no doubt that they will make Ehrlich's name one of the most important in the Old Testament world of our time.

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The seventh series of Schweich Lectures marks an innovation, in that the lecturer was chosen from abroad and the lectures were not given in English. This was in part due to the war, which brought the

¹ A. Van Hoonacker, *Une communauté Judéo-Araméenne à Eléphantine, en Egypte, aux VI^e et V^e siècles avant J.-C.* [The Schweich Lectures, 1914.] London: Oxford University Press, 1915. Pp. xii+91. 3s. net.

work of the University of Louvain, in Belgium, to an end and drove its faculty to other lands for refuge. Professor Van Hoonacker was one of the refugees. His previous works in the field of Old Testament scholarship¹ assured his fitness for the important task intrusted to him by the British Academy. The subject chosen for the lectures had already called out a very extensive literature, to which some of the leading scholars of the day had contributed. But it is safe to say that the present volume will at once take its place among the standard works upon these important Aramaic documents.

Among the more important conclusions presented in these lectures we may call attention to three. The first is that the community in question contained a very influential, indeed dominating, Samaritan element. In support of this are urged the use of the Aramaic language as being perfectly natural on the part of people who had carried their Aramaic with them as recent immigrants into the land of Samaria; the many points of contact between Assyro-Babylonian law and customs and the usage of the Aramaic-speaking community; the evidence from the Assyro-Babylonian names borne by members of the community; and the syncretic character of the religion. The second is that the reason for the letters sent by the leaders of the community to Palestine was, not that they were seeking material aid in re-erecting the destroyed temple, but that they sought authoritative attestation to the fact that a temple in Egypt was not in contravention of the Hebrew law. It is here claimed that certain Jews from Jerusalem had raised this issue, charging that the temple was contrary to the Deuteronomic statutes. The supporters of the local temple urged, on the other hand, that the law in question was never intended to apply outside of Palestine; and in this they were wholly in the right. Failing to obtain satisfaction from Jerusalem, they turned to Samaria, either authority being acceptable to them, there being as yet no such bitterness between the Jews and the Samaritans as arose later. The reason for the silence of Jerusalem lay in the old principle that sacrifices to Yahweh might not be offered upon foreign soil, which was "unclean land." The same principle led the Samaritan authorities, though they granted the right to build, to prohibit the offering of animal sacrifices, involving the pouring out of the blood upon unclean soil. The third conclusion is that the divine name was not pronounced as Yahweh, but as Yahô. In support of this are cited the common writing

¹ E.g., *Les douze petits prophètes traduits et commentés* (1908); *Nouvelles Études sur la Restauration juive* (1896); *Le Sacerdoce lévitique* (1899); *Le lieu du culte dans la législation rituelle des Hébreux* (1894).

on the papyri as ידן, the occurrence in one passage of the papyri and on many ostraca of ידן, the Greek 'Ιαν, and such names as Jehonadab, Jehoshaphat. The pronunciation Yahweh does not rest upon good, old Hebrew tradition, but is a very late inference from the statement in Exod. 3:14.

These conclusions will not command general assent; but they are set forward with much cogency and will compel careful consideration. The argument as to the motif of the temple letters is perhaps most open to question. Why, for example, should a letter growing out of a difference of opinion, such as that alleged, be wholly silent upon the point at issue? We should expect a discussion of the pros and cons of the question, but there is not a word upon the subject. Instead, we hear of the wrongs done to the community and its shrine by the Persian official Widarnag; and the request made to Bagoas is that he give orders for the rebuilding of the temple, not that he merely state such an enterprise to be unobjectionable from the point of view of Palestinian usage. Furthermore, is not too much emphasis laid, both here and in many other discussions, upon the fact that Bagoas in his oral reply, of which a memorandum is preserved, does not mention animal sacrifices explicitly? True, he does not use the word; but this is only a brief memorandum and not necessarily intended to itemize the whole answer of Bagoas, and, likewise, it distinctly states that the temple is to be rebuilt as it was aforetime and that the offering of oblation and incense upon the altar is to go on as it was previously practiced. There is no indication given of any attempt to re-establish things upon a different basis from that in existence before the ruin of the temple. But whatever the judgment upon such questions as these, Professor Van Hoonacker has given us a stimulating and informing discussion of these materials, from which all scholars may learn much.

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A HISTORY OF BABYLON¹

The second volume of King's great work presents the same characteristics as the first. We have the same unrivaled mastery of the original sources, the same painstaking investigation of the problems of the moment, the same ignoring of the earlier bibliography, and the same scrappy form of presentation.

¹ *A History of Babylon*. By L. W. King. New York: Stokes, 1915. xxiii+340 pages. \$4.80.

First we are given an "introductory" sketch of the various cities, from Babylon to Baghdad, which have occupied the strategic point where the Tigris and Euphrates come closest together. One wonders why this was not given in the first volume, for Kish and Agade were the predecessors of Babylon in exactly the same manner as Seleucia, Ctesiphon, and Baghdad were her successors, and the series should be studied as a whole. We may doubt whether the West Semitic origin of the first Babylonian dynasty caused Babylon to be located on the Euphrates when we remember that the still more western Macedonians moved the capital from Babylon to Seleucia on the Tigris.

The next chapter deals with the city of Babylon. Inasmuch as practically all our topographic and architectural knowledge concerns the city of Nebuchadnezzar, we should expect this chapter, together with the material on the cultural life of the period, at the end of the political history. The account is naturally based on Koldewey's *Babylon*, but is by no means a useless compilation. The detailed architectural account of Koldewey unfortunately lacks the charm of his personal conversation, and a topical arrangement is most welcome, especially as King writes from personal knowledge of the excavations. In certain cases he is even able to overcome the natural prejudice in favor of the theories set forth by the excavator. The discussion of the walls is a distinct contribution, and Koldewey's identification of the hanging gardens is almost certainly thrown out of court by King's acute observation that the tablets show grain to have been stored in the vaults, an impossibility if there were irrigated gardens above them. One is, however, surprised to find our author still believing that Herodotus visited Babylon. Aside from the gross error in his statement of the extent of the city, Herodotus shows so vague a knowledge of the interior of Asia, as contrasted with the vivid topographical details he gives of the coast lands, that personal inspection seems out of the question. The few facts he mentions would be just the ones which would most impress the casual traveler who must have been his informant.

King has followed the unfortunate precedent of writers on Assyria and Babylonia who dishearten their readers with a long, dry chapter on chronology before they reach the actual history. He defends himself by quoting the saying that chronology is the skeleton of history; but the average general reader prefers to have this skeleton hidden in the decent obscurity of a learned periodical. As this chapter most invites discussion, we may here investigate the subject in some detail.

The long-discussed Rim-Sin question is once more taken up. This is surprising in view of the recent discovery by Clay of a list of all the kings of the Larsa dynasty, in which Rim-Sin is given sixty-one years and is succeeded by Hammurapi, who is credited with twelve years, with perhaps the addition of a fraction. King has misunderstood this, and strangely thinks that the number is entirely doubtful. That the whole sixty-one years preceded Hammurapi is made additionally certain by the total given by the list. It was compiled in the twelfth year of Samsu-iluna, only twenty-four years after the fall of Rim-Sin, so that we cannot assume error, as if it were later. In spite of this authority, King argues that Rim-Sin spent a part of these sixty-one years as vassal in Larsa. This is flatly contradicted by evidence which cannot be explained away. For a good part of this period Rim-Sin could not possibly have ruled in Larsa, for that city was ruled by Sin-idinnam, so well known from the letters of Hammurapi. Equally certain is the evidence from the date lists. Clay has published¹ a list of dates, found at Larsa, giving the Babylonian year-names from the year when Hammurapi first defeated the Elamites to the year when it was composed, the seventh year of Samsu-iluna. Thus we have twenty-one years when they dated at Larsa, not by years of Rim-Sin, but by those of their Babylonian rulers. Add the thirty-two years of the Nisin era and the fifteen others collected by Chiera,² and we have a total of forty-seven which cannot have been used during the twenty-one years when Babylonian formulae were used. Thus, if we are to assume that Rim-Sin ruled Larsa in the ninth year of Samsu-iluna, he must have had at least sixty-eight different year formulae for his sixty-one years of reign. We come to the same conclusion if we examine the cases where the second year of the Nisin era is equated with the eighteenth or nineteenth of his reign, for that means sixteen years before the capture of Nisin, thirty-two of the era, and twenty-one or more under Babylonian dating—at the least sixty-six years. All the pertinent evidence flatly opposes the theory that Rim-Sin ruled Larsa as a vassal of Hammurapi.

There are, it must be admitted, two lines of evidence which throw a certain amount of doubt on the statements of the list. One is that in a late chronicle we are told that "Samsu-iluna [killed] Rim-Sin in the palace." This might be explained away did we not have other evidence in two documents, dealing with the same sale, one dated in the ninth year of Samsu-iluna, the other by Rim-Sin: that is, he turns up twenty-

¹ *Misc. Ins.*, no. 33.

² *Legal and Administrative Documents*, pp. 74 ff.

one years after his assumed deposition. His long reign indicates that he came to the throne at an early age, and this is confirmed by the fact that his father was still living and was for some time the real ruler, to judge from the inscriptions in which he is mentioned. Yet, even on the improbable supposition that he came to the throne at birth, Rim-Sin would have been eighty-two at this time. Nevertheless, it is not a difficult hypothesis to assume that Hammurapi had not wished to kill the already aged king, who lived on in obscurity until an attempt was made to build the city in his name, when at last Samsu-iluna put him to death. The statement of the chronicle, that he was killed in the palace, not in battle, seems to point to a judicial execution such as would be postulated on this theory.

Another problem is that of the relative date of the capture of Nisin. If the eighteenth and nineteenth years equated with the second year of the Nisin era are really years of reign, then there can be no doubt that Nisin was taken before the fall of Larsa and the accession of Hammurapi. Two arguments may be urged against this date. One is the length of lives which we must accept for certain individuals living at Nippur;¹ but the more this age question is studied, the less certain become its results.² The other is the doubt whether Rim-Sin would use the dating by years, so unusual at this time, for sixteen years, then for thirty-two use the Nisin era, and finally go back to the simple date formula. Both arguments have a large subjective element, and on the whole the evidence is in favor of the earlier date for the end of the Nisin dynasty.

Still another problem of chronology is connected with the dates of Marduk-nadin-akhe and Tiglath-pileser I. In common with other scholars, King seems not to have realized that we can prove that the great war between the two was later, not merely than the fifth, but than the tenth year of the Assyrian king; for, in his tablet 5, dated the tenth year, Tiglath-pileser still holds the Lower Zab as his southern boundary, whereas the first of the two expeditions listed by the Synchronistic History pushed the frontier to the south of that stream. The reference in the Broken Obelisk,³ which probably should be referred to year three, is clearly the first expedition of the Synchronistic History's lost source, for when that document adds to its first campaign "for the second time," it is obviously copying unintelligently a source it but partially excerpted. Thus we have three years of warfare between the two. The first would be in year three, not mentioned in the Cylinder because it is an Assyrian

¹ Chiera, pp. 19 ff.

² Cf. Clay, *Misc. Ins.*, p. 40, note.

³ I. 16.

defeat, and omitted from the Synchronistic History for the same reason, but given in the Broken Obelisk of Tiglath-pileser's son because it led up to the later capture of Babylon. It is, then, to the first of these campaigns, in year three, that we are to assign the carrying away of the gods of Ekallate, and the accession year of Tiglath-pileser I must be dated 1110 B.C.

In the fourth chapter we learn of the West Semites. Here King follows Huntington in assuming that to "climatic changes which seem . . . to occur in recurrent cycles, we may probably trace the great racial migration from Central Arabia." It is perfectly true that probability is in favor of a gradual drying up of the earth, and that climatic changes do seem to go in cycles; but, as has been pointed out elsewhere,¹ history cannot be interpreted in terms of changing climate until we have historical evidence of such changes. Such evidence, as set forth today by advocates of the theory, is, to put it mildly, of a highly unsatisfactory character. Recently Lammens, in his *Berceau de l'Islam*, has brought forward the strongest arguments to prove that the climate of Arabia has not essentially changed since the days of Muhammad, and Lybyer has added the weight of his knowledge of Muslim history to a denial of climatic influences in the great Muslim outpouring.² There may be something for the historian in the theory of climatic influences, but it must first be proved by the historical facts.

Brief but satisfactory sketches of early Palestine, Carchemish, and Hana are followed by a review of the Nisin and Larsa dynasties, a wise repetition since so much new information has come to light since the publication of *Sumer and Akkad*. In his study of Kish, King has not seen that, even with our present data, we can almost exactly date the various rulers. The city fell in the thirteenth year of Sumu-la-ilum and Halurim reigned at least two years, so that his accession is not later than year eleven. Iawium had at least five, which brings us back to year six, one year from year five, which we knew to have been included in his reign. Samsu-ditana, in whose West Semitic name we may see proof that he was a governor sent out from Babylon, reigned one year, and the five years' reign of Manana brings him to year fourteen of Sumu-abum, whereas he really ruled in year thirteen. Under Iawium there was seemingly a conquest of Uruk, and the date of that ruler might well lead us to connect the slaughter of Halamba in year three of Sumu-la-ilum with that city. In his tenth year, Hammurapi conquered Malgum,

¹ Olmstead, *Bulletin Amer. Geog. Soc.*, XLIV, 432 ff.; XLV, 439 ff.

² *Bibl. Sacra*, LXXIII, 156 ff.

which had been under his control six years before. The next year some lists give the credit of the conquest of Rabiquim to Ibiq-Adad, others to Hammurapi himself. King¹ has identified Ibiq-Adad with the Ibiq-Ishtar, king of Malgum, who appears elsewhere. It is better to assume that Ibiq-Ishtar revolted about year nine and that Ibiq-Adad took his place as subject king.

Proof is found that Hammurapi's "occupation of Assyria was of a permanent character" in a letter of that monarch² in which there is a reference to Ashur. That he had some sort of control of Ashur is proved by the Code, but we can hardly find such evidence in a letter sent from Babylon to Sin-idinna far in the south at Larsa, giving orders to send back soldiers whom he has, on the theory, just received from the Ashur far to the north. Langdon has pointed out an Ash-shu-ur³ which seems to be in central Babylonia, and this fits the letter much better.³

If the most satisfactory portion of the book is not that on the Western Semites, then it is the one on the age of Hammurapi. Thanks to the Code, the letters, both public and private, and the numerous business documents, we know the period of the First Dynasty better than many a section of classical or mediaeval history. No two persons will agree as to what should be included and what the method of treatment should be, and it will suffice to say that here is a rich collection of valuable information. Still, just because of this, we could wish for a fuller treatment of social conditions and of the land system. That the two upper classes should be called nobles and middle class, respectively, is a little unfortunate. Even the term "gentry" for the former seems too narrow. At first it would include all freemen of the invading tribes, no matter how lowly; later some of the older nobility and the merchant class would be included. The *mushkenu* certainly did not represent our middle class; indeed, the term "serf" would not be far out of the way. The comparatively high position of the slave would tend to pull down the lower grade of laborers, especially the peasant cultivators. It is much to be wished that an exhaustive study of the land system should be made in the light of recent knowledge of that system of classical times and of the Middle Ages of which our system was in large measure the ancestor.

The history is then continued with the gradual breakdown of the First Dynasty, and the scanty data are well interpreted. King is undoubtedly correct in explaining the reign of Samsu-iluna as a period of rapid decline, though Rogers takes the date formulae at face value

¹ *Chron.*, p. 169, note.

² *Letters*, 37, 23.

³ Langdon, *Lectures*, p. 169; cf. *CT*, VI, 19.

and makes it "indeed a great reign." There can be no doubt that Iluma-ilu, the founder of the Second Dynasty, held Nippur after the twenty-ninth year of Samsu-iluna, but one can hardly follow Chiera¹ in making the Iluma-ilu tablets found there indicate an invasion close to the eighteenth year of the Babylonian. It is true that dating it after the twenty-ninth year makes some of the individuals somewhat long-lived, but, as we have seen in the case of Rim-Sin, such arguments are rather precarious. There is, however, a question which King seems not to have recognized. If the Iluma-ilu tablets from Nippur are after the twenty-ninth year, then King has no right to connect the events of the twentieth year with Iluma-ilu, for the tablets are dated "Year after Iluma-ilu became king," that is, he became king in the twenty-eighth year of Samsu-iluna. If we accept the dates of Kugler for the First Dynasty, then the Second began about 2053.

The chronological difficulties in the way of accepting the dates of the king list become impossibilities if with King we accept the theory that the Damiq-ilishu whose Nisin wall was destroyed by Ammi-ditana was the third king of the Second Dynasty. To be sure, this identification is hardly so sure as King would believe, for the Damiq-ilishu who was the last king of the Nisin dynasty did build the great city wall and used the event in at least two date formulae, and even the fact that he was a good bit earlier can hardly offset the fact that we know nothing of any wall-building by the other. Assuming, however, that King really is correct, we have, according to the list, to squeeze the sixty years of Iluma-ilu, the fifty-five of Itti-ili-nibi, and some or all of the thirty-six of Damiq-ilishu—that is, from 115 to 151 years—into the seventy-four which elapsed from the accession of Iluma-ilu to the thirty-sixth of Ammi-ditana.

In connection with the dynasty which we find at Uruk about the end of the First Dynasty we should note the exhaustive study of the inscriptions of Sin-gashid by Duncan.² Many of these are now scattered over the country: for example, tablets and cones are found at the Bible College, Columbia, Missouri, and the State Normal School, Kirksville, Missouri. Note also the interesting inscriptions of Anam in Clay's new volume.³ In none of these does Anam call himself king, though but one mentions an overlord, Sin-gamil, and a date formula gives the royal accession year. Clearly we have a hitherto unrecognized case of gradual

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 66 f.

² *Amer. Jour. Semit. Lang.*, XXXI, 215 ff.

³ *Misc. Ins.*, no. 35 f.

usurpation by a high official. The new inscriptions deal with the restoration of the temple of Innina, constructed by Ur-Engur and Dungi, but recently burned, perhaps in a war with the sea land kings, whose issue demonstrated that Anam should thrust aside his powerless overlord and himself take the crown.

In his chapter on the Kashshites, King introduces a good sketch of the recent excavations at the Hittite capital. Then follow the letters to and from the Egyptian and Hittite kings. Though there are certain advantages in dealing with the letters as a whole, it makes very difficult a general view of this only too difficult period of history.

In the case of Agum-kak-rime, King is no doubt correct in connecting the Hani from which that ruler brought back the statues of Marduk and his consort with the Hana of the Middle Euphrates Valley, rather than with the place of the same name on the Persian border.¹ We may well ask, however, whether with King we should say Hani-rabbat, Hana the great, or whether we should not rather read Hani-Galbat, and connect it with the Galbatha which Isidore of Charax knew as a deserted village on the Euphrates four hours below Nicephorium. It is true that Galbatha is rather far north for the capital of Hana, Tirqa, which is to be located at 'Ishārah.² Curiously enough, the document which proves it here is from a certain Zim, the son of Ish, who rules as king of Mari; in other words, Hana is the later representative of Mari. That this is actually the site of the most important city in the middle Euphrates region in early times is further confirmed by a neat case of dovetailing. In apparent ignorance of the recent discovery of Herzfeld, Clay³ has identified Mari with the Merrha of the Parthian Stations of Isidore of Charax, and Isidore locates Merrha, as exactly as one can locate on the hour basis, at 'Ishārah.

In the very difficult history of the later Kashshite kings, we note that King regularly follows the Assyrian Synchronistic History, while Rogers as regularly follows the Babylonian Chronicle P. Either reconstruction has its difficulties, and in the present state of our knowledge we can only say that the Synchronistic History is undoubtedly untrustworthy in important cases, and the Chronicle seems about as bad.

With the Assyrian period King loses interest, and the entire period is covered in twenty pages. Thus a great opportunity has been lost. The one exception to the provincial form of government which the

¹ Rogers, *History*, II, 106.

² Herzfeld, *Rev. Assyriol.*, XI, 134 ff.

³ *Misc. Ins.*, p. 4.

Assyrians first developed is found in their treatment of Babylon. They looked upon the older culture land as the Romans looked upon the Greeks. Since sentiment would not permit Babylon to be reduced to the form of a province, and since it was most inconvenient for a militant Assyrian king to seize the hands of Bel-Marduk in the city each New Year's Day, Babylon remained an anomaly whose unique position can be studied only as a whole, in the various attempts of the rulers to fit this anomaly into the rounded provincial organization. So rapid is King's survey that we have but the barest outline of the facts, and there is little basis for criticism. Can we deny to Sargon the title of king of Babylon when he seized the hands of Bel, resided in the city, was included in the lists, and had business documents dated by the years of his rule? Ashur-bani-apal did not conduct, either in person or by deputy, those Egyptian expeditions the record of which many an American student has made his first exercise in cuneiform. If we examine the earliest documents for his reign and then trace the process of re-editing, we find that in edition after edition he has taken more from his father's campaigns in the west, until all are stolen for his own greater glory.

If King can excuse himself for his twenty pages on the Assyrian period because of his intention to deal with it in his third volume, what shall we say of a *History of Babylon* which devotes but ten pages to the Chaldaean dynasty which gave the city its undying fame? Even taking into consideration the earlier chapter on the topography and architecture, there is far too little on the man who put an end to Hebrew nationality. Rogers, in a more general survey of Babylonia and Assyria, finds almost a hundred pages needful for a proper discussion of the period.

In conclusion, we expect a survey of the culture of the later period, corresponding to that on the time of Hammurapi. We now have a mass of material on the non-political history and, in spite of the phrase "unchanging East," a careful study would show many respects in which the Hammurapi culture had become antiquated. In place of this, King offers a criticism of the German theory of Pan-Babylonianism. With his general point of view most American scholars will be in hearty agreement; but why in a general history discuss so elaborately a theory which already has gone far toward itself becoming a part of the history of past error?

In a review of this type, it is natural that matters of disagreement should bulk large, and it is not the desire of the reviewer to deny the solid virtues of the book. At the same time, when compared with works of similar character in other fields of history, there is an obvious lack of

unity and of the historical point of view. It is probably not without its significance that King has spent his life publishing texts while Rogers, who has produced a book so much more in line with modern historical methods, has confined himself almost exclusively to the study of history. It is an axiom of long standing that rarely do we have a genius so great as to be great both as a philologist and as a historian.

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THE BABYLONIAN AND THE HEBREW LAWS

Before publishing his Schweich Lectures for 1912, Dr. Johns apparently took some time to edit his lectures and to compile an extensive bibliography which is appended to the volume.¹

One opens the book with expectation, since Dr. Johns was one of the first translators of the Code of Hammurapi, and has for years specialized in the contract literature of Babylonia, but one lays it down with something of disappointment. Of course in three brief lectures no exhaustive comparison of the long Babylonian code and the laws of the Pentateuch was possible; only a few salient points could be dealt with. In the brief compass allowed the author naturally deals with those points of the two legislations that most readily invite comparison and contrast—questions of the organization of society in the two countries, temporary slavery incurred in consequence of debt, the treatment of an ox who gores a man, etc. In the course of his exposition Dr. Johns often directs his telling shafts of criticism against those who have made extravagant claims for the influence of the Babylonian code. For this work he merits our gratitude, for his rapier pricks many a bubble.

Dr. Johns recognizes, as every student of these legislations does, that there is a considerable element common to the two bodies of laws. For example, the punishments in both are based in a good degree upon the *lex talionis*. The attitude of the author as to the cause of these likenesses is of peculiar interest. It has been clear to his colleagues ever since Dr. Johns wrote the introduction to Jeremias' *The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient Orient* that he has a leaning toward Pan-Babylonianism. That leaning is apparent in this discussion. He remarks on p. 53: "A common Semitic origin may really be only a step toward a reference of

¹ *The Relation between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples.* By Rev. C. H. W. Johns, M.A., Litt.D., Master of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge. London: Published by the British Academy, 1914. xvi+96 pages. 3s.

both to an early Babylonian origin." Again: "We are not likely to find evidence of early Semitic custom anywhere so early by some thousand years as in Babylonia." He goes on to recognize that Arabic customs *may* be really older, as they are certainly more primitive, but says we can never be sure of their date, except where they arise purely and simply out of local circumstances. With this statement the reviewer is inclined to take issue. There are some Semitic institutions that are practically universal in the Semitic world (such, for example, as the Ishtar cult), and the fact of this universality is a strong argument for a purely Semitic and not a Babylonian origin.

Dr. Johns further remarks: "It is most probable that some of the features which Hammurapi's Code has in common with early Hebrew legislation are only slightly modified from the still earlier codes which date from the time of the earlier Sumerian supremacy in Babylonia." This remark assumes that the Sumerian codes which antedated Hammurapi were free from Semitic influence. It overlooks the demonstration that Eduard Meyer made from Babylonian art that the Semites were in Babylonia before the Sumerians, and the religious evidence that Sumerian society was always permeated by a considerable Semitic element. The fact that a law found in the Pentateuch contains features which appear also in Sumerian codes which antedate Hammurapi is really in itself no proof that the feature in question is not ultimately derived from early Semitic custom.

It is rightly argued by Johns that in some cases similarity may be due to the fact that in all parts of the world the minds of men work in similar ways, and frequently hit upon the same expedients. Such similarities are witness neither to direct influence, nor to a common Semitic origin, but rather to the psychological unity of the race.

If, then, one code has influenced the other, we can detect the fact only in incidental and unimportant details, in which similar motives would not be likely to lead men to hit upon the same expedient, and details not found in common Semitic custom. Instances of such possible influence of Babylonia upon the legislation of Israel are tentatively suggested in the following cases:

1. Both bodies of legislation recognize that, when one has contracted a debt and has nothing to pay, he may designate some member of his family to work off the debt. There are differences of detail. The Babylonian code recognizes that a slave of the debtor may be assigned to the task; the Hebrew has no such provision. The point made by Johns has, however, to do with the time of the service. The Babylonian

provides that such a laborer *shall* go free at the end of three years; the Hebrew, that he *may* go free at the end of six. In Deut. 15:18, however, it is remarked that such a person has served "to the double of the hire of a hireling." Dr. Johns believes that this remark betrays a consciousness of the Babylonian three-year system. He accordingly finds here a probable trace of Babylonian influence, though he acknowledges that it may have been indirect. To the reviewer it seems quite as probable that the six-year period of Exod. 21:2 was as original in Israel as the period of three years in Babylonia, but that, if any knowledge of Babylonian law is to be detected, it comes in first with the Deuteronomist, who makes the comparison with the three-year standard. It should be noted, however, that the language of the Deuteronomist does not necessarily betray a knowledge of the Babylonian code, and perhaps precludes it. The Babylonian law contemplates either the giving of a wife, son, or daughter for the money (perhaps as a hostage), or the binding of someone out to service. In Deut. 15:18 the word which is brought into comparison is "hireling"—a word that by no means necessarily indicates such an unwilling hireling as the Babylonian law contemplates. If there is any influence, it seems to have been so indirect that the Deuteronomist was unconscious of its source.

2. A second instance in which Johns sees the possible traces of Babylonian influence is the use made in the two bodies of legislation of the penalty of burning. The code (§§ 157, 158) imposes it for incest with a man's own mother. Both the man and the woman were condemned to burning. In Lev. 20:14 it is imposed upon a man who lies with his mother-in-law, as well as on the mother-in-law herself, and in 21:9 the daughter of a priest who plays the harlot is also to be burned. As in all these cases this terrible penalty is applied to crimes of sexual irregularity, our author sees the possibility of Babylonian influence. It should be noted, however, that the variations in detail are such that direct borrowing seems to be precluded. It seems to the reviewer more plausible to suppose that among the early Semites cases of sexual irregularity were generally punished by burning, and that the instances cited are but specific survivals of it among different peoples. It is true that we have no evidence of such a primitive Semitic custom apart from these codes, but nevertheless the differences in the laws make this hypothesis as probable as that of Dr. Johns, and in the opinion of the reviewer more so.

3. Dr. Johns also brings the case of the priest's daughter (Lev. 21:9) into comparison with the provision of the code (§ 110) that a votary who shall open a wine-shop or enter a wine-shop shall be burned. As one

law mentions a votary and the other the daughter of a priest, he thinks there may be some connection here. This view is strengthened, he thinks, by the fact that Josephus explains the crime as not mere unchastity but as "opening a tavern," and some of the rabbis of the Talmud ask, "Shall not a priest's daughter be treated better than a tavern-keeper?" It seems, however, that all that can be inferred is that Josephus and the Talmud may have had some dim notions of the Babylonian code. The instances do not show that that code influenced Leviticus, if another explanation is more probable.

If, then, the three instances cited are the best that can be said for the influence of Babylonian law upon the Hebrew legislation, it must be confessed that that influence was practically *nil*. Dr. Johns has rendered a real service in narrowing the discussion down to these three parallels, and showing that, if Babylonian law did influence Hebrew law, it was in these instances.

An appendix of twenty-seven pages is devoted to a "Survey of the Bibliography of the Literature relating to the Code of Hammurapi." The title is interpreted so broadly that practically everything relating to the contract literature that has been published in recent years is included. This will add much to the value of the book to Assyriologists. Many of the articles have been scattered through such a variety of publications that it is a great convenience to have them brought together as they are here. On p. 77, by the omission of an author's name (probably by accident), the three volumes of the *Haverford Library Collection* by the present reviewer are attributed to Dr. R. J. Lau.

GEORGE A. BARTON

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

NEW BABYLONIAN PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the course of the last year, the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania has published a number of volumes concerning the cuneiform texts found during the famous Nippur excavations and now preserved in Philadelphia. The publications which will be considered in this review have been edited by Arno Poebel¹ and George A.

¹ *Historical Texts*. By Arno Poebel. University of Pennsylvania, The University Museum, Publications of the Babylonian Section, Vol. IV, No. 1. Philadelphia, 1914. 242 pages. \$5.00.

Historical and Grammatical Texts. By Arno Poebel. *Ibid.*, Vol. V. Philadelphia, 1914. 125 plates. \$10.00.

Grammatical Texts. By Arno Poebel. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, No. 1. Philadelphia, 1914. 122 pages. \$2.00.

Barton.¹ The former publication especially contains some texts which are of considerable importance for the comparative study of the Old Testament.

Poebel has had the privilege of working at his leisure for about two years among the treasures of the University Museum, and of selecting the most valuable material from the existent collections and the recently opened boxes. The copies of these texts (more than 150) are given in Vol. V of the Publications of the Babylonian Section. It is a pity that this publication has been hurried on so rapidly that the author could not even give a catalogue list of the tablets. As it is now, it is nearly impossible to identify texts which are cited merely by the number of the collection. Why this method was followed is not quite clear; for communication with Germany never was "totally interrupted by the war."

The texts published in Vol. V may be divided into three groups: (1) Religious Texts; (2) Historical Texts; (3) Grammatical Texts.

The first two groups are more nearly related to each other; for with the Babylonians as with other ancient nations history and mythology are not strictly separated. Among these religious texts, two are of special interest, both written in the Old Sumerian language about 2300 B.C.: one (No. 23)² contains the narration of the descent of the goddess Innanna or Ishtar into the nether world, the other (No. 1) gives a fragmentary but nevertheless very important account of the Babylonian deluge story. This text has been thoroughly investigated and treated by Poebel in Vol. IV, No. 1, which volume is dedicated to the study of the most important historical texts published in Vol. V.

The first columns of the deluge tablet are rather fragmentary, so that their connection with the following columns cannot be established with certainty. There are mentioned the creation of mankind by the gods Anu, Enlil, Enki, and Ninharsag, the creation of animals, and the foundation of certain cities; but I think this is done in a more retrospective manner, though nothing definite can be said, owing to the defective state of the tablet. In the third column we hear about the intention of the great gods to destroy mankind by a rainstorm. Mention is made of the hero of the deluge myth, who here bears the name Ziugiddu (or

¹ *Sumerian Business and Administrative Documents from the Earliest Times to the Dynasty of Agade*. By George A. Barton. University of Pennsylvania, The University Museum, Publications of the Babylonian Section, Vol. IX, No. 1. Philadelphia, 1915. 33 pages. 74 plates.

² Nos. 22 and 24 are closely related to No. 23.

perhaps Ziusuddu), and is described as a pious king always revering his divine masters. By a heavenly revelation he becomes acquainted with the gods' plan (fourth column). He builds¹ a huge boat and so escapes the rainstorm which rages seven days and seven nights. After this time the sun-god "came forth again shedding light over Heaven and Earth." In the last fragmentary column we learn that Ziusuddu is transported by the gods into a distant land, never to feel the bitterness of death.²

The text characterized just now does not give much new information: its importance lies in another field. First of all, it is the oldest deluge story which has come down to us; secondly, it is written in Sumerian, thus showing that the deluge myth is not a Semitic invention but belongs to the oldest elements of Sumerian tradition; and, lastly, it gives some interesting details concerning the handing down of literary texts to later times and the composite character of the younger legends. The Old Testament student may learn a good deal about the development and changeableness of popular traditions and narrations by comparing this Old Sumerian version (*ca.* 2300 B.C.) with the better known text found in Sardanapalus' library (*ca.* 650 B.C.).

The connecting link between the mythological and historical texts is formed by some fragmentary lists of kings (Nos. 2-5) going down to historical times, but being quite legendary as to the older periods treated therein. Before these lists were known, nearly all our knowledge of the oldest legendary kings was based upon Berossus' history; now we learn from texts belonging to the twenty-third century B.C. that the Babylonians considered their heroes like Etana and Gilgamesh, and even some minor deities like Dumuzi (Tammuz) and Lugal-banda, as having been earthly kings of Babylonia. The number of years assigned to the reigns of all these legendary kings who lived after the deluge is rather high, being between 100 and 1,200; but it may be kept in mind that Berossus gives for the ten patriarchs living before the deluge much higher numbers (10,800-64,800). With the First Dynasty of Ur real history seems to begin, except for the number of years given to the first king, Mesannipada (eighty). The lists come down to the time of the Isin dynasty, which is the time of their compilation.³ The discussion of these lists fills a considerable part of Vol. IV, No. 1.

¹ The passage where this fact was narrated is now totally destroyed.

² Not expressly stated in the lines preserved to us.

³ It may be noted here that in Poebel's transcription and translation of No. 2, col. 12, line 4 has been omitted: [*a-r*]*d I-kam* = "once."

Besides other historical texts, copies of inscriptions of the famous kings of Akkad, i.e., Sharrukin, Rimush, Manishtusu, and Naram-Sin (*ca.* 2800 B.C.) have been found by Poebel among the treasures of the University Museum at Philadelphia. These texts were copied very carefully about 2300 B.C. from statues and other memorials set up by the kings of that dynasty in the temple of the god Enlil at Nippur. They give much new information concerning this early time of Babylonian history. All these texts and some other ones are thoroughly discussed in Vol. IV, No. 1.

For the study of those ancient texts written in the Old Sumerian language, any new information concerning the structure of this language will be highly welcomed by all students of Babylonian culture. Poebel found some new syllabaries and grammatical lists among the tablets of the University Museum which, though fragmentary, give some very valuable details. To those lists and a discussion of some chapters of Sumerian grammar Vol. VI, No. 1 is dedicated. Though we do not deny that Poebel discovered some interesting facts relating to Sumerian grammar, still a good many of his theories are not very plausible. Some of them are simply stated without further proofs. A considerable number of misprints, errors, and wrong quotations sometimes makes it a very difficult task to follow the author. The material being so immensely important, it may be hoped that its discussion will not be restricted to this dissertation only.

Sumerian is also the language of the greater part of the business and administrative documents published by G. A. Barton. They belong to the time of the kings of Akkad (*ca.* 2800 B.C.), excepting the first three texts. While these have been purchased by the Museum, the others (about 130) were excavated at Nippur. Though not of special interest for the theologian, they give many details for completing our picture of Babylonian culture. No. 1 (purchased) is written in a very ancient pictographic kind of writing which is exceedingly difficult to decipher. Barton's translation is at least an ingenious attempt to overcome its difficulties. The list of proper names, compiled by Barton, requires a good many corrections: the quotations given are not always correct¹ and complete²; titles are sometimes omitted³ or considered a part of the

¹ E.g., *Ur-dEn-su* 122, seal; *Ur-dEn-ki-ka* 121 II 2; *Ur-dun*, the *qa-šá-gab* (not *Ur-dun-qa-da*) 112 II 3; *Dug-ga-ni* 19 VI 7, etc.

² E.g., *Dug-ga-ni*, also 19 VII 5; 25, Rev. 4; *Na-ba-lul* (B. *Na-ba-nar*) 113(!) I(!) 2, also 29 I 9, etc.

³ E.g., *Ur-dEn-ki dup-sar* (3 IV 3); *Ur-dDa-mu qa-šá-gab* (18 II 10), etc.

name.¹ Some names are read in different ways.² Others are omitted³ or not read correctly.⁴ Especially interesting is tablet 25, dated in the reign of King Naram-Sin. In this text mention is made of a place (Rev. 9) called *Enim-Ma-an-iš-tu-su^{hi}*,⁵ i.e., "the word of Maništusu," thus proving again that Maništusu reigned before Naram-Sin.

Thankful as we are for the new material given in the volumes reviewed here, we nevertheless may be allowed to add the urgent request to the publication committee not to publish volumes before the author has given his final approval. For it would be a pity if the value of the series should be lessened by unnecessary haste.

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PAUL AND HIS EPISTLES

The author of this book⁶ suggests as an alternative title: "Paul in His Epistles." His object is not to write a biography, but to present an introduction to the letters of Paul, treating them as "human documents." There are two introductory chapters, one on the preparation, personal appearance, and characteristics of Paul; the other on the form, style, and value of the epistles as a whole, with continual reference to the apostle whose personality finds expression in his writings. Then follow eleven chapters dealing with the thirteen epistles of Paul in chronological order. There is no stereotyped uniformity in the topics considered, but each chapter constitutes a brief introduction to the epistle or group of epistles concerned, taking up the usual questions of date, authenticity, integrity, contents, with special attention to the situation of the church addressed, the occasion of the epistle, its dominating idea, and the light thrown on the character and career of Paul.

¹ E.g., *Ur-gu-lal-gal* read *Ur-gā-lā ašgab* (shoemaker); the same instead of *Ur-dgu-lal-lā*.

² E.g., *Ur-dKu-ner-da* and *Ur-dŠu-ner-gal* (read *Ur-dŠē-nir-da*); *Ur-dun-qa-da* and *Ur-saḥ* (read *Ur-dun*), etc.

³ E.g., *A-mur-ru-[um]* 71 III 5; *Il(u)-su-ra-bi* 120 II 9, etc.

⁴ E.g., *Sun-ni-ur-sag* read *be-lī-qarrāḍ*; *Ur-dUš-mu* read *Ur-dDa-mu*, etc.—*Is-mu-tu* is no proper name, but a Semitic verb; *X-sal* is no proper name, but has to be read *I sag-sal*, "one female slave."

⁵ B. takes *Ka-ma-dIš-tu-ruk-ki* as a proper name (p. 25).

⁶ *Paul and His Epistles*. By D. A. Hayes. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 508 pages. \$2.00

The style and plan of the book suggest that the writer has been in the habit of presenting his material in the classroom or in sermons and semi-popular lectures. Leaders of Bible classes or pastors wishing to give a series of sermons or addresses on the books of the New Testament will find this a convenient manual. It will also prove useful for reference in college classes. The facts concerning the location of the Pauline churches, their founding, their general character, and their particular problems and needs are given briefly and simply. Wherever it is possible the teaching of each epistle is unified under one controlling thought in such a way as to make a single definite impression.

The interest of the author is evidently homiletical and practical rather than critical. This is the key alike to the strength and to the weakness of the presentation. Dignity is sometimes sacrificed to striking phrases or to trite expressions. In the attempt to vivify the presentation the writer sometimes makes an assumption and then treats it as a fact. Is the idea that Paul adopted a name meaning by derivation "little one" more than a far-fetched fancy? Was the general attitude of Paul at Philippi such that we can imagine that he said of his treatment at the hands of the authorities that he "would make them smart for it"? In spite of occasional infelicities, however, we appreciate the attempt to present a vital subject in vital terms. We could wish that the writer had gone even farther in his account of the mutual reactions of the new religion and its Greco-Roman environment in the thought and organization of the Christian communities.

The main critical questions involved are raised and discussed, with clear summaries of opposing views. That the sympathies of the author are with the traditional answers to these questions is apparent from his concluding words on the integrity of the Epistle to the Romans: "Without better reasons, then, than have been furnished, conservative scholarship prefers to abide by the tradition that the sixteenth chapter belongs to the Epistle to the Romans" (p. 327). The considerations adduced as of deciding weight in solving the problem of the Pastoral Epistles hardly warrant the confident statement that follows: "The Pastoral Epistles are genuine" (p. 463). An exception to the general attitude of the book is found in the concession of the plausibility of the arguments for the composite character of Second Corinthians.

The bibliography at the end of the book would be more serviceable if it contained fewer titles and gave dates and brief characterizations of the books named. It is difficult to account for the failure to mention certain books, notably the *Commentary on First Corinthians*, by J. Weiss;

Christian Life in the Primitive Church, by Dobschütz; *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, by Lake; and *The Pauline Theology*, by Stevens.

JOHN P. DEANE

BELOIT COLLEGE

THE ARMENIAN VERSION OF EUSEBIUS' CHRONICON

The book which is here given extremely tardy notice¹ really needs no presentation to the readers of this *Journal*. It is of sufficient importance to make it practically indispensable to those scholars who will use it at all, and it was published so long ago that the church historian and the teacher or writer of ancient history, both early (Berossos) and late, who does not yet know of its existence and value is not worth his salt. The writer of this review feels keenly responsible for a bit of neglectfulness which must have made this *Journal* appear in a false light to both public and publishers. Much transfer of residence, always as many and sometimes more duties than were compatible with his time, together with a complete shift in his field of work, may at least in some measure account for, even though they do not excuse, the neglect. The only reason for inserting here and now a notice of some extent, which may bring the volume to the attention of a scattered remnant of occasional users, lies in the fact that the work therein done deserves such recommendation, and the *Journal's* editors are determined, early or late, to present it to their readers and so to discharge a debt of honor which they feel they owe both to these and to the publishers of the volume.

No one can have worked any length of time in the field of ancient history or of early church history without becoming aware of the great importance for his work of the so-called *Chronicon* compiled by that greatest historical genius of the early Christian church, Eusebius of Caesarea. Of the great mass of historical material from the writings of the ancients there, and often there only, preserved to us, now in brief notes, now in extended extracts, we need mention only the work of the Manetho of Babylonia, Berossos. This with other similar material is found in the so-called introduction, which is preserved to us with any degree of fulness only in the Armenian version of the *Chronicon*. In this fact lies this version's chief claim to fame.

¹ *Eusebius Werke*. Fünfter Band. Die Chronik aus dem Armenischen übersetzt, mit textkritischem Commentar von Josef Karst. (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Band 20.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. lvi+320 pages. M. 15.

The task assigned by the Royal Prussian Academy's commission to Dr. Karst, and assumed by him, was to put into print a German translation which would furnish its readers an adequate representation, in form and contents, of the Armenian. Of this task, so far as the reviewer, knowing no Armenian, can judge, Dr. Karst has acquitted himself admirably. Only he who has tried his hand at the publication of tables made up of numbers and fine print can have any adequate conception of the labor involved for editor, printer, and publisher in the well-nigh faultless reproduction of the 82 pages of the *Chronikon-Kanon*. A very slight fault in comparison with the general perfection lies in the omission of one number on each page, especially of the canon, the addition of which would have given the reader at a glance the page of the manuscript, now to be found only by a constantly repeated subtraction of 46. The translation of the introduction reads smoothly, even though it is intended to give him who desires sufficient information on the form of the proper names and on the general manner of the Armenian. And, since Karst's translation rests upon a better textual base than any heretofore made, one has also the assurance that the text here found is more reliable than even the Armenian of Aucher, good as Aucher's work was in its day.

An introduction of forty-odd pages furnishes brief, but in the main good and reliable, information of the kind usually given in such introductions. One feels the more surprised, therefore, though a first and second Eusebian edition of the *Chronikon* is repeatedly spoken of, and no mean evaluation is put upon the Armenian as representing the "original" edition, to find not one word so much as mentioning the incisive treatment of these questions published by Eduard Schwartz in an earlier volume of the same series, *Eusebius*, Vol. II, Part 3, pp. ccxv-ccxlviii. What Schwartz there says seems destined to put an entirely different face upon our estimate of the *Chronikon* as transmitted to us in Armenian or any other dress. It is possible, of course, to disagree with Schwartz, though it is hardly advisable to do so lightly; but to ignore him is impossible. This is unquestionably the most serious defect in the work of Dr. Karst. Perhaps, however, it did not devolve upon him to enter with any fulness upon the discussion of these matters; nor does it detract from the real excellence of the major portion of his work. Quite the contrary. If Dr. Karst overestimated the value of the Armenian version of Eusebius' *Ἐπιτομή παντοδαπῆς ἱστορίας Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων*, he has given us, perhaps for that very reason, the best and most faithful rendering of this version up to the present obtainable anywhere. And though we may not agree with Dr. Karst's ideas as to first and second

editions of the introduction and canon, and as to the relative purity of their transmission in the Armenian version, we shall nevertheless gladly and gratefully use the really valuable book with which he has presented us.

MARTIN SPRENGLING

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SPIRITUAL HEALING

A recent volume dealing with this subject¹ belongs to the saner class of books defending the possibility of curing disease by a means other than that ordinarily employed by orthodox medical science. The author has read widely in the literature of the subject, and writes not as a partisan of any fad but as a religious mystic who feels that the universe is pervaded by an immanent divine power which may minister healing grace as rationally as the ordinary physician does his work, though not so mechanically.

The history of "spiritual" healing is believed to furnish proof of this proposition. Magical cures among primitive peoples, and religious healing among the Greeks, are cited as evidence that a spiritual agent was exercising his beneficent activities even before the rise of Christianity. That the Greeks called this agent Asklepios does not greatly matter, since "God fulfils himself in many ways." When Christianity appears, this same divine Force manifests itself in the healings wrought by Jesus as well as in those cures which have taken place from time to time throughout the whole history of Christianity. The healings of "Christian Science" are effected through this same agency, and not by the virtue of its doctrines expressed in "uncouth jargon." Indeed, its founder is thought to have been so "ill fitted by nature, training, and temperament for the fine work of Spiritual Healing, that the merits of her system are but enhanced by the earthen character of the vessel from which they were poured out." All such healing must be ascribed directly to the divine power of Life normally immanent in the universe from earliest days down to the present time. "We may well believe that Spiritual Healing is an actual fact because it springs from cosmic forces of a constant character. Among these we may . . . include unseen spirits or personalities of some sort."

What, then, are the laws governing the activities of these forces and the means to be employed for securing their aid? The author will not

¹ *Spiritual Healing*. By W. F. Cobb. London: Bell; New York: Macmillan, 1914. xii+312 pages. \$1.60.

allow any fundamentally important place to suggestion, hypnotism, or similar devices sometimes used to accomplish the desired result. Nor are the cures to be accounted "miraculous," in the proper sense of that term. They are as normal and as real as life itself, but the forces by which they are effected belong to the eternal rather than the temporal order. This contact between the eternal and the temporal is made possible for man by supposing that he is composed of two selves—the transcendental self which belongs to the timeless order and the ordinary Ego which is but the shadow of the former. This higher self is no mere "subliminal consciousness"; it is the very essence of our being and the real medium of intercourse between man and Deity. Hence spiritual healing can be obtained if the lower self is kept closely linked to the higher by that expectant, trusting, loving, and receptive activity which characterizes a life of faith and prayer—when the lower self comes into vital union with the higher self "the road is cleared along which can travel the health-giving forces of the Great Physician."

Doubtless many readers will question the validity of the author's psychological and metaphysical theories, but apart from his constructive hypotheses the book is an excellent popular statement by one who is well informed in this interesting field. Whether the well-selected data used might not have been better interpreted from a non-mystical point of view is still an open question.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

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STUDIES IN GREEK AND ROMAN RELIGION

Since the last comprehensive monograph on Zeus was published—by Emeric-David in 1833—the material at the disposal of the student of Greek religion has been vastly increased and the task of giving a satisfactory treatment of one of the greater divinities has been correspondingly complicated. It is no longer sufficient to report the testimony of literature supplemented by an occasional reference to inscriptions or monuments. Not only must every fragment of evidence to be found in inscription and monument be carefully scanned, but also a large mass of material in the form of coins and vase painting must be studied with the trained eye of an archaeologist. Nor can the investigator confine attention to Greek soil. For he may not expect to understand the religion of the Greeks until he has become familiar with the cults of their neigh-

bors. In the preparation of his work on Zeus,¹ Mr. Cook, who is a reader in classical archaeology at Cambridge University and the author of a number of valuable papers on various phases of Greek religion, has availed himself freely of the counsel of distinguished colleagues who are specialists in related fields of study.

The first volume treats of "Zeus God of the Bright Sky," beginning with a discussion of the primitive conception of Zeus as the sky or *aither* and the transition from this to the anthropomorphic conception of a god living in the sky. Then follows a treatment of the mountain cults of Zeus and of his relation to the sun, to the moon, and to the stars. Under these general subjects the author discusses a wide range of topics—some rather remotely connected with the worship of Zeus—giving special attention to matters of archaeological interest. On the general question of the relation of Zeus to the heavenly bodies he concludes that genuine Hellenic religion never identified Zeus with sun or moon or star. "If an inscription records the cult of Zeus Helios, if a coin represents Zeus with a moon on his head, if a myth tells of Zeus transforming himself into a star, we may be reasonably sure that inscription, coin, and myth alike belong to the Hellenistic age, when—as Cicero puts it—a Greek border was woven on the barbarian robe."

Some of the more important of these mixed cults he treats at considerable length with a view to disentangling the complex threads of religious syncretism. Zeus-Ammon he regards as essentially a Greek god, whose cult was established in the oasis by Greek invaders and who later was fused with the Theban Amen-Ra and with Semitic Baal-hamman. Zeus-Sabazios was originally a Phrygian deity closely resembling the Orphic Zeus, the parallelism of the Phrygian and Orphic cults being due to the fact that both alike were offshoots of the old Thraco-Phrygian religion. Jupiter Heliopolitanus was the Roman name for the Syrian Adad, "who had not improbably succeeded to the position of the Hittite father-god Tesub." Zeus-Dolichaios, better known as Jupiter-Dolichenus, the god of Doliche in Kommagene, he regards as another example of a Hittite god surviving into the Greco-Roman age.

A valuable feature of the book is its very complete presentation of the material used in the discussion. Inscriptions are invariably quoted at length, and monuments, coins, and other graphic representations are reproduced in 42 full-page plates and 569 minor illustrations. The

¹ *Zeus. A Study in Ancient Religion.* Vol. I. "Zeus God of the Bright Sky." By Arthur Bernard Cook. xliii+885 pages. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. 45s. net.

second volume, said to be already well advanced in the manuscript, will deal with "Zeus God of the Dark Sky," and from the nature of its contents promises to be of even greater importance for the history of religion in general.

In a series of six lectures¹ delivered at Oxford, W. Warde Fowler discusses the Roman conceptions of deity in the last century before our era. He finds four departments in Roman religion where the idea of deity was at least dimly realized, viz., the family cults, the worship of Jupiter, the belief in Fortune as a cosmic power, and the deification of the Caesars.

Inasmuch as Vesta with her ever-burning fire may be said to have expressed the continuity of family life; the Penates, "the continuity of the household's means of subsistence"; and the Genius of the *pater-familias*, "the power of the head of the family to carry on its life within the gens," the religion of the family may have contributed the idea of permanence or continuity to the developing conception of deity. To this idea of permanence or continuity may be added a growing tendency to attribute to the objects of worship some degree of personality and benevolent protection.

In the worship of Jupiter there appears a tendency toward monotheism, which Professor Fowler would explain as a reminiscence of an original supreme deity of the Latin race. This sense of a great Power in the universe summing up, as it were, the varied powers of the *numina*, he holds, was always present in the background of the Italian mind, making it easy for thinkers like Lucretius and Cicero to abandon or explain away the popular polytheism and for the Stoics to identify Jupiter with their supreme deity.

The growing belief in Fortune as a power in human affairs marks a turning away from the idea of a protecting power and the recognition of the control of blind chance or irresistible fate. The precise meaning that is attached to the term *Fortuna* varies greatly among the Latin authors. Cicero uses it to denote the incalculable in human life; in Lucretius it seems to be equivalent to *natura*; in Caesar it is simply chance or accident; in Virgil, however, it is in some degree a moral force, being conceived as "the will of the gods (or of God) against which a man can struggle if he will, but submission to which is victory."

In the deification of the Caesars we have the expression of a tendency—foreign to Rome but finding there congenial soil—to apply to men of

¹ *Roman Ideas of Deity in the Last Century before the Christian Era*. Lectures delivered in Oxford for the Common University Fund. By W. Warde Fowler. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 167 pages.

high position and of large services to mankind the outward forms of religion and gradually to elevate them into the place once held by the old gods of the state. While this homage was at first the expression of a belief, not in a divinity, but in "something that you can treat as such," it could not fail in the end to react upon the accepted notions of deity.

Anything that Professor Fowler has to say on topics connected with Roman religion is always of value because of his wide and accurate knowledge of this field. The present volume, however, while it contains much valuable material, gives evidence of hasty composition and in this respect falls below the standard set by his Gifford Lectures on the *Religious Experience of the Roman People*.

RALPH HERMON TUKEY

WILLIAM JEWELL COLLEGE

RELIGIONS OF INDIA

Of this new series¹ of studies on the religions of India two volumes have just appeared and six more are announced. The object of the series is thus expressed in the editorial preface:

(1) They endeavour to work in the sincere and sympathetic spirit of science.
 (2) They seek to set each form of Indian religion by the side of Christianity in such a way that the relationship may stand out clear. Jesus Christ has become to them the light of all their seeing, and they believe Him destined to be the light of the world. They are persuaded that sooner or later the age-long quest of the Indian spirit for religious truth and power will find in Him at once its goal and a new starting-point. If there be readers to whom this motive is unwelcome, they may be reminded that no man approaches the study of a religion without religious convictions, either positive or negative. It is possible that to some minds there may seem to be a measure of incompatibility between these two motives. The writers, however, feel otherwise.

There is no doubt that those actively in touch with Indian life are better prepared to explain and interpret the religions of India than those who have only book-knowledge, but the comparison with Christianity as an absolute standard involves a loss of historical and evolutionary perspective which, in many subtle ways, interferes with a sympathetic understanding of the development of Indian religions. There is not "a measure of incompatibility" between the two motives; such a comparison is utterly fatal to logic. This is well exemplified in the

¹ "The Religious Quest of India." Edited by J. N. Farquhar and H. D. Griswold.

first book to be mentioned, which, in carrying out the second motive, abandons the historical and analytical attitude which is admirably maintained in the first part, and becomes at once apologetic and dogmatic. Is it at all necessary for a man to approach a religion with "religious convictions, either positive or negative"? Does a scientist who is working with a "sincere and sympathetic spirit" approach a new problem of physics or chemistry with positive or negative convictions to begin with?

Macnicol's volume¹ lays a welcome emphasis on the theistic side of Hindu religion, a side which has been too much subordinated to its monistic and pantheistic elements. Hindu rationalism works over the religions into philosophies and dogmas which are largely pantheistic; but parallel to this, from the most ancient times, went popular religions developing from polydemonism and polytheism toward a unity, toward a theism. This is just as characteristic an expression of the Hindu spirit as is Monism or Pantheism. The descriptive part of the book is based on careful, critical reading and is admirably done.

Macnicol makes for Theism the "three great postulates of God, freedom, and immortality" and insists on an eternal moral order as a basis (pp. 7 and 220). He forgets that morals and religion are not necessarily connected. In the East, morals have nearly always yielded to religion. In the West, religion has nearly always yielded to ethics. The Hindu has, for the most part, yielded passively to the overwhelming forces of nature; has not made a progressive conquest of nature and reached a pragmatic truth of living half-way between abstract ideas and a mere yielding to nature as it is. In the West, civilization begins where nature ends and builds on nature as a foundation. The more energetic individual builders in India have founded systems which have lost their vitality and have run out and been swallowed up in a wilderness of sand just as the energetic torrents from the surrounding mountains lose themselves in the desert of Chinese Turkestan. This process will continue until the desert is changed. A mere change of creed cannot change the whole life of a people. The change must begin with the social, economic, and intellectual life of the people. Is not a higher form of religion an effect rather than the cause of progress?

In his criticism of *karma* and the difficulty of finding a place beside it for a free, ethical, personal God, Macnicol does not face squarely the difficulty of Christian dogma in placing a free, ethical, personal God over

¹ *Indian Theism from the Vedic to the Muhammedan Period*. By Nicol Macnicol. London: Oxford University Press, 1915. xvi+292 pages. 6s.

against the laws of nature. He sums up his position in the following words (p. 227):

It is the claim of the Christian interpreter of the meaning of the world that history reveals the operation of supernatural powers which transcend and annul the lower laws of nature. It is his claim that in the lives of nations that have been called to great tasks of civilization, and that respond to the call, the ordinary laws of declension and decay are arrested and a "rejuvenescence," "a new era of vision of power," comes to them which can only be explained as the replenishing of their life from the Source of life. . . . In such a region the laws that are called *karma* lie, like the kindred laws of nature, "like a foolish wilful dream."

Are such passages as these at all consonant with the motives set forth in the editorial preface? After a rigorous criticism of Indian mysticism is it not naïve to shift at once to a mysticism which is just as vague and indefinite? Does Çankara, whose doctrine Macnicol calls fraudulent, do more than precisely this? Does he do more than regard the empirical world as a dream?

It is easy in comparing two things to compare the best in one thing with the worst in the other. Comparisons very adverse to Indian religions are made between the moral side of Christianity and the erotic side of Hinduism. Such a comparison forgets that in India everything is given a religious sanction. Religion in the East is a much more inclusive term than religion in the West; it includes many things which to us are purely social. The erotic elements which in India are given religious sanction should be compared to our social evil, which falls entirely outside of religion. Why lay so much emphasis on what is really a part of Indian social life and never mention the corresponding thing which forms a large part of our own social life?

Macnicol (p. 220) postulates "freedom" as a necessity of Theism. To many sincere minds Theism is utterly incompatible with "freedom." In such matters "ought" has no place.

Much confusion is caused by the loose way in which the word "intellectual" is used. If by "intellectual" is meant the kind of consciously directed thinking which brings about a progressive adaptation to nature, as opposed to what James calls "associative thinking," Hindu thought belongs almost exclusively to the latter category. On p. 249 it is said: "A type of religion which views 'knowledge' as the highest means to the attainment of its purpose is to be found strongly established among the theistic doctrines of India." This is true only of early Brahmanism. The later systems emphasize "knowledge" only as a

preparation. Even the Vedānta, the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya, and the Vaiśeṣika, in spite of their efforts to remain rational or empirical, end by a transfer to mysticism, to a flash of intuition in which the thought merges into a feeling.

Çankara's device (p. 98) is not "fraudulent" at all. His own reason and feeling did not declare it to be untrue. The author would do well to read James's *On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings* and Stevenson's *The Lantern-Bearers*. "To one who has not the secret of the lanterns the scene upon the links is meaningless."

Was it the faith itself that changed Nānak's followers into the Sikhs or did they adopt the faith because of certain characteristic traits in themselves? If Nānak had lived in Southern India, would the Dravidians have adopted his teachings? Do not men seek out and adopt what appeals to their own natures? Macnicol sees mere shadowy shells moving across the face of Indian religion. The joy in the hearts of the figures is concealed from him. This must always be the case when one investigates the thoughts and feelings of others from a negative point of view.

"Criticism and Derogation" would be a better name for the last chapter than "Criticism and Appreciation." The whole tenor of the chapter reminds one of the conversation which George Borrow reports as having taken place in a little inn in Wales:

I asked him on what ground he imagined he should be lost; he replied on the ground of being predestined to be lost. I asked him how he knew he was predestined to be lost; whereupon he asked me how I knew I was to be saved; I told him I did not know I was to be saved, but trusted I should be so by belief in Christ who came into the world to save sinners, and that if he believed in Christ he might be as easily saved as myself, or any other sinner who believed in Him.

Borrow's trust became to him a naïve dogmatism which ruled out the trust of the other man.

Most of us do act according to the words which Macnicol puts into Çankara's mouth (p. 99): "Believe for practical ends what all the time is metaphysically false." The West is no exception. Sometimes it seems as though the most important creations of the human mind were made in an effort to escape from its reason.

One misses a chapter on the Purāṇas; but they are so large and diffuse that they almost defy treatment. One of the most pressing needs is a careful study of the Purāṇas and of the many works which treat of local cults.

Mrs. Stevenson's book¹ brings us to the best objective treatment of Jainism that has as yet been written. It is not a cut-and-dried discussion of Jain dogma, but a description of Jainism as a living religion based on long and patient study and thoroughly adequate material.

Amongst her Indian friends, the writer would like to thank two Jaina paṇḍits, who successively lectured to her in Rājkot (Kāthiāwāḍ) almost daily during a period of seven years, for the patience and lucidity with which they expounded their creed. . . . In her study of Jainism, however, the writer is not only indebted to paṇḍits, but also to nuns in various Apāsārā, to officiants in beautiful Jaina temples, to wandering monks, happy-go-lucky Jaina schoolboys and thoughtful students, as well as to grave Jaina merchants and their delightful wives.

In her treatment of the ascetic and negative sides of Jainism Mrs. Stevenson is too prone to forget the many prosperous Jaina merchants and the abundance of Jaina architecture and profane literature. Jain stories reflect a thriving objective life too. Everywhere the unconscious vital energy of man proves to be stronger than theory and system. Is it quite fair to emphasize the discrepancies in India and pass over the discrepancies between Western theory and practice?

If Rhys Davids (*Buddhist India*) be correct in his deductions from the Jataka stories, the lot of the common people in the sixth and fifth centuries was not hideous with suffering and oppression as Mrs. Stevenson says on p. 3.

The last chapter is entitled "The Empty Heart of Jainism." Those Jains who felt conscious, as she reports, that their hearts were empty had outgrown their faith. That is all. The devout Jain is singularly unconscious himself that his heart is empty.

WALTER EUGENE CLARK

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McGIFFERT'S *RISE OF MODERN RELIGIOUS IDEAS*

This book,² based upon the Earl Lectures given by the author before the Pacific Theological Seminary at Berkeley, California, in 1912, is the second of a series of works on modern theology being published under the editorship of Dr. J. M. Whiton. The author's aim, as stated in the

¹ *The Heart of Jainism*. By Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson. London: Oxford University Press, 1915. xxiv+336 pages. 7s. 6d.

² *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*. By A. C. McGiffert. New York: Macmillan, 1915. x+315 pages. \$1.50.

Preface, is "to contribute in some degree to the understanding of the existing situation." Its three hundred-odd pages are offered as a brief "account of the influences which have promoted and the circumstances which have attended the rise of some of the leading religious ideas of today in so far as they differ from the ideas of other days and so may fairly be called modern."

The first part, some sixty pages, entitled "Disintegration," suggests some of the forces which occasioned the retirement of the traditional orthodox scheme held in common by Catholicism and the older Protestantism. The subjects treated are pietism, the enlightenment, natural science, and the critical philosophy. The second part, entitled "Reconstruction," might very well have been divided into two main sections, since the first five chapters deal with certain tendencies of modern thought, and the last five with the resultant religious conceptions. Of the former, chap. v, "Emancipation of Religion" (dealing mostly with Schleiermacher's great innovation in the conception of religion), chap. vii, "Rehabilitation of Faith," and chap. ix, "Evolution," are the most important. Chaps. x, xi, and xii deal with the conception of God; chap. xiii, with "The Social Emphasis," and chap. xiv, with "Religious Authority." In chap. vii the author outlines, first, the development of the notion of faith as a faculty of direct apprehension of truth, a sort of spiritual realism, by such men as Wesley, Rousseau, Jacobi, Fries, Coleridge, and Emerson; and, secondly, what the author calls the pragmatic method of arriving at religious assurance—a sort of voluntaristic realism, which he traces back through Ritschl and Fichte to Kant's postulation of ideas necessary for moral living. Chap. ix gives a very good brief summary of the development of the evolutionary conception in the social and natural sciences and suggests the significance (and the limits thereof) for religion. In chap. x, on "Divine Immanence," the author says: "Few ideas have proved more revolutionary. But the conception of immanence is beset, from the point of view of Christian theism, with serious difficulties, and the efforts of modern theologians have been largely directed toward their removal." This contradiction of immanence and transcendence the author rightly feels to be the crux of modern theology. Various suggested solutions are referred to.

The book is very readable in style and should prove very useful as a semi-popular general introduction to modern viewpoints and modern views in religion. It would perhaps be stronger if the treatment had been such as to bring out more clearly the logic underlying the whole situation. Especially would more explicit account of the beginnings of

the modern age be helpful, such as the divorce of reason and revelation and of experiment and authority. These two separations are the key to the whole modern development, and it is well worth while seeing more clearly how they came about.

The author's reference to Pragmatism is unsatisfactory. The Kantianistic working hypothesis is certainly not Pragmatism, except in a loose, popular sense. There are two quite different motifs in the writings of William James: one is his doctrine of "the will to believe," or the voluntaristic motif; the other is evolutionist logical theory or doctrine of knowledge, which is the pragmatist motif, properly so called. Voluntarism and Pragmatism are certainly not the same thing. This Kantianistic Pragmatism can never get quite clear of a hopeless dualism between experience and reality. For genuine Pragmatism, or dynamic idealism, experience *is* reality. The religious implications or possibilities of the latter have not yet been worked out. Perhaps this is the next essential step in the task of theological reconstruction.

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

ROGERS, ROBERT WILLIAM. *A History of Babylonia and Assyria*. 6th ed. New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1915. 2 vols. xxvi+542 and xix+609 pages. \$10.00.

Professor Rogers has issued a sixth, "largely rewritten" edition of his *History of Babylonia and Assyria*. In the first volume the fascinating story of the discovery of the remains of the Babylonian civilization, and the charming tale of the decipherment of the cuneiform script are told in an inimitable manner. This covers 353 pages of the 542 of this volume. Chapters on language, geography, and chronology close Vol. I. In Vol. II the history proper is taken up. This Professor Rogers has brought up to date. As in the case of the first volume, the presentation is invariably interesting.

When the historian has arranged his Babylonian dynasties in their proper order, has recorded the rise to power of this or that city-state, and has followed the establishment of empires now in the south, now in the north, he has only commenced his task. Today we demand of the historian, in addition to the political history, the story of the economic and social development of a people. The first part of the historian's task has been accomplished in an admirable manner by Professor Rogers. He has not, in the opinion of the reviewer, been so successful in performing his other duty. Not that this has been neglected altogether. But it is evident that the enormous mass of legal and business documents, dating from every period of Babylonian history, has been touched only here and there. Perhaps it is unfair to criticize the author for

this. Others have failed in this respect likewise. Nevertheless, the commercial and legal texts must come into their own before a satisfactory history of the Babylonians and Assyrians can be written.

The price of the book will, unfortunately, keep the book in the class of "reference books" to be purchased by the libraries of our colleges and universities. There is a crying need of a good history of Babylonia and Assyria for students.

The reviewer wishes he could say that as much care had been given to the proof-reading as to the writing of this work.

D. D. L.

EISZFELDT, OTTO. *Krieg und Bibel*. [Religionsgeschichtlicher Volksbücher.] Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. 84 pages. M. 1.

To write an objective history of the wars of Israel would be to write practically the entire history of Israel, at least in the pre-exilic period. Wars and rumors of war succeeded one another almost continuously. An almost equally large task confronts him who would theorize as to the place of war in Hebrew development, the legitimacy of the various wars, their effects upon national character, and their influence upon Hebrew religion. Pastor Eiszfeldt has confined himself almost entirely to the presentation of an objective and chronologically arranged list of the wars of Israel and to an exposition of the fact that in early Israel the wars of Israel were all also the wars of Yahweh, while in later Israel under the preaching of the prophets the wars of Israel came to be looked upon as the means employed by Yahweh to discipline and punish Israel for its sins. No attempt is made at any new investigation of the data; this lies outside of the scope of this series. But the author offers a simple and readable statement of the main facts in the sphere of Hebrew military activity. The attitude of the New Testament toward war is perhaps somewhat cursorily treated, only 13 pages of the 84 being allotted to it.

J. M. P. S.

The Codex Alexandrinus [Royal MS I D V-VIII] in *Reduced Photographic Facsimile*. *Old Testament*: Part I, Genesis-Ruth. London: British Museum, 1915. £1 15s. net.

The first autotype facsimile of Alexandrinus was published in four volumes, running from 1879 to 1883. The plates of this reproduced the pages of the manuscript in full size. The work was done under the editorial supervision of E. Maunde Thompson. In 1909, the reduced facsimile of that portion of the manuscript containing the New Testament and the Clementine Epistles appeared. The present volume is a continuation of this latter enterprise and will be followed by three more parts, completing the Old Testament and the codex. The editorship of this facsimile is in the competent hands of F. G. Kenyon. It is hardly necessary to say that the work has been splendidly done. The photography is beyond praise. The size of the plates represents a reduction of about one-third from the original. This does not diminish the value of the facsimile for practical purposes, the type remaining clear and distinct; but it makes a lower price possible and so brings the ownership of the facsimile within reach of many scholars for whom the larger edition was out of the question. One advantage of the reduced facsimile is the editor's addition at the foot of each plate of the chapter and verses contained on the plate. This greatly facilitates ready reference.

Now that it is coming to be generally recognized that no single codex or edition represents the original Septuagint and that said original can be attained, even approximately, only after a long and patient labor of comparison and classification of manu-

scripts, it may be expected that there will be an increasing demand for facsimiles of the more important codices at a reasonable price. The study of facsimiles and of careful collations will prepare the way for intelligent appreciation of that history of the Septuagint text which must some day be written.

J. M. P. S.

WICKS, HENRY J. *The Doctrine of God in the Jewish Apocryphal and Apocalyptic Literature*. London: Hunter & Longhurst, 1915. xii+371 pages. 10s.

BURKITT, F. CRAWFORD. *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*. [The Schweich Lectures, 1913.] London: Humphrey Milford, 1914. vii+80 pages. 3s.

Dr. Wicks has treated his subject in three chapters headed "The Transcendence of God," "The Justice of God," and "The Grace of God," which are subdivided in three periods of a century each. In the nine resulting sections every relevant passage in the literature is studied carefully and an attempt made to determine its exact meaning; at the end of each section the results are summarized and at the end of each chapter they are resummarized. The result is an extremely convenient compendium for quick orientation and rapid reference that must represent an amazing amount of labor on the author's part.

Further than this the book makes no claim to go, and its title is slightly misleading, for what it offers is rather a systematized collection of data for determining the doctrine of God than a presentation of the doctrine itself. Little is done to trace the relation and development of the ideas within the period treated, and outside of that period the author does not even glance. A second volume giving a historical treatment that would also take into consideration the origin of the concepts is greatly to be desired. And unfortunately the present volume was prepared before Canon Charles's standard edition of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha was available, and the work was done entirely with the aid of the older English translations, the German versions being disregarded entirely. In fact, very little attention has been paid to the work of Continental scholars, except where their results were available through translations, and the limits thus imposed are obvious.

Dr. Burkitt has presented his own conception of the apocalyptic literature in a very readable little volume full of suggestive hints (such as the parallel drawn on p. 30 between "Enoch" and Posidonius). The only important independent positions taken are a vigorous defense of the Glzeh MS of Enoch (in Appendix I) and a protest against literary-critical dissection of the Ascension of Isaiah (pp. 45 ff.). Apocalypses are "inherently inconsistent," "a logical Apocalypse would most likely be a dull Apocalypse" (p. 49).

B. S. E.

NEW TESTAMENT

PATTON, CARL S. *Sources of the Synoptic Gospels*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xiii+263 pages. \$1.30.

Part I (pp. 3-120) of this work aims to give a survey of generally accepted synoptic results; it is clearly and attractively written and will serve admirably as an introduction to the Synoptic Problem. In Part II the author offers his own contribution to the subject, an argument that Q was used by Matthew and Luke in two different recensions that are to explain not only the different forms of the Q sayings in these

evangelists but also a considerable part of the special tradition of each. It is to be hoped that this theory will be developed elsewhere in greater detail, for at present the discussions of the various passages are too brief to carry conviction. Real contribution to so technical a subject as the Synoptic Problem can be made only by minute analysis and the weighing of alternative possibilities; Mr. Patton leaves the reader (doubtless wrongly) with the feeling that he is stating little more than general impressions. A wider familiarity with the literature of the subject would also strengthen the book; "J. H. Holtzmann" (*sic*) is quoted only once and Loisy is not noticed at all. And Bernhard Weiss is likewise virtually ignored; an acquaintance with *Die Quellen des Lukasevangeliums* would have saved Mr. Patton from saying that the Hebraic character of Luke's infancy sections is "quite absent from his other peculiar material" (p. 211).

B. S. E.

LUMMIS, E. W. *How Luke Was Written*. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. viii+141 pages. 12mo. 4s. 6d.

Luke first wrote his Gospel with two sources and only two before him, a copy of Mark shorter than the present form and a somewhat illegible copy of Matthew. He set himself to copy as much of the contents of the two rolls as he thought important, at times making one primary and at times the other, but using elements from both in the sections contained in both. At first, principles of order obliged him to omit certain Matthean sayings, but he returned afterward and gave most of the omitted material in various "sequences," of which five are counted. The result, which contained nothing original, is styled Lk^m. This work reacted on the text of Matthew. Many years later Luke returned to Lk^m and revised and expanded it so as to produce the present Gospel, although the details of this last process are to be explained in a larger work.

This solution of the Synoptic Problem is offered in place of the two-document theory, chiefly as giving a more rigorous explanation of the variations in the order of the discourse sections in Luke and Matthew. Certainly many very interesting matters of detail have been brought out and no specialist in synoptic work will be able to ignore this very stimulating little book. But it does not carry conviction. The variations in order are treated as if they were elements in a mechanical problem, whereas the evangelists like all editors must often simply have followed their own taste and convenience in their arrangements; it is illegitimate to insist that a critic either must explain precisely why Matthew united two passages or else must abandon his theory. Mr. Lummis' arguments that Luke detected flaws in the logical sequence of Matthean passages often modernize the psychology of the evangelist, as much so as when he states that Luke thought Matthew's massacre of the children inherently improbable or his connection of baptism with righteousness too materialistic. And he leaves entirely too much unexplained. Why does not Luke agree at least occasionally with Matthew in the relative positions of discourse and Markan material? Why does this material appear so often in a more Jewish form in Luke than in Matthew? Why does Luke 11:17-23 omit from Matt. 12:25-30 precisely the words in which Matthew agrees with Mark? And, by no means least, how is the composition of Matthew to be accounted for? The two-document theory does not in itself explain all the phenomena, but its persistence in synoptic work is due to its necessity and not, as Mr. Lummis holds, to the fact that back in 1838 Weiss gave a "hasty answer" to a badly phrased question.

B. S. E.

GROSCH, HERMANN. *Die angefochtenen Grundwahrheiten des Apostolikums*. Leipzig: Scholl, 1914. 118 pages. M. 3.

This pamphlet is very, very orthodox and, indeed, is meant to be so orthodox that many of the orthodox will probably call it heretical. For the writer in defending the deity of Christ reaches the conclusion that the incarnation involved the assumption of the Logos of an "impersonal" human body without a human soul ("Apollinarianism"). The tone of sturdy faith that pervades its pages is worthy of all admiration, but it is to be feared that its arguments will have little effect on the adversaries.

B. S. E.

HUNTING, HAROLD B. *The Story of Our Bible*. New York: Scribner, 1915. xii+290 pages. \$1.50, illustrated.

Numerous attempts have been made in recent years to explain the origin of the literature contained in the Bible in terms which might be comprehensible to the popular mind. None of these attempts has achieved a more noteworthy success than that of Mr. Hunting. We have here a vivid, concrete, fascinating story of how the Bible grew to be what it is. Beginning with the letters of Paul, the narrative traces the genesis of the New Testament books in the order of their production as that is viewed by modern scholarship. The New Testament presupposes an older literature whose teachings are reflected throughout its pages. The origin and development of the Old Testament books are traced from the bards and ballad-singers of the earliest days to the writings of the Greek-speaking Jews. Several chapters are added describing the translation of the Bible into modern languages and its influence on western ideas. The book is fully and beautifully illustrated. It will interest both children and grown people.

RALL, H. F. *New Testament History*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 314 pages. \$1.50.

This is a popular study of the beginnings of Christianity, designed primarily for use as a college textbook, but so untechnical and readable that it may well serve the needs of any "average reader" who wishes to trace the story of Christianity in its first days. The object of the book is, not to describe an institution or a body of doctrine, but to guide the student to that "great current of life which was at once the greatest revelation of the divine Spirit and the greatest movement of the human spirit that mankind has known." Using the genetic method with great skill, the author develops his material in five chief parts: "The World of the Early Church," "Jesus," "The Jerusalem Church," "Paul and the Church of the Empire," "The Later Church." It is an excellent book, equally well adapted as a textbook for classes or as a reading-course for individuals.

O. C. H.

CHURCH HISTORY

SMITH, PRESERVED (Ed. and transl.). *Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters*. Vol. I, 1507-21. Philadelphia: The Lutheran Publication Society, 1913. 583 pages. \$3.50.

This volume contains translations of almost five hundred letters written by or concerning Luther before 1521. The scope of authorship is comprehensive, representing about four hundred authors, ranging all the way from Pope and Emperor through

Erasmus, Hutten, and Spalatin, down to otherwise unknown monks. The Luther letters are not quite exhaustive for the period. A few relatively insignificant ones have been omitted; also the thirty-eight embodied in the author's earlier work, *Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (1911).

To his services as a sympathetic and luminous translator, Dr. Smith has added those of a painstaking editor. Exhaustive notes throw important light upon hundreds of the characters and events of the period. In respect to the chronology of the letters, some slight changes have been made, yet not such as modify our accepted view of Luther's development. All in all, this work will be greatly appreciated by teachers who direct their students to the sources. It is an important contribution toward the possession of complete source material of the Lutheran movement.

P. G. M.

BUCHWALD, GEORGE. *Martin Luther*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. x+516 pages. M. 8.

In a series of forty-nine readings designed for parents who wish to tell the story of Luther to their children, the author has condensed the career of the Reformer. A description of how Luther was led to, grappled with, and carried through his life-task is followed by a picture of his home life. One chapter is devoted to Luther's part in the development of the evangelical church. The closing chapter describes the last year of the Reformer's life. The presentation as a whole is clear, animated, reasonably complete, and well proportioned. Like many other books that have been written for children, it makes profitable reading—even for adults. It is obvious, however, that the critical historian will find nothing of interest to him. Nothing is added to our present knowledge of Luther. The author is an extreme admirer of Luther, and would not tolerate for a moment the qualified admiration accorded to his hero by such historians as Lindsay or Vedder.

P. G. M.

BÖHMER, HEINRICH. *Luthers Romfahrt*. Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Werner Scholl, 1914. iv+183 pages. M. 4.80.

In this brief monograph a painstaking investigator has endeavored to bring together every scrap of data bearing upon the Reformer's visit to Rome. He establishes by overwhelming evidence that the date was 1510, and by almost as convincing testimony that the purpose was to present the grievances of Augustinian monasteries in revolt against Staupitz. Foiled in this mission at Rome by Egidio Canistro, the writer shows that Luther was won over to the "Conciliation Party" and hence became unpopular among his Augustinian *confrères* at Erfurt. This embarrassing unpopularity is offered as an explanation of his transfer from Erfurt to Wittenberg.

Respecting the impressions that Rome made upon Luther, Professor Böhmer notes that it was only after he had heard and read of the experiences of others that he gradually awakened to the distressing contrast between the Rome of his day that he had looked upon and the Rome of the past that he had been idealizing. Not the least valuable service of the author is that he gives the presentation of how Rome appeared to famous travelers of Luther's day. One defect somewhat mars this volume—the disproportionate emphasis assigned to minor points, such as the career of Egidio Canistro.

P. G. M.

GHELLINCK, J. DE. *Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle*. [Études, Recherches et Documents.] Paris: Lecoffre, 1914. ix+409 pages. Fr. 7.50.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. As a preparation for a later volume that promises to treat comprehensively twelfth-century dogma, the author in this work sweeps the field from the Carolingian renaissance, dealing largely with introductory problems of authorship and historical environment of sources. From a scientific analysis of the text, he argues at great length and convincingly for the dependence of Gandulph upon Peter Lombard. Gandulph he regards as a "un abrégiateur de Pierre Lombard et l'héritier de beaucoup de ses idées" (p. 223). Considerable attention is devoted to tracing the enlarging influence hitherto unnoticed of John of Damascus upon the Occident.

The reader cannot fail to be impressed with the imposing erudition of this writer. He has mastered the sources and is thoroughly conversant with latest research. Although so highly technical, this volume will be valuable as an introductory hand-book for the study of dogma. In attempting to cover such a wide field, the treatment sometimes (as in chap. i) becomes rather cursory. For this defect, however, full compensation has been made in a thorough documentation of the text, a discriminating selection of material supplementary to each chapter, a catalogue of the manuscripts referred to, and last and best, an excellent bibliography.

P. G. M.

LEGG, J. WICKHAM. *English Church Life from the Restoration to the Tractarian Movement*. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1914. 428 pages. \$3.75.

The thesis of the author of this book is that the period under investigation has been very much maligned. In the interest of truth and justice he proposes to let the sources tell their own story, and he believes that the story when thus told without embellishment or literary finish will convince all fair-minded readers. He takes such central subjects as: "The Eucharist"; "The Daily Service"; "Manners and Customs at Church and at Home"; "Discipline and Penance"; "Books of Prayer and Spiritual Reading"; "Church Building, Its Furniture and Decoration." The records abundantly show that none of these things fell into neglect, but rather that they received full and constant attention. This is a book that no student of the period can afford to overlook.

J. W. M.

DOCTRINAL

COFFIN, HENRY SLOANE. *Some Christian Convictions: A Practical Restatement in Terms of Present-Day Thinking*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. ix+222 pages. \$1.00.

The purpose and scope of this book are well stated by the author. He says: "It is not an attempt at a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine, but an effort to restate a few essential Christian convictions in terms that are intelligible and persuasive to persons who have felt the force of the various intellectual movements of recent years." The theological position from which the book proceeds is modern but not radical; it is constructive, placing the emphasis upon positive religious truths; the tone is reverent and devotional. The various chapters composing the book were

given as popular lectures to audiences of thoughtful people who were questioning some of the older forms of Christian faith. For readers in a like situation the book should prove helpful. For the serious student it has little to offer.

F. A. S.

LANGHAM, JAMES P. *The Supreme Quest, Or the Nature and Practice of Mystical Religion*. London: W. A. Hammond, 1915. 224 pages. 2s. 6d.

The author says that his purpose is to give a spiritual interpretation of life. This interpretation consists in an exposition of the mystical view of life. The goal of the "Supreme Quest" is union with God and participation in the world of spiritual realities. In the older mysticism God and this spiritual realm were apart from, and above, the world of sense, and as a consequence there was an undervaluation of the world that stands next to us and the actual happenings of life. The attempt is here made to bring these two worlds together and correct this older estimate of the common earthly life. One feels, however, that this attempt has been made without due recognition of the radical nature of such an effort. If we are to interpret life mystically on the basis of our living in one world, we cannot use very much of the schema of the older mystics, who lived in two worlds.

F. A. S.

BUCKHAM, JOHN WRIGHT. *Mysticism and Modern Life*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 256 pages. \$1.00.

The renewed interest in mysticism is an interesting and significant aspect of modern religious life. Professor Buckham, though a teacher of theology, does not write primarily in the interest of theology, but in behalf of religion and of life. His claim is that mysticism is the very core of religion, and that the mystical sense is, potentially at least, present in all men. His purpose is to clear away misconceptions and extravagances and present a normal mysticism rationally justified that will ensure to life its higher values. He finds many evidences of a genuine mysticism in our modern life. Such an experience lies at the heart of the numerous health cults. Though this may be interpreted in a too one-sided fashion with too much emphasis on the physical, yet these movements bear evidence of an experience in which union with the Infinite is attained. There is today also much of what may be called cosmic mysticism, an experience in which one sees new meanings in the world of nature and of humanity, when the whole in which one shares is clothed with a new dignity and glory.

But this mystical experience must be freed from the charge of being viciously subjective. The author reviews the criticisms to which it has been subjected by the psychologist and concludes that psychology, rightly interpreted, has only reinforced the contention that the mystical element is deeply grounded in our total nature and constitution. Philosophically mysticism is justified on the ground that there is in man a "higher reason" that experiences immediate truth. The intellect has validity within its own sphere, but it deals only with ideas of truth, not with truth itself. Dialectic is helpful in leading one to a point where the vision of the truth may be obtained, but the vision itself is intuitive, immediate.

The author clearly recognizes that the whole matter rests, philosophically, upon intuitionist idealism. Absolute truth, reality, objectively existing, is to be apprehended by means of a "higher reason." The whole discussion moves within the limits of a world thus conceived. Its helpfulness is therefore strictly limited.

F. A. S.

KEYSER, CASSIUS J. *The New Infinite and the Old Theology*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. v+117 pages. \$0.75.

The author believes that theology today is suffering because of contradictions which destroy its inner unity and make it an object of suspicion for the scientific mind. Many of these contradictions are due to the inability of the theologian to make clear the meaning of the term "infinite" as applied to God. The definition of this term, made available through mathematical study, will enable the theologian to avoid these contradictions and to solve many of the age-long difficulties that have beset his path. The discussion is interesting, but the problems upon which the new mathematical knowledge throws light are problems that are rapidly losing interest for theological thinking.

F. A. S.

REUTER, HANS. *Zu Schleiermachers Idee des "Gesamtlebens."* Berlin: Troitzsch, 1914. 31 pages. M. 1.60.

This suggestive study appears as No. 21 in the series "Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche," edited by Bonwetsch and Seeberg. The author traces through Schleiermacher's principal works the idea of reality as an organism. This idea is conceived now metaphysically, now religiously, now socially, now historically. It underlies the mysticism which enabled Schleiermacher to construct so potent a conception of religion. Unlike Hegel, for whom the relation of the parts to the whole was logically conceived, Schleiermacher thinks in terms of life-relationships. This leads, it is true, to a certain vagueness; but Reuter holds that Schleiermacher's conception is nevertheless more capable of meeting the facts of experience than is a more exact logical scheme. The study is unusually suggestive.

G. B. S.

STANGE, CARL. *Die Wahrheit des Christusglaubens*. Mit einem Anhang über die Eigenart des christlichen Gottesglaubens. Leipzig: Deichert, 1915. 126 pages. M. 2.80.

Stange here publishes a series of popular lectures delivered at Dorpat in April, 1914. His audience evidently consisted of persons who are vaguely disturbed by recent historical criticism, and who wish to be reassured in their old faith. To this desire Stange ministers by asserting that criticism cannot make uncertain either the unique spiritual character of Jesus or his resurrection. He then proceeds to relate these undoubted facts to the construction of a christological faith. His exposition starts from concepts which seem abstractions to anyone except a scholastic theologian. "Sin" is portrayed as a realistic entity dominating the "world," which is thus the object of God's just wrath. Death is declared to be the penalty which man must suffer for the dominion of sin over him. The coming of Christ introduced a sinless life into this "world"; hence since Christ "the world is no longer *schlechtthin und ohne Einschränkung für Gott eine verlorene Welt*" (p. 81).

Is the case of Christology, then, so desperate that only by the reinstatement of abstract concepts drawn from ancient thinking there is any meaning to be found to the life of Jesus? To a man accustomed to think of religious problems in terms of actual psychological and historical inquiry Stange's position is well-nigh incomprehensible.

G. B. S.

CUSHING, MAX PEARSON. *Baron D'Holbach: A Study of Eighteenth Century Radicalism in France*. Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Political Science. Columbia University. New York: Columbia University, 1914. iii+188 pages.

This is an excellent little study, very useful to all students of eighteenth-century thought. The author contends that Holbach has not met his deserts at the hands of historians, for the genial baron stood in the very van of French radical thought. Beginning as a translator of German scientific works and English deistic productions, he made his way to an atheism so uncompromising that such by no means gentle scoffers as Voltaire and Frederick the Great stood aghast and cried a frightened halt. All is matter, and matter is from eternity: such is Holbach's central formula. After this beginning it follows quite naturally *qu'il faut sabrer la théologie!* The author of the study is chiefly concerned with cataloguing and summarizing Holbach's works, giving particular attention to the most famous, the *Système de la Nature*.

F. S.

SHELDON, HENRY C. *Studies in Recent Adventism*. New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1915. 160 pages. \$0.50.

Professor Sheldon has written a useful and informing book which will be welcomed by many pastors who are compelled to meet the influence of adventism. With copious citations from typical modern Adventist publications, he sets forth the main tenets of millennialism. Two chapters are devoted to a clear statement and an equally clear criticism of the "cardinal assumptions in Adventist argumentation." The book is written expressly to help pastors and it purposely avoids theological positions which might distract attention from the main theme. From a critical point of view it therefore scarcely avoids dogmatic decisions as to the "true" as over against the "false" interpretation of the "coming of Christ." But with recognition of the self-chosen limitations under which the author wrote, the exposition is to be highly commended.

G. B. S.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

MURRAY, GILBERT. *The Stoic Philosophy*. [Conway Memorial Lecture.] New York and London: Putnam, 1915. 74 pages. \$0.75.

The Stoic system is here expounded in a single popular lecture. Only the most salient features of the system are mentioned, but the choice has been made with skill and sympathy. The more practical aspects of Stoicism are emphasized, with a view to showing that this philosophy was not so much an elaborate scheme of speculation as "a way of looking at the world."

S. J. C.

PHYTHIAN-ADAMS, W. J. *Mithraism*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. [1915]. xi+95 pages. \$0.40.

This little volume appears in the series "Religions Ancient and Modern," and is a concise statement of the principal facts regarding the Mithraic religion. After listing the most important modern literature and sketching a "Mithraic Chronology,"

the author describes briefly in a "Foreword" the task which confronts the student of this subject. This is followed by a statement of Mithra's career in Asia before the cult began to spread in the Roman Empire. The extent of its spread and the means by which this was effected are then described. Finally, its monuments, its mythology, its rites, and its doctrines are briefly treated. The whole is a very compact yet reliable exposition of this ancient faith.

S. J. C.

Beiträge zur Religionswissenschaft. Herausgegeben von der religionswissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Stockholm. I. Jahrgang (1913-14), Heft 2. Stockholm: A. Bonnier; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. M. 6.

This is the second part of the first volume of a new periodical designed to give expression to Swedish scholarship in the general field of the history of religions. It promises to be an important publication, judging from the contents of this "Heft." Ignaz Goldziher contributes an article on catholic and particularistic tendencies within Islam; S. A. Fries, the general editor of the publication, writes on the temple of Yahweh outside of Palestine; and G. P. Wetter interprets the Johannine expression "I am the Light of the world." A review of recent Swedish literature and a chronicle of events of interest to scholars in this particular field are also included.

The periodical is not to appear as a regular magazine but as the organ of the society under whose auspices it is published. Consequently the frequency of its appearance and the extent of its contents will be conditioned by the contributions which are from time to time found available for publication. This arrangement will naturally tend to insure the scientific character of the publication.

S. J. C.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

WARD, HARRY F. *Social Evangelism.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1915. 145 pages. 50 cents.

This is a valiant attempt to reconcile the individualistic and the socially minded followers of Jesus. The author deserves great credit, not only for his heroic grappling with the problem, but for unusual clarity of thought and statement. To substitute the "both and" "of the gospel" for the "either, or" of partisan dogma and thus to bring Christianity into full dynamic relation with the modern world—or even to try to do this—is surely a work of merit.

A. H.

AGAR, FREDERICK A. *Church Finance.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1915. 108 pages. 50 cents.

In this volume the flabbiness of church membership in terms of attendance, support, and evangelization is quite shockingly exposed. The final chapter on proper methods of church finance has considerable merit, but notwithstanding these efficiency devices which should be adopted one feels depressed by the self-concern with which the evident invalidism of the church afflicts her. It will take more than interest in the church to save the church.

A. H.

CRANNELL, PHILIP WENDELL. *The Survival of the Unfit*. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1915. x+203 pages. \$1.00.

Dr. Crannell, president of Kansas City Baptist Theological Seminary, here presents, in a series of homiletic essays, the primacy of Christian experience in moral culture. This is the clue which, perhaps, unifies the thirty-two essays composing the book. The material is presented in pleasing style and should be an acceptable aid to devotion and meditation.

A. H.

PEPPER, GEORGE WHARTON. *A Voice from the Crowd*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. 204 pages. \$1.50.

From 1871 until the present time the Lyman Beecher Lectureship on Preaching has been filled "by a minister of the gospel who has been markedly successful in the special work of the Christian ministry." The choice of a layman for this very honorable position in the year 1915 is therefore an innovation which we prefer to regard, not as proof of a dearth of suitable ordained men, but as proof of a growing spirit of democracy in religion and a sincere desire on the part of the pulpit to listen to the wisdom of the pew.

Mr. Pepper's knowledge of men derived from the practice of law and his membership in the Episcopal church color and perhaps enhance his friendly criticism of the ministry.

The subjects treated are of wide range, including orthodox theology, religious education, and Christian unity, and while in all of these fields there is room for difference of opinion the reviewer is convinced that the lectures as a whole are very valuable in two respects, viz., in enabling the minister to see himself as others see him, and in convincing him of his need of a more intimate, broad and normal acquaintance with his fellow-men. The bearing of the gospel on social morality and reconstruction is slighted by Dr. Pepper.

A. H.

LEETE, F. D. *The Church in the City*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 317 pages. \$1.00.

Bishop Leete's wide experience in city pastorates and his keen observation of the problems of the city church form the basis of this book. The material is presented in flowing style but with discriminating judgment and attention to detail. The chapters on the "Institutional Church" and on the "Children of the Town" are especially valuable. The whole work is pervaded with a fine sense of the needs of the mass of urban humanity which the church should serve.

A. H.

CONNELL, J. M. *A Book of Devotional Readings from the Literature of Christendom*. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1913. 295 pages. \$1.25.

The writer states that his aim has been to illustrate the continuity of divine inspiration since New Testament times. He has therefore given in chronological order extracts from the noble Christian expressions of those who have been in the apostolic succession of the spirit. Anthologies are always their own best justification.

T. G. S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Clay, A. T. *Miscellaneous Inscriptions in the Yale Babylonian Collection.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915. xii+108+iv pages. \$5.00.
- Humbert, Paul. *Qohéleth.* (Extrait de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie.) Lausanne: Bureau de la Rédaction, 1915. 27 pages.
- King, L. W. *History of Babylon.* New York: Frederick Stokes, 1915. xxiii+340 pages. \$4.80 net.
- Vernes, Maurice. *Sinai contre Kades. Les grands sanctuaires de l'exode Israélite et les routes du desert. Étude archéologique et géographique.* (École pratique des hautes études. Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire 1915-1916.) Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1915. 131 pages.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Abbott, Edwin A. *Miscellanea Evangelica (II). Christ's Miracles of Feeding.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1915. xii+197 pages. 3s.
- Allen, W. C. *The Gospel according to St. Mark.* (Oxford Church Biblical Commentary.) London: Macmillan, 1915. xvi+214 pages. 7s. 6d. net.
- Dean, John T. *The Book of Revelation.* Edinburgh: Clark, 1915. 191 pages. 2s.
- McKnight, R. J. G. *The Second Coming of Christ. Is It Pre-Millennial?* Wilkinsburg, Pa.: R. J. G. McKnight, 1915. 72 pages. \$0.15.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Lietzmann, Hans. *Paul and Paulus in Rom.* Bonn: Verlag von J. Neumann, 1915. xii+108 pages. 3s.
- Pollock, J. H. *Medieval Chancery.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1915. 3s.
- Schubert, Alfred, and Gallinger, Herbert. *Conversations with Luther.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1915. xxvii+260 pages. \$1.00.

- Swete, Henry Barclay. *The Holy Catholic Church.* New York: Macmillan, 1915. x+265 pages. \$1.25.
- Wilkins, H. J. *Was John Wycliffe a Negligent Pluralist? Also John de Trevisa; His Life and Work.* New York: Longmans, 1915. xii+113 pages. \$1.75.
- Wotherspoon, H. J. *The Ministry in the Church.* New York: Longmans, 1916. xvi+208 pages. \$1.35.

DOCTRINAL

- Forsyth, Peter Taylor. *Theology in Church and State.* New York: Doran, 1915. xxvi+328 pages. \$1.25.
- Janvier, A. *Exposition de la morale catholique. Morale spéciale. IV. La charité: La nature et son objet.* Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1914. 391 pages.
- A. *Exposition de la morale catholique. Morale spéciale V. La charité: II. Ses effets.* Paris: Lethielleux, 1915. 364 pages. Fr. 4.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Jordan, Louis Henry. *Comparative Religion. Its Adjuncts and Allies.* London: Oxford University Press, 1915. xxxii+575 pages. 12s.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Agar, Frederick A. *Church Finance.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1915. vii+108 pages. \$0.50.
- Cowan, H., and Hastings, J. (Editors). *Sub Corona. Sermons Preached in the University Chapel of King's College, Aberdeen, by Principals and Professors of Theological Faculties in Scotland.* Edinburgh: Clark, 1915. x+297 pages. 4s. 6d.
- The Essential Place of Religion in Education.* Ann Arbor: National Education Association, 1916. 134 pages. \$0.30.

- Hall, Francis J. *The Bible and Modern Criticism*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. 44 pages. \$0.25.
- Hough, Lynn Harold. *In the Valley of Decision*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1916. 71 pages. \$0.50.
- Rhineland, Philip M. *The Faith of the Cross*. New York: Longmans, 1916. xiii+144 pages. \$1.20.
- Runnalls, C. Bertram. *Suggestions for Conducting a Church Class in Psycho-Therapy*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. x+75 pages. \$0.75.
- Stewart, H. F. *The Holiness of Pascal*. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. ix+145 pages. 45.
- Eckman, George P. *The Literary Primacy of the Bible*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 209 pages. \$1.00.
- Goldsmith, Peter H. *A Brief Bibliography of Books in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, Relating to the Republics Commonly Called Latin American. With Comments*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xix+107 pages.
- Holland, Henry Scott. *So As by Fire*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. 120 pages. \$0.40.
- Holt, Edwin B. *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*. New York: Holt, 1915. vii+208 pages. \$1.25.
- Leonard, William E. *Socrates: Master of Life*. Chicago: Open Court Co., 1915. vii+118 pages. \$1.00.
- Lhande, Pierre. *Le prix du sang*. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1915. 147 pages. Fr. 1.50.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Dieu, La France, nos enfants. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1915. 109 pages. Fr. 1.50.
- Besançon, Georges. *Les "Zeppelins."* Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 43 pages.
- Blanchon, G. *Le Général Gallieni*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 31 pages.
- Blanchon, G. *Le Général Joffre*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 32 pages.
- Blanchon, G. *Le Général Pau*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 38 pages.
- Blanchon, G. *Les sous-marins et la guerre actuelle*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 38 pages.
- Bristol, Lucius Moody. *Social Adaptation*. (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. XIV.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915. xii+356 pages. \$2.00.
- Denison, Henry Phipps. *Some Spiritual Lessons of the War*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. v+67 pages. \$0.60.
- Doumic, R. *Le Soldat de 1914. Le Salut aux chefs*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 38 pages.
- The Living Church Annual and Churchman's Almanac—1916. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. xxxii+528 pages. \$0.50.
- Lorin, Henri. *L'héroïque Serbie*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 37 pages.
- Marre, Francis. *Dans les tranchées du front*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 61 pages.
- Marre, Francis. *Notre "75."* Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 61 pages.
- Miles. *Le Général Maunoury*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 48 pages.
- Nothomb, Pierre. *Le Roi Albert*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 32 pages.
- Rockefeller, John D., Jr. *The Colorado Industrial Plan*. New York: Rockefeller, 1916. 95 pages.
- Sauveur, Albert. *L'Allemagne et la guerre européenne*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 70 pages.
- Welschinger, Henri. *Les leçons du livre jaune*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 139 pages.

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THE PROGRESS OF THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT DURING THE PAST FIFTY YEARS¹

ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT
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I have been asked to speak upon the progress of theological thought during the past fifty years. The subject is a large one and in order that my address may not be a mere catalogue of names and titles, it seems necessary to eschew details and to devote myself to certain general tendencies which have marked the period.

The half-century during which your Divinity School has been in existence is not sharply marked off from other periods in the history of Christian thought. So far as I am aware, there are no theological tendencies which exactly synchronize with it. Those of which I propose to speak are all of them much older, but I think that I am right in saying that they have gathered new force during the last generation or two, and within recent years have completely changed the face of theology. It is this which justifies me in singling them out for particular mention.

1. First let me speak of the evolutionary tendency, the steadily growing control of theological thought by the conception of evolution. The conception, of course, is much more than fifty years old. It was already abroad in the eighteenth century, and before

¹ An address given on the occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

the middle of the nineteenth, particularly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, it was widely influential in certain theological circles. But since the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 it has had a far larger influence in theological thought, and, what is more, its influence has been of a different kind, for the conception itself has undergone a radical change.

One effect of the doctrine of evolution has been the growing prevalence among theologians of the scientific spirit and method. It is a striking fact that it is only since the appearance of Darwin's epoch-making book that the age-long conflict between theology and science has been outgrown. Until recently the attitude of theology toward science was one of distrust, if not of active hostility; but in the last few decades, and in no small degree as a result of the growing prevalence of the idea of evolution, theology and science have laid down their arms and are living on friendly terms with each other. As a consequence modern theological thought is more and more feeling the influence of the scientific attitude to which it was for so long bitterly hostile.

One result of this has been the spread within theological circles of a naturalistic way of looking at things. The older supernaturalism has been outgrown in many quarters, and in the place of it has arisen a naturalism which has transformed our theological thinking. As an illustration of what I mean take modern apologetic. It is not very long since apologists were in the habit of appealing to prophecy and miracle as an important, if not the chief, support of Christianity. A small book published a dozen years ago by my lamented colleague, Dr. George William Knox, on *The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion*, is an indication of the change that has taken place. He took the title of his book from Bishop Butler's *Analogy*. To Butler "the direct and fundamental proofs of the Christian religion" were the miracles. To Dr. Knox the direct and fundamental proofs of Christianity were the worth and practicability of its ethical principle of mutual love and sympathy and service. And though not all modern apologists may phrase the argument as he did, there is general unanimity among them in shifting the emphasis from external signs and wonders to the character of the Christian message

and of the Christian purpose; and, if the miracles appear at all, it is rather as objects of faith than as supports for faith.

Another evidence of naturalism in the religious realm is the modern biological study of religion. It is a common thing today to deal with religion in a wholly naturalistic way, as one of the forces promoting the development of the race, and to estimate it accordingly. An illustration of this is found in the chapter on "The Function of Religious Beliefs in the Evolution of Society" in Kidd's book on *Social Evolution*. And the still more recent book of your own Professor Foster on *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence* is a capital example of the general tendency.

Still another illustration of the changed attitude toward religion is the recent development of the psychology of religion. To deal with religion as a natural phenomenon in human life as any other phenomenon is dealt with; to study the experience of conversion, for instance, not as the immediate and miraculous work of the Spirit of God, but as the natural result of entirely explicable psychical forces—this, whether we like it or not, is working a revolution in modern religious thought, and the end is not yet. The transformed apologetic of our day, the tendency to treat religion as a biological factor in the development of the race, the study of the psychology of religion—all these are significant of the change that has come over the theological world in the last few decades.

And yet it would be misleading to speak of these effects of the naturalistic tendency without calling attention also to the modern doctrine of divine immanence, which owes its prevalence in part at least to the very conception of evolution to which naturalism in theology is largely due. That doctrine, so widely current in these days, has served to bridge the old chasm between nature and the supernatural and to make them completely one. As God is in all there is, to explain religion biologically or psychologically does not make it any less divine. And so the peril for religious faith that seemed to lurk in the modern amity between science and religion is avoided.

Another manifestation of the influence of the general scientific spirit and method is seen in the modern recognition of experience

as the only legitimate basis of theology. This, too, is much more than fifty years old. Schleiermacher was the great representative of this tendency a century ago, but Schleiermacher's influence was checked by the rise and spread of the Hegelian philosophy and its dominance within theology, and it is only in modern times that the attempt to establish it has again been made by theologians, both across the sea and in our own land.

One is reminded in this connection of the book by Professor Stearns, published a quarter of a century ago, and entitled *The Evidence of Christian Experience*, as also of the Barrows Lectures on *Christian Belief Interpreted by Christian Experience*, given some ten years ago by the late President Charles Cuthbert Hall. These books illustrate what is a very common method today in Christian theology, the use of the Christian experience and its data as the primary materials for theology. Let me quote the following from Professor Stearn's book:

The work on which we are engaged is one of the highest scientific importance. Let us not unwittingly copy the unbeliever's attitude toward Christian experience and treat it as though it were a matter of sentiment rather than a subject of rational thought. We believe this experience to be real; our certainty of its reality is not less strong than our certainty respecting the other great facts of human experience in the outward and inward worlds. We regard our faith as the most reasonable exercise of our rational activity. Let us have the courage of our convictions. If we are right, here is a field for scientific research of the utmost importance. If it is a noble thing for men, in their search for truth, to devote themselves to the investigation of the phenomena of the material and physical world, or of those of the inner world of thought, why is it not a nobler and higher thing to devote themselves to the investigation of this lofty sphere of spiritual reality, where God in his supreme revelation enters our souls and moulds them by his grace?

As a matter of fact, this sounds more scientific than it really is. It must be recognized that in so-called Christian experience we are not dealing with a set of objective data like the phenomena of nature. Our Christian experience is determined in no small measure by our pre-existent beliefs, and so we are apt to move in a circle; when we think we are basing our theology on our experience, we are really only interpreting the latter in the light of the former, or, more probably, are simply putting into theological form an experience which is itself largely the fruit of the

theology which we already have and which we may only have inherited. Whether we can ever escape this dilemma I for one doubt. But whether the attempt to be scientific in this matter be successful or not, it has at any rate had large and beneficial results. It has served to moderate the claims of a speculative theology that knew no bounds or limits, and has brought to the fore and emphasized those ideas and those doctrines which have a direct bearing upon experience and a vital relation to it. And this means a real advance, even if in the name of science theologians are claiming for the experimental method in theology more than that method will bear.

Associated with this emphasis upon experience as alone supplying the materials for theology is a marked agnosticism which is widely characteristic of the present day. Agnosticism, too, is much more than half a century old. It dates back in fact to an early period in the history of thought, and it has occasionally found entrance even into the Christian church; but it is not without significance for our day that the word "Agnostic" was coined by Huxley only in 1869, at a time when the old dependence on supernatural authority, which had helped many a theologian of other days out of his agnosticism, was beginning to break down. As a result, agnosticism touching many matters formerly deemed fundamental has come to be a common attitude on the part of religious men, and even of theologians. If we say that in order to be scientific we must take our theological material from religious experience alone, then we must be content to be agnostic about all that lies beyond the range of experience.

One of the most striking illustrations of this attitude is the place of the doctrine of immortality in modern thought. During all the Christian centuries it has been regarded as a fundamental doctrine of religion, of such a character that doubt of it must destroy religious faith altogether. But in recent years, as a result of many influences, among which the scientific tendency not to transcend the limits of experience is one, the belief in immortality has become less and less controlling. Theologians are not so inclined as they once were to dogmatize upon the subject. The very title of a recent book upon immortality, *The Christian Hope*,

by a colleague of my own, William Adams Brown, illustrates the modern attitude. Or one may go still farther and say that many Christians, because the life after death lies beyond the range of experimental proof, have grown indifferent about it and are turning their attention to other things of more immediate and practical concern.

And yet there is another side of the matter which throws light upon the general situation, and that is the way in which religious men are nowadays proving the doctrine of immortality—not by logic, and not by philosophy, but by experience. Men even of high scientific rank, like Sir Oliver Lodge, for instance, are finding evidence of a life beyond the grave in direct communications from the spirit world. This is very significant of the modern attitude—agnosticism upon the subject of immortality, and then the re-establishment of belief in it on the basis of scientific experiment!

Another effect of the conception of evolution within the sphere of theology is the great and increasing dominance of the historic spirit and interest, a striking illustration of which is modern biblical criticism. Biblical criticism is also very old, but it is within the last half-century that it has won its greatest victories and come finally into practically undisputed possession of the field; and it is within this period too that American scholars have begun to bear their share of the work. Biblical criticism is a subject by itself, and I cannot dwell upon it here; but I may call your attention to the fact that it has had theological effects of the very greatest significance. It is not that simply our view of the Bible has changed as a result of it, but our whole view of religious authority has changed. As we have learned not to think of the Bible as a final and infallible authority, as the ultimate court of appeal in all matters of human concern, we have come to see that there is no such authority and that we need none. The result has been a change of perspective and a readjustment of values in religion of simply untold consequence. Biblical criticism may seem often to concern itself with matters of minor importance and of very small religious interest, but it has cut deeper into the traditions of the past than any other single movement and has made

our modern theological liberty possible. The conservatives who feared and opposed it in its early days, because they saw what a revolution it portended, were far more clear-sighted than most of the liberals, who thought that it meant simply a slight shifting of position, and imagined that they could retain religious and moral infallibility while giving up all other kinds. Fortunately, few realized all that was involved, or they would have feared to go forward, as Luther declared he would have feared to begin his reforming work had he known how far it would lead him. But it is now becoming clear that, largely through modern biblical criticism, we have at last won that spiritual freedom which even the Reformers failed to attain, and without which permanent progress is impossible in religion as in everything else.

And what is true of biblical criticism is true in only lesser measure of the modern scientific study of the history of Christian thought. Tracing in objective fashion the rise and development of the great dogmas to which large sections of the Christian church have pinned their faith, and upon which they have staked their hopes of salvation, we have become emancipated from theological tyranny and have learned to think for ourselves in religion, instead of simply repeating the thoughts of other generations. All of which means that relativism has finally come to take the place of absolutism in theology, as it long ago did in other departments of life and thought. Theologians have given up the old dependence upon an infallible and immutable authority, and religious men in general are rapidly outgrowing the need of it. It is coming to be ever more widely recognized that all is in process of development and change, and that each generation must discover for itself the new truths and the new principles by which it shall live.

I said at the beginning that the conception of evolution has not simply spread rapidly and gained an ever larger influence since the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, but that it has also changed in character. In older days, evolution was thought of as the mere unfolding of what was already in the original germ. It was thus represented by Cardinal Newman in his work on *The Development of Christian Dogma*, and by my own teacher, Dr. William G. T. Shedd, in his essay on *Evolution*, published as

recently as 1877. In both cases the conception was consistent with a conservatism of the most extreme type.

Or, again, it was thought of, for instance by the Hegelians, as the mere unfolding of the Absolute, an idea which gave a metaphysical and logical character to the process which is very uncongenial to our modern mind. As a matter of fact we have come to recognize that evolution is a process of give and take; that there is creation in it, not mere unfolding; that there is appearing in it, all the time, not simply the old in a changed form, but the new in its own form; and hence the conception makes, not for conservatism in theology, worship of the old and submission to it, but for radicalism, the recognition of the new and the welcome of it.

In the work of the modern *religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, which has had so marked an influence upon the interpretation of Christian origins, not only in Germany but in America as well, this newer idea of evolution finds striking illustration. Early Christianity is recognized, not as an original and simple germ developing in the midst of an alien environment, but as a complex and eclectic thing, itself the product of the most diverse and conflicting forces, religious and cultural. And, whatever our attitude toward this particular school, we are coming widely to think of Christian history in a similar way, and to abandon the old notion of an essence of Christianity which has remained the same during all the centuries and which may be discovered by stripping off the husk of local and temporary beliefs and practices and getting at the true kernel within. We are coming to recognize that Christianity has been many and different things in the past, and to expect that it will be many and different things in the future, as it becomes the religion of successive generations and civilizations and is reinterpreted by them. Judicious words are said upon this subject in a recent book by one of your own Faculty, Professor Case, in his *Evolution of Early Christianity*.

2. A second influence that has meant much for modern theological thought is the social emphasis. It has had its chief effects in the sphere of practical life, but it has borne fruit also in many important changes in theology. The roots of it lie far back, and the last half-century has but entered into the heritage of preceding

generations. But it is worthy of notice, as we are celebrating this semi-centennial, that it was in 1865 that there appeared a striking book, much discussed at the time and widely influential, in which the burden of Jesus' message was declared to be, not the salvation of the world from sin, but humanitarianism pure and simple. I refer to *Ecce Homo*, which had not a little to do with the interpretation of Jesus' message in social terms—an interpretation increasingly common in modern times.

The tendency of the social emphasis in theology is well illustrated by the Bampton Lectures for 1883 by Canon Freemantle, on *The World as the Subject of Redemption*. The first lecture opens with the following passage:

The purpose of this course of Lectures is to restore the idea of the Christian Church as a moral and social power, present, universal, capable of transforming the whole life of mankind, and destined to accomplish this transformation. The Church has often been presented to men as if it had no object but public worship and teaching, with some few accidental adjuncts of beneficent action. It is regarded as a society, but a society of which public prayer and preaching are the supreme, if not exclusive, *ratio essendi*. If a further object is assigned, it is to prepare men for another world. In contrast to this limited view of its functions, the Church will be here presented as the Social State in which the Spirit of Christ reigns; as embracing the general life and society of men, and identifying itself with these as much as possible; as having for its object to imbue all human relations with the spirit of Christ's self-renouncing love and thus to change the *world* into a kingdom of God.

A number of books upon the subject have been written in recent years, as, for instance, *Outlines of Social Theology* by President Hyde of Bowdoin, and *Theology and the Social Consciousness* by President King of Oberlin. And few modern works on theology have failed to show the influence of the social point of view, in this respect offering a striking contrast to the older dogmatic systems. One of the most notable examples of what I have in mind is Professor Royce's recent work upon *The Problem of Christianity*, in which the community appears as the central and formative principle of the whole treatment.

All experience [he says in his preface] must be at least individual experience; but unless it is also social experience, and unless the whole religious community which is in question unites to share it, this experience is but as sounding brass, and as a tinkling cymbal. This truth is what Paul saw. This

is the rock upon which the true and ideal church is built. This is the essence of Christianity. . . . We are saved, if at all, by devotion to the Community, in the sense of that term which these two volumes attempt to explain and to defend.

It is evident that such a shifting of emphasis from the individual to society must have large effects upon many of our traditional religious ideas. Already it has profoundly altered our conceptions of the nature of the gospel, the person and work of Christ, of man and sin and redemption, of the church and the sacraments. And above all it has transformed our interpretation of the character and purposes of God. As Dr. George A. Gordon remarks in his *Ultimate Conceptions of Faith*, "The selfish man gives rise to the selfish God; the man who has not yet come to the sense of the society in which alone he is real, conceives of God as like himself, a pure individualist." This may mean, as it means to Dr. Gordon himself, and to many others, a new reason for believing in the doctrine of the Trinity, or for substituting a form of polytheism, a commonwealth of gods, for traditional monotheism, as suggested by Felix Adler in an interesting article in the *International Journal of Ethics*. But its more significant effect is the reinterpretation of God's character in terms of our own social interest, a reinterpretation which finds its finest expression in Ritschl's description of God as a being whose holy purpose of love is to promote the spirit of love among men.

3. I have left myself all too little time to speak of a third influence which is making itself felt in modern theology. The influence I refer to is pragmatism, and, though its effects are less patent and less familiar than those of evolution and the social emphasis, they are equally profound and far-reaching. I use the word pragmatism only for a single phase of what is today known in philosophical circles as pragmatism—for that aspect of it which means the postulation of realities we cannot prove and the living of our lives by faith in them. William James's essay on *The Will to Believe* is the most familiar modern expression of it, though as a matter of fact it is a very partial and fragmentary expression.

Understood thus, pragmatism is only a new name for an old thing. The earliest important representative of it in modern times was the philosopher Kant. Recognizing the impossibility

of finding God in the world of phenomena which is bound together by the iron chain of mechanical causation, Kant looked for God in another sphere altogether. He believed that man's moral nature—the necessity laid upon him to live for high and holy ends, for the best ends he knows—involves the belief in freedom, in immortality, and in God. And so he postulated God and freedom and immortality on the basis of man's moral need.

My justification for speaking of pragmatism in an address dealing with the progress of theology during the last fifty years lies in the fact that the influence of Kant's pragmatism began to make itself felt in Christian theology only after three-quarters of a century, when the credit of Hegelianism had begun to wane and the movement back to Kant was in full swing in Germany. In 1874 there appeared the third volume of Ritschl's great work on *Justification and Reconciliation*, in which the first attempt was made to reconstruct theology upon the basis of what has since come to be called pragmatism. According to Ritschl, man belongs to two worlds, the world of ideals where free moral purpose has play, and the world of things, where all is determined by mechanical laws. And man's problem as a moral being is to win the victory for his ideals and to keep his soul intact and free. This need of man, according to Ritschl, leads him to believe in God, a God of moral purpose to whom he links up his own purposes and thus wins his victory. The pragmatic character of Ritschl's position is not impaired, though it has been somewhat obscured, by his empirical use of the life of the historic Jesus. Jesus won his victory, so Ritschl says, by faith in God and by devotion to his will, faith in a God of holy purpose, whose will it is to promote the spirit of love among men. Giving himself to the fulfilment of the will of such a God, Jesus won his victory over the world, not by exploiting it, but by serving it. And by a like faith and devotion we may win our victory too; and thus our postulate of God will vindicate itself as sound. This means, of course, that religious faith is a venture, as faith in all the higher things of life is a venture—faith in love, in goodness, in honesty, and truth. But in living by faith in them and by the practice of them men prove them in their daily experience, and in living by faith in God and by doing his will men prove him too.

The significant thing about pragmatism in theology is not that it leads to a change in this or that traditional doctrine, but that it alters the whole method of theology and the whole basis of faith. And whatever one's attitude toward the movement, it must be recognized that it works a revolution for all who have felt its influence.

Evolution, the social emphasis, pragmatism, these three influences are bringing it to pass that the contrast between the theological thinking of this day in which we live and the theological thinking of other days is greater than the contrasts between any other two periods in the history of Christian thought. The chasm is deep; what is before us no one knows. But the future is full of hope, for there are abroad a courage and a venturesomeness, both in life and in faith, which bode well for religion and theology.

I may close with a familiar passage from William James's *Pragmatism*:

Suppose that the world's author put the test to you before creation, saying: "I am going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does his own 'level best.' I offer you the chance of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk?"

Should you in all seriousness, if participation in such a world were proposed to you, feel bound to reject it as not safe enough? Would you say that, rather than be part and parcel of so fundamentally pluralistic and irrational a universe, you preferred to relapse into the slumber of nonentity from which you had been momentarily aroused by the tempter's voice?

Of course if you are normally constituted, you would do nothing of the sort. There is a healthy-minded buoyancy in most of us which such a universe would exactly fit. We would therefore accept the offer—"Top! und schlag auf schlag!" It would be just like the world we practically live in; and loyalty to our old nurse Nature would forbid us to say no. The world proposed would seem "rational" to us in the most living way.

Most of us, I say, would therefore welcome the proposition and add our *fiat* to the *fiat* of the creator.

There can be no doubt that these words fitly describe the dominant religious spirit of our age. And theology, if it be a genuine theology, is but the child of religion.

RELIGIOUS ADVANCE IN FIFTY YEARS¹

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The present day might seem a most unfavorable time for calm review or for any attempt to see the past in true perspective. The earth-shaking events beyond the sea distort our vision and confuse our judgment, as a violent wind sweeping over a lake shatters the reflection of all objects on the shore. Yet at just such a time we may see most clearly, because the tremendous issues now forced upon the world release us from those petty questions which so often befog religious men. Superficial things are being sloughed off, that the things which cannot be shaken may remain. Times of crisis should be times of understanding.

The most noteworthy element in the religious advance of the last fifty years is the general diffusion of the idea that advance in religion is desirable. Darwin's great book was published fifty-seven years ago—the work of one of the most modest, patient, open-minded men of the nineteenth century. As a result of his ideas—received at first with indignation, then with ridicule, then with quiet readjustment of old ways of thinking—we learned to think in terms of time rather than in terms of space. Religion before his day was largely spatial in its conceptions. It conceived the world as a finished article, heaven as a distant place, revelation as completed in an oriental province, the second coming as an apparition in the clouds, the final judgment as a geological upheaval and a rending of the sky. Such a world was pictured by Milton as though laid out with a pair of celestial compasses. By Bunyan it was conceived as a road leading from a City of Destruction to a Celestial City—both cities being fixed in position and unchangeable in character. Hence religion was static, an adjustment of one's self

¹ An address given on the occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

to events that occurred in Palestine or would yet occur in the sky. As heaven was beyond the reach of change, human life was admirable in proportion as it, too, became static. We need not stop to point out how Plato's city-state embodies the same conception of the ideal city as one that has attained, and so has no need to grow.

But with the gradual infiltration of the idea that the world is the result, not of fiat, but of process, came a new and vitalizing conception of religion itself as a progress, an unfolding, a forward-looking and upward-striving power. Spatial conceptions—the lost Eden, the Solomonic temple, the cloud that received Him out of their sight, the city that had twelve gates great and high—began to seem inadequate to religious aspiration. Temporal suggestions, long overlooked in the Scriptures—"after a long time the Lord of those servants cometh," "first the blade, then the ear"—began to glow with new meaning. Religion, instead of expecting release through a geological catastrophe, began to expect a slow development, a resistless advance, and a glorious conquest of the world that now is. Once men had said: Whatever is unchangeable is divine. Now they began to say: Whatever is marked by ceaseless unfolding in forms of beauty and truth and power of human service, is divine. Thus the most notable progress was in making the idea of progress at home in the religious consciousness of our generation. The idea of evolution has been called by one of our teachers an "opium pipe" to lull the church to sleep. Rather would I call it a bugle call, a summons to move as God is moving, to march with the stars that fight for us. Henceforth we are not to live "hastening to the day of God," as the Authorized Version said; but to live as "hastening the day of God"—a very different matter.

The first result of this new conception of progress was a new joyousness in the expression of religious faith. The hymnology of fifty years ago seems to us now like a suit of clothes outgrown. The old hymns were peculiarly plaintive. A mild and pensive melancholy was then the note of spirituality. We sometimes wonder that Lincoln could select as his favorite poem, "O, why should the spirit of mortal be proud?" But we forget that the note of disillusionment and resignation was then the mark of all spiritual aspiration. "There is rest for the weary," was the opening hymn

at many a church service. "I'm a pilgrim and I'm a stranger" was sung by little children. "A fleeting show for man's delusion given" was the accepted verdict of the church on the world.

But whoever enters any religious convention today hears at once hymns of a new virility and joyousness. The world is no longer merely to be escaped, it is to be transformed. It is not a fleeting show, but a battlefield where victory may be delayed but is absolutely sure. In 1855 Mr. Beecher shocked Christian sentiment by including in his *Plymouth Hymnal* some serene and optimistic poems of John G. Whittier. Since then the church has searched all the songs of all the singers for the expression of its victorious faith, and the songs of the church, having passed through their wailing period, have returned to the earliest type, heard at Philippi when Paul and Silas sang at midnight until the prison doors fell open. The Christian hymnology of the twentieth century is much nearer to that song in the Philippian jail than it is to the mediaeval *Dies Irae*, as our conception of the Christian life is much more in sympathy with the first epistle to the Corinthians than it is with Dante or Milton or Bunyan. In its singing, at least, the church is getting "back to Christ."

But the real change of these fifty years lies deeper than any imagery or any series of conceptions. It lies in the general preference for the psychological approach to reality in place of the old dogmatic approach. We were made perfectly familiar with the dogmatic method in our childhood. In the ancient creeds formulated by the church, or in the ancient Bible dictated by inspiration, were certain pronouncements of doctrine. "Whosoever will be saved, it is necessary that he believe"—so began the famous formula. The Puritans of New England revolted from those historic creeds, but the credal approach they believed to be indispensable. The *New England Primer*, of which three million copies were printed in one hundred and fifty years, contained the shorter catechism and the whole Puritan theology. Those men gave to their children unchanging, infallible statements of historico-metaphysical fact as the indispensable basis of a good life. These statements, coming down from inspired sources, were incapable of improvement and needed only explication and assent.

But the great change that has come over the church is the loss of interest in this whole dogmatic approach. Whether the formulas be true or false does not seem to us so vital as to our fathers. Not only have we ceased to contend over the ancient distinction of *homo-ousion* and *homoi-ousion*, but the debates over imputation versus impartation, over plenary versus verbal inspiration, over "nature" and "person," all seem to us curiously unreal. It is not because one side has outargued the other, but because both have lost interest in the struggle. It is as if two contending armies had simultaneously discovered that they were fighting over shadowy issues, and had walked off arm in arm to another battlefield to face another and a common foe. We have learned to ignore some things for which our fathers fought—as Jesus of Nazareth ignored one of the hottest controversies of his time and quietly said: "Neither in this mountain nor yet at Jerusalem shall men worship." The psychological approach has lifted us into a new atmosphere, as the aeroplane enables the operator to look down on the hosts contending in the battlefields below him. We may call the new approach the historic method, or pragmatism, or realism, or what we will. For the religious life of the multitude it means finding out how ancient conceptions originated and then asking what their value is for the development of character today.

For example, the rank and file of our churches are not interested in discussing the heresies alleged of Horace Bushnell and Albert Barnes and Charles Augustus Briggs. Those famous trials are "burnt-out craters healed with snow." We regard the once fiercely defended propositions as "value judgments" to be replaced by deeper insights today.

The forgiveness of sins, once a forensic process, is now interpreted as an inner experience, a change in the consciousness of God and man. The second coming, once a stupendous spectacle, has become a far more significant entrance of Christ into the consciousness of humanity—his immergence in the thinking and hoping and toiling of the entire world.

This psychological approach is the characteristic note of modern preaching. Phillips Brooks's most famous sermon, "The Candle of the Lord," is simply an attempt to show how the human per-

sonality is the supreme expression and necessary limitation of the divine message. Those who were brought up to admire the preaching of Canon Liddon felt a strange sense of insecurity when listening to Phillips Brooks. But the church at large felt that Liddon's method was already antiquated and that Phillips Brooks was turning

A keen untroubled face
Home to the instant need of things.

This new approach has transformed our idea of religious education. Life itself has become an education, including "probation" as a necessary element in the endless process. In teaching our children we are trying to come at truth from the child's point of view rather than from that of the writer of Deuteronomy or of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

This new point of view has profoundly affected our attitude toward religious denominations. The movement toward Christian unity has advanced by leaps and bounds. We have learned that denominational divisions are sometimes the result of temperament rather than conviction, sometimes based upon contentions which no longer seem vital. We perceive that no denomination can endure if based merely upon liturgical or ceremonial forms. When denominational barriers have proved too rigid to admit the new life of our times, that life has gone outside and created new organizations. The Men and Religion Forward Movement, the Laymen's Missionary Movement, the Edinburgh Conference with its continuation committees, the proposed World-Conference on Faith and Order—all these are signs of the times, clearly showing that the larger unity of Christendom will either be allowed expression through existing denominations or, being refused passage, will find independent expression and will pour the new wine into new bottles.

This point of view has given us a new conception of the great ethnic faiths; it has created the science of comparative religion. The difference is not that we have come to see some truth in other religions—we have always admitted that. It is rather that we have come to see the human processes by which other races have reached the truth. The oriental standpoint has become for us not only a fact, but an intelligible fact. We have come to see how it is possible

for men to see through a glass darkly—to worship a quiescent being like Buddha, or a hideous being like Kali, or a sportive deity like Siva.

In short, we no longer think of religion as a set of propositions to be defended, but as a great human process—the search after God and the finding of God in a transforming and regenerating experience. It means finding God often in strange places, under alien skies, by unconventional methods, and through unconsecrated channels. For fifty years the Christian church has been making novel discoveries of the divine and crying out: “Surely the Lord is in *this place*, and I knew it not!” What Professor Hocking calls “the tyranny of the religious idea” has given place to joy in the religious experience, whether our own experience or that of our fellow-men.

The real peril involved in this transition we cannot disguise if we would. The dogmatic method gave a sense of authority which the psychological approach has not yet attained. When the world was conceived as a system of divine government, and salvation as a forensic process, there was at least a profound sense of sovereign power at the heart of the universe. Under such a theology there was a spirit of reverence and obedience now often totally lacking, just as under imperialism and militarism we may cultivate soldierly virtues which it is difficult to produce in a democracy. Popular faith has sometimes been bewildered by the transition from exterior to interior authority. The education of our children has been made more difficult by the transition from picturesque and dramatic images to the inwardness of really spiritual conceptions.

But we cannot falter on that account. A more spiritual faith seems at first in every age of the world a nebulous and nerveless faith. So it was when Jesus refused to indorse either Gerizim or Moriah; worshiping “in spirit and in truth” seemed vague and disappointing to both Jews and Samaritans. So Paul grieved both parties when he cried, “Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision, but a new creation.” In every age spiritual advance has involved the relaxing of dogma. With this comes the danger of the loosening of life, but with it also comes the joy of a new inspiration in living.

We need not dwell on the results of the psychological method as applied to the study of the Bible, for the facts are known to all. Always the Bible has been recognized as a historical account, but strange to say the historical process through which the truth entered into the souls of the writers has been ignored, or conceived as a miraculous event having no relation to the method by which men find truth today. But modern Biblical scholarship has changed all that. It has for the more thoughtful section of the church enormously strengthened faith in the value and power of the Scriptures, and for the thoughtless section, always the largest, it has seemed to dissolve the voice of God into many human echoes.

For the thoughtful Christian of today faith in the Bible is vastly easier than fifty years ago. The ostentatious attacks of Robert Ingersoll which made our fathers shiver and quake would be quite impossible today. He now seems like a crusader against windmills. The attack of Professor Huxley on the Gadarene swine seems no longer a tragedy, but much nearer a comedy. No longer do we desperately strive to reconcile Genesis and geology, but we rather rejoice in the two conceptions of the cosmos, the prophetic and the scientific. No more are we troubled by contradiction between the morality of Joshua and that of the Sermon on the Mount, but we accept the inconsistencies as marks of progressive revelation. The church of today is not so certain of all parts of its Bible as was the church in the days of Finney and Spurgeon. But it is getting from the Bible vastly more ethical inspiration, more knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth, closer sympathy with his apostles, more light on ever-present problems than the older generation dreamed of. If the Bible is no longer a complete illumination of the universe, it is in a deeper sense than ever before "a lamp to my feet and a light to my path."

But no review of the half-century can fail to notice the marked advance in ethical standards, both extensive and intensive. The ethical demand now covers a section of life once looked upon indifferently, and it requires far higher attainment. We have thus discovered new sins and created new virtues.

Is it true that the sense of sin has died out, or died down, in the modern world? That depends on what we mean by the sense

of sin. If we mean that sense of impending wrath which sometimes drew our fathers from their beds in the night and flung them to their knees in agony of contrition and remorse, then indeed we are right. That fear of wrath has dwindled in the minds of men. But if we mean the sense of dissatisfaction with all one's past, the sense of moral failure, the hunger for rightness within and for right relation to one's fellow-men, then the sense of sin is peculiarly characteristic of the present day. The sense of social sin, municipal sin, national sin has been growing each year more pungent and compelling. If the sense of fear is less acute, the sense of hunger is more urgent. If desire to escape no longer drives us, the desire to attain has become more intense and eager. The appeal of the most prominent evangelist now on the American horizon is primarily an ethical appeal. His theology is mediaeval, and has nothing to do with his success. Men forget his outworn theology as they are seared and transfixed by his tremendous drives into the human conscience. They rise up in horror, not at the vision of an offended judge of all the earth and a last grand assize, but at the sudden vision of their own meanness, their social treachery, their moral leprosy, when brought face to face with the purity and splendor of the character of Christ. They flock to the "sawdust trail," ignoring the mediaeval history and philosophy of the preacher, and summoned by the conviction of a righteousness which might be theirs and which they have miserably failed to attain. They scarcely hear Mr. Sunday's doctrine of a forensic transaction, but they eagerly respond to his announcement of an incarnation of the Eternal in Jesus of Nazareth and of a possible incarnation in each of his followers.

The truth is that we have been through a far-reaching revival of religion in America and do not yet know it. When Nineveh was summoned to repentance it put on sackcloth and ashes. When Pittsburgh a few years ago was convicted of sin—the sin of caring more for making steel than for making men—it did something very much more to the point. It appointed a Mayor's Commission, it employed landscape gardeners, it planned to cover the scarred and blackened hillsides with decent homes for its workers, it underwent a more genuine repentance than any that Nineveh

could conceive. And other American cities have followed. Social surveys are the modern equivalent of the old "self-examination."

"When ye pray say 'Our,'" is the old injunction. We are learning to say "Our," not only when we pray, but when we toil, when we plan our cities, and make our laws. That fever in the tenement house is our fever, and, if we neglect it, will come creeping down the street and enter our dwelling. That girl that has gone wrong in the streets is our girl, and her fall is part of the fall of a social order which tolerates or produces her. We are returning to the conceptions of the Book of Acts, and to the time when the primitive Christian faith poured out its spiritual energy in a social movement, in the reconstruction of the social order.

This return has involved what Principal Fairbairn calls "a new feeling for Christ." In no respect have the fifty years brought greater change than in the attitude of the church toward its Lord. In my father's library—the usual library of the minister of the last generation—were many works on philosophy and theology, many acute discussions and defenses of the faith, but only one *Life of Christ*, that by Samuel J. Andrews. No other life of Christ was then accessible in English. Such lives were not felt to be needful, Christ was then a representative figure, an official in a transaction, but hardly a person whom we could know as we know Luther or Wesley. His followers gave him unbounded adoration and devotion, but not acquaintance. But in these fifty years scores of lives of Christ have been written, and men have explored every clue to discover his opinions on the family, on our duty to the state, on prayer, on the hereafter, on the problems of labor, on all the characteristic tasks of human society. The result is that the striving, struggling world has a conscious sympathy for the ideals of Jesus such as no previous generation has known, and an insight into his purpose which is the great dynamic of our civilization.

The discovery of new sins has accompanied each new religious insight. There is less emphasis today on personal correctness of deportment, more emphasis on the industrial and fiduciary virtues. We understand what W. T. Stead meant when he said of James Russell Lowell: "He taught me how to hitch on the newest philanthropy to the old story of Calvary." But philanthropy does not

need to be "hitched on," it needs only to blossom out of religion. The sense of social trusteeship has spread throughout the modern world. Service on boards of directors is no longer a nominal matter. Public office has become a public trust. Social science has become a social gospel, and constantly dreams of a millennium. Political economy, no longer the "dismal science," is shot through with human quality and is indulging in bright-colored dreams.

The social interpretation of Christian truth has extended in every direction. We conceive God now, not only as transcendent over the cosmos, but as immanent in the social process. We find him in the sense of social obligation far more clearly than in the thunder and the rain. We echo again the word of Diderot: *Elargissez Dieu*. We find him not only in the evening star and in the flower in the crannied wall, but in the cry of the poor and the oppressed and in the gropings of men after a fairer social order. Our generation may not be able to claim the blessing of the pure in heart, but it may surely expect the blessing of those who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

The church in general has not adapted its worship to these new ideas. Its utterance steadily lags behind its life. Still we pray and sing mainly in the categories of transcendence. We work indeed as if God were in his world, but we worship as if he were an absentee who must be entreated to return. One vital task now before the church is to make its formulas and its hymns reflect its new faith in a God immanent in the unfolding life of humanity.

Here again we encounter an obvious peril. This perception of the divine presence in all things, this hallowing of the secular, involves a change in the modes of religious expression which is to many devout and simple minds most bewildering. There is more of vital Christianity in the world today than ever before, but it is seeking and finding novel channels for its utterance. It is like a mighty and restless river, which veers and lurches and suddenly carves out for itself a new channel. The houses built beside the old river bed are still standing, but they are uninhabited. The old wharves are there, but no steamers call—the mighty river and the mighty life it creates have moved away.

The oldest meeting-house in Providence, built in 1775, was made to seat 1,400 people, at a time when the total population was less than 5,000 souls. The church was then not only the sanctuary, but the forum, the lecture platform, the news bureau, the central telephone exchange, the clearing-house of the community. Nineteenths of the life that then surged through the church has now found other channels. Charity has created its own instruments. Philanthropy has planned huge organizations. Education has achieved its widespread apparatus. The Christian message is carried by printing press and electric wire and by "the sightless couriers of the air." The Christian school is taking over much of the work once done in the Christian home, and the Christian college is molding men as once the church alone could mold them.

Saul is not only among the prophets today, but he often outpreaches the prophets themselves. Literature has become one of the main avenues of Christian truth. The popular magazine spreads before us illustrated articles on Palestine, on biblical cities, on the meaning of Christmas and the Easter festival. Even the drama, in *The Passing of the Third Floor Back* and kindred plays, delights to picture the influence of a silent, shadowy figure that suggests the Prophet of Nazareth. G. K. Chesterton charges against our idols in frontal attack, and Bernard Shaw punctures them from behind.

New prophets of the faith arise in unexpected places. Just when some men were ready to repudiate religious "conversion" as no longer necessary, came William James, affirming that all the great leaders of humanity were "twice-born men." Just when some men began to think that the divinity of Christ was hardly tenable came Sir Oliver Lodge with his reminder that in the "subliminal consciousness" may dwell the fulness of the Godhead. In the last generation the most powerful pleas for the perpetual study of the Bible were made by Matthew Arnold and Thomas H. Huxley. In our own generation, just when we are beginning to deprecate all crisis in the life of the individual or the church, comes De Vries with his doctrine of mutation as the mark of true life. When our pulpits hesitate to affirm the perpetuity and power of the church,

then Josiah Royce unfolds the eternal necessity of the "religious community." Just when the church stammers and hesitates in its proclamation of a life to come, then arises Myers and offers in bulky volumes to demonstrate survival of the human personality after death. The clearest voices in defense of Christian truth today are often heard outside of all Christian temples, and the sturdiest supporters of Christian principles and motives are often those not classified with any section of the Christian church.

All this is heartening and inspiring. But it forces upon us an immensely serious problem. It is the success of the Christian faith which now imperils it. It is the victory of the church which may mean its absorption. Can the church compete with the organizations itself has created? Can Christianity control the spirits it has evoked? Will the church remain the center of hope and joy and inspiration to the struggling world? Or will it give way to the innumerable associations it has energized, to the social leaders it has inspired, to the ethical movements it has generated? Shall Christianity be devoured by its own children, or shall it show itself mightier than all its transient offspring? If it is to survive, it must refuse to change its nature. It must hold itself more sacred, more divine, than any of the changing channels through which it flows. It must refuse to be dissolved into poetry, into sociology, into civic betterment, or any other partial goods. It must decline to be sidetracked into public playgrounds or cheap lodging-houses. These are its fruit, but never its roots. It must keep the soul on top. It must master the powers it has let loose on the world. It must rise above all its varying expressions and remain, as it has been in all its most triumphant days, at once the power of God and the wisdom of God.

THE HELLENISTIC MYSTICISM OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

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With the discovery that not a few of the early Christian doctrines had their counterparts in Hellenistic religion, a fresh horizon has opened before the student of the New Testament. The discovery is still too recent to afford ground for definite conclusions. We cannot tell when or in what manner Christianity united with the foreign conceptions, or to what extent they modified its native character. But however these and other grave questions may ultimately be answered, there can be little reasonable doubt as to the fact. Our religion, even in the earliest times, was powerfully affected by influences that had their source in contemporary paganism. This fact must be recognized in all future attempts to explain the nature and genesis of New Testament thought.

The Fourth Gospel, more perhaps than any other New Testament writing, has assumed a different complexion in the light of this modern investigation. Hitherto it has been regarded as the work of a Paulinist, who wove the Pauline ideas into the synoptic history and carried them to further issues with the aid of philosophical conceptions derived from Alexandria. In a broad sense this reading of the Johannine theology may be permitted to stand; but it needs to be revised in all its details when account is taken of the new factor. On the one hand, the Paulinism of the Gospel has now to be defined more carefully. It is more than probable, in view of many coincidences of thought and language, that the evangelist knew the writings of Paul and was in sympathy with their general teaching. But we can no longer take for granted that the so-called Pauline doctrines were peculiar to Paul, and that their appearance elsewhere is proof of dependence on him. In large measure they seem to have been adapted from the religious

thought of the time, and may have found their way into the Gospel by other than Pauline channels. The problem as we now understand it is not merely to explain how the teaching of Paul developed into that of John and threw off in the process many of its characteristic elements. We have rather to conceive of Paul and John as reacting to a common influence, and to discover why it affected their thinking in ways so different. On the other hand, the Alexandrian contribution to Johannine thought is perceived to be a highly complex one. Philo, as we have now learned to read him, was a product not only of Judaism and Stoic philosophy, but of Hellenistic religion. The Greek conceptions on which he relied for his interpretation of the Old Testament had undergone a second growth in the soil of Egypt, where they had been crossed with the native theology. His Logos was something more than the immanent Reason of Stoicism, or the creative Word of Scripture. It was in some sense a personal divinity, corresponding with Thoth, the utterance or self-manifestation of the supreme God. The communion with God, which to Philo was the chief end of all human endeavor, was not the fruition of the pure life of reason, as in the Greek thinkers. It involved a real participation in the divine nature, and could only be realized by a grace vouchsafed to the soul by God himself. Thus when we speak of the Alexandrianism of the Fourth Gospel we imply much more than that the evangelist betrays the influence of a given philosophical school. The Philonic influence has to be understood in its context with the whole Hellenistic movement to which the thought of the Gospel is related.

What was the nature of that Hellenistic religion which laid its impress on Christianity as it had already done on Alexandrian Judaism? As we know it even from the few surviving documents which are of first-hand value, it presents a bewildering variety. Growing up as it did in an age of syncretism, it combined in itself elements which were often contradictory, and which had their origin in many different types of faith and tradition. Yet amid the diversity we can make out several broad conceptions common to all forms of Hellenistic belief. In the first place, they were

all based alike on the idea of redemption. The soul, it was assumed, was of divine essence, and had been exiled, as the consequence of some error or cosmical disaster, from the higher world to which it belonged. It had become imprisoned in the body and involved in the material order; it had been subjected to the yoke of necessity and the tyranny of demonic powers. How was it to obtain deliverance from this alien world into which it had wandered, and to ascend again to its true home? In an earlier time religion had accepted the earthly life, and had been content to hold forth the promise of divine assistance amidst its inevitable ills and troubles. But according to the view that now prevailed the present life was intrinsically evil, and by means of religion men sought to escape from it into a life different in kind. Hellenistic piety was thus in its very nature mystical. It set an aim before it which could not be attained by the normal human activities. To rise into the higher life it was necessary to break with all given conditions and to undergo a mysterious change, through the agency of a divine power.

It is all-important to observe that this redemptive conception was originally foreign to Christianity. The deliverance which Jesus had offered was not a transition here and now into a higher state of being. It consisted of the future inheritance of the Kingdom of God, and was granted as the reward and outcome of moral obedience. Life in the Kingdom was conceived by Jesus, not as a different, but as a perfected life, set free from all present evils and limitations, and especially from sin, which precludes a true fellowship with the holy God. As a result of the gentile mission this doctrine of the messianic deliverance was assimilated to Hellenistic ideas, and with Paul had already transformed itself into a doctrine of redemption. But Paul maintains the earlier conception alongside of the later one. He refuses to abandon the hope of a glory to be revealed when Christ returns to bring in the Kingdom, although he insists on the new life which is given to the believer as a present possession. In the Fourth Gospel the eschatological belief is little more than a survival. Christianity has become a religion of redemption in the Hellenistic sense, and is concerned wholly with the miraculous change whereby we pass even now from death into life.

The longing for redemption is thus the ultimate motive in Hellenistic religion, and the redemptive idea is closely associated with that of a new birth. This peculiar doctrine meets us under various forms in the cults of Isis, Mithra, Cybele in the Hermetic literature—to some extent in the speculations of Philo. When once the deliverance of the soul was envisaged, not as a moral or intellectual progress, but as a transition, effected once for all, the image of a rebirth was hardly to be avoided. The soul was regarded as suddenly emerging out of the earthly condition into another, with which its previous existence had nothing in common. And since the change was a supernatural one it was inevitably connected with rites and ceremonies carrying with them a magical efficacy. The central interest in all the religions seemed to have turned on these observances, which had power to lift the soul out of its earthly bondage. He who participated in them was supposed to die to his former self and to be “born again for eternity.”

The idea of redemption, however, was no less closely related to another. If men were to seek deliverance into a new life, how was the knowledge of that life and the desire of it to be awakened in them? From the world around them, which was gross and material, the mere negation of true existence, they could receive no hint of anything beyond. There must therefore be a revelation imparted directly from above; and each of the communities laid claim to such a revelation. It might consist in spells and watchwords, in names of powerful angels and demons; or it might take the form of a sacred myth or a speculative doctrine. In any case it was assumed that something hidden from man's natural sense and reason, some “mystery,” was divulged to the chosen circle of adepts. Religion was now unthinkable apart from such revelation. Concerned as it was with a world that transcended all experience, it had nothing to offer unless it had access to some higher source of light. Hence the significance that was now attached to the term “knowledge.” For the Greek thinkers, knowledge had meant the exercise of the higher reason, whereby the mind attains to a clear apprehension of the truth. But the *γνῶσις* of the Hellenistic age differed from this philosophical knowledge alike in its object and in its method. It was directed

to the nature of God and the destiny of the soul—to the riddles of creation and the invisible world—to the secret lore of redemption. And since these mysteries were beyond the scope of man's reason they could only be understood by a divine enlightenment, bestowed in dream or ecstasy or by way of a hidden tradition. Not infrequently the knowledge was described in terms of vision. It has long been surmised, from stray allusions in ancient writers, that a large use was made, alike in Greek and oriental mysteries, of scenic presentation. The myth of the divinity was set forth in a sort of drama, sacred objects were unveiled, and symbolic actions performed by priests and initiates. The language of vision had thus a special suggestiveness in the mystery religions, and it corresponded better than any other with the immediate, intuitive character of their *γνώσις*. In the loftier expressions of Hellenistic mysticism, for instance in the Hermetic literature, the knowledge of God is sometimes identified with seeing. "We rejoice that while we are still in our bodies thou didst make us divine by the vision of thyself."

This quotation from the *Asklepius*, which is typical of many others, brings vividly before us the interrelation of the two great Hellenistic ideas. Strictly speaking, the function of revelation is to awaken men to the fact of the new life and to teach them how it may be realized, but it thus comes to be considered as part of the redemptive process. Through the knowledge of God men are brought into communion with him; they are raised by the divine vision to participation in the divine nature. It may almost be said that Hellenistic religion takes up the fundamental idea of Greek philosophy and transposes it into a different key. Knowledge is life—no longer in the sense that by perfect exercise of reason we achieve the true end of our nature, for the meaning of both terms has now been altered. Knowledge is a divine illumination; life is a new state of being. But with this change in its significance the equation still holds good. The *γνώσις* which apprehends the mysteries of the unseen world is at the same time the redemptive act, by which we rise out of the material existence into the life of God.

Turning now to the Fourth Gospel, we can feel at once that these Hellenistic ideas are all-pervading. For the evangelist,

Christianity is the religion of redemption. He writes, as he himself tells us, that through Christ we may have life—deliverance from the earthly condition which is no better than a state of death. This life is given us even now by inward fellowship with Christ, who is himself the eternal Logos, sharing in the nature of God. Like the contemporary religions, too, the Gospel knows of a new birth. It is true that its teaching here has points of contact with the synoptic sayings on conversion, and with Paul's description of the believer as a "new creature"; but the real parallel must undoubtedly be sought in Hellenistic doctrine. The new birth, as the evangelist thinks of it, is no mere change of will and of religious attitude, but a renewal of nature, miraculously effected. Again, the Christian message is construed as a revelation, and the historical data are so modified as to conform to this idea. It is taken for granted that Jesus appeared on earth in order to manifest the divine nature, which men of themselves were unable to apprehend. In his own person he was the eternal Logos made visible. The incidents of his life had all a deeper significance, and were meant to disclose one aspect and another of the hidden purpose of God. His "words" were not merely those of a great teacher, but were the vehicle through which a heavenly grace was communicated. It is from this point of view that we must understand the "knowledge" which in the Fourth Gospel almost takes the central place assigned by Paul to faith. Attempts have often been made to correlate it with Hebraic or Greek-philosophical ideas; but for its true explanation we must turn to Hellenistic religion. "Knowledge" for the evangelist is the response on man's part to the revelation offered by God. It has nothing to do with any activity of the reason, but proceeds from that higher illumination by which we become aware of unseen realities. "Faith" is now merged in "knowledge," not because the emphasis has shifted from the moral to the intellectual side, but because the message of Christ is conceived as a mystery only to be appropriated by an inspired *γνώσις*. And the faculty of knowing is interchanged, as in the contemporary religions, with that of seeing. "The world seeth me no more, but ye see me." "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." "We beheld his glory." The actual teaching

of Jesus falls quite into the background, and everything hinges on the fact that through him the higher nature was manifested. The vision of God was imparted to us in the vision of his Son. Thus in the Fourth Gospel we are met everywhere by the two great Hellenistic categories of redemption and revelation; and as in the other religions they are intimately linked together. Life and light are the two inseparable watchwords of the Gospel. The life is the light of men, and according as we receive the light we participate in the life. The teaching of the Gospel culminates in the great saying, "This is life eternal, to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."

We have now, however, to examine more closely into those outstanding features in the Johannine theology which mark its relation to Hellenistic thought. What was the nature of the relation? How far are we justified in considering the Gospel as nothing more than an effort to transform the Christian message into a particular phase of the current mysticism? To answer these questions we have to take account, not only of the obvious affinities, but of certain differences which are no less significant.

1. We are struck, in the first place, by the absence from the Johannine teaching of those cruder elements, derived from astrology or primitive religion, which play such a part in all the Hellenistic cults. There is scarcely a trace of the widespread belief in the activity of angels and demons; and this silence is the more remarkable as the Christian tradition itself afforded so many footholds for this kind of speculation. It is hard to avoid the impression that the evangelist here places himself in conscious antagonism to the prevailing cults. He wishes to substitute an inward and spiritual religion for that worship of personal agencies, working from without, which was almost universal in his time. The ecstatic element, which is so characteristic of the mystery religions, likewise disappears. Communion with God through Christ is described as no mere momentary rapture, induced by certain rites or physical conditions, but as a tranquil and constant mood of the soul which has been reborn. Even the charismata of the early church now fall from their paramount place, for the believer "abides in Christ."

It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the sacraments, although their efficacy is fully recognized, are not allowed to obscure the more inward conception of religion. The rites themselves are subordinated to the power that works in them, and apart from which they lose their value. Baptism effects a mysterious change because the Spirit co-operates with the material act. In the fellowship with Christ as mediated in the Eucharist, "it is the Spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." Here we have passed entirely out of the atmosphere of the cults, which stand or fall by their hallowed ritual, and interpret it solely by magical ideas. A similar difference emerges in the protest of the Gospel against the secrecy in which the religions of the time were wont to shroud themselves. To Hellenistic sentiment all higher religious teachings were of the nature of arcana, reserved for the initiated few, and the communication of them was hedged about with every kind of precaution. The evangelist, while he thinks of the new message as a mystery, refuses to confine it to a narrow circle. He declares that Jesus taught no private doctrine, but ever spoke openly to the world. He holds, indeed, that the very purpose of the revelation was to do away with all exclusive and localized worship, and to enable all men to have free access to the Father. Thus in accepting the main postulates of Hellenistic religion the Gospel discards its whole apparatus of angelic beings, planetary influences, incantations and ceremonies, midnight conventicles for the practice of an occult discipline. All those external elements are absorbed in a purely spiritual mysticism.

2. But further, this mysticism itself is of a different and wholly original type. Mystical piety, as we find it in the contemporary religions, may be said to follow one or other of two main directions. On the one hand, we have a mysticism which is frankly pantheistic, and which is best exemplified in the Hermetic literature. It treats even the agency of the Logos as something secondary, a preparation for that union with God which is the ultimate aim of spiritual endeavor. "The Logos does not attain unto the truth" (*Poim.* ix. 11), but is "erring and the cause of error" (*ibid.* xv. 10). On the other hand we have the mysticism of the cults, in which the worshiper seeks to unite himself with a given divinity, and to

share in his experiences. The Fourth Gospel can be reconciled with neither of these forms of mysticism. It is free from the pantheistic strain, which might easily have found entrance through the Logos conception, and which is traceable in the kindred Oxyrhynchus "Sayings." Nevertheless it bears no real affinity to the mysticism of the cults. From these, it is almost certain, Paul had derived suggestions which he turned to far-reaching account, but the evangelist here parts company with him. The name *κύριος* does not occur until nearly the end of the Gospel, and seems to be little more than a colorless title of reverence. The conception of union with Christ in his death and resurrection falls entirely out of sight. Christ is not merely a heavenly being who rises through death into life, and whose experience is repeated in his followers, but is himself the life. He partakes from the beginning in the eternal life of God, and communicates it to those who abide in him. At the same time he imparts this divine life as a human personality. The Gospel as a whole is only the expansion of its opening thesis that the Word was made flesh—sojourned with men as a living Person, with whom they can still hold fellowship, although he now dwells with them invisibly. For such a mysticism we can find no analogy in any previous form of religion. All that has been borrowed from the feeling and speculation of the time has been merged in a new conception, springing out of the soil of historical Christianity.

3. Again, the mystical ideas of the Gospel are integrally related to its ethical teaching. It would be unjust to say that in Hellenistic piety the ethical interest is entirely wanting; but at any rate it has no independent value. The one object set before the worshiper is his ascent into a higher state of being, and so far as moral demands are laid on him they are meant to detach him, as far as possible, from the earthly desires and affections that weigh him down. But in the Fourth Gospel the mystical communion with Christ has itself an ethical side. To love him has for its consequence the doing of his commandments. The knowledge of his doctrine is conditioned by practical obedience. His example of humility and love and self-sacrifice is held up to his followers as their one rule of life, by fidelity to which they will be known as

his disciples. This ethical quality of the Johannine mysticism distinguishes it, in a radical fashion, from anything that we find in Hellenistic religion, and can only be explained in one way. It serves to remind us that whatever he may have derived from alien sources the evangelist was rooted in that tradition which had come down, through the primitive church, from Jesus himself. Even while he conceives of life, after the Hellenistic manner, as different in kind from the life that now is, he does not define it to himself in purely metaphysical terms. It involves a moral fellowship with God, a self-surrender to his will as manifested in Christ. "If ye keep my commandments ye shall abide in my love, even as I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in his love."

4. Thus we arrive at the fundamental difference between Hellenistic and Johannine mysticism. The evangelist avails himself of certain abstract ideas, prevalent in the religion of his time, but he does not set out from those ideas. He takes his departure from a historical fact, which he aims at unfolding and elucidating in its deeper import. To Hellenistic piety the speculative interest is everything. The myth or legend is only an allegorical vesture, and has no meaning or value apart from the doctrine that lies beneath it. For the evangelist the history is of primary significance. His theology, into whatever regions of speculation it may lead him, is all a reflection on the actual revelation in Jesus. No doubt he deals freely with the tradition, and is less concerned with events as they happened than with the "truth"—the inward purpose that was embodied in them. None the less, this purpose is bound up with its manifestation. The Word was made flesh; the life was imparted to us in a Person, whose actions and words are on historical record. All through the Gospel the writer is seeking to interpret this record. He does so with the aid of theological categories, and may often appear to resolve the facts into mystical speculation, but they are always primary to his mind. The abiding life of Christ, as he conceives it, is the fulfilment, under larger conditions, of his earthly life, and must be understood in the light of it.

How, then, are we to account for that mystical element in the Fourth Gospel which is so closely related to Hellenistic religion

and is yet so new and distinctive? It was formerly regarded as part of John's inheritance from Philo; and this hypothesis, as we have already seen, cannot altogether be put aside. A mystical strain is undoubtedly present in the teaching of Philo. He had learned from his contact with Egyptian beliefs to think of the soul as ascending, by the aid of divine power, to that union with the Godhead in which alone it can find true life. But the mysticism of the Fourth Gospel, though it may owe something to the Alexandrian influence, cannot be explained from it. The Philonic ideas which seem akin to it are inextricably blended with others of a different kind, originating in Greek philosophy or Jewish custom and legend. A teacher who drew his whole inspiration from Philo could hardly have discarded those other elements which had their essential place in Philonic doctrine. If it is the mystical note alone which finds an echo in the Gospel, we may infer that the evangelist's relation to Philo was not one of mere dependence.

Neither is it probable that he derived his mysticism from a direct acquaintance with the oriental cults. As we have tried to indicate, the features that were most characteristic of the cults are precisely those of which we find little or no trace in Johannine religion. Here and there some chance phrase or image may recall the mystery worship, although even these may easily have been borrowed from the general religious language of the time. But the Gospel as a whole, with its catholicity of outlook and the essential sobriety of its thought, moves in a different world from the fantastic gnosis of the exclusive cults. In one respect we may indeed discover an affinity. The cults, in their own fashion, had allied themselves with those conceptions of the vision of God and the birth to a new life which were to find their crowning expression in the Gospel. But in these, as some recent writers have too easily forgotten, the cults had no monopoly.

A new hypothesis, and at first sight a tempting one, has been suggested by the late discovery of the "Odes of Solomon." The date and origin of these remarkable poems are still undetermined; and it may be that the Gospel itself had something to do with creating them. But the weight of evidence would seem to support the theory that they present in a Christian garb the work of a

Jewish poet, who interprets in a mystical sense the imagery of the Psalms and Canticles. If this be so, the Gospel may have had its antecedents in some Jewish form of mysticism. There is certainly no surviving work of the early period which is so full of the very spirit of Johannine piety as these long-lost "Odes," and if they were anterior to the Gospel they may possibly afford at least a partial key to its genesis. Among the multifarious sects of first-century Judaism there may have been one of which they are now our solitary witness, and which made a vital contribution to the teaching of the church. But a hypothesis of this kind is difficult to maintain in view of the evident relation of the Gospel to gentile Christianity; and would only carry the problem a stage farther back, even if it could be established. For in any case the mystical feeling which pervades the "Odes" cannot have been native to Judaism. Their Jewish origin would prove nothing more than that the Hellenistic ideas had blended themselves, in some measure, even with Palestinian thought.

Thus along different lines we are led to the conclusion that the underlying conceptions of the Gospel were generally diffused in the first century, and had entered as coefficients into many varieties of thinking. To understand how they came into being we should need to take account, not of any single movement, but of that commingling of eastern and western thought which had been in process ever since the time of Plato, and had come to a head in the cosmopolitan life of the Empire. For the mind of that age, myth and philosophy, feeling and speculation were merged in one another; and religion, whenever it rose above mere formality, ran into the molds of mysticism. Christianity, from the beginning of its gentile mission, was exposed to the pervading atmosphere. The theology of Paul, in spite of its rabbinical framework, is penetrated with mystical conceptions; and in the Fourth Gospel they determine the whole presentation of the message. Beliefs which were normative for the earlier teaching fall into the background, and the work of Jesus is viewed under the Hellenistic categories—life and light, truth and knowledge, redemption and the new birth.

To this extent, then, the evangelist may be said to have transformed Christianity into a mystical doctrine, analogous to that which is reflected in many pagan writings of the first two centuries. He thought of Jesus no longer as the teacher of a new righteousness, the Messiah who was to bring in the Kingdom of God, but as the messenger of a higher gnosis, the incarnate Logos, the Savior, by whose name we have life. All the primitive doctrines are lifted out of their original setting, and are informed with new meanings, under the influence of mystical ideas. But in the process of revision these ideas themselves undergo a change, no less momentous. They cease to be mere abstractions, and become incorporated with the given facts of the Christian revelation. For the redeeming principle or the impersonal savior of Hellenistic religion we have now the historical Jesus. The attainment of life involves a fellowship with him, comparable to that of his first disciples. This new life itself is not merely a higher condition of being, but a moral likeness to God, through obedience to his will. Indeed we mistake the essential character of Johannine piety when we try to explain it wholly from alien influences; for whatever he may have borrowed elsewhere the evangelist found his chief inspiration in the authentic Christian tradition. He availed himself of the religious ideas of his age for no other purpose than to expound that tradition more adequately, and to reach a deeper insight into its hidden meaning. It is not a little remarkable that in the last few years, while the Hellenistic factor in Johannine thought has received an ever fuller recognition, the literary criticism of the Gospel has become more guarded in its conclusions. There has been something like a reaction from the view that this professed narrative of the life of Jesus is only a free composition, in which facts are dissolved into theological symbols. It is claimed that by searching analysis of the text, two or three different strata can be distinguished, one of which may go back to a primitive time and possess a real historical value. These partition theories, like others of the kind, break down by their oversubtlety. They fail to remove the impression that the work, as we have it, is substantially a unity, and that its history is derivative, and is elaborated for the most part from the

synoptic records. Yet in one sense they have their motive in a sound critical instinct. Students of the Gospel have begun to feel that the effort to construe it as wholly mystical and allegorical has been carried too far, and that the writer was far more interested in the actual tradition than has sometimes been recognized. No doubt, to a modern reader, as he compares this Fourth Gospel with the simple and concrete narrative of the Synoptists, it appears that the evangelist cared nothing for the facts, and sought deliberately to transform them into doctrines, acceptable to minds which had been nourished on the philosophy of the time. All that is definite and historical in the life of Jesus seems to evaporate in a mist of speculation. But it must be remembered that the Gospel was written in a later age for a gentile public, to which the history was foreign, and which was accustomed to think of it solely in the light of doctrine. There was no need to insist that the facts must be spiritually understood, for this was everywhere taken for granted. The danger was—and all responsible teachers of the church were fully alive to it—that the Christian message should lose sight entirely of its historical origins, and attach itself to those vague mythologies which were already forming in the incipient gnostic schools. When we contrast the Fourth Gospel, not with those which precede it in our New Testament, but with the literature which had begun to flood the church in its own generation, we can hardly avoid the feeling that it stands for a sober and conservative Christianity. By the very fact that he offers his message in the form of a gospel—a narrative of the life of Jesus—the evangelist makes his protest against the growing tendencies which threatened to subvert the faith of the church. He indeed accepts the Hellenistic ideas, for they were now inseparable from all Christian teaching, but he finds them implicit in the history. The Word was made flesh; the revelation was given in the living Person who once dwelt among us. From the abstract speculations of his age he turns back to the primitive tradition, and tries to impress on his readers its infinite significance.

It is from this point of view, we would suggest in closing, that the Gospel must be interpreted. The writer is a true son of the gentile church, most likely of the church of Ephesus, where the

fusion of Hellenistic with Christian ideas had been carried out most fully. He takes it as self-evident that Christianity is a religion of redemption—that it must be understood as a higher gnosis—that discipleship consists in a mystical fellowship with Christ. But he is primarily a Christian teacher, bent on preserving the tradition as it had been handed down in the church; and although he perceives the facts dimly, across an age that had learned to blend them with a religious philosophy, they are no less vital to him than to the first apostles. All the more because he is aware of false teachers, who denied that Christ had come in the flesh, he feels it necessary to vindicate the tradition. We thus mistake the whole purpose of his Gospel when we regard him as a Hellenistic thinker, who substitutes a mystical doctrine for the recorded facts of the Christian message. For it is the facts on which his mind is centered. All that he borrows from contemporary religion is pressed into the service of a new mysticism, which rests on a deeper apprehension of the meaning of the life of Christ.

TWO TYPES OF LIBERALISM

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Nothing can be more stimulating to the free and high-minded than that noble allegory of St. Paul's which concludes with the words, "So then, brethren, we are not children of the bondwoman but of the free." The sons of Hagar are the children of law and tradition; Sarah is the mother of the laughing sons of light and liberty. Sad was the day when the bondwoman was sent forth into the wilderness; sad the fate of the Coptic maid whose child was to symbolize the darkness and bondage of Egypt. Ishmael gave way before Isaac, the child of laughing liberty; and it is to Isaac that the apostle appeals when he seeks to place Christian freedom in its true light. St. Paul has done much to enliven Christendom with this allegory; it is true that there is no levity with the man who made that journey to Damascus, yet it cannot be denied that his picture of Christianity has its high lights, or that his tangled Greek does not give way now and then to the free skein. But what is the character of that liberty which the apostle so gaily celebrates in symbolism; in what sense is the religionist a free-thinker?

To the fault-finding critic of the New Testament the Good News for the soul may appear as so much Bad News for the intellect; free-thinking is the last thing to be expected in reading a religious document. To the open-minded reader who is as modern as Ibsen the old parchments can appear as thoroughly seasoned with "freedom and truth" as are the human documents of this thrilling dramatist from Scandinavia. We who read the old epistles and the new plays break with all bondage and become as vikings, children of the sea rather than of the land; we see that in becoming modern we are still Christian, while with the same eyes we may read the ancient truths of apostles and the modern ones of free individualists. The free-thought of the modern Enlightenment came

to an end when Hume criticized Deism. Re-echoed in this country by Paine and Jefferson, still faintly heard in thinkers of the Elbert Hubbard type, and not wholly absent from the mind of the critical theologian, such free-thinking is now sadly out of place. If, like Marguerite in *Faust*, we say, "The Evil One has gone but Evil still remains," we may add, "The Free-thinker is gone but Freedom remains." What is the essence of this freedom?

Our lament over the mind's loss of laughing liberty were bitter indeed did we not believe that there was more than one kind of freedom. If the old, discordant free-thinking of the eighteenth century has passed away, there is a newer type of liberty which knows how to resolve the dissonance of doubt into the more remote keys of religious belief and Christian joyousness. The difference between the two types may be indicated furtively when one observes that there is a method of thought which is extensive and latitudinarian, another which is intensive and heartfelt. From this academic distinction, as point of departure, one may continue to observe that freedom may be either rationalistic in its demand for plain facts and logical relations, or it may be humanistic in its insistence upon ends and values. Furthermore, freedom may so exalt the actual and rational as to become unduly optimistic, or it may so indulge the intensive and humanistic as to elaborate a pessimistic ideal. The degree of freedom is in each case about the same, since both types proceed from the mind of the enlightened man in an age of culture; but the character of the types is radically different, since rationalistic freedom separates man from the world of men, while humanistic liberty keeps him *en rapport* with the strivings and sufferings of mankind. Granted that Moses was too busy with the affairs of the camp to indulge in literary work, granted that Jonah never enjoyed his alleged cetacean experience, granted that Isaiah's vision lacks historical unity such as one finds in a classic drama, granted that many memorials of Christ are more allegorical than authentic; what's to be said, what's to be done?

There is freedom and there is freedom; here it is the liberty of the thinking process, there the full freedom of the soul in its human unity. The minor liberal, with his petty atheism and superficial

criticism, may so stir the depths of his soul as to release a nest of scorpions, may open within his brain a cage of deceitful birds; the major liberal employs the same sense of freedom and secures the serpent's wisdom and the eagle's vision. Rationalistic freedom often suffers the brain to act as a snare for the mind, so that he who entertains a new idea is soon pinioned by it. This pseudo-freedom appears in the mind of one who entertains new ideas of godhead, but who cannot gather around these the strong sentiments which once made the old idea romantic and thrilling. Such feeble freedom elaborates new ideas of man, but his revised anthropology has lost the dash and chivalry of the old, non-evolutionary biped. In the realm of criticism, this sense of freedom reads the Bible without spectacles, but clarity of vision is not accompanied with the one-time aesthetical, ethical, and religious values. Theological freedom, the bequest of eighteenth-century liberalism, has been costly; we have felled the trees, leveled the hills, and mined the gold; and now we wonder why the landscape no longer pleases us. As in the Renaissance there were great artists but inferior painters, where now we have great painters but poor artists, so there were once great religionists but poor critics, where now we have fine scholars but very minor prophets. Our liberty is not the liberty of laughter.

Humanistic liberty takes its values wherever it finds them, and it is the search for these values which characterizes the liberal of the second type. Unless one be able and willing to distinguish between the two types, he will be sadly out of place in contemporary culture. How was it possible for Wagner to press onward toward a position practically atheistic without disturbing one stone in the temple of historical Christianity? By what intellectual means did Ibsen try to neutralize the values of religion without tampering with the facts of tradition? How could Nietzsche become such a rabid opponent of Christianity when he used none of his powers of literary criticism to neutralize the effect of historical Christianity? Nietzsche spoke with contempt of the "roast-beef chewing free-thinkers" of England; Renan's strident tones appealed to him as so much "shrill falsetto." Compare with Wagner, Ibsen, and Nietzsche such free-thinkers as Renan, Huxley,

and Andrew D. White, and the skeptic appears sophomoric and boyish. The Superman is beyond all higher criticism with its pedantry and peevishness; the Superman cares nothing for "facts" when he can have values. Liberals of the humanistic type are better than free-thinkers because they are worse; they are more friendly to Christianity because they are more inimical. These humanistic liberals have set their sharp teeth in the bitter apples of pessimism, so that they have lost their taste for the soft, sweet grapes of optimistic freedom with its sublime faith in the power of reasoning. How are we to explain the presence and justify the function of these new liberals unless we accept the notion that there is to freedom something more than that extensive latitudinarianism which has so long been the guide of the free-minded?

In the history of modern free-thought, as this movement writhed its way through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were a few who saw the possibilities of intensive, humanistic liberalism. Along with the thousands of books and pamphlets which came forth for and against free-thinking, there was but a slender array of works in which the larger liberalism shows itself. With his social intuitions, which were absolutely new when he wrote in 1699, Shaftesbury was in a position to suggest that good humor is the foundation of true religion, while ill humor may be the cause of atheism. Thus arguing from the risible in religion, Shaftesbury concludes that Christianity is a "very witty religion." While it is true that the roots of the words "humor" and "humanity" are quite distinct, it is undeniable that there is a sort of association between the two ideas; whence Shaftesbury, while a free-thinker of the rationalistic type, becomes prophetic of that liberalism which is humanistic. Among the Deists, Arthur Bury, with his *Christianity Not Founded on Argument*, may be taken as another member of the old school who saw that there was a higher type of freedom than that which is put forth by the intellect. In Lessing, Germany saw both types of liberalism confusedly joined; in Rousseau, France witnessed the conflict between the freedom of thought and the freedom of humanity. Lessing was saved by his art, by his sense of historicity; Rousseau was too much the humanist to be wholly ensnared by such an artificial thing as Deism.

The free-thought movement builded better than it knew when it set Milton to work. In many ways, Milton was no more than the usual free-thinker in search of exterior, extensive liberty; at the same time, *Paradise Lost* rejoices in much of the humanistic freedom which one finds blooming in the nineteenth century. This intensive freedom Milton instils into the soul of his Satan, who repudiated weakness and sought to effect an exchange of good and evil. Under the same sky, but with clusters and clots of brighter stars, William Blake achieved the freedom which with the greater poet was only tentative and wistful. "Milton," said Blake, "was of the Devil's party without knowing it." In Blake, Satanism comes forth stark and strong; at one bound he leaps to the height attained a century later by Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. Blake's fine hallucinations were turned to good account by the free poet, who found in his soul-states a sense of freedom which made rationalistic thinking unnecessary. Bitter in his opposition to all natural religion, Blake expresses intensive, humanistic free-thought in the development of which he becomes a veritable laughing lion. Shelley shows signs of the second type of freedom; for, while he is not wanting in rationalistic atheism, his *Prometheus*, at once humanistic and philanthropic, rejoices in that pessimistic liberalism without which freedom is but a name or a sound.

With the memorials of free-thinking ordinary before him and with the suggestions of free-thinking extraordinary out on the borders of his consciousness, the man of today is in a position to judge between the performances of the one and the promises of the other. The plain free-thinker, who is free in intellect where he is trammelled in will, promptly throws out the child with the bath, the religious with the traditional; the fine, intensive free-thinker keeps to his values, even when he knows that the new wine is fermenting in old wine-skins. The analytical critic cannot detach his values from his facts, so that when he dismisses one-time truths, he is called upon to witness the departure of one-time ideals. The synthetic humanist so rejoices in the *largesse* of life's endless vision that facts and values float freely upon the surface of reality in its unfathomableness. The rationalist takes the

sword by the blade; the humanist grasps the handle. In his hurry to pull up the tares, the rationalist pulls up the wheat also; the humanist lets wheat and tares grow side by side in the same harvest field. The rationalist is amphibious; he swims poorly in the sea of values, while he moves about painfully upon the solid land of hard facts. Meanwhile the liberal humanist keeps to his wonted habitat where the waters support him with little effort of his own.

It is of course the Aryan mind with its "blue-eyed" love of factual truthfulness which has begotten the child of the free. The Semite has ever reposed in his ideal of obedience; the Mongolian has slept the long sleep of tradition. Among advanced Aryans, however, there is no little difference between the Briton and the Gaul here, the Teuton and the Slav there. Which type of mind is the more free? The difference between the two types consists in this: where the Brito-Gallic mind chooses the path of mental freedom so well known to the Deists and encyclopedists, the Teutonico-Slavonic spirit has found its freedom in a full humanism wherein facts as facts were of secondary importance. The history of conventional free-thought is thus the history of England and France in the modern Enlightenment; for this movement Germany cared but little, while Russia was hardly aware of it. Nevertheless, there has been no want of freedom on the eastern side of Europe, although the style of liberalism is hardly comparable to that which went on in the West. Germany has had its schools of criticism, but they have usually been based upon philosophical notions, whence the free-thinker has sought to synthesize his results in such a manner as to come to an understanding with humanity.

The poignant difference between East and West will appear when one institutes the contrast between Voltaire and Goethe. Much of eighteenth-century thought these two thinkers had in common; both were free and scientific in their moods, both tended to despair of the human intellect. Only a few reminiscences of the eighteenth century are necessary to remind us that Voltaire entertained violent antipathy to the Bible, while he himself was not far removed from atheism. Why it was that Voltaire said, "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him; but all nature

cries out that he does exist," and why he did not have the courage of his doubts and thus say, "There is no God," we are unable to determine. The atheist usually fails at the critical moment and surprises people by taking his place among the prophets. Like all rationalists who seek to place their affair upon the framework of intellect, Voltaire had his limitations, whence stubborn nature and striving humanity drive him to a theistic position. Goethe must be considered as not less, but more, liberal than Voltaire, since Goethe paused not in the presence of the eighteenth-century Deity, but like Siegfried raised his sword against God. As a result, Goethe often assumes the position of the nihilist whose spirit is that of perpetual denial. At the same time, one cannot speak of Goethe as a "free-thinker."

Voltaire looked at religion with the eye of a hawk; Goethe contemplated it as the song-bird the sky. For some reason, Voltaire has slipped out of sight while the genius of Goethe is as dominant as ever. As a child of laughing liberty, Goethe went full sail in the midst of a gale which forced Voltaire to scud under bare poles. In his youth, Goethe made a careful but free study of the Old Testament, whose contradictions between the actual and the traditional did not pass unnoticed. But, far from being daunted or embittered by the account of the miraculous, he sought for the vague presence of the spiritual in the midst of the traditional, just as one may imagine the sacred writers to have done. "Deep minds," said he, "are compelled to live in the past as well as in the future." Indeed, it was the need of the past with its remoteness and tranquillity which persuaded Goethe to make that free but sympathetic review of patriarchal history which adorns and strengthens the fourth book of his *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Aware of English, French, and German attacks upon the Scriptures, the youthful Goethe was disgusted with their unjust and scoffing attacks, while his humanism enabled him to realize how God had adapted himself to the writer's character and the day in which he lived. Was Goethe less liberal, less intelligent than Voltaire, or was he a perfect child of liberty, who in the midst of his negations knew how to accept religion in the same spirit in which it was given?

In the case of the Slavonic mind, intensive liberalism is such as to warn all those who imagine that a little readjustment of the thinking faculty is sufficient to bring man to an understanding with life. If the light that is in one be darkness, how great is that darkness! To Dostoevsky with his pessimistic liberalism, we are indebted for a frank statement of the life-problem viewed from the standpoint of religion. Here one recalls how Huxley, in his article on "Agnosticism," published in the *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1889, was staggered by the demons that entered into the Gadarene swine. In this vigorous episode the genius of Dostoevsky fairly revels. "My friend," said Stepan Trofimovitch, in *The Possessed*, "that wonderful and extraordinary passage has been a stumbling-block to me all my life. Now an idea has occurred to me: *une comparaison*. A great number of things keep coming into my mind now. You see, that's exactly like our Russia, those devils that come out of the sick man and enter into swine. They are all the sores, all the foul contagions, all the impurities, all the devils great and small that have multiplied in that great invalid, our beloved Russia, in the course of ages and ages. But a great Idea and a great Will will encompass it from on high, as with that lunatic possessed of devils. We shall cast ourselves down, possessed and raving, from the rocks into the sea; but the sick man will be healed and 'will sit at the feet of Jesus,' and all will look upon him with astonishment." Confident of himself and his nation, Huxley felt that he could afford to eliminate the Gadarene story; filled with anxiety for his soul and his Russia, Dostoevsky was impelled to make it the motif of his great story.

In reading such a Russian author, one should not be in a hurry to accuse him of undue orthodoxy, since the genius of Dostoevsky ever kept him on the brink of atheism and nihilism, forms of free-thinking quite foreign to merry agnosticism. But, living with "Russian intensity," Dostoevsky so denies everything that at last all things are upon the same level, whence he turns about and accepts life just as it is, with all its chaos and contradiction. In the same novel referred to, the hero, Stavrogin, says, "If it were mathematically proved that the truth excludes Christ, I should prefer to stick to Christ rather than to the truth." In the night of

nihilism, all things are alike, true and false, good and bad. Minor liberalism and petty atheism are both swallowed up in this pit which the Russian opens within his own soul, for the Russian soul is a "dark place." The disadvantages of such a type of doubt are obvious, but they will never be felt in this part of the earth; on the other hand, Russian liberalism with its superb credulities has the supreme advantage of delivering the mind from all forms of trifling "truthfulness," as this appears in the writings of the average liberal. Doubt may be cured by belief or by more doubt; it is the overdose of poison which acts as the antidote.

Intensive, humanistic liberalism is thus pessimistic liberalism. Optimism is local in its tendencies; optimism never fares forth into the darkness; for this reason, optimism would better not wander in the Black Forest or seek to climb the steppes. The rationalistic liberal is so confident of his intellect, so soothed by facts, that he cannot appreciate the mood of the humanistic liberal who seeks truths and facts engulfed in the general confusion of things in the world at large. In itself as a life-doctrine, pessimism must ever beware of making the life-burden so great that the pessimist is overcome with weakness; but there can be a strong pessimism, and it is to such a type of thought that one looks for spiritual insight. To this sense of strong pessimism, Homer and Dante, Jeremiah and St. Paul, Goethe and Dostoevsky, Baudelaire and Nietzsche, to mention only a few of the most obvious of dark souls, have responded. The supreme value of pessimism lies in its insistence upon the Ideal, and it is the harsh contrast between the Ideal and the Actual that begets the pessimistic mood. As an interpretation of liberalism, pessimism has the merit of pointing out the somber fact that life as lived by human beings, far from being a simple matter of correct thinking and just action, is beset by all sorts of complications and *nuances* due to the fact that life, instead of following such as those which the surveyer draws when he maps out one of the western states, has lines like those of the Maine coast. As a result, pessimism sees that all may be true where nought is exact.

Optimistic liberalism, sure of its ground in logical law and moral principle, is prone to cast aside every form of religious tra-

dition which does not fit snugly into the trim system which the buoyant free-thinker has elaborated from his fresh soul-stuff. Pessimistic liberalism is so impressed by the august and complicated character of the life-problem that it refuses to be blinded by mere enlightenment, and thus it keeps turning to the sublime irrationalities of religion for relief. Optimistic liberalism, filled with an intellectual confidence which borders on intellectual conceit, can see no plausibility in any ideas save its own and those of its own age. Pessimism has sympathy for the impenetrable ideas of darker ages, because pessimism is not unaware of a due amount of darkness in its own soul. In the midst of this contrast between the rationalistic, fact-loving liberalism of the optimistic school and the humanistic, value-seeking freedom of the pessimist, it appears that religious tradition with its primitive characterizations has the power to conserve far more of the elemental and naïve than can be found in any amount of advanced thinking. Now, it is pessimistic liberalism with its dominant humanism which tends to conserve these bold and thoughtless ideas of an age which did not feel constrained to emphasize the exactitudes of an age of science. Let optimistic liberalism have its way, and the fundamental values of life, as these went to make up poetry and religion, are lost to us.

In the larger liberalism, as this appears in pessimistic humanism, there is freedom of thought and freedom of religion also. In modern times, when liberalism first became an issue, all work of emancipation seems to have been directed toward the intellect, as though the cognitive process were the only function of consciousness which stood in need of or had the capacity to enjoy freedom. But is there not a freedom of religion, of morality, of art? Logic is not the only form of human culture which has come in for emancipation; for the liberating movement of the modern has been generous enough to spread its wings over all the forms of spiritual life. The liberation of religion took place when Schleiermacher refused to allow religion to be identified with either metaphysics or morality. The emancipation of art, anticipated by Kant, was made possible by the Romanticists and the Decadents. The freedom of the moral ideal came later when Stendhal and Ibsen

sought to change the point of departure in ethics from society to the individual. Now, to have freedom of thought without freedom of belief or conduct or taste would be incomplete and intolerable; but, for some reason, the liberal has usually confined freedom to the narrow domain of free-thinking. Here, again, appears the importance of humanistic liberalism according to which the soul in its totality is to enjoy the blessings of liberty; here, further, appears the notion that truth in its scientific form is not the sole issue in a complete human life which is pledged to worship, beauty, and the moral ideal also. In this spirit, pessimistic liberalism stands for the freedom of humanity in all its aspects rather than for the freedom of man in his scientific thinking.

To what academic conclusion does this contrast of the two freedoms now lead? First of all, pessimistic liberalism does not call upon its optimistic confrère to surrender the ground of scientific fact which it has won, even when the significance of the free-thinker's victory is often no more impressive than the charge upon the enemy's position which yields some strategic point. Pessimistic liberalism calls upon man, not to be less free in his thinking, but more liberal in his general estimate of the facts and values of human life as a whole. The thinker is also a man, and as a man he has at stake the same spiritual interests as were entertained by the men of elder days who made such sorry work of their thoughts. If a new fact now and then, if straighter and shorter lines in the physical world were sufficient for the perfection and redemption of mankind, the way of optimistic liberalism would indeed be rose-strewn. Unfortunately, man in all ages produces pathetic effects in his life, so that a serious-minded person cannot allow liberal scientism to throw dust into the eyes and thus create the impression that life in its complexity and limitlessness is an overcome standpoint. Life is not so easily overcome, and so hard is it to be human that the liberal must feel free to call upon all forms of human synthesis which mankind in past and present has perfected. We do indeed live in a "scientific age," but we have not yet appreciated anything more than the obvious benefits of enlightenment upon certain physical questions; when the disadvantages begin to appear, a larger liberalism will be requisite.

To what practical corollaries does humanistic liberalism lead? Humanistic liberalism assures us that as long as we accept both nature and humanity in their richness and intensity we are in a safe position, just as it further points out that any attempt to run nature upon the tracks of science and to draw off humanity from its own wells into the cisterns of sociality is sure to end fatally. At this point it is probably unnecessary to refer to that confidence in reason and that faith in morality which led to American atheism, for such a colonial notion seems to have lapsed. The product of adolescence, American atheism, was a joke, and the pity is that our national sense of humor did not call forth the laughter of the liberal. With us the seeds of thought spring up quickly, because we have not much earth. We have practically nothing to root and ground us in the world-whole—no peasantry to keep us in remembrance of the elemental in life, no genuine traditions, no art, no world-politics. On the other hand, we have that ideal of freedom which, having worked so effectively in Holland, England, and France, brought our interesting nation into being. Our danger lies in our trust in science, whose happy effects we see all about us; our danger lies in an equally implicit trust in sociality, whose advantages and problems are ever thrust upon us. It is true that the Yankee has somehow held fast to a kind of faith. His evangelical and evangelistic tendencies show us that. But does the Yankee really believe, has he the capacity for a profound faith in anything which does not produce immediate and practical results? To compare the new world with the old and to recall the difference between the two types of liberalism leads one to suggest that our national need is the need of an intensive, humanistic liberalism, even when this is sure to entertain us under the auspices of pessimism.

THE GERMAN CHURCH AND THE CONVERSION OF THE BALTIC SLAVS—*Concluded*

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The fatal turning-point in the history of the Baltic Slavs is the year 1106 when Magnus Billung, the last of his house, died and was succeeded in the duchy of Saxony by Lothar of Supplinburg. The new duke was politically as powerful as his predecessor and by tradition and family ties represented more than the Billunger the real interests of the Saxon people. The Billunger, as we have seen, were hostile to the conversion of the Slavs because the tithes of the church reduced the tribute which they exacted from the conquered Wends. Their interest had been to prevent missions among the Slavs. But Lothar was an ardent supporter of the church. His accession was followed by a renewal of church energy. For the first time church and state in Saxony were united in a common purpose. The sword of the duke was extended in favor of the clergy and a series of attacks began upon the Wends which were at once military expeditions and missionary campaigns.

It is fair to say, however, that at this time the Rugian Slavs furnished some provocation for these feats of arms, apart from the religious zeal which actuated the Saxons. Like the Vikings of the ninth century, the Rugians, whose capital was situated on the island of Rügen, were a sea-robber folk, adventurous and fiercely pagan.¹ Their depredations along the Baltic coast, in Mecklenburg, Holstein, and Schleswig, whence they carried off men, women, and children into slavery, and immense booty, were serious. In 1110 their robber bands fell upon Holstein and penetrated nearly to Hamburg. A cry of protest went up from the land.² In 1111

¹ L. Giesebrecht, *Wend. Gesch.*, I, 205 f.; Barthold, I, 324 f.

² *Annal. Hildesh.*; *Annal. Sax.* 1110; see the anecdote related by Helmold, I, 35, of a peasant (*rusticus*) whose wife and children had been carried off, who met Count Godfrey of Sturm in the way and bitterly upbraided him.

(the date is not certain) they again invaded Nordalbingia "as if they were going to possess the land," says Helmold. But Henry, the Christian Obodrite duke, was ready for them, and so great a slaughter of the invaders was made that out of the bodies of the slain a huge mound was erected called the Raniberg, which was long pointed out to the curious. This victory raised the prestige of the Obodrite chief to a high pitch both among the Germans of the lower Elbe and among the converted Wends. When, soon afterward, Duke Henry's son was killed by the Rugians, a united Wendish-Saxon host was gathered to the number of 1,600 men, it is said. No Saxon or Christian army had been beyond the Peene River since the time of Otto I.

The campaign was purposely undertaken in the winter season in the hope that it might be possible to cross from the mainland to the island of Rügen upon the ice. The plan was as successful, perhaps, as the leaders had dared to hope. After nine days' march the army reached the Baltic, where they burned all the Rugian fishing villages. When nothing but the frozen strait separated the attackers from the island, the priests of Arkona took alarm and sent a humble message through a Rugian priest (Helmold calls him a *flamen*, not the mediaeval Latin word for priest, i.e., *sacerdos*) with the proffer of 400, and then 800 marks. But immunity was not to be purchased so cheaply. In the end the Rugians gave hostages for the payment of the astonishing sum of 4,400 marks. The imposition of this huge indemnity stripped their temple and even private persons; messengers had to be sent to the mainland for contributions. The heart of Baltic Slavdom was shaken to the core by this expedition.¹

In 1114 Hartbert, titular bishop of Brandenburg, then *in partibus paganorum*, invaded his see and returned, boasting that he had destroyed many idols of the pagan Wends.² On February 9,

¹ Helmold, I, 38; *Annals of Corbei*, MGH., SS. III, p. 8; *Annalista Saxo*, *ibid.*, VI, p. 75. The date of this expedition is put by Wendt, I, p. 84, in the winter of 1123-24. Schmeidler, the latest editor of Helmold, places it in 1113-14. Personally I incline to the date 1113-14, for such a campaign as this would naturally follow in retaliation for the great piratical raids of 1110-11.

² *Ritum sum persecutus paganorum . . . multa atque innumerabilia destruximus idola.*—Riedel, *Codex Diplom.* Brand, X, p. 69 (1114).

1115, Count Otto of Ballenstadt won a crushing victory over the Wends at Köthen.¹ In the winter of 1124-25 Lothar, the Saxon duke, in company with a force of Christian Obodrites, destroyed the temple at Rethra,² and would probably have destroyed that of Arkona in Rügen if a thaw had not inopportunately broken up the ice and prevented the army from crossing the strait.³ In that very spring the Christian Obodrite chief, Henry, died (March 22), and in the ensuing August, Lothar, the Saxon duke, succeeded Henry V, the last of the Franconian house, as king and emperor.

It is manifest to the student who reads the history of this time that by 1125 the religion of the Baltic Slavs was clearly doomed to extinguishment. The division of the Obodrites into a Christian and a pagan group, the careers of such Wendish chieftains as Gottschalk and Henry, are evidences of it. Above all, the change of dynasty in Germany in 1125 was a bad omen for the Baltic Slavs. The old Saxon tradition of conquest and expulsion of the Wends was now identified with the power of the German kingship. Moreover, Lothar was a zealous Christian, not of the calculating Franconian kind, and warmly espoused the Saxon clergy's program of forcible conversion of the Wends.

The times were propitious for such achievement. History sometimes has a singular way of clustering men and events within a brief space of years, often, too, within a limited geographical area. Such was the case in North Germany at this time, where a remarkable combination of men and events is to be found. The rise of Conrad the Great of Wettin (1124-56), of Adolph of Holstein in 1130, of Albrecht the Bear in 1134, of Henry the Lion in 1139, was destined to revolutionize the history of lower Germany. Moreover, by the side of these great lay princes lived and labored churchmen of a new and progressive type, such as Norbert of Magdeburg (1126-34), Vicelin of Oldenburg (died 1154), and Otto of Bamberg, the apostle to the Pomeranians (died 1139).

¹ *Annal. Sax.*, 1115.

² Helmold fails us of this information, but the fact is attested by Ebbo, III, 5; cf. Wendt, I, 85, n. 14.

³ Helmold, I, 38, end.

Astonishing as it seems, at this time even some of the clergy appear for a brief moment to have been actuated by a new and softer spirit. The German church, in some degree reintegrated by the Cluniac reform, and given new ideals of practical humanitarianism and spiritual enterprise by the spread of French monastic foundations like the Cistercians, began to manifest a refreshing missionary zeal and partially to abandon its brutal desire for increase of tithes merely. Vicelin of Oldenburg and especially the saintly Otto of Bamberg represent a new type of bishop practicing gentle methods, learning the Slav tongue, and considerate of the customs and prejudices of the Wends.¹

Let us first glance at the history of the conversion of Pomerania. Henry II had founded the bishopric of Bamberg in 1007 as a missionary station among the Wends of the upper Main and the Neckar, and something of the pious spirit of Henry and his empress, the gentle Cunigunde, seems to have affected the traditions of the see. A bishop endued with sincere religious zeal, who learned the Slav language and mingled with the hated race with the loving-kindness of a father among his children, is a novel and refreshing type of German ecclesiastic.²

The conversion of Pomerania by evangelization and not by the sword is Otto of Bamberg's title to fame. He literally created a new Baltic state in the first half of the twelfth century. Pomerania was nominally under the sway of Poland, and it was the initiative of King Boleslav III which first interested Otto in the project of converting the Pomeranians. "Durch sein Verdienst wurde die seit einem Jahrhundert unterbrochene Mission im Osten neubelebt und deutscher Sitte und Sprache die Bahn und Ostseeküsten gebrochen."³

¹ Helmold's knowledge of the tongue must have been large, for his observations upon the words and the language are too intimate for it to have been otherwise (see I. 1, 12, 20, 25, 50, 52, 84, 88. In chap. 84 he lauds the labors of a priest of Oldenburg in the twelfth century, named Bruno, who "sufficienter amministravit verbum Dei, habens sermones conscriptos Slavicis verbis, quos populo pronuntiaret oportune").

² See the comments of Lavissee, *La Marche de Brandebourg*, p. 52; Guttman, in *Forschungen zur Brand. und Preuss. Gesch.*, IX, 439-40.

³ Richter, *Annalen*, II, 634, note. The text of Boleslav's charter to the first Christian establishment in Pomerania is in Herbordus, *Dialogus*, II, chap. xxx (Jaffé, V, 775-76).

Otto of Bamberg's life is so interesting that a brief sketch of it may be permitted. Having received a good education, he conceived the idea of going to Poland—this was about 1080—not so much to carry the faith into this new country as to carry the light of learning thither. In Poland he opened a school for boys, and from his own pupils learned to speak the Slav tongue. He attracted the attention of Boleslav, whose service he entered and by whom he was sent on an embassy to Henry IV in 1097. His unusual abilities here also attracted royal attention and he became the emperor's chaplain and chancellor. Henry at this time was engaged in erecting the cathedral of Speyer and intrusted Otto with the responsible task of superintending the construction. In 1102, when the bishopric of Bamberg fell vacant, the emperor passed over all the eager "political" clerics who scrambled for the office and conferred it upon Otto. It was a congenial post for a man so cultured, for Bamberg was at this time perhaps the most distinguished intellectual center in Germany.

For twenty-one years Otto ministered to his diocese, where he displayed great aptitude in administration. But he never forgot the country of his young adventure, and in 1123 when Boleslav III wrote in terms of affectionate friendship beseeching him to come and help in the work of Christianizing and civilizing the pagan and barbarian "Land-by-the-Sea"—for such is the meaning of the word Pomerania¹—Otto, although over sixty years old, could not refuse, in spite of the hardships he knew it would be necessary to endure. Twice he made the long and arduous journey down the Saale and the Elbe, and thence up the Havel, and so to the far Baltic coast towns of Stettin and Wollin.

Pomerania then was a land of marsh and fen, of sluggish streams and stagnant lakes, inhabited by a pure Slav people who still lived after the primitive manner of their kind and were absolutely untouched by Christo-German civilization. A fisher folk chiefly, wealth was estimated in lasts of dried fish and in hives of bees, for honey was a staple article of production. Their food was fish and rye and a few vegetables; they drank a mead of cherry and honey. Their textile skill was considerable, but they were poor

¹ Herbordus, II, 1.

farmers. The towns at the mouth of the Oder and the Peene had considerable commerce in raw productions like dried fish, furs, tar, rope, etc., but were astonishingly squalid and miry.¹ The only structures of prominence were the temples.² Here, too, was a sacred black horse. Amid this population, which was spared the intolerance, the bigotry, the greed which was so heavily inflicted upon the Slavs of the Elbe, Otto lived and labored, winning the confidence of the Pomeranians by gentle means.³ Pomerania was the only Slavonic land under the domination of the Latin church in the Middle Ages which made the transition from paganism to Christianity and from barbarism to civilization by transformation and not by force. Among the many canonized but unhallowed saints of the Roman church Otto of Bamberg justly deserved the halo with which Clement III crowned his memory in 1189.⁴

Nordalbingia, too, at this same time had its Otto of Bamberg in the person of a devoted priest named Vicelin. But in his case his gentle labors were neutralized by the fierce violence of Henry the Lion and the bigotry of St. Bernard. The work of Vicelin of Oldenburg among the unconverted Obodrites and Wagri is closely interwoven with this period of German trans-Elban expansion. "In these days," writes Helmold, "there was neither church nor priest among all the people of the Wilzi, Obodrites and Wagri, except only in the city of [Alt-] Lübeck, because there the court of Henry [the duke of the Obodrites, who personally was Christian] was established (1126). And at this time there came a certain

¹ Sommerfeld, *loc. cit.*, pp. 62-66.

² In Herbordus, II, 32, is a remarkable description of the temple at Stettin. It was adorned with carved wooden figures of men and beasts and birds, brilliantly painted and so true to nature "ut spirare putares ac vivere."

³ See the anecdote in Herbordus, III, chap. xix, of the boys playing in the street whom Otto spoke to in their own language, and who followed him.

⁴ This brief sketch is wholly based upon the life of Otto by Ebbo and the *Dialogus* of Herbordus in Jaffé, V; also in *MGH.*, SS. XII. The literature is large: Zimmermann, *Otto, Bischof von Bamberg*, Freiburg, 1875; Looshorn, *Der heilige Bischof Otto*, Munich, 1888; Maskus, *Bischof Otto von Bamberg, Reichsfürst und Missionar*, Breslau, 1889; Zuritsch, *Geschichte des Bischofs Otto von Bamberg des Pommernapostels*, Gotha, 1889; Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, III (5th ed.), 987 ff.; Juritsch, *Otto von Bamberg*; Sommerfeld, *Gesch. des Germanisierung des Herzogtums Pommern*, chap. i (in Schmoller's *Forschungen*, XIII, Fünftes Heft, 1896); Hauck, III, 564-87.

priest named Vicelin who came to the 'king' of the Slavs in [Alt-] Lübeck and asked to be given the right to preach the word of God in his land."¹

Vicelin was born in a little Saxon hamlet near Minden and was educated in the episcopal school at Paderborn under a then distinguished master named Hartmann; thence he passed to the instruction of his uncle, a priest of Fuhlen, in the county of Schaumburg,² who seems to have had more than local fame as a scholar. When his uncle died Vicelin went back to Paderborn and afterward to the episcopal school in Bremen. Here his winning personality and high moral qualities exercised a great influence over his clerical pupils, who were accustomed, like boys in a boarding-school, to get "out of bounds" and roam the streets at night, or find unlawful pleasure in frequenting taverns. His efficiency drew the praise of his superior, the bishop Frethericus, who, however, expressed misgivings of the disciplinary value of moral suasion when compared with the time-honored schoolmaster's rod. But Vicelin could not be persuaded to use the whip upon his pupils, saying that many a good student was ruined by cruelty.³ In the year 1122-23 Vicelin went to France, then the educational center of Europe, and pursued his studies at Laon under the famous masters, the brothers Anselm and Raoul,⁴ "qui in explanacione divinae paginae fuerant eo tempore precipui."

But Vicelin had no taste for the "empty subtleties and mere battles of words"⁵ which characterized scholastic education at this time. He pined for some more practical interest. In 1126 he returned to Germany and sought out Norbert, the famous Praemonstratensian archbishop of Magdeburg, who in Brandenburg had begun to imitate the enlightened policy which Otto of Bamberg was so successfully employing in the conversion of the Pomeranians. Although Vicelin did not become a Praemonstra-

¹ Helmold, I, 41.

² See von Mooyer, *Die vormalige Grafschaft Schaumburg*, p. 25.

³ This paragraph is derived from Helmold, I, 44.

⁴ See G. Le Fevre, *De Anselmo Laudunensi scholastico*, Evreux, 1895.

⁵ "Quaestiones supervacuas pugnasque verborum."

tensian,¹ he imbibed the generous missionary enthusiasm of the Norbertines. It was from Norbert himself that Vicelin first learned of duke Henry, the Christian Obodrite prince, and speedily conceived the idea that the conversion of Wagria was his appointed task. "At once he took the road into the land of the Slavs" with two companions, Rodolph, a presbyter of Hildesheim, and Ludolf, a canon of Verdun.²

The Obodrite ruler received them graciously and they joyfully returned to Saxony in order to bring back the vessels and garments and other apparatus of church worship. The new gospel station was established at Neumünster on the boundary line between German Holstein and Slavonic Wagria.³ It was a rough and uncouth frontier community in which Vicelin undertook to minister, predominantly Wendish, but with a considerable sprinkling of a hardy, lawless pioneer element—Helmold says it was a *gens bruta*. One is reminded of the frontier missionary labors of Peter Cartwright in America, for even in religion, as in many other aspects of the frontier, the mediaeval German border reminds one of our own West in pioneer times. A wave of crude revivalism stirred these rude border folk which impressed Helmold with its intensity.⁴

But Vicelin's hopes were soon dashed. Duke Henry died shortly after the mission was established; his sons quarreled till both were killed, and the land was rent with dissension, in the midst of which a band of Rugian pirates descended upon the country. Border ruffianism prevailed. Knut Laward, a Danish exiled prince,

¹ See Hirsekorn, *Die Slavenchronik Helmolds*, Göttingen, 1873, p. 42. Helmold, I, 47, gives the form of their agreement together: "Hii ergo sacris connexi federibus statuerunt amplecti celibatum vitae, perdurare in oratione et jejunio, exerceri in opera pietatis, visitare infirmos, alere egentes, tam propriam quam proximorum salutem curare." One MS bears the marginal comment that Vicelin was probably an Augustine. But this form does not appear in the rules of that order.

² These were later joined in their labors by four others, "of whom," says Helmold (I, 47, quoting I Cor. 15:6), "the greater part are fallen asleep" (cf. I, 54). Undoubtedly Helmold derived his account from actual comrades of Vicelin.

³ Helmold, I, 47.

⁴ Denique incredibili dictu est, quanta plebium caterva in diebus illis ad penitentiae remedium confugerit, insonuitque vox predicationis ejus in omni Nordalbingorum provincia"—I, 47. ". . . Jactumque est misericordia Dei . . . seminarium novellae plantacionis in Slavia."—I, 54.

intervened at the instance of the Emperor Lothar, but was himself soon slain. Peace and order were not restored until the rise of those two strong men of lower Saxony, Adolph of Holstein and Henry the Lion.¹

Yet in spite of these adverse conditions Vicelin's labors managed to prosper and a half-dozen wilderness missionary stations were founded.² But there were few Germans living across the lower Elbe³ at this time, except in Holstein⁴ where some scattered Burgwarde gave greater security.⁵ The private chapel of the Obodrite duke in Alt-Lübeck was the only Christian edifice in the land before Vicelin's coming.⁶ The best element in the country was a considerable colony of German merchants⁷ settled in the Obodrite capital. But the new Obodrite Duke Pribislav had apprehensions of the political effect upon his people which might arise from the establishment of a church in the capital of the Obodrites⁸ and

¹ This account of Vicelin's early life has been drawn from Helmold, I, chaps. 42-49. For literature see A. Boehmer, *Vicelin*, Rostock, 1887; Höhlbaum, "Vicelin und seine Biographien," *Forschungen zur deutschen Gesch.*, XVII, 209-29; n. p. 387 and n. 1; Schirren, "Über Vicelins Priesterweihe," *ibid.*, pp. 376-89; Bernhardi, *Jahrbuch-Lothar II*, cf. Dähmann-Waitz, *Quellenkunde des deutschen Gesch.*, No. 5477 (last ed., 1912).

² Helmold I, 53, says: "sex vel eo amplius oppida." In I, 58, he describes them as "incommoda fori—forensis ecclesia." The names are recorded in some verses commemorative of Vicelin printed in the appendix to Schmeidler's edition of Helmold, p. 229, vss. 125 ff. They also are mentioned in a diploma of Lothar II, March 17, 1137, and another of Conrad III, dated January 5, 1139 (Boehmer-Mühlbach, *Regesta*, Nos. 3348, 3384). But there is some doubt of the trustworthiness of the documents. Cf. Bernhardi, *Lothar II*, p. 800, n. 27; Bahr, *Nordalbing. Studien*, pp. 37 ff; Schultze, *Die Urkunden Lothars II* (Innsbruck, 1905), p. 129 ff.

³ This is established from the testimony of Helmold, I, 8, 48 and 56, though he contradicts himself in chap. 24, where he falls into error by following Adam of Bremen. See edition of Helmold by Schmeidler, p. 96, n. 1. It is confirmed by the *Ann. Pegov. anno 1115*. "Ultra Albiam illis temporibus rarus inveniebatur Christianus" (*MGH.*, SS. XVI, p. 252).

⁴ Helmold, I, 41. "Sed et Slavorum populi agebant ea quae pacis sunt, eo quod Heinricus Slavorum regulus [observe that he is not called *dux*] comitem Adolfum et contiguos Nordalbingorum populos omni benivolentia amplexatus fuerit."

⁵ Helmold, I, 34, 56.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 34, 41.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 48: "a mercatoribus quorum non parvum coloniam."

⁸ "Protestatus est omnem Slavorum gentem divinae religioni subjugere"—Helmold, I, 53.

refused permission. Accordingly the first public church in Alt-Lübeck was set up across the Trave River on a hill outside the city.¹ The precaution was wisely taken, for the irritation of the Obodrites daily increased because of the steady encroachment of German settlers into their territory, and the feeling was all the more aggravated by the intolerant preaching which Vicelin could not control and the popular hatred with which the religion of the Slavs was regarded by the German incomers, which found vent in attacks upon their sacred groves and their temples.²

The moderation of such men as Otto of Bamberg, Norbert of Magdeburg, and Vicelin of Oldenburg was out of temper with the spirit of the twelfth century. It was the age of the crusades—that great manifestation of mediaeval bigotry. In 1144 Edessa had been captured by the Mohammedans and Jerusalem was in peril. Europe was fired to a new crusade. St. Bernard of Clairvaux was the archpreacher of the new expedition. Having prevailed upon Louis VII of France to take the cross at Vézelay, Bernard came to Germany, and on December 27, 1146, Conrad III of Germany also espoused it. But the Saxons held aloof from the movement. To the exhortations of Bernard, Henry the Lion and other nobles of the north replied that it was senseless for them to expend blood and treasure beyond sea when the pagan Wends were on the border of Germany. The saint yielded the point and released them from service in the East on condition that they forcibly converted the Wends.

So was engendered the Wendish Crusade of 1147, the effect of which was to break the power of the Baltic Slavs and annex their territory to the German kingdom. It was a sinister mixture of bigotry and lust for land. "They agreed to this: either utterly to destroy the pagan race of the Slavs, or to compel them to become Christian," runs a chronicle of the time.

Forewarned of the coming storm, Niklot, the Obodrite duke, the ablest leader ever developed among the Baltic Slavs, fortified his stronghold at Dubin on Lake Schwerin, and then suddenly

¹ Helmold, I, 48; cf. Ohnesorge, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

² "Lucos et omnes ritus sacrilegos destruens."—Helmold, I, 47; cf. chap. 52, which is a dissertation on the religion of the Slavs.

attacked Lübeck before his enemies were organized. By August, 1147, two armies were on foot against him, one under Henry the Lion advanced upon Dubin and was accompanied by the archbishop of Bremen and a host of Saxon nobles, the other massed at Magdeburg under the margraves of Meissen and the Nordmark, Albrecht the Bear of Brandenburg and Conrad of Wettin. With it were the bishops of Havelberg and Brandenburg and the archbishop of Magdeburg. The Slavs fell back into the marshes and could not be captured. But their towns and villages were given to the flames and the land so reduced to desolation that in the next year a terrible famine came.¹ In the end Niklot, the Obodrite duke, succumbed. His people accepted the Christian faith and were baptized at the edge of the sword. Niklot's despondent words to Henry the Lion need no comment: "Let the God who is in heaven be your god. Be our god and it will suffice. You may worship your God. We will worship you."

Henry and his Saxon vassals were greater gainers from this crusade than the church. The Saxon duke collected tribute from the conquered Obodrites, divided the conquered lands among his vassals, and left the church in the lurch. As long as Niklot punctually paid the tribute (which he acquired by pirate raids upon the Danish islands)² Henry was indifferent to the church's welfare in the Slav land, and even pretended to be Niklot's friend. He used the situation to his own advantage. The "conversion" of the Obodrites had accentuated the difference between them and the other pagan Wendish tribes, and two of these, the Kycini and the Circipani (stems of the Wilzi), rebelled against Niklot, refusing either to become Christian or to contribute to the tribute exacted by the Saxon duke. The result was that in 1151 a joint expedition was made by Henry the Lion and Niklot and Adolph of Holstein against them. The celebrated fane at Goderak was destroyed and

¹ On this crusade see Wendt, II, 20; Hauck, IV, 563 ff., etc. All the chroniclers and modern historians have noticed it. The point of view of a Christian Slav is given by Vincent, *Prag. Ann.*, *MGH.*, SS. XVII, p. 663.

² Helmold, I, 84.

³ *Ann. Colbas*, *MGH.*, SS. XIX, p. 715.

an immense amount of booty in gold and silver taken from the coffers of the Wendish priests.¹

In the midst of these waves of war Vicelin had labored with a heavy heart. The destruction of its edifices and farms threw a great burden on the church for the care of the destitute. He was joined at this time by one of his former pupils in Bremen, who also had studied in France, who now came to Neumünster.² Together Vicelin and his companions worked for the feeding of the hungry, for actual famine prevailed.³ The door of opportunity was opened to the church to extend its power in Nordalbingia and Wagria as never before. For all the area which had once been Christianized and had been lost in 1066 in the great Slav rebellion under Kruto eighty-four years before⁴ lay open again. The restoration of the destroyed sees of Oldenburg, Ratzeburg, and Mecklenburg was now possible. In this work Hartwig I, archbishop of Hamburg-Bremen, who strongly reminds one of Adalbert of Bremen, was a prominent figure.⁵ In 1149 he consecrated Vicelin as bishop of the revived see of Oldenburg, where he continued to labor until his death in 1154. Already he had been over twenty-two years in Holstein.⁶ In the same year Mecklenburg was filled and Ratzeburg was restored in 1152.⁷ The establishment of rural churches was also rapidly pushed, as at Bornhöved and Högersdorf (near Sigeberg, called in the Slav tongue Cuzalina). These sanctuaries were all built of wood cut in the near-by forests by the peasantry.

The natives were quiet but sullen, especially around Oldenburg, where a local Slav cult of the god Prove obtained, whose priest (flamen) was a descendant of the pagan chieftain Kruto and was

¹ Helmold, I, 71. This temple could not have been the *sanum celeberrimum* at Rethra, though that is often said; for Rethra was south of the Peene in the country of the Redarii and was destroyed by Lothar II in the expedition of 1124-25. See Wendt, *Germanisierung*, etc., II, 47, and compare Arnold of Lübeck, V, 24.

² Helmold, I, 58.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 24, 69.

⁵ Dehio, "Hartwich von Stade, Erzbischof von Hamburg-Bremen," *Bremisches Jahrbuch*, VI, 35-154, and separately, Göttingen, 1872.

⁶ Jaffé, *Lothar*, p. 233.

⁷ Dehio, p. 147; Hauck, IV, 618, n. 1, disagrees. Cf. *Neues Archiv*, XXXII, 514, n. 19.

"an idolator and a great pirate."¹ Timidly civilization and Christianity crept into the land, for a new native outbreak was always feared, for which reason castles were again built as before.²

Under these strained conditions the public, voluntary espousal of the Christian faith by Pribislav must have come as relief. It was in the dead of winter, in January, 1156, that the summons came to Oldenburg that a priest be sent to him to explain the sacred mysteries. Helmold apparently was one of the little company of priests appointed to accompany the bishop. After wading through snowdrifts (*inter cumulos nivis*), they came to an abandoned castle where was a little ruined chapel which Vicelin had once built. There they met Pribislav.

"After having expounded the sacred mysteries," says Helmold in telling of this adventure, "Pribislav asked that we would go with him to his own dwelling-place which was a castle farther off. He received us with much readiness and made things very pleasant for us. A table was set which they heaped with twenty kinds of food. There I learned by actual experience what I had heard before in popular talk that there is no people decenter in the graces of hospitality than the Wends."³

Having remained with Pribislav for two days and nights, the little band of cross-bearers went on into Farther Slavonia (*in ulteriorem Slaviam*) in response to another summons from a lesser Wendish chief named Thessemar, who lived near Lake Schwerin. Let Helmold again tell the tale:

We came to a wood which is the only one in that region, for the whole land stretches away in a plain. There among trees hoary with age we saw the sacred oaks which are dedicated to the local god who is named Prove, enclosed in a court having two entrances, and constructed like a palisade of logs. Besides being sacred to the "penates" and the idols which each [Slavonic] town has, this place was the sanctuary of their whole country to the god, to which a "flamen" and sacramental and sacrificial rites are appointed. There every fortnight the people of the land with a judge and a priest are accustomed to

¹ Helmold, I, 69.

² "Jam enim circumjacentia oppida incolebantur paulatim a Christicolis, sed cum grandi pavore propter insidias latronum."—Helmold, I, 75.

³ Helmold, I, 83. Cf. this judgment with I, 1, and II, 12 (*ad finem*); also with Adam of Bremen, II, 19.

convene for justice. It is forbidden unto all to enter this court save only the priest and those wishing to offer sacrifice, or those in peril of death, for the right of asylum is not denied. The Slavs display so much reverence for their gods that they do not allow even the blood of their enemies to pollute the approach to the temple. . . . There is a great variety of idolatry among the Slavs, for all do not follow the same superstitions. Some of their gods are represented in the form of idols in temples, as the idol at Plönen, which is named Podaga; others dwell in groves or forests, like Prove, the god at Oldenburg, who has no idol-form. Many have two or three or even more heads. Among the great variety of divinities who preside over fields and forests they do not recognize a single ruling deity above the rest. . . .

The bishop had strongly enjoined upon us that we should insist upon the destruction of this sacred grove. The bishop himself leaping down from his horse with his staff struck down the emblems at the gates of the temple, and then, having entered the atrium, we piled wood around the sacred trees and fired a huge pyre—not without fear, however, lest we would be stoned by the crowd. But heaven protected us. After these things we were hospitably entertained at a sumptuous banquet by Thessemar. But the drinking-cups of the Slavs were not sweet and pleasant to us.¹

A long colloquy followed between Pribislav and the bishop, at the termination of which the Wend chief said:

If it please the lord duke and you that we have the same worship, let our rights be recognized in the manors and the revenues of the Saxons, and then we shall willingly be Christians. We will build churches and we will pay our share of the tithes.

Pribislav had laid his finger on the sorest and the traditional grievance of the Slavs in their long resistance to Christianity—the land-grabbing of the church and its merciless imposition of the tithe. Only in their consent to use the Slavonic tongue in preaching does the Saxon clergy seem to have advanced beyond the time of Thietmar of Merseburg.² They were the same hard, ambitious, avaricious priests as before. In the reconquered dioceses, after the crusade of 1147, the surveyors of the church had set busily to work with their measuring ropes to retrace the lines of the former ecclesiastical manors and to mark out new ones. The labor was long and tedious and hard, so much so that it was not completed for years. But as the church practiced surveying, the

¹ Helmold, I, 84.

² "Habens sermones conscriptos Slavicis verbis."—Helmold, I, 84.

result was lucrative to it; for swamps and even forest land were *not* included within the measurement, but were "thrown in," to be afterward cleared and drained, so that the aggregate land acquisitions of the church were very great—*fecit maximum agrorum numerum*, says honest Helmold.¹

Fortunately for Brandenburg, the storm of the Wendish Crusade had not driven over it. The raid of Hartbert, the bishop of Bradenburg, in 1114 to recover his see *in partibus paganorum*, though unsuccessful in its main purpose, seems to have been followed by a slight restoration of Christianity, however, in the region.² Henceforward, although the great Slavonic gods Gerovit and Triglav were worshiped at Havelberg and Brandenburg, there was, nevertheless, a handful of Christian Wends in the Brandenburg territory, notably a Wendish chief with the German name Widukind, whose seat was in Havelberg, and another named Pribislav (not to be confused with the former Pribislav), who dwelt at Brandenburg, whose policies were pro-German and pro-Christian. Since the conversion of the Poles the Wends of the Havel and the Spree were fiercely menaced by them, and between the two alternatives preferred German domination. It was for this purpose that Widukind had sought the emperor at Merseburg in 1128. The half-French archbishop of Magdeburg at this time, Norbert, a man who expressed the new spirit of the church, as we have seen, seized the opportunity to extend the church into Brandenburg. A church was built in Havelberg, and for a few years the protection of Widukind gave it a precarious security. But the natives were sullenly hostile to the policy of their chief, for they feared with good reason the extension of the church's system of taxation over them again. Accordingly, when Widukind died, in 1136, pagan resentment broke out and destroyed the church. The permanent re-establishment of Christianity in Brandenburg was not made until Albrecht the Bear got control of Brandenburg.³

Albrecht the Bear was probably the most statesmanlike prince in Germany in the twelfth century. In an age of religious bigotry

¹ Helmold, *op. cit.*, I, 84. Cf. chaps. 69, 71, 77.

² *Annal. Pegav.*, MGH., SS. XVI, p. 252.

³ Wendt, I, 83; Ebbo, *Vita Ottonis ep. Babenb.*, III, 3; *Annal. Magdeb.*, MGH., SS. XVI, p. 186; *Annal. Hild.*, *ibid.*, III, p. 116.

he was not a bigot. In an age when German hatred of the Wends was rancorous, he was friendly to them. His policy was a rare combination of firmness and tact. He fended off the Wendish Crusade from his country and largely was content to let time work out the solution of things. He was justified of his enlightened resolution. In 1136 when Widukind died and his sons headed a pagan reaction, the new margrave acted promptly, and by 1144 Anselm of Havelberg returned to the long-abandoned bishopric.¹

Most of the Wendish population in Brandenburg accepted the *fait accompli*, both in its political and its religious bearing, without opposition. They acknowledged the faith and the authority of the German church and even began to live German law.² But vestiges of Slavonic paganism persisted for many years around Spandau in the heart of the marshes of the Havel and in the Spreewald.³

Albrecht kept a restraining hand upon the church in his dominions, and would not let the Wends be taxed with a heavier tithe than German subjects.⁴ He was neither a bigot nor an iconoclast. While every other Slav temple had been ruthlessly destroyed, to the regret of the student of history as well as of comparative religion, in Brandenburg Albrecht spared the temple of Triglav. It was converted into a Christian church consecrated to the Virgin, and lasted until Frederick the Great, who, with unforgivable vandalism, pulled it down in order to use the stones for the erection of his palace at Potsdam. The marvel is that this Wendish sanctuary had been built of stone in a country so devoid of stone that even today brick is the almost universal building material. The first building of modern Berlin made of stone and not brick was the Bourse, erected in 1859. Think of the devoted labor which must have been expended by this simple people in building a massive

¹ Riedel, *Codex diplom. Brand.*, I, 15, p. 6; Sommerfeld, p. 132. Cf. Helmold, I, 88. Mark Brandenb.

² Riedel, II, 2-39; Wohlbrück, *Gesch. des Bistums Lebus*, I, 323 ff.

³ See the long and interesting note in Wendt, II, 21.

⁴ "Si Slavi vel in foro vel quacumque commutatione sibi contraxerint aliquos mansos Teutonicorum ejusdem villae, eandem decimam sine contradictione persolvent, quam Teutonicus inde persolvit."—*Urk des Kl. S. Marien in Erfurt*, 1227, quoted by Guttman, 448; cf. Tuttle, *History of Prussia*, I, 26.

stone temple in such an early period, and under such adverse physical conditions; for every block of stone must have been freighted from the mountains of Bohemia, down the Elbe, and up the Havel!

By the middle of the twelfth century only a single islet of independent Slavdom west of the Oder River yet survived. This was the pirate state of Rügen, in its island fortress. Protected by its difficult location, environed by rough and stormy waters,¹ and defended by the bold and fanatical priests of the great temple of Arkona, Rügen held out until 1168.² In that year Waldemar of Denmark, who cherished ambitions for the expansion of Danish power along the Baltic coast which were destined to be a source of danger to future Germany,³ and who also hated the Rugians because of their piratical forays upon the Danish coast and in the Danish islands, organized a formidable expedition against them. Even Christian Slavs participated in it, notably Kazamir and Buggeslav, two Pomeranian princes, and Pribislav the Obodrite—the last reluctantly, “because the duke [of the Saxons] commanded him.”⁴ Arkona was captured, the famous temple of the god Svantovit destroyed, the statue of the god dragged through the midst of his subjugated votaries and chopped to pieces and burned, the population scattered or else sold into slavery. Twelve churches were established in Rügen in honor of the extinguishment of the last stronghold of Slavonic paganism in Germany.⁵ The last vestiges of the religion of the Baltic Slavs were stamped out. The temples and sacred groves were destroyed. The native cult ceased to be a national expression. Where it survived at all, it was furtively practiced around some ancient oak, or by a spring or holy stone,⁶ and so degenerated to folklore and popular superstition, snatches

¹ See the description of the great storm of February, 1164, in Helmold, II, 1.

² “Sola Rugianorum gens durior ceteris in tenebris infidelitatis usque ad nostra tempora perduravit, omnibus inaccessibilis propter maris circumjacentia.”—Helmold, II, 12.

³ Cf. Sommerfeld, chap. 5.

⁴ Helmold, II, 12.

⁵ Helmold, II, 12–13; Wendt, II, pp. 57–60.

⁶ “Et inhibiti sunt . . . jurare in arboribus, fontibus et lapidibus.”—Helmold, I, 84.

of which still persist among the peasantry, having lost their heathen label.

There is always a certain melancholy attending the death of the gods, and one feels the pathos and romance of this *Götterdämmerung* as he feels the tragedy in the ancient cry, "Pan is dead," or the fall of Woden. As with the Druids, as it was in Rome in the fourth century, as it was with the Aztec religion in Mexico, when the body of the votaries had become cowed by force, or grown lax and indifferent to the national religion owing to the attrition or the attraction of a new faith, so it was with the religion of the Baltic Slavs. The priests of the high temples at Rethra and Arkona made the final and futile struggle to preserve the tribal faith.

It is a pity that the Slavic side of this story has been lost. It was of the nature of mediaeval Christianity to be bigoted and intolerant; the church in its mistaken zeal destroyed every vestige of the conquered faith. We know this sad history only from the German enemies of the Baltic Slavs. But if one reads the record between the lines and with sympathetic eyes, it is apparent that there surely was another side. One cannot refuse the meed of honor to those pagan priests of the Wends who were loyal with a desperate fidelity to their historic religion. What Sir Gilbert Murray has said of the dying paganism of the fourth century is applicable here: "Like other conquerors these conquerors were often treacherous and brutal; like other vanquished these vanquished have been tried at the bar of history without benefit of counsel. . . . Only an ignorant man will pronounce a violent or bitter judgment."¹

¹ *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 180.

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

IV. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN PERIOD AND IN JEWISH- GREEK LITERATURE

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A. GREEK WRITERS OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN PERIOD

Under this caption are included the more prominent Greek writers, non-Jewish and non-Christian, of the period 1-200 A.D. The authors examined are representative historians, geographers, orators, and philosophers, and include Strabo, Musonius Rufus, Cornutus, Epictetus, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, Arrian, Maximus Tyrius, Lucian, Marcus Aurelius, Hermogenes, Pausanias. In treatment, however, it will be advisable to begin with the usage of philosophic schools rather than with that of the individual writers. Of the types of philosophic thought current in the Greco-Roman world in this period two are of especial importance for the purposes of this study. These are neo-Pythagoreanism and late Stoicism.

The literature of neo-Pythagoreanism consists of about ninety writings ascribed to some fifty different authors. It is largely pseudonymous, its ostensible authors being outstanding representatives of the ancient school, as, e.g., Philolaus, Archytas, and Timaeus of Locris. Zeller believes that it arose chiefly at Alexandria and in the two centuries 100 B.C. to 100 A.D. The material is collected in Mullach's *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, Vols. I and II.

The neo-Pythagoreans apparently did not employ πνεῦμα as a prominent term of their philosophic vocabulary. In the Similitudes "of the Pythagoreans and others" it occurs once, meaning "wind," in a passage ascribed to Aristonymus (Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 489, 19; Stobaeus *Florileg.* iii, 40). In the *Pythag. Fragg. Varia* (II, 66, 2, 5)

it occurs in an ascription to the Stoics of their familiar doctrine that the soul is πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον. Sextus Empiricus (225 A.D.) ascribes to the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles the doctrine, akin to that which Aristotle says was held in his day (see *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1914, p. 573, and cf. p. 399 below), that there is one πνεῦμα which permeates the whole world like a soul and unites us to the irrational animals. But his failure to indicate precisely to what writers or period he means to ascribe this doctrine makes it impossible to affirm that it was held by the neo-Pythagoreans of the period of which we are speaking.

Ψυχή is commonly used in the sense of "soul," as the seat of intellectual and moral life. A typical example is the Pythagorean similitude,

κοσμητέον ἱερὸν μὲν ἀναθήμασιν τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μαθήμασιν.

A temple should be adorned with votive offerings, but the soul with knowledge [Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 493, 96].

According to Alex. Polyhistor (Diog. Laert. vii. 19 ff. [28]), they held that the soul is a fragment of the aether, both warm and cold, distinguishable from life (ζωή), and immortal because that from which it is detached is immortal. It is divided into three parts, νοῦς, φρήν, and θυμός (§30), the first and last being found in other animals, but the second only in man; the reasoning sense is immortal and the soul is nourished by the blood, and reasons are the winds (ἄνεμοι) of the soul.

Σάρξ seems to have played no special part in neo-Pythagoreanism. In a passage ascribed to Pythagoras (Stobaeus *op. cit.* ci. 13; Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 50, 20) it apparently means the body without ethical implication. No other instances have been noted in neo-Pythagorean writers. In the neo-Platonic writers of the fourth century (Iamblichus *Adhort. ad Phil.* 21; Mullach, *op. cit.*, I, 506, 28) the body is regarded as the prison of the soul, and, since even Plato taught this, it would not be surprising to find the idea in the neo-Pythagoreans of the first century. Definite evidence of it has not, however, been discovered. In the writings of Didymus, a Pythagorean of the first century A.D. (Mullach, *op. cit.*), body and soul are often spoken of together but without characterization of the former as evil. To the Peripatetics he ascribes

the view that the goods of the body are inferior to those of the soul, but they are still goods, and the body is definitely said to be friendly to us. These views Didymus does not oppose, and indeed in one passage in which he is apparently expressing his own opinion he says:

For if man is desirable for his own sake so also the parts would be desirable for their own sake. But the parts of a man, completely considered, are body and soul; so that the body, too, would be desirable [Mullach, *op. cit.*, II, 88, i, *fin.*].

The earliest testimony we possess as to the views of the neo-Pythagoreans concerning the ultimate elements of the universe is from Alexander Polyhistor, 80-40 B.C. (cf. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, p. 108), quoted by Diogenes Laertius (viii. 19. 24):

Alexander says in the Successions of the Philosophers also that he found these things in Pythagorean commentaries; the monad is the beginning of all things. And from the monad the indefinite duad arises, so that matter is made subject to the monad which is cause. And from the monad and the indefinite duad the numbers arise and from the numbers the signs. . . .

In this passage nothing is said about the origin of evil. In pseudo-Archytas, however, quoted by Stobaeus i. 710 ff., it is affirmed that the most general principles are form and matter, the former corresponding to the ordered and definite, the latter to the unordered and undefined; the former being of beneficent, and the latter of destructive, nature. A similar doctrine is in pseudo-Plutarch ascribed to Pythagoras:

Placita i. 3. 8: Pythagoras says that the numbers are elements; and again that the monad and the undefined duad are in the elements. And of the elements the one is according to him directed toward the active and formative cause, which is mind and God, and the other to the passive and material, which is the visible world.

Ibid. i. 7. 18: Pythagoras says that of the principles the monad is God and the good, which is the nature of the one, the mind [*ὁ νοῦς*] itself. And the undefined duad is a demon and the evil, belonging to which is the material mass, and it is the visible world.

Vita Hom. 145: He [Pythagoras] held the ultimate principles to be two, calling them the defined monad and the undefined duad, the one being the cause (or principle) of good things, the other of evil things.

Here we seem clearly to find the doctrine that there are two principles, the one beneficent and the other malevolent, and the

latter identified or associated with matter. On the other hand, these statements manifestly apply, not to Pythagoras himself, but to the neo-Pythagorean school, and this in turn raises the question in what period this doctrine, that the origin of evil is in matter, was held. Its absence from the earliest testimony concerning the views of the school, and apparently, indeed, from such writers as Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius, and Hippolytus, makes it doubtful when it became a part of the teaching of the school. It is noticeable, moreover, that the testimony which we have from pseudo-Archytas, pseudo-Plutarch, and Epiphanius does not enter into details, nor define what is meant by evil, whether physical or moral.

Among post-Christian writers more or less strongly influenced by Stoicism, none is more important than Seneca, whose life was almost contemporaneous with that of the apostle Paul. Although writing in Latin, he is an important source of information concerning the thought of the period. According to Arnold he was the last Roman who made a systematic study of Stoicism in the original authorities.

Seneca's term *animus*, like the *ψυχή* of the earlier Stoics, is a functional term denoting the seat of feeling, thought, and will. With the question of its substance he was apparently less concerned than some of his predecessors. The investigation has at least discovered no passage in which he predicates of it either *spiritus* or *corpus*. The body is for him a temporary, decadent affair, a burden on the soul (*Ep.* 120. 17), but he goes no farther than this into the philosophy of the matter.

Death is followed, as with Virgil (*Aeneid* vi. 724-51), by a period of purgation, after which the soul finds its way to the higher regions, eventually being absorbed into the primal elements (*Dial.* vi. 23. 1; 25. 1; *Ep.* 57. 8; *Dial.* vi. 26. 7; cited by Arnold, p. 259). The necessity of purgation evidently arises from the experiences of the soul in the period of its residence in the body, but Seneca does not say that that from which the soul requires purgation is a pollution derived from the matter of which the body is composed. There is nothing in his language to show that he goes beyond the fact of common experience that men in the period of bodily life commit sin; while against the view that he ascribes moral evil to the

corrupting influence of the body is a passage in *Ep.* 65. 16, where, if *poena* be taken in its usual and proper sense, he definitely expresses the old Orphic theory that the body is a punishment of the soul,¹ the sequel to sin, not the cause of it.

Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher of the time of Nero, does not use the term *πνεῦμα*. He employs soul and body as complementary terms, and once (24. 9-11) says expressly that man is a composite of soul and body. That *ψυχή* was for him a term inclusive of all the vital and psychical elements of man is suggested in 87. 14-16:

For we do not philosophize with hand or foot or the rest of the body, but with soul, and with but a small part of this, which we call understanding [*διάνοια*].

When, accordingly, he makes the soul the organ through which man knows God, saying (134. 5),

Why dost thou tarry, or what art thou waiting for? Cut out the dead part of thy soul and thou shalt know God!

the soul must doubtless be understood as possessing this power by virtue of the understanding, *διάνοια*. Musonius uses *σάρξ* only once, and then it denotes flesh in the physical sense.

Cornutus, a Stoic contemporary of Musonius Rufus, uses *πνεῦμα* in the sense of gas or vapor. It has no ethical, vital, or theological meaning. He employs *ψυχή* sixteen times in senses already familiar. He holds that the soul is composed of fire and located in the head. Zeus is the all-permeating world-soul. Cornutus also furnishes examples of the usage, as old as Homer, of *ψυχαί* used of the spirits of the dead in Hades. *Σάρξ* does not occur.

Plutarch, one of the most voluminous and best-known writers of the first century A.D., who wrote about a generation later than Seneca and Paul, is somewhat difficult to classify. Though undoubtedly much influenced by the Stoics and Academics, he was

¹ The impression that Seneca ascribed morally corrupting power to the body by virtue of its materiality seems to have arisen from what is clearly shown by the context to be a misinterpretation of *putre* in *Ep.* 120. 17 and of *inficitur* in *Dial.* vi. 24. 5. In the former case he is clearly contrasting the body, as a ruinous, ramshackle, and hence temporary, dwelling of the soul, with its aspirations after eternal things. In the latter, the words that precede *inficitur* and those that follow, referring to the soul as imprisoned and restrained, naturally require, not the derived meaning "stained," but the proper sense "submerged."

himself an eclectic rather than an adherent of any one school.¹ In the progress of this study hundreds of passages which illustrate his use of the terms under discussion have been collected and examined. In *De defectu oraculorum* 50-51 he uses *πνεῦμα* in connection with the exhalation that arose out of the ground at Delphi and was the cause of the inspiration of the prophetess. When this exhalation instead of inspiring the Pythia produces disastrous effects he calls it a "dumb and evil *πνεῦμα*." Yet he also affirms that the power of the "spirit" is divine and celestial or demonic, but not perpetual or incorruptible or capable of enduring forever. The whole passage illustrates the ascription of supernatural and psychical effects to a subject itself substantially defined and materially conceived; *πνεῦμα* is throughout vapor, but, as vapor, is according to circumstances "inspiring" or "dumb" and "evil."

Ψυχή occurs with great frequency in Plutarch. Prevaillingly, at least, in the *Non posse suaviter* and *Epit.* and *De virtute et vitio*, it means the soul of man as the seat of emotion, thought, and will. His usage calls for no special discussion.

Σάρξ occurs more frequently in Plutarch than in any previous philosophic writer. It usually has the meaning "body." It might be expected that in opposing Epicureanism, which he interpreted as essentially sensualism, he would have been led to ascribe moral evil to the flesh. But though he constantly disparages the pleasures of the flesh or body as compared with those of the soul, not even in his polemic against Epicurus (*Non posse suaviter*), nor in his essay concerning virtue and vice, does he find in the flesh the root of moral evil or give to the term an ethical sense.²

The teachings of Epictetus, a Stoic contemporary of Plutarch, though perhaps a little younger, are preserved to us by his pupil

¹ R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, 1916, maintains that he is really a Platonist.

² According to Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, pp. 186 ff., Plutarch, unwilling to ascribe the origin of evil to God, and unable to deny its existence—to both of which expedients the Stoics had resorted—found the source in a world-soul, distinct alike from matter, itself self-existent, and God. Matter is the sphere of operation both of good and of evil, in its lowest parts subject to the power of evil, but according to its true nature yearning after the good and the divine.

Arrian. He regards man as dichotomous, consisting of body and soul. The substance of the soul is *πνεῦμα*, which is also one of the four elements (iii. 13. 15); death is the separation of the body from the *πνεῦμα* (iii. 24. 93, 94); vision is made possible by the *πνεῦμα* infused into the eyes (ii. 23. 3), a statement which reminds us of Plutarch *Epi.* iv. 15. *Πνεῦμα* is then to Epictetus a term of substance, "a vital spirit . . . a nervous fluid," as Schweighäuser calls it.

Ψυχή is for Epictetus the seat of life (iii. 22. 87) and thought, but especially of will. It is the supreme and best element in man. Thus, in vii. 3. 10:

For that there are three things that relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains then for you philosophers to answer which is best. What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? . . . What, then, do we possess better than the flesh? The soul, he replied.

Epictetus, indeed, uses *αἵρεσις*, *προαίρεσις*, and *τὸ κυριεῖον* for the soul even more frequently perhaps than *ψυχή* itself.

Σάρξ is sometimes used by Epictetus of the soft part of the body, more commonly of the body as a whole. Epictetus continually depreciates the body or the flesh as compared with the soul; but on the other hand he does not find in the body or the flesh, by virtue of its character as matter, the source of moral evil. He is an anti-Epicurean moralist, not a philosophic dualist. Both soul and body go back at length to the four elements, which are not sharply distinguished from one another as regards their relation to soul and body respectively, and not distinguished at all ethically. There are, indeed, in both Plutarch and Epictetus indications of a movement in the direction of an ethical dualism, especially in the fact that flesh, which may be described as a middle term between body and matter (*ὄλη*), tends to take the place of body in ethical discussions. But neither of them actually arrives at an ethical dualism. In particular it is to be noted that *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* are not set in antithesis, and that neither of them is an ethical term.

The writings of Dio Chrysostom (50-125 A.D.), an orator with Stoic tendencies, are extensive and deal with a large variety of subjects, historical, biographical, literary, political, and ethical. They probably reflect the ordinary literary usage of the times,

save as this may have been affected by his conscious efforts to follow the earlier classical models. Πνεῦμα occurs twelve times, mostly in its usual senses of wind, air, breath. In a striking passage (ii. 66. 5) the formative and active element in generation is said to be πνεῦμα. Ψυχὴ occurs over one hundred times meaning life and soul. It frequently stands in antithesis to σῶμα, with the implication that the σῶμα is inferior. Σάρξ occurs but once, and with the meaning flesh. Πνεῦμα and ψυχὴ are never set in antithesis to σάρξ, and moral evil is never traced either to σάρξ or to σῶμα.

These facts, taken in connection with the relative frequency and wide range of meaning of ψυχὴ, the entire absence of the use of πνεῦμα as a psychological term or as a predicate of God, and the absence of any ethical use of the word σάρξ,¹ tend to indicate that the New Testament usage of these words has been developed under influences quite different from those which affected the common Greek usage of the century, if the latter is adequately represented by Dio Chrysostom.

In Marcus Aurelius we have not a philosopher, strictly speaking, but a thoughtful man of affairs, a man of deep moral earnestness, who wrote down his meditations for his own benefit. Though much influenced by Stoicism, he is not to be classed as a Stoic philosopher, nor can there be found in his writings an altogether consistent psychology. He wrote a full century after the apostle Paul, but may legitimately be included in the present study because he furnishes to a certain extent an indication of the rate of movement of philosophic and ethical thought.

Πνεῦμα in Marcus Aurelius sometimes means simply air, but also (and this applies to πνευμάτιον) breath, breath of life; yet this is defined as wind (ἄνεμος) and is associated with the σάρξ (σαρκίδιον, or κρεάδιον) as in ii. 2. The investigation has discovered no clear instance of πνεῦμα or πνευμάτιον as an individualized term meaning (intelligent) spirit. Apparently Marcus Aurelius is not a trichotomist, although he employs various trichotomous series, as, e.g., σάρκια, πνεῦμα (or πνευμάτιον), τὸ ἡγεμονικόν (ii. 2); σῶμα, ψυχὴ, νοῦς (iii. 16); σωματίον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς (xii. 3); cf. also σωματίον, ψυχὴ (vi. 32). He regards man as composed of body and soul; but

¹ Nor is evil, so far as observed, in any way traced to matter.

soul is endowed with life and intelligence, or the soul is identified with the self and distinguished as such from the body (iv. 41; x. 1). As the second term of a trichotomous series, *πνεῦμα* may approach or equal *ψυχή*, including life and the power of motion.

Ψυχή denotes all in man that is not body, including both the life-principle and the element of intelligence, choice, etc. (vi. 32; cf. v. 26); the life-principle only (rare, iii. 16); the element of intelligence, etc., equivalent to the "ruling part" (v. 11, and frequently by implication). Soul is ascribed to God (v. 34) and the universe (iv. 40; cf. viii. 54). *Ψυχή* is also used quantitatively (ix. 8), as *πνεῦμα* is in other writers. Man's soul is a part of the universal soul, as are all the souls of beings that have souls (xii. 1, 26, 30, 32). Incarnated in a lower animal it becomes a *ψυχὴ ἄλογος*; in man and other rational beings (v. 34), a *ψυχὴ νοερά*. Though distinguished from the body, the soul is liable to extinction or dispersion at death, being only an exhalation from the blood (v. 33). Three possibilities await it: extinction, dispersion, and continued existence (viii. 25; xii. 3); but he has no expectation of the last.

Σάρξ, usually represented by its equivalents *σάρκια*, *σωμάτιον*, *σῶμα*, denotes one element of man's nature and this in itself inert. There is no trace in Marcus Aurelius of the thought that the flesh is the source of moral evil. Like Epictetus, he is an anti-Epicurean moralist, not a philosophic dualist. Equally absent is any assertion of the superiority of *πνεῦμα* over *ψυχή*. God has a *ψυχή*, but is never said to be *πνεῦμα*, and if there is any difference between the terms as applied to man, *πνεῦμα* is the more material and *ψυχή* the more psychical.

A few words may be added concerning *πνεῦμα* conceived of as permeating all things, whether animate or inanimate. Hints of this doctrine are found in Plutarch *De virt. mor.* 12; Galen *Introd. s. med.* 14., p. 726K (Arnim, II, 716); and *De Hipp. et Plat.* vi, p. 561K (Arnim, II, 710); Diog. Laert. vii. 84 (156) and earliest of all in Varro (26 B.C.) as quoted by Augustine *Civ. Dei* vii. 23, cited by Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 190, where, however, *anima* is more probably the equivalent of *ψυχή* than *πνεῦμα*. Finally, in Sextus Empiricus (225 A.D.) we find a fully developed doctrine of

πνεῦμα as permeating all things. In *Ad physicos* 126-31 he refutes the Pythagorean objection to the eating of the flesh of animals because "there is one πνεῦμα which extends like a soul throughout the world, which also unites us to them" by the reply that the argument proves too much. By the same token we could not cut plants and stones, he says, because there is a πνεῦμα that runs through us and all these. As early as the days of Aristotle there were those who conceived of πνεῦμα as the vital and generative substance that permeated all living things; Chrysippus, as Arius Didymus testifies, made the world-stuff self-moving πνεῦμα; by Seneca's time the suggestion had been made that the universe was the work of a divine spirit (*divinus spiritus*) diffused through all things great and small; a little later Plutarch and Epictetus, as did also Galen in the second century, conceive of πνεῦμα as a vital and nervous fluid, flowing from the soul to the eyes and other organs of sense; Galen applies the term πνεῦμα ἐκτικόν to what Plutarch had already called ἔξις ("cohesion"), and finally Sextus Empiricus in the third century definitely identifies the πνεῦμα which is in man with that which permeates also the plants and the rocks. Whenever this doctrine arose, both it and the doctrine of Chrysippus have this in common, viz., that to both there lies close at hand the identification of the πνεῦμα with God. Yet there seems to have been a singular reluctance to take the next step and say that God is πνεῦμα. Posidonius is the only Greek writer earlier than the author of the Fourth Gospel whom we definitely know to have made this statement.

B. THE USAGE OF JEWISH-GREEK LITERATURE

This literature ranges from the middle of the fourth century B.C. to the end of the first century A.D., that is, from the earliest date assigned to the Book of Tobit to the death of the historian Josephus. In bulk it is three or four times as great as the Old and New Testaments. Quasi-historical works written with a moral purpose, books of wisdom, exegesis, and apocalyptic, psalms, legends, and additions to canonical writings are among the types represented. For the explication of terms in the New Testament this closely related literature is of the utmost value.

In the canonical books of the LXX translation רִּיחַ is regularly rendered by πνεῦμα, the translators availing themselves of certain relatively late meanings of that term which are attested by very few examples in Greek authors. For the LXX phrases πνεῦμα θεοῦ, πνεῦμα κυρίου, πνεῦμα ἁγίου, no earlier Greek vouchers have been discovered. A probable point of connection appears, however, in Menander's expression, θεῖον πνεῦμα.¹ The LXX translators, familiar with this probably current expression, apparently coined by analogy the expression πνεῦμα ἁγίου as a translation of רִּיחַ קֹדֶשׁ, which, literally rendered, would have been πνεῦμα ἀγιασμένης. The expressions πνεῦμα θεοῦ and πνεῦμα κυρίου are literal translations of the Hebrew.

Πνεῦμα as denoting the seat of emotion and mentality in the individual occurs frequently in the LXX, translating רִּיחַ in the same sense; but πνοή and compounds of θυμός, ψυχή, and φρήν are also used. For this individualized sense of πνεῦμα a basis may have been found in the usage illustrated in the *Funeral Oration* of of pseudo-Demosthenes.² The LXX use of πνεῦμα to denote an unembodied being neither human nor divine finds no parallel in earlier Greek writers.³ It originated perhaps in the difficulty the translators felt with the idea of the Spirit of God working evil in one affected by it, there being joined to this the influence of such passages as I Kings 22:21; II Kings 19:7; Zech. 13:2; Job 4:15, etc. (see רִּיחַ ii. 3, *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1914, p. 67 f.). The omission of the phrase "of God" in such passages as I Sam. 16:16, 23 (though it is inconsistently retained in vss. 14, 15) gave to πνεῦμα the definite objective meaning, "a spirit of evil."

Ψυχή is the standard equivalent of נֶפֶשׁ, though it occasionally represents other Hebrew words and other Greek words occasionally represent it. It covers all the senses in which the Hebrew term is used. On the other hand, certain classical meanings of ψυχή disappear in the LXX and certain non-classical meanings

¹ Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, III, 139; cf. *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1914, p. 591.

² Pseudo-Demosthenes *Declam. fun.* 24; cf. *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1914, p. 403.

³ The earliest instance aside from the LXX is that of Dion. Hal. i. 31. 28; cf. *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1914, p. 402.

emerge. Thus, while still denoting the soul, capable of departure from and of return to the body (I Kings 17:21, etc.), it is never used in the LXX strictly for the shade, the disembodied spirit, this idea being otherwise expressed (I Sam. 28:12, 13), the tendency being, as appears in the Enoch literature, to transfer this meaning to *πνεῦμα*. For the LXX use of *ψυχή* to denote a deceased person or a dead body (a transfer to Greek of a Hebrew usage of נֶפֶשׁ) there is apparently no parallel in Greek writers.

Σάρξ represents all the Old Testament senses of רֶשֶׁת (see *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1914, p. 74 f.), though the LXX usually prefers *κρέας* for רֶשֶׁת when the latter refers to the flesh of sacrifices or to flesh used for food, and *σῶμα* for רֶשֶׁת denoting the body as such. Σάρξ sometimes denotes a kinsman; in the plural, kinsmen (II Sam. 5:1; 19:12, 13). Occasionally it denotes a living being, usually in the phrase *πᾶσα σάρξ*, which probably signifies every living being, but in Gen. 6:19; 7:15, 16, every *kind* of living being.

The usage of *πνεῦμα* in the Apocrypha and other Jewish religious writings which were translated from the Hebrew is substantially that of the canonical books. Some notable passages illustrate the persistence, if not the increase, of the tendency to blur the distinction between the spirit of God and that of man conceived of as responsive to God's will; cf. Sir. 39:6; 48:24; Ps. Sol. 17:42; 18:42. Examples of *πνεῦμα* as the seat of moral action are found in Dan. 3:39, 86; Sir. 9:9. In Sir. 38:23 *πνεῦμα* is used of that which departs from man in death (as in Eccles. 3:21; 12:7) but without implication of its power to exist apart from the body, for "the son of man is not immortal" (Sir. 17:30). In Tob. 6:8 *πνεῦμα* is used of an evil spirit. In Ps. Sol. 8:15 *πνεῦμα πλανήσεως*, though apparently exceptional in this period, illustrates the persistence of an ancient usage; cf. I Kings 22:21; also Rom. 8:15; I John 4:6.

The usage of the Greek Enoch is exceptional, though akin to that of I Sam. 16:16, etc. The term occurs most frequently in the plural, denoting (*a*) incorporeal beings called τὰ πνεύματα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (15:7) who had their dwelling in heaven and were immortal, but who left the high heaven and defiled themselves with women

(15:3); (b) the offspring born of these spirits and women, called *πνεύματα πονηρά* (15:9, 11); (c) the spirits of dead men *τὰ πνεύματα τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν νεκρῶν* (in 22:5, 6 occurring in the singular also) and immediately afterward *αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων* (22:3). It is to be noted that the spirits here spoken of are not so immaterial but that they are visible and have audible voices. The spirits of the dead are divided into three classes: the spirits of the righteous, and two classes of the spirits of the sinners, divided according to the nature of their experience on earth (22:8-13). In other portions of Enoch of which no Greek is extant the word for spirit occurs frequently, especially in the expression "Lord of Spirits," applied to God. But these, of course, afford no direct evidence as to the use of *πνεῦμα*.

There are no marked differences between the uses of *ψυχή* in the LXX version of the canonical books and in the other books translated from Hebrew into Greek. The leading meanings are life, and soul as the seat of emotion, etc.—the mind in the larger, especially the religious, sense. In Judith 11:7 it is a general term for a living creature, and in Sir. 16:30 *ψυχή παντός ζώου* is a pleonastic expression for every living creature. In Sir. 4:20, 22 (cf. vs. 27); 10:28, 29; 14:4; 19:4; 20:22, *ψυχή* seems clearly to be used for the self as the totality of powers, possibilities, and interests that belong to a human personality, as it is in Sir. 16:17 for the self in a more general sense, and in 19:3 for a person. Of soul as an entity capable of existence after death or before birth, there are no quite certain instances, though this is probably the meaning of the Greek in Sir. 6:4 (not of the underlying Hebrew) and in Tob. 14:118 (cf. the Homeric *ἐλπε ψυχή*). Of the meaning "shade," a being in the underworld, there are no examples.

Σάρξ in this literature follows closely the usage of the canonical books, except that there are apparently no instances of the meaning "kindred," nor of special emphasis on the frailty of corporeal beings. The word is especially frequent in Sirach, where it occurs in all the various usages, but most frequently in the sense of a corporeal being, either inclusively or with reference to men only. Of especial interest are 13:5, 6; 14:17, 18. In Enoch *σάρξ* is used of the women from whom the giants were born, yet designates

them simply as corporeal beings in distinction to the spirits as incorporeal.

The Jewish works written originally in Greek show in the main the same usages as the translated books.

In the Alexandrian book of the Wisdom of Solomon *πνεῦμα* continues to be used occasionally for wind (5:11, 23; 17:18) and breath (11:20), but most commonly bears the meaning "spirit." The Spirit of God (*πνεῦμα κυρίου*) permeates all things (1:7; 12:1; cf. Jud. 16:14, where the Spirit of God is the source of life); the spirit of man is breathed into him by God (15:11), is the seat of life (16:14), and is from God and capable of immortality (15:11), though the ungodly believe it to vanish at death (2:3); wisdom is spirit (1:6); but it is also said that in it is a spirit (7:22 ff.). A spirit of wisdom comes from God to man (7:7), and God sends his holy spirit to give wisdom to men (9:17), and a holy spirit of discipline, itself identified with wisdom, dwells in men (1:4-5). There are evident traces of the Stoic materializing conception of spirit, especially in 7:22 f., and nowhere a strict hypostatizing of the divine spirit, any more than of wisdom, with which the spirit is identified. The spirit of man is sometimes given objectivity, as capable of separate existence after death, but it is more commonly spoken of simply as the seat of life, wisdom, etc., with no sharp distinction between the spirit of God and that of man. Its use as denoting the seat of emotion is rare (but see *Wisd. of Sol.* 5:3), corresponding to the rarity of its use in non-Jewish Greek.

Ψυχή is used meaning life, *Wisd. of Sol.* 16:9; human soul, 2:22; 3:1; 15:8, 11; 16:14; person, 10:7; 12:6; 17:1.

Σάρξ means flesh in *Wisd. of Sol.* 12:5; 19:21, and body in 7:2.

In Philo we have an attempt to express ideas of Hebrew origin in forms derived from and congenial to Greek philosophic thought, a process which modified both their form and substance. His writings show a thorough familiarity with the Old Testament and a general acquaintance with Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, Stoicism, and neo-Pythagoreanism. His system of thought is fundamentally dualistic. His ultimate principles are God and matter. Though rejecting the doctrine of the eternity and independence of the world as an organized system, he makes matter

eternal, and distinguishes between God as the active principle and the passive principle on which and with which he works.¹ He takes from Plato the doctrine of ideas and from the Stoics the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and affirms that God formed first the ideal world (the world composed of ideas), in order that, using a pattern incorporeal and as like to God as possible, he might produce the corporeal world, a younger likeness of the older one.²

Philo's use of *πνεῦμα* is derived in part, through the medium of the LXX, from the Hebrew use of *רוח*, in part from the Greek philosophers, but fundamentally from the former. In about forty-five instances it means wind (Schoemaker). In *Gigant.* 2 (*bis*) he employs it for air. His most characteristic use of the term is in the Hebrew fashion with reference to the Spirit of God. In this sense it occurs nearly fifty times. In *Gigant.* 5, 7 he says this spirit cannot dwell continually with men and that it is imparted to exceptional men, such as Bezaleel and the elders of Israel, for exceptional tasks.

In one exceptional passage, *Quod Deus immutab.* 35 (7), Philo says that God has endowed some bodies with cohesion, others with soul, and others also with rational soul, and that stones and pieces of wood are bound together by cohesion, "which is *πνεῦμα* returning to itself." The first part of the statement is quite consistent with his prevalent doctrine; but in the latter part, in which, like Sextus Empiricus later, he employs *πνεῦμα* of the informing principle of all things, including the cohesive power in inanimate things, he takes over from the Greeks an entirely un-Hebraic idea of spirit, which is, moreover, inconsistent with his more common doctrine, according to which *πνεῦμα* is possessed by man only, as an addition to the irrational soul which he shares with the animals.³

¹ *De opif. mundi* 2.

² *Ibid.* 51.

³ In *Legg. alleg.* ii. 22 (7) Philo practically parallels the statement which Plutarch ascribes to the Stoics respecting the graded series, cohesion, growth, irrational soul, and rationality, only, carelessly perhaps, he substitutes "mind" for "man" as the subject to which these powers belong, with the result that he ascribes cohesion even to the mind. Neither in this passage nor in *Quod Deus immutab.* 35 (7) can Philo be credited either with originality or with thorough assimilation of his sources.

Consistently with his prevailing view, Philo uses *πνεῦμα* as a predicate of the dominant element of the human soul; thus in *Fuga* 24 (here using the Stoic expression *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον*, though not at all in the Stoic sense, but making it equivalent to *νοῦς*) and in a number of other passages.

It is to be observed that with the exception of *Post. Caini* 19, *Agric.* 10, which are simply quotations from the LXX, and possibly *Gigant.* 26 a (6), *πνεῦμα* is not a functional term used as a synonym for *ψυχή* or *νοῦς*, but a substantial term denoting the divine spirit, wise, indivisible, undistributable, good, everywhere diffused—*Gigant* 26 b (6)—as that of which the soul, or the dominant portion of it, is composed. In one passage, *Fuga* 182 (32), following the familiar doctrine of the Stoics he uses *πνεῦμα* of the vital nervous fluid which extends from the ruling part of the soul to the various organs of sense. The *πνεῦμα* of Philo is much less materialized than that of the Stoics, but is still quantitative rather than individualized. With the exception of a single passage twice quoted from the LXX, and one other passage of doubtful interpretation, he nowhere uses *τὸ πνεῦμα* in the sense, common in the LXX, of the individual spirit of man.

Ψυχή in Philo, as in ancient writers generally, is a functional term denoting the seat of life, feeling, thought, and will. Following the Hebrew (*Lev.* 17:14), he affirms that the substance of the soul is blood (*Quod det. pot.* 79 [22]). Elsewhere he agrees with the Stoics in saying that the soul is made of aether (*Legg. alleg.* iii. 161. 4, 5), adding that it is a fragment of God. These two theories he confirms and harmonizes in *Quod det.* 79 (22) ff., in the doctrine that the irrational soul which men have in common with the irrational animals is blood, but that the rational soul is spirit. In *Quis rer. div.* 55 (11) he says that blood is the substance of the entire soul, divine spirit of the most dominant part.

In such passages Philo perhaps lays the basis for the New Testament distinction between the natural (*ψυχικός*) and the spiritual (*πνευματικός*), illustrated in I Cor. 2:14; 15:44, 46; Jas. 3:15. He at least approaches more nearly to such a distinction than either the Hebrew, with its conception that the beasts also derive the *πνεῦμα* from God (*Eccles.* 3:19, 21; 12:27), or the Greek

writers, none of whom before the time of the New Testament associate the πνεῦμα which they predicate of the human soul with its higher powers in particular, or put πνεῦμα and ψυχή in antithesis. It is apparently Philo who first of all, deriving from the Greek philosophers the division of the soul into the rational or governing part and the irrational part, and from the Hebrew the idea that the spirit as the supreme element of man comes from God, associates the spirit with the rational part and divides men into two classes—those who live by the divine Spirit, which is reason, and those who live according to blood and the pleasures of the flesh (*Quis rer. div.* 55 [12]). Even he never uses ψυχικός in a derogatory sense in antithesis to πνευματικός, but such an antithesis is but one step beyond his usage.

Philo employs σὰρξ sometimes literally, sometimes allegorically. Literally it denotes the flesh, or the body, or the material substance of the body generally, without ethical implication. Frequently body and soul are used as complementary terms, signifying the constituent parts of a man, but his general disposition is to treat the body, for which he much more frequently employs σῶμα than σὰρξ, as the seat and organ of the sense-life, and being such, as a force hostile to the highest interest of the soul; see, e.g., *Legg. alleg.* iii. 158 (53) and *Gigant.* 19-45 (5-10) *passim*; also *Quod Deus sit* 140-144 (30); *Ebriet.* 69 (16). The idea that the body is the cause of evils of various kinds finds frequent expression in Philo. It is the greatest cause of ignorance (*Gigant.* 7); it is a leathern mass, an evil thing that plots against the soul (*Legg. alleg.* iii. 69 [22]); righteousness and every virtue love the soul, but injustice and every evil love the body (*Quis rer. div.* 243 [50]); the philosopher is more praiseworthy than the athlete, because while the latter gives all his attention to the body the former disregards it as dead (*Legg. alleg.* iii. 70, 71 [22]); the pale and emaciated are praised because by the energy of their minds they have become quite disentangled from the body (*De mut. nom.* 33 [4]).

But in none of these passages, nor in any other that this investigation has discovered, does Philo express or distinctly imply that matter (ὅλη) is, as such, the cause or source of moral evil. The nearest approximation to this teaching is perhaps in the passages cited by such modern writers as Dähne, *Jüdisch-Alexandrinische*

Religionsphilosophie (Halle, 1834), p. 196; Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, p. 407. It is evident, however, upon examination, that these passages affirm no more than the original chaotic condition of the universe as taught in Gen., chap. 1, the transcendence of God, and his contact with the universe through his "power," rather than immediately. Philo is a dualist, but not, apparently, an ethical dualist. His ultimates are God and matter. The former is good; the latter is in itself ethically indifferent. Originally without order, without quality, capable of becoming all things, it acquired by the divine world-creation the qualities that are opposite and best, viz., order, quality, organization, harmony (*Opif. mundi.* 21 [5]). His solution of the problem of moral evil does not go beyond the notion that man's body tempts him to sin, but man himself is the captain of his soul and capable of living by the divine Spirit.

In Josephus the earlier meanings of πνεῦμα obtain along with those of a later time. In numerous passages it denotes wind, and generally, though not invariably, a strong or violent stormwind. In a few passages it means breath. In other passages there appears to be found a trichotomy of spirit, soul, and flesh or body. In one passage (*War*, VII. 185) it is τὰ πνεύματα (rather than αἱ ψυχαί) which persist after death, and, in the case of evil men, become demons. Occasionally πνεῦμα and ψυχή are set in juxtaposition, though not in contrast, as in *Ant.*, III, 260, where Josephus mentions that Moses regarded the blood as containing "soul" and "spirit," and in *Ant.*, XI, 240, where Esther tells Artaxerxes that when she appeared before him uninvited her "spirit" recoiled and she was deserted by her "soul." Πνεῦμα may also for Josephus denote the seat of emotion or passion, as in *War*, III, 92, where he describes the Romans as "filled with a certain warlike πνεῦμα."

Akin to this usage of πνεῦμα with respect to human beings is its use to denote superhuman beings. Saul's obsession is traced to an "evil spirit" or demons (*Ant.*, VI, 211). A moment later (214) "the demonic spirit" is held to be the cause of his madness. More frequently, however, Josephus, in keeping with LXX usage, employs πνεῦμα for the divine spirit that produces prophetic inspiration, the possession of which distinguishes the true from the

false prophet. Whether this spirit is regarded as a subtle substance or as an influence of divine personality is difficult to determine. In *Ant.*, VIII, 114, Solomon petitions God to "let some portion of thy spirit come down and inhabit in this thy temple," a passage which shows the persistence of quantitative phraseology and probably of the corresponding thought.¹

Two hundred and sixteen occurrences of *ψυχή* have been noted and examined. The usual significations are represented, ranging from the life-principle to the soul as the seat of emotions and moral qualities. *Ψυχή* denoting a departed spirit or shade occurs with relative frequency, being more common, perhaps, in Josephus than in the other writers of this period. As "person" its occurrence is rare. Denoting one of the two (or three) constituent elements of which a human being consists, it occurs with considerable frequency. The meaning "soul," as the seat of emotions and intelligence, is in Josephus, as in the writings of his contemporaries, most common (the familiar coupling of *ψυχή* with *σῶμα* occurs frequently, though rarely in contrast). It is chiefly in the speeches of Eleazar in Book VII of the *War* that Josephus discusses the relationship of soul and body. Ordinarily there is no assertion of the superiority of the soul to the body. There are few traces of the Platonic doctrine of the limitation and punishment of the soul through its connection with the body, these occurring chiefly in the speeches mentioned above. Instead of *ἀφιέναι τὸ πνεῦμα* (Matt. 27:50), we find the expression used in the LXX (Gen. 35:18) and in classic writers, *ἀφιέναι τὴν ψυχήν*.

Σάρξ occurs rarely, only six instances being noted. In three it denotes the human body and alludes to the separation (or release) of the soul from the body. In *War*, VI, 47, the plural is used, but apparently without difference in meaning. Twice the reference is to the actual flesh of the human body, and once it refers to the flesh of a wild animal. In *War*, II, 155, it is said that the Essenes rejoice upon their release from the bonds of the body. Such depreciation of the body is, however, rare, and insufficient to show an ethical dualism of mind and matter either in the conception of the Essenes or in that of their reporter.

¹ For this treatment of Josephus I am almost wholly indebted to Dr. W. R. Schoemaker, Professor H. H. Severn, and Dr. A. W. Slaten.

The closest approach to a doctrine of the evil of matter, or of the incompatibility of soul and body, is found in the second speech of Eleazar (*War* VII, 344), where it is said of souls that "while they are in a mortal body they are bound and are filled up with the evils of the same, to speak most truly, they are dead, for fellowship with mortality is unseemly for the divine."

In other Jewish works written in Greek *πνεῦμα* follows in general the usage of the writings already discussed. Of its use in the sense of wind, however, no examples have been observed. IV Macc. 11:11 is perhaps an example of the meaning "breath." IV Macc. 7:14 furnishes an illustration of its use with reference to the Spirit of God. Of the spirit of man it occurs in the various senses previously noted. In the Greek additions to Esther 5:1 it is used of the spirit of man as the seat of various passions, qualities, and emotions, as also in IV Macc. 11:11. As the seat of mentality it occurs in IV Macc. 7:14, and as the seat of life in II Macc. 7:22-23; 14:46; III Macc. 6:24; IV Macc. 12:20. There are no examples, so far as noted, of the use of *πνεῦμα* for a superhuman being (other than God) either good or evil in Jewish-Greek religious literature written originally in Greek. Some obscure uses of the term occur in pseudo-Phocylides l. 106; Sib. Or. iii. 102; Letters of Heraclitus 7:63.

Ψυχή occurs in its common senses of life and soul. Illustrations of the former meaning occur in II Macc. 14:38; III Macc. 2:32; 6:6; IV Macc. 9:7, 25; 12:20; Letters of Heraclitus 5:5. Denoting the human soul it is found in IV Macc. 13:21; 18:23; Alex. Polyhistor 139. 107 (*bis*), 113, 122.

Σάρξ carries only its proper meaning of flesh, the soft portion of the body, and its metonymic signification, body. As flesh it is found in Alex. Polyhistor 9 (l. 5 from the bottom), 139. 75; Letters of Heraclitus 5:28; II Macc. 9:9; IV Macc. 6:6; 9:17, 20, 28; 10:18, 15 (*bis*), 20. Denoting the body it occurs in IV Macc. 7:13, 18; Sib. Or. iii. 697. Other meanings are not represented in Jewish writings originally composed in Greek.

We may summarize the results of our investigation of the usages of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σάρξ* in Jewish-Greek literature as follows: The ordinary classical meanings of all three words to a large extent obtain. *Πνεῦμα*, in the philosophical sense of the contemporary

and later philosophical and medical writers, viz., as meaning world-stuff, soul-stuff, occurs but rarely (Philo). In the LXX *πνεῦμα* is the standard equivalent of *רוּחַ*. Its use to denote a constituent element of a human being, viz., as the seat of intellect, emotion, etc., is somewhat more than occasional. The use of *ψυχή* as the seat of intellect, emotion, and moral qualities far exceeds its employment in any other sense, but its use in the early meaning of a shade is surprisingly frequent. In the LXX it occurs regularly as the rendering of *נֶפֶשׁ*. In this literature for the first time we observe a distinct tendency to equate *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, giving to the former even the task of denoting the unembodied or disembodied spirit or shade. *σάρξ* occurs infrequently, with the meanings "flesh" and "body," common in Greek writers, plus the added meaning of "kinsman" and "living being" in writings translated from the Hebrew.

Toward the problems that have largely inspired this study the investigation of the Jewish-Greek literature makes only a negative contribution. Nowhere does there appear a clearly defined or certainly implied dualistic doctrine attributing to matter an evil quality.¹ The only instances of sharp depreciation of the body as compared with the soul which occur in this literature are in an exhortation to courage in the face of death (Josephus, *War*, VII, 337 ff. [8, 7]) which repeats if it does not echo the ideas long before expressed by Plato (*Phaedo* 66, 79; *Crat.* 400C) and almost contemporaneously by Plutarch (*Consolatio ad Apollonium*). Nowhere is there any elevation of *πνεῦμα* above *ψυχή*, or of *πνευματικός* above *ψυχικός*, though there is in Philo a possible starting-point for such a usage. Nowhere is there the antinomy of *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* which we shall later find in Paul, or the personification of the former as the principle of evil.

¹ Cf. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums* (2d ed.), p. 461. F. C. Porter, "The Yecer Hara," in *Biblical and Semitic Studies*, by Members of the Faculty of Yale University, New York, 1901, has shown that the rabbis do not place the evil impulse in the body as distinguished from the soul, still less make the body the seat of the evil and the soul that of the good impulse (pp. 93-111). In their various efforts to account for the evil impulse they sometimes ascribe it to God and sometimes to man, but never explain it as inherent in the matter of which the human body is composed (p. 123). These results of the study of the rabbinic writers are in evident harmony with what we have discovered in the Jewish-Greek writers.

Before passing to the study of the usage of the New Testament and other religious writings of the early Christian period it may be well to summarize the results thus far reached, it being remembered that our study has not yet included the Hermetic literature, the magical papyri, the Gnostics, or any writings influenced by Christianity.

Πνεῦμα is throughout the classical period and with few if any exceptions among non-Jewish Greek writers to the end of the second century A.D. a physical term signifying wind, air, breath, breath of life. It is throughout this whole period a substantial, not a functional or individualizing, term. In the sixth century B.C. Anaximenes said that *πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ* encompassed all things. In the same century Xenophanes said that the soul was *πνεῦμα*, meaning by *πνεῦμα*, however, evanescent breath. In the fifth century Empedocles found the source of all things in four roots—fire, water, earth, and air—and Diogenes made air (*ἀήρ*, not *πνεῦμα*) the ultimate principle of existence. In Aristotle's day there were those who found in *πνεῦμα*, defined as a vital and generative substance, the informing principle of all things, perhaps meaning, however, by "all things" all living things, plants and animals. Zeno and his fellow-stoics repeat the statement of Xenophanes that the soul is *πνεῦμα*, but add *ἐνθερμον* and use *πνεῦμα* rather in the sense of Aristotle than of Xenophanes. Chrysippus, on the one side following the line of Diogenes' thought, says that the ultimate basis of things is self-moving *πνεῦμα*, and on the other, that of Zeno and the contemporaries of Aristotle, makes *πνεῦμα* a sort of nervous and vital fluid or vapor, which, proceeding from the ruling part of the soul to the organs of perception and generation, becomes sight, hearing, etc. Some of the Stoics say that the soul arises from the cooling of the *πνεῦμα* in or surrounding the bodies of infants. Though in the fourth century B.C. Menander used the phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα*, Posidonius (150 B.C.) was apparently the first to make the assertion that God is *πνεῦμα*, adding, however, *νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες*. In the early Christian period Plutarch and Galen repeat the doctrines of Chrysippus with reference to the origin of the soul. Plutarch also discusses the distinction between the soul of man, the irrational soul of animals, the principle of growth in plants, and the

power of cohesion in stones, but does not apply the term *πνεῦμα* to either of the latter two. Galen, however, distinctly speaks of the *ἐκτικὸν πνεῦμα*, meaning by this what Plutarch had called *ξίς*, and finally Sextus Empiricus groups all these things together under the common term *πνεῦμα*, identifying the *πνεῦμα* which is in man with that which permeates other animals, the plants, and the rocks.

Only in the Greek translated from the Hebrew or written under the influence of Hebrew thought do we find the expression spirit of God, *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, or holy spirit, *πνεῦμα ἁγίου* (the latter modeled after the *θεῖον πνεῦμα* of the Greeks, but expressing a Hebrew idea). So also it is in this literature only that we find spirit of man, or spirit meaning a shade, an angel, or a demon.¹ Even in these writers the word often has a certain quantitative force, inherited not only from its Greek, but also from its Hebrew ancestry.

On the other hand, with rare and almost negligible exceptions *ψυχή* is throughout the whole period of this study a functional and individual, not a substantial term. From the earliest period of the Greek language of which we have remnants the Greeks believed that there was in man a something which, existing in the body in life, departed from it in death. This Homer calls *ψυχή*, using it most frequently for the shade as it exists in the underworld after death, but sometimes, also, apparently for the life of which it is the seat while it remains in the body. This early meaning, shade, though somewhat rare after the time of the tragic poets, is found even down to the end of our period. The meaning, life, likewise persists throughout the period.

The far more common use of the word, however, from Pindar and the tragedians on is to denote that in the living man which feels, thinks, wills, and by virtue of which he is alive. The philosophers have their theories as to what it is composed of or the parts into which it is divided, but the constant meaning of the term, that about which these theories are proposed, is the soul as the seat of life, intelligence, and emotion. Aristotle's definition, "The soul is that by which we live and perceive and initiate thought" (I. 414a), would hold for practically all Greek writers. That Aristotle and

¹To this statement Dion Hal. i. 31. 28 is the only observed exception; cf. *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1914, p. 402.

other writers after him ascribe soul to animals and plants, meaning, however, to impute to them not all the powers of the human soul but only certain lower ones; that some writers ascribe soul to the universe and to God; that by metonymy man, possessing a soul, is called a soul, the word thus becoming equivalent to "person"; that in Jewish-Greek writers, under the influence of the Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ, *ψυχή* means any living being; and that Philo once or twice uses *ψυχή* as other Greek writers use *πνεῦμα* for soul-stuff—all these exceptional and more or less consciously tropical usages in no way obscure the fact that the prevailing and all-but-constant use of the term from Pindar to Sextus Empiricus is to denote the human soul as that in which reside life, emotion, thought, and will, and that the term is functional and not substantial.

Σάρξ, properly meaning flesh, the soft portion of the body of an animal, living or once living, retains this meaning throughout all the periods we have been studying. In them all it is also used by metonymy for the whole body. In Greek writings translated from the Hebrew it has also two meanings derived from the tropical use of the Hebrew בֶּשָׂר, namely, kindred, and a corporeal living creature, a corporeally conditioned living being. Neither in non-Jewish nor in Jewish writers does the term seem to have acquired any ethical significance. Like *σῶμα*, it is spoken of in terms of disparagement as compared with the soul, and in Philo it is once used in somewhat remote antithesis to *πνεῦμα*. It is nowhere used to express the notion that matter is the source or cause of moral evil. Plato regarded the body as a burden upon the soul, and later writers, perhaps influenced by him, notably Philo and Seneca, express similar views. There are traces in Plato, and much later in neo-Pythagoreanism of the idea that the disorder of the universe is traceable to the matter which enters into its composition. But in the literature we have been examining these two ideas do not seem to have been united in a formal doctrine that the moral evil men do is traceable to the fact that the body is composed of matter.

CRITICAL NOTES

WAS JOHN THE BAPTIST THE SIGN OF JONAH?

The Dutch scholar Wilhelm Brandt suggested in 1893 (*Die Evangelische Geschichte*, p. 459, n. 2) that, by his famous allusion to the sign of Jonah, Jesus meant his predecessor John. In 1910 (*Die jüdischen Baptisten*, pp. 82-84) Brandt argued the point more at length. The idea was developed from Brandt's suggestion by Canon Cheyne, in his article "John the Baptist" in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* (II, col. 2502), and later by Alban Blakiston (*John the Baptist and His Relation to Jesus* [1912], pp. 220 f., n. 54). Independently and on different lines the same identification was argued by Professor B. W. Bacon (*The Sermon on the Mount* [1902], p. 232; *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate* [1910], p. 350; *Christianity Old and New* [1914], p. 160). Whether the suggestion was made prior to Brandt I have not been able to discover; it does not seem to be noticed in the commentaries, so far as I have examined them. It seems, however, to be of sufficient interest to warrant some attention.

The *logion* in question is found in Mark (8: 11 f.) and was apparently also in Q. Matthew has it twice (16: 1, 4, parallel to Mark, and 12: 38-42, paralleled by Luke 11: 29-32, doubtless from Q). The allusion to the sign of Jonah fails in Mark, but it is found in both the Q passages. The questioners who demand of Jesus a sign are "the Pharisees" in Mark, "Pharisees and Sadducees" in Matt., chap. 16, "some of the scribes and Pharisees" in Matt., chap. 12. In Luke the question fails altogether in this context, and the *logion* is delivered before a throng of indefinite $\delta\chi\lambda\omicron\iota$. The demand for a sign Luke gives in 11: 16, where the questioners are "others" of his critics, parallel to those who say, "By Beelzebub casteth he out devils." Clearly the original auditors are Pharisees, who demand some direct supernatural attestation of Jesus' claim to speak for God, such as was so often vouchsafed to the prophets of old, from Moses on. Jesus' reply rebukes the demand for such a sign as an evidence of faithlessness toward God, and roundly declares that none such will be forthcoming—save the sign of Jonah (Matt. 12: 39 adds "the prophet"). Quite obviously Jesus' works of healing and the like, which later Christians denominated "miracles," and used precisely

as signs divinely given to attest Jesus' supernatural status, did not have this value for his critics or for himself. "Miracles," in the dogmatic sense, he repudiates, and censures the reliance upon them as lack of faith, with a sure spiritual and psychological insight. But one sign, he declares, is vouchsafed to his generation, the sign of Jonah. What is meant?

It is obvious that he does not mean any miracle, in the traditional sense, specifically not the prodigious miracle of Jonah's adventure with the whale, of which Matthew, like most moderns, immediately thinks at the mention of Jonah's name. Without repeating the familiar discussion, we may assume that Jesus' meaning is essentially that set forth in Luke's comment (11:30): "For as Jonah became a sign to the Ninevites, so also shall the Son of Man be to this generation." In other words, the prophet himself is the sign; specifically, the prophet as he preaches his message of repentance. The Ninevites shall condemn this generation in the judgment, for at Jonah's preaching they repented, whereas, despite the fact that something more than Jonah is here, this generation makes no response to this sign, and even contumaciously demands one of another sort. The general meaning is clear.

But the comment which parallels the Son of Man, i.e., Jesus, with Jonah is from the evangelist, not from Jesus himself, and it is not yet clear whether this identification corresponds to Jesus' own intention. Does he mean himself and his own work by something more significant than Jonah, something of greater wisdom than Solomon? The first evangelist's comment (Matt. 12:40) also identifies the sign with the Son of Man, or with something which happens to him; it might be held, therefore, that the comments of both Matthew and Luke rest upon an original saying in which this identification was made, and the common phrase "Son of Man" was used. But the complete divergence of the two comments renders this most unlikely; it is inevitable that any early Christian should suppose that the reference was to Jesus himself, and "the Son of Man" is Jesus' regular phrase for alluding to himself in the third person, as he must necessarily do here. We are, then, free to inquire: What prophet or prophetic activity is the sign of Jonah?

According to Brandt, Jesus would very naturally parallel John, who came crying to the people of Israel, "Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand," with Jonah, who came to Nineveh with the cry, "Repent, for yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed." Both men are distinctively prophets and preachers of repentance. Jesus has the most exalted opinion of John, and calls him, in another connection,

greater than all the prophets, yes, the greatest of all that have been born of women (Matt. 11:9-11, Luke 7:26-28). The appearance of so notable a figure in this generation ought surely to be significant, and set the people to thinking. That John was everywhere held to be a prophet (Mark 11:32), and that Jesus was explained as John come again, show that the Baptist could very properly be spoken of as a sign to this generation. Indeed, Jesus himself uses him as a sign, of a somewhat different sort, in Mark 9:12 f. (Matt. 17:12). Elijah came, and they did unto him even as they would; and how is it written of the Son of Man! And Brandt makes an interesting point in citing Jesus' figurative reference to John in Matt. 11:7 f. (Luke 7:24 f.). Was he a reed shaken by the wind (like the inconstant Jonah), or one clothed in elegant attire (like Solomon in all his glory, clothed in splendor, dwelling in a king's palace)? No, he was more than these; something more than Jonah, more than Solomon.

Bacon stresses the contrast of this utterance "with Jesus' invariable reserve regarding his own personality in public address," which would seem to indicate that he could not be referring to himself. Given the reference to John, how appropriate, Bacon goes on, is the parable of the House Swept and Garnished, which immediately follows in Matthew and almost immediately precedes in Luke, and so must have stood in this context in Q! Does not the parable mean that this generation, though it had seemed to be purged by John's activity, yet, because it did not receive God's spirit, brought by the preaching of Jesus, was falling a prey to spirits more evil than those which John had expelled?

It is a peculiarity of Bacon's view that he refers to John only the comparison with Jonah, that with Solomon being referred to Jesus himself, or, more specifically, to "the gracious call of God extended through Jesus to repentant sinners" (*Sermon on the Mount*, p. 235). Or, in other words, "The Baptist had come like Jonah to the Ninevites crying, 'Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed.' His ministry was a sign from God to an unbelieving generation, but not the greatest sign. The works of mercy and grace, the glad tidings to the poor, forgiveness and restoration, the winning, gracious appeal of a divine Father's love, which constituted the ministry of Jesus, were 'a greater matter than Solomon,' a final plea of 'the Wisdom of God,' whose function is to seek out and save the erring" (*Christianity Old and New*, p. 160). I have quoted Bacon's own words here, as offering, to my mind, the most persuasive argument for the thesis in question. Cheyne, as usual, makes less appeal to conviction when he resorts to philological

arguments. He follows Brandt, but ascribes to Jesus an explanatory saying equivalent to Luke 11:30, with a play upon the names יִיִן and יִיִן. "As Jonah was a sign to the Ninevites, so shall also Johanan be to this generation." Blakiston repeats the points made by Brandt and Cheyne.

What shall we say of the argument? That it has at first sight something persuasive must at once be admitted, especially as set forth by Bacon. But closer examination seems to render it untenable, whether with Brandt, Cheyne, and Blakiston we apply both the sign of Jonah and the sign of Solomon to John, or whether with Bacon we apply the latter to Jesus. In regard to this point it seems clear that the parallel clauses have the same reference, ἰδοὺ πλεῖον Ἰωνᾶ ἔδε and ἰδοὺ πλεῖον Σολομῶνος ἔδε. One of these can hardly refer to the work of John, now dead and gone, the other to the work of the speaker, still in full course. And the whole context makes clear that we have here *one* sign, not two; the reference to the wisdom of Solomon is but a parallel, illustrative of the same figure just described in terms of Jonah. No sign shall be given save the single sign of Jonah, one prophetic personality with his summons to repentance. The entire context would be different if Jesus' response to his critics were an appeal to *two* signs, two prophetic personalities, one the antitype of Jonah, the other of Solomon.

Let us examine, then, the considerations offered for referring the sign of Jonah to John. Cheyne's play on names need not detain us. That John and Jonah are parallel as preachers of repentance, as prophets sent with a message from God, is of course true; but it is equally true that Jesus was the same. He too came with the cry, "Repent, for the Kingdom of God is at hand!" (Matt. 4:17; Mark 1:15). His own prophetic consciousness is assuredly not less keen than his conviction that John is a prophet, and comes to frequent expression, as clearly distinguishable from his messianic consciousness. Or, rather, we cannot really speak of Jesus' messianic *consciousness* at all; he was never *conscious* of being Messiah, as in truth he was not Messiah, yet. He only believed himself called and appointed to the messiahship, which is a very different thing. But he was very distinctly and directly conscious of being a prophet, with a message of God to deliver. His first public words, according to Mark, imply this: "Repent, and believe in the gospel," the divine message of which I am the spokesman. It is true that he called John more than a prophet and the greatest of men. We could hardly expect him to add "except myself." He thought more

highly of John than any Christian since has done, yet we can see, from his own words, that his own prophetic consciousness rose above anything he said of John. It is indeed quite proper to speak of "his invariable reserve regarding his own personality in public address," which is too often overlooked, but it must not be pushed too far. Just before the passage we are considering, we read (Matt. 12:28-32): "If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then is the kingdom of God come upon you. . . . He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth. Therefore I say unto you, Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven," etc. These are words spoken publicly to the Pharisees, and mean, if they mean anything, the consciousness of a prophet in whom the very Spirit of God dwelt and did its works. Or go back to the preceding chapter (11:20-24) and read how Jesus "began to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not. Woe unto thee, Chorazin; woe unto thee, Bethsaida. . . . And thou, Capernaum . . . thou shalt go down unto Hades: for if the mighty works had been done in Sodom which were done in thee, it would have remained unto this day." Here is a prophetic consciousness that finds an expression not less exalted than that which uses of itself the language, "the sign of Jonah, something more than Jonah, something more than Solomon." If we seek modesty here, we may find it in the neuter *πλεον*, which obviously designates, not Jesus in his own person, but what he signifies and brings to men. And in this passage, too, we see the cities upbraided because they repented not—at Jesus' preaching—precisely as a little later this generation is upbraided because it repented not at a preaching compared with that of Jonah. The parallel is very close. "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father. . . . Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me." Are these words not such as to furnish a background for the consciousness out of which the sign-of-Jonah utterance comes? Or these (10:32-42): "Every one who shall confess me before men, him will I also confess before my Father which is in heaven. . . . I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother. . . . He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. . . . He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it. He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me," etc. There is an abundance of such words, which go beyond the sign-of-Jonah passage in the intensity of prophetic con-

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sciousness to which they give expression. To be sure, some of these sayings are doubtless spoken privately to the disciples; some are probably not spoken by Jesus at all, or not in just this wording. But we cannot draw our blue pencil through them all on the ground that Jesus cannot have so spoken, since we may know how he can have spoken only from our record of how he did speak. After all legitimate critical excision and discounting, there remains sufficient utterance of this kind to make it altogether plausible that Jesus said of himself, "No sign shall be given save the sign of Jonah; something more than Jonah, something more than Solomon, is here." If it is insisted that John, not Jesus, is the characteristic preacher of repentance, the synoptic data do not bear out the observation. *μετανοέω* is found once on the lips of the Baptist, eleven times on the lips of Jesus; the noun *μετάνοια* occurs in two sayings of John, in three of Jesus. This is not to minimize the prominence of this conception in John; it is only to show that Jesus also is a fit parallel to Jonah.

There remain the allusions to the reed shaken by the wind and to those who wear soft raiment (Matt. 11:7 f.; Luke 7:24 f.), which Brandt, Cheyne, and Blakiston take as suggesting Jonah and Solomon respectively. If this were so, the passage would necessarily have originally been part of the same utterance as the sign-of-Jonah context. So Brandt and Blakiston: the latter would attach Matt. 11:7-11 (Luke 7:24-28) to Matt. 12:39-42 (Luke 11:29-32). But there is no real warrant for such connection. Each passage has its own setting and its own distinct occasion. In the one case, as a sequel to the query of John's disciples, Jesus has said, "This is he of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger," and, according to Matthew, at any rate, has gone on directly to declare, "He is Elijah, which was to come." It is hard to believe that in the same utterance Jesus would equate John with another prophet, Jonah; and the adding of Solomon to the list makes it even less credible. The other passage has an equally definite occasion in the demand of certain Pharisees for a sign, which circumstance conditions the wording of the saying. It is a simple comment on the demand for a sign. And if this passage preceded the other, it would be equally difficult to believe that Jesus would go on to say, "This is Elijah," and to quote the Malachi prophecy of Elijah's appearing, after he had begun by saying, "John is the sign of Jonah, that of which Jonah and Solomon were only imperfect types." It seems clear that the two passages in their occasions and contexts are different, and cannot be satisfactorily fitted together.

Moreover, are not the suggested applications a little far-fetched? *ἄνθρωπον ἐν μαλακοῖς ἱματίοις ἡμφιεσμένον* is surely intended to characterize a courtier rather than the king. Notice how the clause that follows, *οἱ τὰ μαλακὰ φοροῦντες ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις τῶν βασιλέων* (Luke, *οἱ ἐν ἱματισμῷ ἐνδόξῳ καὶ τρυφῇ ὑπάρχοντες ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις εἰσὶν*) is *plural*; quite certainly Jesus has here in mind the hangers-on about a royal court, who make life easy for themselves by subserviency to the ruler. The contrast of John's attitude toward Herod Antipas at once comes to mind. That the allusion is to the king, specifically to King Solomon, is in the highest degree improbable. Here the point made concerning the dweller in kings' houses is that he has every luxury of dress and food; the *sole* point mentioned concerning Solomon in the other passage is not in the least his luxury, but his wisdom. He is cited as a type of what is good, of the prophet of the new dispensation (whether John or Jesus). The man of soft raiment, on the contrary, is reprehended, cited as a type of what is scorned and held up as worthless. In truth the two passages have no connection one with the other.

Even more far-fetched seems the equation of Jonah with the reed shaken by the wind. It is not entirely clear what is actually implied by the figure of the reed, but, granting that it means instability and inconstancy, as most of the commentators assume, there is no reason to think specifically of Jonah, who was stubborn enough until he was driven by the irresistible divine Power to his task and even then had the hardihood to criticize the merciful dispensation of God to the repentant city. The connection here is in truth artificial and arbitrary, and fails to suggest any original relation of the two passages. The reed is spoken of with reproach; Jonah is mentioned, not in criticism, but in the loftiest terms of praise.

As for the parable of the House Swept and Garnished, it is reasoning in a circle to make it support the reference of "the sign" to John, for there are no independent grounds for making the parable itself refer to John. Only if it formed part of a context which clearly dealt with the Baptist would we have ground for finding in it some allusion to him; whether the present context is concerned with him is precisely the question at issue. The meaning of the parable is obscure; it is by no means certain that the impersonal phrase, "the unclean spirit, when he is gone out of the man," is an allusion to the cleansing of Jewish life supposedly wrought by John or by Jesus. The moment of driving out the demon, which would make the point of this comparison, is precisely the moment omitted in the parable. But even if Jesus were meaning to

contrast an earlier cleansing with a later relapse, the reference could as easily be to the following of his own initial success by an indifference which rapidly grew into the opposition which is the occasion of the very passages under discussion. Finally, even if the departure of the demon were a parabolic allusion to John's salutary influence, that fact would not make it the more likely that John was also meant by the sign of Jonah. The two things are not brought into sufficiently close connection to support each other.

In conclusion, two general considerations make against the proposed exegesis. The demand brought to Jesus is that *he* should show some sign that would serve as *his* legitimation: διδάσκαλε θέλομεν ἀπὸ σοῦ σημεῖον ἰδεῖν (Matt. 11:38); ἐπηρώτων αὐτὸν σημεῖον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐπιδείξαι αὐτοῖς (Matt. 16:1); ζητοῦντες παρ' αὐτοῦ σημεῖον ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (Mark 8:11); σημεῖον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐζητοῦν παρ' αὐτοῦ (Luke 11:16). The sign must come from him, or be something directly related to himself. Those who make John the sign of Jonah explain him as a sign to this generation of God's mercy, or God's wrath, or of the approaching end of this aeon, of the coming judgment, but not as a sign of Jesus, something that will show what he is and that God is with him. If Jesus replies, "I myself am the only sign you shall have," the connection is clear. If he says, "God gave you a sign in John the Baptist," he ignores the point of the Pharisees' demand, and speaks of something quite different. Proof is required that the preaching of Jesus is from heaven; the only proof is the preaching itself, says Jesus. However true it is to say that John the Baptist was a sign to his generation that the end of all things was at hand, it is quite meaningless for Jesus to point to him as a sign of the validity of his own message.

And, in the second place, it is not wholly without force that the earliest tradition, as it found expression in Q, clearly understood the reference to be to Jesus himself. If the saying had originally been part of the speech concerning the Baptist, as Brandt supposes, it would be difficult to account for the fact that in Q all memory of its original meaning is lost, and it is made a wholly distinct *logion*, with a setting and a context all its own. Both Matthew and Luke, though their source does not explicitly explain the reference, without a moment's hesitation identify the sign of Jonah with the Son of Man, their Master. Unless far more cogent evidence can be offered to the contrary than we have yet seen, we should make the same identification.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

BIBLE PROPHECIES AND THE PLAIN MAN

The book which bears the above title¹ may be given a little attention as a symptom rather than for its intrinsic value. It represents a class of works of which some have already been published and more are likely to appear in the near future. To understand them we need to bear in mind the periodic recurrence of the millennial expectation of believers. Especially at times of political upheaval like the present, speculation concerning the time of the end or of the Second Advent becomes active. The messianic program taken over from Judaism declares that extraordinary convulsions of nature and of the nations will presage the great event. At each crisis, therefore, enthusiastic souls discern the birth-pangs of the new age. Such books as the one before us are to be looked for. This one professes to be written for the plain man. It is possible, however, that the plain man will be puzzled by it rather than edified.

The fundamental assumption is that the purpose of the prophetic books of both parts of our Bible is to set forth the course of human history throughout long ages. The fortunes of the church for nineteen centuries were thus recorded in advance. Specifically we may say that the Book of Revelation "contains the series of all the remarkable events and changes of the state of the Christian Church to the end of the world" (p. 23). The inference which the writer wishes us to draw is that the present world-war was foreseen by the author of the Apocalypse, and that his interpreter is authorized to say, on the ground of his study of the book, that the end of the present dispensation is at hand. Of course if the alleged predictions can be shown to be accurate accounts of events in the history of the church down to the present there will be strong presumption that the forecast of the brief period remaining to this generation is correct.

The plain man may at first be impressed by this claim, since it makes use of the popular conception of prophetic inspiration. If he stops to reflect, however, he will discover that Scripture itself nowhere claims to reveal a long series of future events. The purpose of revelation as defined

¹ *Bible Prophecies and the Plain Man*. By Marr Murray. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. xiv+319 pages.

in revelation itself is quite different. All divinely inspired Scriptures, we are told, are profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness. For these ends is it necessary that the long course of Christian history should be known in advance? To ask the question is to answer it. If this foreknowledge is essential, then it must be confessed that revelation has failed of its object; for it is obvious that not one in ten thousand of those who have read their Bibles in time past have had any accurate idea of the program of history there alleged to be laid down. The plain man will be both pained and puzzled to discover that the exponent of prophecy thus really confesses the impotence of Scripture to reach the goal for which it (ostensibly) set out. He will begin to suspect that the expositor is in fact reading his own fancies into the Bible. The fundamental assumption, without which his whole scheme falls to the ground, is that in certain passages a given number of days stands for so many years. The period singled out is that of 1,260 days given by the Apocalypse twice (11:3 and 12:6). This is taken to mean so many years, and of course if we choose our starting-point aright we can make the end of the period come in this present year, as we could make it come in any other year by shifting the *terminus a quo*. But for the primary assumption that a day means a year there is no support in Scripture itself. One passage there is, to be sure, in which a day is put for a year. This is where Ezekiel symbolizes the period of the exile by lying on his side "a day for a year." But in this solitary instance the explanation is given with the command. In Daniel and Revelation there is no hint of this sort of symbolism. When the author of Daniel says, "Blessed is he who waits and comes to the end of the thousand three hundred and thirty-five days," there is no reason to suppose that he meant any but literal days. It would be nonsense to encourage the reader to hold out 1,335 years! And when the apocalyptic writer affirms that the domination of the beast shall last forty-two months, and in immediate connection that the two witnesses shall prophesy 1,260 days (the same period), there is no reason to suppose that anything but the literal sense of the words is to be understood.

If the plain man looks a little into the history of interpretation he will find that all the earlier calculations concerning the date of the end have been mistaken. The first generation of Christians looked for the Second Coming in their own time. Ticonius thought it would come in the year 380, Lactantius fixed upon 500, Beatus upon 780; as the year 1000 approached there was a very general expectation of the end of the world and the final judgment to come at that time; Joachim of Floris dated

it at 1260, Joannes Annius at 1481, early Protestant commentators at 1554. In the seventeenth century Dutch believers looked for the immediate setting up of the Kingdom of God, and announced that the standard of the Lord was already raised at Amsterdam. About the same time the Fifth Monarchy men in England entertained the same idea. Napier, the Scotch mathematician, determined the date 1688 as the one indicated, while Whiston, widely known as a biblical scholar, fixed on 1715 and later on 1734. Bengel, another biblical scholar, named 1836; Miller, who had a considerable following in this country, had his people prepare their robes for 1843. Since his time the end of the age or of the world has been predicted for the years 1866, 1882, 1914, and probably at intermediate dates. Now it must again be pushed forward. This constant shifting condemns the whole process. It still remains true that it is not for us to know the times and the seasons which the Father has put in his own power.

What makes the case serious is that those who publish these speculations undermine faith in the Scriptures. This is not their purpose—this we freely acknowledge. They are devout believers in the inspiration of the Bible, and in fact hold the most rigid theory of inspiration. They denounce modern critical study of the books as one evidence of the degeneracy of our age, and therefore one of the signs of the end. Yet they are willing to have people believe that their crude calculations of the time of the end are based upon the infallible declarations of God himself. Why else should they publish them? They may not in so many words claim divine authority for the statements that the British are the lost Ten Tribes, that our own nation is the tribe of Manasseh, that the British royal family is descended from David,¹ that the coronation stone at Westminster is the stone which served Jacob for a pillow, that the Prussians are really the objects of divine denunciation under the name of Assyrians, that the Kaiser is Antichrist; but the tone in which these things are told shows that they are thought to have more than merely human attestation. The plain man may give them credence, but if he does it will be to his own hurt.

Even if we were ready to accept the assertion that the second seal in the apocalyptic vision "reveals a mighty military power seeking to obtain domination and deluging the world with blood," and were ready

¹ In confirmation of this assertion we read that one of the names of the present Prince of Wales is David, and that the day on which he is thirty years old will be the year 3000 from David's coronation. If the author anywhere betrayed the slightest sense of humor we should suspect this to be a joke.

to identify this power with Prussia; or, again, if we were convinced that Daniel's composite image symbolizes the destinies of the British Empire, we might still protest that our old friend the Great Pyramid ought not to be dragged into the witness-box. Yet here it is again, compelled to reveal to the plain man the whole course of human history. The Bible, it seems, is not enough to give us the revelation we crave. The great monument of stone is an even more wonderful revelation. Built by Shem or by Melchizedek, it is not only evidence of superhuman technical skill on the part of the human architect, but also a sign and witness of God, "a prophet whose words are available for the ears of every generation which has the faith to understand and take heed." Pity 'tis that this inspired prophet has been dumb throughout so many centuries. A hundred generations have seen it without any suspicion of its great secret. Only in the nineteenth century there arose an interpreter, the Scotch astronomer who proclaimed the message to the world. And he, the only one who understood it, must have misunderstood it, for he made it declare that the end of human history was to come in the year 1883.

The plain man who reads this book will not only be puzzled. I fear he will lose his religious faith. The Millerites who in the last century prepared for the Advent in 1843 lost faith, many of them, not only in their leader, but also in the Bible. They reasoned that God had definitely promised the millennium for a certain date. The time specified had come and gone without any millennium. God had therefore deceived them, or else there had been no revelation. In either case their faith was gone. It is to be feared that such books as the one before us may be followed by a similar revulsion of feeling. The religious exaltation produced by the present war may stimulate fantastic expectations such as those we have here considered. If so, the last state may be worse than the first.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BIBLE SOCIOLOGY

The Abingdon Press, which is known to be affiliated with one of the leading evangelical denominations, is issuing a series of textbooks for Bible-study. The books are designed to meet the need of a more complete and comprehensive study of the Bible in all the colleges. The volume before us is one of this series.¹ The progress made in the last

¹ *The Social Institutions and Ideals of the Bible*. By Theodore Gerald Soares, Ph.D., D.D. New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press (no date, but the copyright is dated 1915). 8vo. 385 pages.

few years in our apprehension of the Bible is well illustrated by this book. The traditional point of view, which was chiefly concerned with evidences of inspiration and inerrancy, is quietly ignored, and we have a genuinely historical discussion, laying the emphasis where we are learning more and more to lay it—on the social development of the Hebrew people. And this social development is not taken as something apart from the stream of human history. The point of view is the broadly human. As the author says: "The only way to appreciate the development of religion is to realize how it enters into the social life of a people and relates itself to their institutions."

The greater part of the work is devoted to Israel, although the last hundred pages present the social teaching of Jesus. After an introductory sketch of the evolution of Hebrew social institutions, these institutions—the family, slavery, economic status—are taken up in detail. Political organization has a group of chapters to itself, as have religious observances. The discussion of the synagogue comes at the end of this group, and closes the first main division of the book. The second main division is concerned with the prophets and their teaching, the sages coming in as a pendant. The third part, as already indicated, takes up the social teachings of Jesus. Each chapter is followed by directions for study in the form of questions to be answered after study of certain sections of the text.

The book seems well adapted for the purpose which it is intended to serve. Detailed comment is unnecessary. At the first reading the student may not be sufficiently impressed by the fact that the motive behind Israel's social development was not consciously economic but religious. The cry of the prophets was for obedience to the will of God. Social justice was their aim, because social justice is the will of God. Our author's statement, "Jehovah wills health and happiness to men and all the good earth has been given to them and he hates tyranny and injustice" seems to attribute to them a theory which was not distinctly in their minds. That Jehovah hates tyranny and injustice was their starting-point undoubtedly, but the hot indignation aroused by particular cases of oppression did not stop to reflect on all the earth's being given for the health and happiness of men.

In a few instances the author seems to rely too much on the documents in our hands. Thus, he speaks of Abraham's three hundred and eighteen retainers as though they were historically verifiable. The chapter of Genesis which tells of them is on good grounds suspected to be a legend of comparatively late date. The conception of law does not

seem to have been quite clearly worked out. The statement is: "Law was not thought of as the result of enactment, but as the time-honored custom of the tribe or nation. It was God who gave laws." The two sentences represent two different ways of looking at law, and the two should be sharply distinguished. The earliest source of law, if we call it law, was tribal custom. "It is not so done in Israel" was sufficient to condemn an act as criminal. But where tribal custom was not clear there was always an appeal to an authority, primarily to the divinity at the sanctuary, later to the king. The king gave laws just as truly as God did. In neither case was there statutory enactment, but when the body of case law came to be of a certain size it was promulgated by statute. At least I can see no difference between the solemn publication of Deuteronomy and the publication of Hammurabi's Code. Professor Soares has the correct apprehension, as is shown by his discussion on pp. 136 ff., but this does not seem quite consistent with the passage just quoted.

Exegetical tradition is on the side of the statement that the Hebrew word translated "atone" means "to cover." The tradition, however, rests on very insecure foundations. The verb used is one of the technical liturgical terms whose original meaning is lost to us. I put a query also at the statement that the scapegoat was sent into the desert *symbolically* to carry the sins out of sight. To the early worshiper, and doubtless also to the priests who formulated the code, the sins were conceived realistically, and were in actual fact loaded upon the goat and carried into the desert.

These are minor matters. The book as a whole will command the approval of thoughtful men, and it is to be hoped that it will be widely used by the class for which it is intended.

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UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BABYLONIAN LETTERS OF THE HAMMURABI PERIOD¹

During the past ten years there have appeared no less than ten publications in the new Babylonian series of the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania, including one of Aramaic divination texts. The latest is by Professor Arthur Ungnad of Jena, who during a leave of

¹ *Babylonian Letters of the Hammurabi Period*. By Arthur Ungnad. University of Pennsylvania. The University Museum Publications of the Babylonian Section, Vol. VII. Philadelphia, Pa.

absence occupied the Clark chair of Assyriology at the University of Pennsylvania for the year 1913-14. The volume of early Babylonian letters is the result of his efforts during that year.

The work contains 131 numbers and fragments of letters belonging to the Hammurabi dynasty, including an administrative document, No. 37, and a letter belonging to the Assyrian period. Among them is a dated letter, No. 89, written in the reign of Ammi-zaduga. Dated letters are rarely found. The Assyrian letter, No. 132, is a message from a king, but unfortunately it is only imperfectly preserved. Although a number of fragments have been included which do not have any value, the volume on the whole contains many valuable texts, and is an important contribution to the epistolary literature of the Babylonians. Eight of the texts are translated in the Introduction, but the author expects to publish translations of all in the second part of his *Babylonische Briefe*.

It is gratifying that Ungnad is not one of those who copy closely written texts in such a way that they appear more difficult to read than the originals. His copies are clear and easily read. Besides, his reputation for exact scholarship inspires confidence in his reproductions.

The largest portion of the letters contained in the volume were purchased from dealers, and came from Sippar. About a score and a half were discovered at Nippur, through the work of the expeditions conducted by Peters and Haynes. These letters the author assigns to the time of Hammurabi and Samsi-iluna. From internal evidence, and especially with the assistance of name lists made up from the names which occur upon dated legal documents, the author has attempted to present the letters in historical order, and has assigned them to this or that reign. It is interesting to note that the letters from Nippur show a more archaic style of writing than those from Sippar. The contract literature from the same site exhibits the same peculiarity. At Sippar and Babylon, although these were cities not far removed from Nippur, the script is more simplified. Two letters mention the king's name in the salutation: for example, "may thy welfare be lasting before Shamash, Marduk, and my lord Ammi-ditana." In this respect these two letters seem to be unique.

The letters deal chiefly with official business in connection with the temple. Many of them were written by or to a high official, and in some instances perhaps to the king. There are also letters referring to private affairs. Although as a rule there are few letters from such archives that contain any considerable material of value for the reconstruction of the life of the people, this class of literature is especially important for linguistic purposes, because of the many expressions

employed which were used in everyday life, and which are not found in the formal language of the legal documents or of the religious and other texts.

The author, in discussing one of the official letters, briefly refers to the fact that it is not an original, but a copy that had been preserved in the archives at Sippar. The ancient Babylonians frequently have handed down copies of their letters. They were inclosed, addressed, and sealed like the original, and then preserved among the records in the archives of the temple. The author cites an instance of a rough draft, which contains signs and whole lines erased, having been preserved as the copy for the archives. Doubtless private individuals practiced the same custom, exactly as it is in vogue at present. In the Yale collection there are several letters from the administrative records of the Larsa temple, which were also received unopened. Upon the envelope is found the address, and also the impression of the seal of the sender.

The publication under consideration includes "the famous Lushtamar tablet," an incased letter which figured so prominently in the controversy some years ago at the University of Pennsylvania. The envelope has at last been removed, and the tablet translated. It is only just to those who precipitated that controversy to state that their contentions are fully substantiated by the contents of this letter. This tablet, as well as another in the same lot, deals with transgressions of what is known from the Hammurabi Code as the *nipdu* right, by which an obligee can take a slave or even a freeman of an obligor to work for him on account of the non-payment of a debt. It appears, however, that Lushtamar, although his claims against certain debtors, who were women, as shown by the tablet, had been satisfied, continued to hold their slaves.

The volume contains an index of the proper names of the text. This shows that the Amorite personal names, so common in the legal documents of this era from Northern Babylonia, are in evidence, as was to be expected. The number of foreign names is much smaller in the Nippur tablets. This is also the case with contracts and letters from cities farther south, as, for example, those from Larsa, as represented in the Yale collection, which contain for the most part pure Babylonian names.

As an appendix to the letters of this period, Ungnad has published the text and also the translation of an inscription of Hammurabi. This was one of the first objects secured for the university's collection, more than twenty-five years ago. It was purchased from a dealer, and apparently came from Abu-Habba, the ancient city called Sippar. The inscription is weathered considerably, but Ungnad has succeeded in deciphering all that is preserved. The inscription gives evidence that it was written

in the early part of the king's reign, prior to his conquest of Elam and Larsa; for in it Hammurabi calls himself simply "King of Babylon." It refers to the building of the wall of Sippar, which, doubtless, is the event celebrated in the dates of the king. From them we learn that in his twenty-third year the foundations of the wall were laid, and that they were finished in the twenty-fifth year of his reign. Hammurabi called the wall which he constructed In-Qibit-Shamash-Hammurabi-mahiri-arshi-shumshu, which means, "by the command of Shamash may Hammurabi not have any adversaries." He closes his inscription, after recording some other pious deeds, with these words: "Truly I have established my splendid name daily in the mouth of the people, to be mentioned like that of a god, who for all times will never be forgotten."

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THE ASIATIC DIONYSOS¹

The author of this book dips into the waters of Indic philology with a broad-meshed sieve and brings up—nothing. It is a pity that so much work should be wasted on such an antiquated mythological method. Her far-reaching conclusions are based on a very superficial knowledge of India. In the light of present-day knowledge it is fatuous to base a treatment of Soma on Langlois (1853) and Maury (1857). These books were written in the infancy of Vedic study and are negligible today. The bibliography at the end of the book is imposing at first glance; but no mention is made of a large number of recent books and articles which are indispensable for the author's purpose. Miss Davis prefers to move in an atmosphere of hazy generalities. She adds up a long row of zeros and expects to get a positive number as an answer. Lack of space prevents citation of counter-evidence and mention of important discussions which, apparently, are unknown to Miss Davis.

The aim of the book is to prove that the Dionysos cult of Greece was derived from the Vedic Soma cult. See p. 258:

The elaborate chants of the priests were, it may be conceived, preserved in the form of cult-epithets, and the metaphors applied by them to the Soma crystallized into the picturesque myths attached to the legend of Dionysos.

There must have been a wholesale disease of language in this "remembrance of the Soma ritual" (p. 184) and this "process of the formation

¹ *The Asiatic Dionysos*. By Gladys M. N. Davis. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914. x+276 pages. 10s. 6d.

of myth from ritual" (p. 171). Further, in order to fill out her comparisons, the author is compelled to draw upon many local cults from many different parts of Greece. If there was such wholesale and minute borrowing from a unified, hieratic Soma cult, why are the derivatives so scattered? As in the case of Çiva and Vishnu, is it not likely that many local godlings and cults were fused into the Dionysos cult? Many of the epithets on which Miss Davis bases her conclusions are not typical of Soma but are applied indiscriminately to nearly all the other Vedic gods or belong to Soma secondarily. Our author has no understanding of the aristocratic and hieratic nature of the Soma cult; no knowledge of the symbolic, metaphorical, and hieratic aspect of Vedic diction; no comprehension of the part played by Soma in the Vedic ritual as a whole. For the most part Soma is not anthropomorphic; he is merely compared to the objects she mentions, is not equated with them. Even here she is not consistent, for she maintains on the one hand the origin of myth from ritual and on the other hand makes great effort to prove anthropomorphic forms of Soma corresponding to forms of Dionysos.¹

On the one hand Miss Davis presses into service every obscure Vedic epithet (such as that of the "thunderbolt," p. 40, and of the "razor's edge," p. 44, note); on the other hand she finds utter disagreement in such general and important matters as the eschatology and theories of sleep (pp. 33, 40). If the acquaintance with the Vedic ritual was so minute that epithets occurring only once could be borrowed, it is unthinkable that there should be no traces of some of the more general characteristics of the Soma ritual, that there should be such fundamental differences between the Vedic and the Greek ritual. Why did not Agni and Indra, the most important figures in the Vedic pantheon, leave as much trace as Soma? The Vedic ritual is, to be sure, a Soma ritual; but it is chiefly directed to Indra. Soma is secondary.

¹ See for instance pp. 169, 171, 172, 173, 177, 223 for untenable comparisons with Dionysos based on similes and secondary traits of Soma. All Vedic gods are more or less gods of safety, of creation, and of healing. The traits are secondary in the case of Soma (p. 195). Soma is not "largely a deity of the dead" (p. 41). The Āpas "Waters" are not special attendants of Soma or equated with the Apsarasas (p. 148). The terms *ṛsi*, *kavi*, etc., are applied to Agni as often as to Soma. There is nothing in the passage (p. 141) to suggest in the faintest way a prototype of "Dionysos Melpomenos, the God of Tragic and Musical Festivals." The comparisons of Soma to the ocean and to rain are secondary. They are based on the fact that water was mixed with the Soma and that the Soma vat was compared to an ocean. To derive Dionysos "Τῆς" from Soma is absurd (p. 146). There is no real parallel between the functions of the two. Surely *su*, "to flow," from which Soma is derived, is very different from *βου*, "to rain," applied to Dionysos.

Miss Davis alleges two currents of Indian influence on Greece (pp. 6, 134, 168, 244-46), one during the thirteenth century, the other between the eighth and the sixth centuries B.C., but without trying to locate definitely the home of the Vedic Aryans during the thirteenth century (except for the hazy generalities of pp. 135, 168) and without discriminating between the Soma ritual of the thirteenth century and that of the sixth century. She finds in Zagreus "a reference to his (Dionysos) identity with Homa the plant-god of Zagros" (p. 156), but does not try to show what connection there was between the Vedic Soma ritual and the Zagros range. Her conception of the relation of the Rig Veda to the Avesta is most naïve. See pp. 134-35 and especially p. 23: "In the absence of documents which would show the philosophical side of Zoroastrianism, we must naturally turn to these semitheological speculations of the kindred Indian race as evidence for what may have been the state of contemporary Persian metaphysics." We might as well turn to Kant and Schopenhauer for evidence of the condition of the contemporary philosophy of the kindred Russians. Why try to "imagine" (p. 26) Indian teachers in Persia at the time of Pythagoras? We must have tangible evidence if the argument is to be valid.

On pp. 63-130 a multitude of quotations from Sanskrit works ranging in date from the fourth to the twelfth centuries A.D. is adduced as proof of Indian influence on early Greek writers (the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.). Even in India, as Barth has said, the centuries have a physiognomy. No parallels can have any possible validity unless they are coeval with the Greek authors to whom the comparisons are made. What can be proved by comparing with Aeschylus passages written one thousand years later? If passages later than the fourth century B.C. are ruled out, the parallels shrink to insignificance. Even these few remaining parallels of word and thought can mean little unless backed up by definite historical evidence. For the earliest traces of an "artificial" style, see the well-known article of Bühler translated in the *Indian Antiquary* for 1913.

The only reference to the important Boghaz-keui inscriptions, which are of prime importance for the problem discussed on p. 256, is at second hand (p. 18). There is a long list of valuable articles on the subject.

There is nothing whatever in the sat and asat of the Upanishads or in the Mâyā of the Vedānta to correspond to the statements made on pp. 24, 34, 38, 47, 66. There is no duality of Good and Evil in Hindu

philosophy as there is in the Avesta. Brahman is free from all evil. Māyā is Nescience with no moral implications. The Hindu finds in karma an answer to the moral problem.

For the Upanishads only Müller and Gough are used. Both are bad guides. We can arrange the Upanishads only according to a relative chronology. Miss Davis treats them as on a flat background. The quotations from the *Çvetāçvatara* (pp. 38, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 59, 65), from the *Mundaka* (pp. 33, 37, 45, 54, 64), and from the *Māṇḍūkya* (pp. 58, 64) are useless as parallels. These texts may date from well within the Christian era. Even the *Kaṭha* (pp. 31, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53) cannot be used as coeval with Plato and his predecessors.

It is now generally recognized that the Māyā doctrine, which Miss Davis confidently refers to as found in the Upanishads (pp. 26, 42, 47, 64, 65), is of much later date. Müller, Gough, Deussen, and Çankara carry the speculations of a much later age back into the primitive Upanishads. The monistic Vedānta is not pre-Buddhistic. Miss Davis (p. 26) calls it pre-Buddhistic; but compare the contradictory statement on p. 28, note: "The Vedantic philosophy which arose about the beginning of the Christian era."

The *Gītā* is not a Upanishad at all (pp. 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 41, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 72, 180, 205). Hopkins has maintained erroneously that it was based on an old Upanishad. All comparisons from the *Gītā* (ca. 200 B.C. to 200 A.D.) are chronologically impossible.

Garbe's theories about the Sāṃkhya are no longer considered tenable. Miss Davis accepts them without criticism. The theory of kalpas and yugas (pp. 43, 52, 53, 62, 73) is first found in the Epic (400 B.C. to 400 A.D.). There is no evidence that it is as old as Anaximander. The Puranic cosmology (p. 63) cannot be adduced as a parallel. None of the Purāṇas can be dated earlier than the third century A.D. There is not a shred of evidence that the Jain cosmology (pp. 47-48) is as old as Plato. Surely references should be given to the standard articles which treat this much disputed problem.

The note on Buddhism (p. 30) is grossly misleading. Whatever Buddha himself believed about the soul and about Nirvāṇa he did not himself preach a doctrine of annihilation. The *çūnyavāda* is much later.

The fallacy of arguments based on the flimsy generalities quoted below is too patent to need criticism. The most superficial reading of

the standard books on anthropology would show her abundant parallels from all parts of the world.

The body is the prison of the soul [p. 31], . . . the notions of *δουήρης* and purification and the abstinence from the flesh of animals enjoined by Orphic doctrine are all essentially Indian customs and foreign to Hellenic practice [p. 32]. . . . Also we see clearly that in India as in Greece, side by side with the practice of liturgies and sacrifices, we have the consciousness that there is something higher in religion than material acts of worship [p. 33]. . . . Now mysticism is exactly what we should expect to find as a result of Oriental influence [p. 59]. . . . Now this is just one of those passages where Plato might equally well be supposed to allude to the teaching of some Ionian lecturer who had imbibed the doctrines of the Upanishads [p. 61]. . . . In conclusion, the idea of the power of Necessity is intensely Oriental [p. 63]. . . . While the idleness which Aristophanes denounces might be taken as identical with the abstention from activity recommended in the philosophy of the Upanishads [p. 101]. . . . We have, indeed, seen that a tendency to asceticism and the practice of purificatory rites is a mark of Oriental influence in the teaching of the Orphics [p. 187]. . . . We have in ancient India a parallel to the notion of *δημιώσις τῷ θεῷ* in the Dionysiac omophagy [p. 214].

Doubtless there were in the Orphic mysteries and in the local cults survivals of primitive animism and magic which were not countenanced by Attic rationalism.

The hazy generalities on which Miss Davis bases her arguments and her lack of precision are best exemplified by her etymologies. Her whole conception of Brahman (p. 34) is erroneous. See Griswold, *Brahman. Dhuni* (pp. 144, 185), a word of very doubtful etymology and meaning, is applied once to Soma. How is it possible to base Bacchus Thyoneus on a single occurrence of a common modifying adjective which is not even characteristic of Soma? *Nārās*, so far as we know (but see Hopkins, *JAOS*, XXXIII, 57), is not an old word for water. This meaning, which occurs first in Manu and the Epic, was probably invented to explain the old, obscure cult-name *Nārāyaṇa*. Miss Davis argues that, even though there was not in Greek or Sanskrit such a word meaning water, "the same idea which caused the early Hindu to speak of the waters as the offspring of Nara was transmitted to Greece, and caused the Hellene to apply the name Nereus to his own Sea-god." Such reasoning is preposterous. What authority is there for "good sacrifice" as the original meaning of *svāhā* (p. 156) or why are the words *εὖω* and *svāhā* "manifestly closely connected philologically"? Why are *Meros* and *Meru* "evidently" connected (p. 166)? For *Meru*, see Hopkins, *JAOS*, XXX,

366 ff. There is not a particle of evidence to prove a confusion of *uru* and *ūru* (p. 167). The connection of *εραφιῶτα* with *ṛṣabha* is more than doubtful. No conclusions should be based on the etymology (pp. 175-76). *Indu* is derived from *und* (p. 146), but on p. 201 Miss Davis discards an etymology of Dionysis because a *v* of Greek does not represent an *i* of Sanskrit. Is not Sanskrit *i* different from Sanskrit *u*? What authority is there for connecting Typhos with *dhūma* (p. 110)? Miss Davis misunderstands the signification of *b* versus *v* in Sanskrit and the dialects (p. 181). See Wackernagel, I, 161-63. The word is Kubera, not Kuvera, as Miss Davis regularly spells it. There is no trace of such a confusion in *aṣva*. *Aṣva* occurs just once as the name of a priest in the Ṣatapatha Brāhmaṇa. *Vājin* (p. 183) does not mean "winged" or "swift." A laudable self-control leads Miss Davis to consider the name Dionysos as an unsolved problem (p. 201). And yet see the nonsensical note below. A personification of the Doors of the sacrificial place occurs in the obscure *āpri* hymns (see 1, 13, 6). A reference to Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, would show how common a personification of things pertaining to the sacrifice is. Because of this ritualistic metaphor she is led to consider Dithyrambus as the Lord of the Divine Doors and Dionysos as the Child of the Divine Doors. This is myth made from ritual with a vengeance. Contradicting this we find that Miss Davis on p. 190 approves Maury in finding an analogy between *dvijanman* and Dithyrambus and Dimeter. *Dvijanman* however is not "frequently" applied to Soma in the Rig Veda. There is not a single example of such use. The application to Soma in the passage from the Sāma Veda is of no consequence. A double birth is characteristic of other gods as well. The fawnskin of Dionysos is derived from the epithet *mṛgapiplu* (p. 203). The word is found only in a late lexicon. I can find no such word as *itāna* in Sanskrit (p. 217). Miss Davis seems to agree with Langlois in deriving Sabazios from *sabhājya*, a word which is first found in the Epic. Miss Davis continues (p. 221), "In any case the word has a manifestly Iranian appearance and might easily have been derived from contact with Persia." Characteristic is her treatment of the name Orpheus (p. 252). After mentioning the proposed derivation from *ṛbhu* which, "needless to say, commands the approval of Oriental scholars," she continues, "But it is better, perhaps, to regard the name Orpheus as akin to *ὄρφνη*." In order to carry out her conceptions of the chthonian nature of Orpheus she abandons what is to her an unimpeachable etymology. Does such a proceeding increase our confidence in her other "approved" etymologies?

There *is* in the Vedānta a very close parallel to the theory of Ideas (p. 55). A reference to Rhys David's *Buddhist India* would show that in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. the Brahmans were by no means rulers and the Ksatriyas auxiliaries (p. 55).

Brahman is not the eleven-gated city of the soul (p. 62). There is no reference to a Heavenly City. The figure is a very concrete one and refers to the body (and its openings) in which the soul dwells.

The chapter on Asianism in Greek art and music (pp. 84-94) proves nothing. We know nothing of Indian art until the third century B.C., or of classical Indian music until the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata (ca. fourth century A.D.?). Strangways, *Music of Hindustan*, with good bibliography, appeared too late perhaps to be used; but there is no excuse for ignorance of all the articles which treat of the development of Sanskrit meter. There are no Sanskrit meters coeval with Aeschylus which admit of comparison with the Greek dithyramb (p. 99).

On p. 115 Miss Davis draws a comparison between the use of different dialects by Timotheos and the mingling of Sanskrit and Prakrit in the Hindu drama. Our earliest plays, the recently discovered works of Bhāsa, are to be placed shortly before Kālidāsa (ca. 400 A.D.). There are no valid parallels for the time of Timotheos or for many centuries later.

Yaksha (pp. 161-63) is not derived from *yaj* and does not mean "a being honoured by sacrifice." The resemblance to *ἱαχσος* does not prove that the two words are the same. *Bhaksha*, "food, drink," is never a proper name and is useless in proving any analogy between *ἱαχσος* and *Yakshas*. There is no evidence to show that Soma developed into Kubera. See Hopkins, *JAOS*, XXX, 55 ff. The Kubera of the later Veda is a very different figure from the Kubera of the Epic. The *Yaksha* of the Veda is very different from the *Yaksha* of the Epic. There is no possibility that the word was originally applied to the guardians of Kubera's treasure. That is a much later development. Bacchus is derived (p. 162) not from the Vedic Bhaga but from the Avestan Bagha (who has none of the particular traits of the Vedic Bhaga and is Indo-European for "god"), "inasmuch as it was primarily through Persia that Greece came in contact with Aryan ideas or culture" (cf. p. 200: "among their Iranian brethren, from whom it is natural to suppose the Greeks would have heard the words rather than from the Indians"). And yet our author bases a large number of the cult-names of Dionysos directly on Vedic words without adducing any Avestan parallels. Does she assume here, as she must do to be logical, intermediate Avestan

forms? If these Vedic words were likewise heard from the Iranians it would be necessary to assume that there was an older Persian cult, corresponding exactly to the Vedic one, which has vanished without leaving any trace in our Avesta. Further, Miss Davis contradicts herself (p. 162) in trying to make the words philologically identical; but the *gh* of the Avestan word is not "Aryan," since the Vedic form has *g*. Either Bacchus was "derived" from Persia (in which case there is no need to prove exact philological identity) or it is an Indo-European cognate (in which case she needs evidence for the equation of *g* with *κχ*). Test her logic in any way you please and it collapses like a house of cards.

Rākshasa is not derived from *raks*, "to protect." There is no evidence to connect the Rākshasas with the Gandharvas "as a more malignant variety" (p. 180).

On pp. 162 and 298, note, an effort is made to prove that the torch-light festival of Iakchos was borrowed from the Indian *dīpālī* festival. The words *dīpālī* and *yaksharātri* are found only in late lexicons. On p. 243 Miss Davis notes a similar festival in Egypt and says with sang-froid that it may be difficult to say whether the torches at the Eleusinia "are derived from Egypt or from farther East."

There is no evidence to show that in Hanuman and his monkey followers "we probably have representations of the more propitious character of the Centaurs" (p. 181).

Miss Davis (p. 216) bases Dionysos Isodaites on the passage Rig Veda, 9, 74, 5. *Pimati* does not mean "delivers" but "fills, swells." *Manuṣe* probably means "for mankind." *Tvacam* is not "body" but "leather bag," used metaphorically for "cloud."

Nāsadiya, p. 27, should be *Nāsadiya*. *Namarūpa*, p. 38, should be *Nāmarūpa*. *Sabrāmanmān*, p. 86, should be *Subrahmanya*. *Mathūra*, p. 160, should be *Mathurā*. *Bhanu*, p. 194, note, should be *bhānu*. There are many errors in the transliteration of passages from the Sanskrit.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CHURCH

Since the appearance, fifteen years ago, of Wernle's *Anfänge unserer Religion*, much earnest study has been devoted to the numerous problems associated with the development of early Christianity. Until recently,

by far the greater emphasis was placed upon the work of Paul as the great religious genius who rescued Christianity from an untimely grave and who molded its organization and created its first theology. The transcendent value of that which the greatest of the apostles wrought remains, of course. Lately, however, a reaction has set in against the extreme tendency to consider the work of Paul as altogether revolutionary. Among those who are seeking to modify this tendency few have shown sounder reasons than E. F. Scott.

Scott's *Beginnings of the Church*¹ contains the Ely Lectures, delivered at Union Theological Seminary in 1914. The object of the lectures is "to investigate the aims and beliefs of the Christian community in the time preceding the advent of Paul." Believing that the influence of Hellenistic beliefs and practices upon the earliest Christians has been exaggerated, and that the essential connections between the phases of early Christian developments have not been duly recognized, the author reviews the period between the death of Jesus and the beginnings of the gentile mission in which the church grew up in its native Jewish soil, and seeks to show the connection with what went before and what came after. In his attempt to interpret the ideas of the budding church, he sets out from the hypothesis that Jesus imparted his message in the terms of Jewish apocalyptic, and that these conceptions were normative also for his disciples, and found their natural outcome in the building up of the first Christian communities.

Tracing first the steps by which the disciples (who even before the death of Jesus formed a "brotherhood") passed from the despair caused by the death of the Lord to the triumph of their faith in his messiahship, wrought by the resurrection, the author describes in consecutive chapters the development of the primitive brotherhood into the church, the gift of the Holy Spirit and the assurance of the continued presence of Jesus as the Lord, the relation of the primitive church to Judaism, the life of the first Christian community, the meaning of baptism and the Lord's Supper, and the significance of Stephen in the transition from the earlier to the later development of the church.

With all its obscurity, there is no period in the history of our religion which is quite so momentous as that which intervened between the death of Jesus and the advent of Paul; and no discerning student of the New Testament will fail to appreciate the valuable contribution made to its better understanding by this book. The work is based on a keen

¹ *The Beginnings of the Church*. By Ernest F. Scott. New York: Scribner, 1914. ix+282 pages. \$1.50.

and penetrating study of a source material which tests the ability of the best of scholars. The conclusions arrived at are suggestive and noteworthy.

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GARDNER'S STUDY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL¹

Dr. Gardner has followed up his book on *The Religious Experience of St. Paul* by a study of the Fourth Gospel, "the greatest work of the Pauline School." He employs the same plan and methods as in the companion volume, with results equally successful. By relying less on the work of previous writers than on his own first-hand impressions he has been able, in not a few instances, to examine well-worn problems from a new angle; and even when he travels the same ground as his predecessors his book bears the impress of a fresh mind, thinking for itself.

The book consists in the main of a discussion of the Johannine teaching under its various aspects; but the theological discussion is prefaced by a number of chapters in which the attempt is made to understand the Gospel in the light of its environment. These chapters are perhaps the most interesting in the book and determine its point of view throughout. To Dr. Gardner the key to Johannine thought is largely to be found in the fact that it was the product of Ephesus. He considers the place of this city in the life of the ancient world, its peculiar intellectual traditions, its associations with Pauline Christianity, and shows how the ideas which find expression in the Gospel can all be related to these local influences.

With critical problems Dr. Gardner does not concern himself, except in so far as they have a direct bearing on his work of exposition. He accepts as proved the modern contention that the Gospel is not a literal history, but an endeavor, on the part of a great spiritual thinker, to disclose the inner "truth" that lay behind the visible facts. At the same time he is willing to admit a much larger substratum of genuine tradition than many modern scholars have recognized. He is even prepared to allow that the reminiscences of the apostle John may in some form be incorporated in the Gospel as we now have it. "By far the most probable view is that the Fourth Evangelist, a man of philosophic mind and profound genius, had as a young man been converted by the preaching of St. Paul, and had afterwards come under the strong

¹ *The Ephesian Gospel*. By Percy Gardner. New York: Putnam, 1915. 362 pages. \$1.50.

influence of St. John or one of his immediate followers. The simple narrative of the eye-witness took in his mind a new and exalted character." In support of this view Dr. Gardner lays stress on the numerous episodes and details which it is artificial to construe otherwise than as fragments of actual history. We believe that he has done a real service in protesting against the pedantry that would explain the whole Gospel symbolically; but some of the incidents which he regards as authentic appear to us more than doubtful. The meeting of the Greeks with Jesus may surely be taken, without any forcing, in a typical sense; while it is difficult to see in the raising of Lazarus merely "the transposition into a higher key of something that actually happened."

Although he makes full allowance for the survival of genuine tradition in the narrative, Dr. Gardner insists that the teaching attributed to Jesus must be viewed as the evangelist's own interpretation. He refuses to accept the passage "All things are delivered unto me by my Father," etc., as a possible bridge between the synoptic and the Johannine teaching of Jesus. This passage he regards as an intrusion into Matthew and Luke from some alien source, in which the sayings of Jesus were developed in the direction of later theological ideas. Much can be said for this theory; but it does not explain why the enigmatical passage is present in both Matthew and Luke. We could wish that Dr. Gardner had worked out a little more fully his very important suggestion as to the type of Logos speculation which is represented in the Gospel. He is disposed to think that the influence of Philo is much smaller than has commonly been supposed, and that the evangelist was more immediately dependent on some theory of the Logos which was current at Ephesus, the city of Heraclitus. In this connection he makes use of a valuable analogy, borrowed from the field of Greek archaeology. It has been proved by recent discovery that besides the two or three schools of art hitherto recognized there were others, native to certain great cities. Sculptures which the last generation would unhesitatingly have assigned to the art of Pergamon are now known to belong to an important school which flourished at Ephesus. "In the same way there were no doubt in the great cities schools of philosophy of which we have insufficient knowledge."

Dr. Gardner does not discuss the recent theories of the composite origin of the Gospel. He is apparently satisfied—we believe rightly—that the seeming discrepancies can be accounted for without the aid of such expedients. Perhaps he would have done well to examine more fully the relation of the Gospel to Gnosticism. That such a rela-

tion exists would seem to be involved in his own contention that the Gospel and the First Epistle are probably by the same author. Indeed, the whole idea of "knowledge," which occupies such a prominent place in Johannine thought, was entitled to a much more elaborate treatment.

A closing chapter deals, in a highly suggestive fashion, with the bearing of the Gospel on modern needs and tendencies. This, indeed, is an aspect of the subject which is never far from the writer's mind throughout the book. It is perhaps the best praise which can be given to Dr. Gardner's work to say that while presenting the Johannine ideas in a manner satisfying to the scholar he is sensitive to their abiding value and brings them into living contact with the religious thinking of today.

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DR. SWETE ON THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH¹

This book, as its foreword explains, was written for Anglican students of theology, and comes from one of the most eminent scholars of the Church of England, who dedicates it *Ecclesiae Anglicanae Matri Carissimae*. Naturally, its appearance is welcomed by all who share the author's point of view, but it will also command the attention and respectful consideration of a far wider circle of readers to whom anything by Dr. Swete is of interest. His theme is an article of the Apostles' Creed concerning which, of course, no positive statement can be made without suggesting points of controversy. Many of these, it is true, are associated with outworn polemic, but some of them have a bearing upon present-day problems and therefore are live questions. This being the case, no student of systematic theology, whatever his leanings or confessional allegiance, will deem the subject unimportant; but also, and equally, it goes without saying that any discussion of it, to call for notice, must proceed on the lines of the best modern scholarship. That the volume before us satisfies this requirement the name of the author guarantees.

Dr. Swete's well-known method is here applied to elucidate the historic sense or senses of the creedal language, but always with the purpose of exhibiting the truth thus expressed, in the interest of definite teaching, and with reference to the questions which people are asking

¹ *The Holy Catholic Church: the Communion of Saints*. A Study in the Apostles' Creed. By Henry Barclay Swete. London: Macmillan, 1915. x+265 pages. \$1.25.

today. The first part of the subject is considered under three heads: (1) "The Church and Its Notes"; (2) "The Church in Its Life, Order, and Functions"; (3) "The Church in Its Relations." The subdivisions in this scheme afford material for new combinations which can be made to advantage by the student. Thus, for example, the unity of the church (1) has obvious affinities with its order (2), and with its relations to the individual and to the "churches" (3); its indefectibility (1), with its teaching and authority (2). In treating the unity of the church we notice that the author dissents from Streeter's view¹ that inquiry should be deprecated in the present state of disunion, and from that of Lindsay² that the unity of the church consists in the personal union of its individual members with the head—his point here being that unity is an objective fact which exists before it is experienced.

Holiness is stressed as the most characteristic note of the church. Catholicity—the name and the thing—is discussed, first, with reference to ancient authorities (its comparatively late entrance into the Creed being noted), and, secondly, with reference to the estimates of Harnack and Sohm. The position is taken, in agreement with the latter, that the development of the conception was the natural and logical outgrowth of New Testament principles. On the other hand, the note of apostolicity is shown to have its distinct value as against a too exclusive emphasis on catholicity.

Before passing to the second part of the book, which deals with "The Communion of Saints," the reader should consult the note on pp. 261-62 for the position of this phrase in the Creed and its possible significance as a separate article. Incidentally, the author's thoroughness in leaving no minor or doubtful point unnoticed is here illustrated, but the purpose is to explain his preference for Bishop Pearson's view that the two clauses of church and communion together form one article of belief.

The discussion starts from the New Testament *κοινωνία* (with its five renderings in the Vulgate) and the meaning of *sanctorum* (masculine)—thus determining the meaning of the phrase as "the fellowship of consecrated persons." Without expressly committing himself, he inclines to the opinion of Morin in *Sanctorum Communionem*³ that the expression originated in an old Armenian Creed and was picked up by Jerome in the course of his travels in Asia Minor. It served a useful polemical purpose in the West and, possibly owing to this restriction, was at first

¹ *Restatement and Reunion*, p. 150.

² *The Church and the Minister*, pp. 13 f.

³ Macon, 1904.

understood in a sense altogether inadequate to the profound meaning which it really enshrines. The remarkable thing about the whole process is that for three centuries at least a truth explicitly recognized in the universal Christian consciousness lacked formal expression in the symbols of the Western church. What seems to us even more remarkable, considering its origin, is the absence of this clause from all the great Eastern creeds (cf. the Nicene Creed) even to this day.

The theme thus presented is developed, first, on the basis of such texts as I John 1:3; I Cor. 1:9; II Cor. 13:13; Phil. 2:1; etc., as communion with God; and, secondly, as communion in the church militant—the sacraments, the spiritual life, and the visible fellowship. In each case the continuity of the idea is traced from New Testament exegesis through the primitive and patristic periods to modern expression in Anglican formularies.

This is followed by what is possibly the most interesting and suggestive of the author's chapters—"The Communion of the Living Saints with the Departed." The same method of investigation is adopted and, whether we view it as a piece of accurate scholarship, or as an effort to state the message which Christian faith and hope have to offer in response to the universal yearning for communion with the departed, the result must be pronounced wholly admirable. The subject is of such a nature that "the will to believe" usually exerts a dominant influence over the mind, and if the theologian is not proof against this tendency the fact is neither surprising nor discreditable. Any real interest in eschatology, even in the bare historical data of the subject, must depend upon the presence of such a factor in our consciousness. But just because of this we need to be on our guard against its solicitations. The rights of sentiment must respect the rights of reason. A sane eschatology, devoid of eccentricity and at once Christian and Catholic, is felt by many to be a real desideratum, and this in a word is what our author has given us here. The interchange of prayer, he contends, is not interrupted by death, and the practice of praying for the departed is abundantly justified, and therefore should be more distinctly countenanced than it is in the Prayer Book. The practice of invocation of saints is on a somewhat different footing. While the familiar *ora pro nobis* is innocent enough, considered in itself, the reader is reminded that anything like a cultus of the saints tends to derogate from the sufficiency of Christ's intercession, which is the point of the condemnation to be found in the Articles of Religion (XXII). Such Anglo-Catholic authorities as Andrewes and Pusey are cited in

opposition to the modern practice, and the author has little to add to their weighty words.

In these comments we have aimed to show the value of the book to students of theology. But, in the main, it is also suited to the educated laity who may be in quest of reliable information on the subject of which it treats. Aside from other points of excellence, its beautiful and faultless style would be an attraction to this class of readers. Last, but not least, it will be appreciated by teachers of theology. This may be said without qualification, not only because of the writer's eminence as a scholar, but because all his books are models of their kind. The new volume is similar to its predecessors in this respect. Like the earlier ripe fruits of Dr. Swete's learning, it does not disappoint the taste; it satisfies.

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STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY¹

Amid great diversities of attitude and outlook exhibited in the different fields of theological scholarship and by various types of competent theologians, there is coming to be something like a general agreement on the importance of the "philosophy of religion," considered as a distinct department of study. The reasons for this are obvious enough and are not affected by the circumstance that writers differ on one minor point, the exact meaning of the term. Taken in its widest sense, it will cover all formal theorizing on religious subjects. Thus understood, the "philosophy of religion" is coeval with philosophy itself, or, to be more precise, it is the root of all philosophy, since the earliest speculations had to do with religion. But if it be restricted to "the scientific and systematic investigation of the totality of phenomena which in the life of man compose religion," it must be regarded as the most recent branch of philosophy, and dates from the middle of the seventeenth century. This sense of the term, in the words just quoted, is that adopted by Pfeiderer, who argues that up to the period of free philosophizing inaugurated by Descartes and Spinoza a genuine philosophy of religion was impossible. The ancient world lacked the material—an independent religious experience—and the mediaeval world was fettered by the dog-

¹ *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*. By Clement C. J. Webb, Fellow of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford, and Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion, 1911-14. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915. vi+363 pages.

matic method. A simple line of demarcation like this is naturally attractive to the average student, and for that reason alone the term will probably establish itself in Pfeiderer's sense, if it has not already done so, regardless of what anyone may say to the contrary. In this connection it is significant that the writer of the volume now before us adopts in his title the term "natural theology," seemingly out of deference to the prevailing view and not desiring to beg the question. For he is to deal with thinkers who belong to the very periods that are excluded by "philosophy of religion" in the restricted sense. At the same time, he refuses to allow that the exclusion is just, and his criticism of Pfeiderer on this point is the first thing to arrest the reader's attention.

He expresses surprise that an author who evinces little sympathy with subjectivism should hold that the objective attitude of ancient philosophy in the matter of religion was any bar to our respect. The ancients speculated on the nature of the gods, but "never made religion as a whole the subject of their systematic inquiry"; that is to say, they did not approach religion from the psychological (modern) point of view. But, it is maintained, we might as well deny the discussion of the nature of being by the ancients to be philosophy at all as deny their discussion of the nature of the gods to be philosophy of religion. Again, the ancients should be credited with a political philosophy, in spite of the fact that the distinctness of politics from religion was not clearly recognized by them. On the same principle, the ancient conception of religion may be held to involve a religious philosophy, notwithstanding its associations with the traditional cultus of the state. As a matter of common knowledge, the philosophical religion of Plato and Aristotle discloses a severance of religion from civil life which anticipated the fuller achievement of Christianity in that respect.

Turning from classical antiquity to the thinkers of the Middle Ages, the author deals with the assumed disqualifications of the latter on the ground of their dogmatic presuppositions. Complete independence of dogma—demanded for genuine religious philosophizing—is, of course, not to be found in patristic or scholastic theologians, but neither is it to be found in Spinoza, nor yet in Pfeiderer himself. We are reminded that a reference to authority may be only an appeal to the actual facts of experience which we seek to understand, and this method is eminently characteristic of the schoolmen, who, with all the theological and ecclesiastical elements of their intellectual situation, enjoyed considerable freedom of speculation. On the strength of these arguments, elaborated with confidence and in a most convincing manner, Mr. Webb finds places

in the history of the philosophy of religion for great thinkers like Plato, Anselm, Abelard, and Aquinas, and for lesser lights, such as Raymond of Sebonde, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Lord Herbert. One notices the omission of Aristotle, the Stoics, the neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers, also the interval of thirteen centuries between the Sage of the Academy and the famous Archbishop of Canterbury, but a reference to the title dissipates any false impression. These are "studies" in which the writer deals with material most familiar to himself, and at a time when the larger part of the ground he omits was being covered by other lecturers in his own university, Oxford.

The topics fall under three heads, each representing a separate course of lectures. The first of these, "Introduction to the History of Natural Theology," contains his criticism of Pfeiderer's position, already adverted to, and a discursive review of the scope of natural theology, leading up to its definition as "the sphere of general reflection upon the objects of religious experience so far as this experience is open to all men, and not peculiar to a particular race, community, or individual." Many important points are disposed of on the way to this definition. He is obliged to discuss at length the possible senses of "nature," "naturalism," "natural science," etc., because he cannot ignore the intractability of words, or claim that they shall mean what he (or another) chooses them to mean. He has no love for hard and fast lines of distinction, such, for example, as a doctrinaire natural theology is prone to draw between natural and historical religion, two things not mutually exclusive. From all of this the general character of the writer's position may be inferred. It is simply, if we do not misunderstand him, that natural religion, together with natural theology (its ordered expression), is in every age related to the background or basis of man's existing religious beliefs or practices, and that a genuine religious philosophy will take note of this fact. It may properly refuse to distinguish between "natural" and "revealed" religion: it is vitally concerned with the distinction between "natural" and "institutional" religion. But even there, as Mr. Webb demonstrates again and again, the line cannot be so easily or so strictly drawn as the Deists, for example, imagined.

Summing up impressions, we may say in a word that these lectures are a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject. The few points which had been noted for criticism are relatively unimportant and do not detract from the general excellence of the work. Even radical dissent from some of the positions taken by the author would not justify a different verdict. Mr. Webb has given us an illuminating

discussion which no one interested in the great themes of which it treats can affect to ignore. It is especially commended to those, if there be any such, who cherish the conviction that natural theology is a thing that has had its day and ceased to be.

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RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A good book covering the general field of the philosophy of religion in a popular way comes from Francis L. Strickland, formerly president of Simpson College, Iowa, now professor of philosophy in the University of West Virginia.¹ The author has evidently a wide knowledge of philosophy of the past and present, and of the problems which confront the intelligent man of today when he considers the claims of Christianity upon his interest. The language is simple, avoiding unnecessary technicalities, and the style fresh and clear. The book would be especially suitable as a college textbook, for giving an introduction to philosophy, and for presenting and defending the Christian world-view in the light of contemporary currents of thought, both friendly and hostile.

One brief chapter considers "Christianity and Philosophy" in their historical relations of the past. Another presents the philosophic world-views of the present. The twelve remaining chapters take up specific problems of theism and other elements in Christianity, and consider them from the philosophic standpoint.

The most unsatisfactory part of the book is the chapter on "The Place of the Supernatural in the Christian Revelation." The author desires to avoid the idea of a miracle as a break in the lawful order of events, but is willing to admit a break in the "natural" order provided it can be shown to have "a harmonious relation with the larger moral order." On this ground he accepts the resurrection of Jesus and the objectivity of Paul's vision on the road to Damascus. It is doubtful whether the author has reached the best philosophical solution of the relation of natural and supernatural. The contribution of this book lies in its clear and popular presentation of a wide range of the best present-day thought favorable to Christian faith in a way to assist the intelligent young person to readjust, clarify, and confirm his ideas of

¹ *Foundations of Christian Belief: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion.* By Francis L. Strickland. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 319 pages. \$1.50.

religion. It makes no original contribution to the solution of philosophical problems. A good analytical table of contents only partly supplies the place which an index might have taken.

A more specialized study of important phases of Christian thought is given in the book entitled *The Theology of Experience*.¹ The name of the book is likely to suggest a defense of Christianity or of some system of Christian doctrine on the grounds of experience. This is, however, not the general purpose of the book, and where such work is attempted it is unsatisfactory. The intention is rather to give a critical presentation of the methods of deriving or confirming religious belief from experience and thus to furnish a valid method for such use of experience. Dr. Hughes gives interesting, popular, and helpful discussions of mysticism, of the inward light of the Quakers, of characteristic experiences in the Wesleyan movement, and of the relative place and proper balance of intellectual, emotional, and volitional elements of experience in arriving at religious truth.

Aside from some philosophical weaknesses, this book should be very valuable for the "ordinary working minister," from whose standpoint it is written, in indicating the various forms of religious experience, and the way to preserve a healthy balance in using them.

The publisher's assertion on the wrapper of Balfour's *Theism and Humanism*² that "the fact and reality of God are conclusively demonstrated by Mr. Balfour" would be more apt to prejudice the student of philosophy against it than in favor of it, since the conclusive demonstration of the existence of God has never hitherto been accomplished, and one has reason to doubt whether it can be, or whether it would be well if it could be. But what this famous philosopher and statesman does attempt most students will probably feel that he accomplishes. He undertakes to show "that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational. If this be granted you rule out Mechanism, you rule out Naturalism, you rule out Agnosticism; and a lofty form of Theism becomes, as I think, inevitable." That does not yield a demonstration, but it does give valuable evidence.

¹ *The Theology of Experience*. By H. Maldwyn Hughes. London: Charles H. Kelley, 1915. 285 pages. 3s. 6d. net.

² *Theism and Humanism*. [Gifford Lectures, University of Glasgow, 1914]. By Hon. Arthur James Balfour, New York: George H. Doran Co., 1915. xv+274 pages. \$1.75 net.

The book is mainly taken up with attacks, which finally seem entirely successful, on naturalism. Lectures II and III maintain the thesis that if our sense of beauty, our higher feelings of enjoyment of love and the lovely, are regarded as the mere accidental product of a soulless evolution—if in looking upon the beauties of nature we abstract all of our sense of it as an expression of a spiritual cause—such enjoyment will be very seriously impaired, if not destroyed. This argument, the author well recognizes, is not calculated to appeal to everyone, but will have much force with some.

The fourth lecture argues that our higher and most treasured altruistic ethical principles have in general no "survival value" for the race, considered as breeding animals, and must therefore on the naturalistic hypothesis be considered as accidents or even "mistakes." The author here will not convince us all that they must *therefore* be regarded as originated by some other force. His final argument, however, that the highest ethical principles are often the weakest in their appeal to us ("the good I gaze at and approve," etc.), but that theistic belief is the best factor we know of to give them compulsive force, is more convincing.

But naturalism receives its *coup de grâce* in Part III, where Mr. Balfour considers intellectual values. Naturalism asserts that without going outside of experience, or assuming at the start any reason or purpose or mental existence of any sort, it can explain all of our experience. Balfour then challenges it to explain our "inevitable belief" in the external world. No one can do without this belief in practice, the adherent of naturalism least of all; but when he undertakes to begin with psychical states, and to get from them to physical causes in an outer world, he denies his fundamental principles. In order to have any philosophy at all he must *assume* an outer world corresponding more or less to our mental notions of it. Leslie Stephen then is obliged to abandon his fundamental principle, borrowed from Locke, of "not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant," before he has any science to accept.

Lecture VII shows that the most fruitful principles with which natural science has worked are entirely impossible of explanation as products of non-spiritual evolution or as inferences from experience. For milleniums scientists have held stubbornly to theories like the atomic, that of the regularity of nature, and that of the conservation of energy, which were ~~not~~ suggested by experience, but were constantly contradicted by obvious experience. The argument is too long even to be

outlined here, but it is extremely interesting and convincing. The conclusion is that there is no rational explanation of these incurable tendencies of the human mind but in the hypothesis of a mind behind human minds. And thus we feel that after all Laplace did not put himself nor humanity beyond the need for "the hypothesis of God," even for physical science.

Balfour's book is in clear, popular style, but the argument is deep and often subtle, not difficult to misunderstand. It is a book which every theistic philosopher should welcome, and with which every adherent of naturalism or agnosticism must reckon.

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THE FAITHS OF INDIA

The dominant impression one bears away from a careful reading of this volume² is that of a scholarly work full of balance, insight, and sympathy. Those who have read the half-pictures—most valuable though they be—of the Abbé Dubois' *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies* on the one hand, and those of Sister Nivedita, Fielding Hall, and Mrs. Besant on the other, will find in this book a conscious endeavor to avoid these extremes by not merely giving facts, but by giving facts in such balance that the resulting picture will be true. Throughout, one finds a careful weighing of attainments and deficiencies, of merits no less than of defects. The author's insight is all the more valuable in that he makes the approach to India "neither as a Sanskritist nor as a missionary nor as convert to some Oriental cult," but as one who as professor of philosophy in Williams College and author of the *Psychology of Religious Belief* and *What Is Pragmatism?* has long labored at the problems of the psychology and philosophy of religion. It is this background which has made such a book as this possible after a mere nine months' stay in India.

The author's object has been to present Indian religious life as it is today. Seven chapters are given to the various aspects of Hinduism, three to modern reform movements, while very discriminating chapters deal with the Theosophists, Kabir Panthis, Sikhs, Jainas, Moham-medans, and Parsees. The four chapters on Buddhism are noteworthy, especially the one on the "Value of Buddhism and Its Springs of Power," where the strength and attractiveness of this great religion are so set

² *India and Its Faiths: A Traveller's Record.* By James Bissett Pratt, Ph.D. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. 476 pages. \$4.00 net.

forth that the reader who is a mere partisan will come with relief upon the closing words, in which the author expresses his belief in "a still greater Teacher, whose message was more simple than the Buddha's, whose insight into the secrets of the spirit was certainly no less deep, whose example was no less inspiring, and who also taught the Great Peace and pointed out to it, as I believe, a more excellent way."

A glance at the index will enable one to see how interested the author has been in worship. In connection with each of India's faiths the worshiper is made to move before us. In almost every case description is followed by an interpretation of the religious experience from a truly Indian point of view. Reports of conversations and extracts from letters from representative adherents of the faiths give warmth to the statements of values as they see them. To this the author adds his own estimate of the profit and the loss from such a faith.

No other book is known to the reviewer that sets forth with greater fulness the methods used by the different communities of India for religious education. In almost every chapter one will find the attempt to portray the way in which the religious tradition under discussion is passed on to the next generation. This is especially true of the chapters on "Teachers, Priests, and Holy Men," and on Buddhist "Education and Reform."

Three chapters might well be read by every student volunteer and by those interested in the work of missions in any land. The one on "Avoiding Misunderstandings" describes four points of view to be avoided and points the way between enthusiastic sympathy on the one hand and complacent superiority on the other. In the chapter on "Christian Missions in India," after seventeen pages of thoughtful discussion of the argument against the mission enterprise, viz., that the conversion of India to Christianity is impossible, the author says that on the whole "the prospect is much less brilliant than one would gather from certain missionary books, and that, humanly speaking, it is impossible to predict that India will ever be entirely Christian; and that, on the other hand, the results thus far attained have amply justified the money and men, the thought and human life, which have been expended in the missionary enterprise, and that one cannot reasonably set any limits to the possibilities of the future." Against the arguments of those who hold that such conversion is useless, he shows in detail that the differences between Christianity and the faiths of India are neither negligible nor unimportant, and that Christianity on the whole is sufficiently superior to the other religions to justify the missionary effort

for the conversion of the non-Christian world. This conclusion is not new, but most friends of missions may learn much from the method and the spirit by which it is obtained. The chapter on "What the West Might Learn" is an illustration of how the eyes of travelers or missionaries should be open to learn from the Orient as well as to give.

Another characteristic of this volume, which makes it especially valuable for use in missionary preparation, is the way in which time after time the portrayal of some defect in non-Christian faith or practice is followed by something which makes the reader humbly conscious of some kindred defect in Christendom. We are told that the many devas are as consistent with fundamental monotheism as are angels with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The creation of the Vedanta from the essentially religious material of the Upanishads has its counterpart in the development of Christian theology from the Prophets and Apostles. We are introduced to intelligent and spiritual Hindus who deplore the externalism of their ignorant fellows just as Protestants would repudiate the veneration of ikons as a part of true Christianity. Just when we are filled with surprised pity for the repetition of the *Gayatri* and the syllable *Aum*, we are reminded that many a pious soul receives from this the same religious value that the good Catholic gets from the rosary.

While some may feel that a little too much has been conceded to the value of India's faiths, or may feel that the author has somewhat underestimated the value to India of formulations of Christian belief or organization, we do not hesitate to recommend this volume to all interested in comparative religion or in the beliefs, worship, religious education, or evangelization of the people of India.

DANIEL JOHNSON FLEMING

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ROBINSON'S HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS¹

The task of foreign missions, "whether viewed from a spiritual, a moral, or an educational standpoint, is the greatest which men have ever essayed to undertake" (p. 496). Of this great enterprise we have in this latest volume of the "International Theological Library" the best single-volume history yet written. Canon Robinson is editorial secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign

¹*History of Christian Missions*. By Charles Henry Robinson. New York: Scribner, 1915. ix+533 pages. \$2.50.

Parts, is editor of *The East and the West*, and is one of the best-informed and statesmanlike among those interested in missions.

His object in writing this volume has been "to provide the intelligent reader with an outline sketch of Christian missions which may enable him to obtain a correct perspective," and it is hoped that its use as a textbook may encourage and facilitate a more detailed study of the several countries and periods of history.

After a chapter on "Methods in Mission Work" and one giving a rapid survey of the period from 1580 to 1750, when modern missions were dawning, the history of missions in seventeen areas is considered in as many chapters. Exigencies of space have compelled the author to omit all references to the conversion of Europe and the methods adopted by its early missionaries; but on the other hand there are interesting sections on Canada, the United States, and the West Indies. The concluding chapters discuss missions to the Moslems and to the Jews and give the outlook for the future. Special emphasis has been laid on the beginnings of the missionary enterprise and this has led to some very discriminating studies of Roman Catholic missions in which their methods and results have been weighed not without sympathy. Statistics have been introduced whenever their use would elucidate the relative progress that has been made in different sections of the mission field or in different epochs. The author, however, in several places repudiates the idea that the depth and stability of work in any given place may be judged by the standard of mere numbers.

The courageous task of covering the Christian centuries (although the main emphasis is upon modern missions), during which hundreds of societies have worked in varied fields, and of reducing this survey to some five hundred pages, has been well done. While of necessity there are many pages which give little more than lists of societies with data concerning them, one is constantly coming across insights full of human interest. Canon Robinson is especially strong in pointing out and weighing mission policies as developed in different fields. One has in this volume, not only a history, but the ripened judgment of a scholar in mission statesmanship.

In a work covering so many facts it would not be surprising if inaccuracies crept in. For instance, Forman Christian College is called Forman College and is credited to the American United Presbyterian church instead of to the Presbyterian church in U.S.A. (p. 89). The Robert College, Constantinople, is called the Robert Noble College, the author possibly confusing it with the college at Musulipitam

(p. 270). The American college at Beyrout is simply called the Protestant College instead of the Syrian Protestant College. In an extensive index of twenty-seven pages as important a subject as "mass movements" has no place. No bibliography is given.

No leader in missions can afford to omit the reading of this volume; it should be in every mission library and it will undoubtedly find large use as a text or reference book among the growing number of classes in colleges and seminaries taking up the serious study of the history of missions.

DANIEL JOHNSON FLEMING

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE¹

As the page numbers indicate, this volume is no hurried publication of half-digested views, a practice which has become too much the fashion in philosophy. From hints in the preface and elsewhere, one gathers that this is the first of a possible series of volumes that is to set forth a system of philosophy of religion. In these days of rapid reconstruction and of tentative and timid philosophizing, it is interesting to find some one with courage to project a system.

Also, at a time when epistemology is despised and rejected of philosophy, it is refreshing to see a volume frankly devoted to this outcast subject. I say "frankly," for there is a large amount of philosophical writing which, while professing to have renounced epistemology and all its works, is yet forced by its presuppositions to speak throughout with the voice of epistemology. But Professor Macintosh is a well-oriented writer. He knows what he is about. He is fully aware of his premises. He sees clearly, as many do not, that if one starts with the metaphysical premises of a world of purely "psychical subjects" and acts on the one hand and "physical objects" and acts on the other, there is no escape from epistemology. It is not to be got rid of by dropping the name or by calling it "logic." Professor Macintosh is equally successful in showing that the epistemological problem is neither solved nor shelved by the various metaphysical devices of the idealistic movement, nor by the "logistics" of neo-realism. And here perhaps is the place to say that one of the most valuable features of the volume is the expository and critical survey of current theories of knowledge which it furnishes.

¹*The Problem of Knowledge.* By Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Theology, Yale University. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xviii+503 pages. \$3.00.

However, it is noticeable that the conception of the problem of knowledge as the presentation to, or the representation by, a "psychical subject" of a "physical object" makes very difficult a successful exposition of those views of knowledge—e.g., the experimental conception of knowledge of the pragmatic movement—which are based on the explicit rejection of the metaphysical dualism of the psychical and physical. Doubtless this is the besetting sin of all criticism—the substitution of the critic's premises for those of the theory he is discussing, and the assumption that the problem is the same for the critic and his victim. So in this volume, I think, many of the difficulties and inadequacies which are found in some pragmatic theories of truth and error are due to the assumption that the theories discussed start from the same conception of what makes knowledge a problem as that of the author, viz., the dualism of "psychical subject" and "physical object." But in the pragmatic theory of knowledge, as the reviewer understands it, this dualism is not only irrelevant but malevolent. Failure to keep this in mind is responsible for what will appear to some as the grotesque characterization of Professor Dewey's theory of knowledge as "disguised psychological idealism" in which all conscious experience is regarded as "subjective, as *my* sensations, *my* feelings, *my* ideas" (p. 118)!

For the author the "problem of knowledge" falls into two phases which determine the two main divisions of the volume: the problem of immediate, i.e., perceptive, presentative knowing; and the problem of mediate, representative knowing. The general doctrine which includes the solution for both these phases is called "critical realistic epistemological monism," whose thesis is that the object as known is "numerically identical" with the "real object" at the moment of knowing. From the reviewer's standpoint there is no doubt that if we are to escape agnosticism we must, as Professor Macintosh insists, be realists in some sense. Knowing must succeed in its work. But whether its work is presentation of a "physical object" *to* a "psychical subject," or the representation *by* a "psychical subject" of a "physical object," and whether if that be its mark it can succeed, is another matter.

Some readers are sure to find that the doctrine of epistemological monism is more easily applied to presentation than to representation. In the latter, the representing factor is "never identical with its object, *except for practical purposes*." Just how does "numerical identity" apply here?

For a presentative-representative theory of knowledge the crisis of the argument comes in dealing with truth and error. And the difficulties are not lessened when the theory is cast in the form of epistemological

monism. If the presentation or representation must be "numerically identical" with the "real object," how is there to be misrepresentation or misrepresentation? And what is to distinguish a true from a false presentation or representation? Here pragmatism is a present help. But it is a serious question whether we can find salvation in pragmatism if we still cling to a psychical-physical metaphysics and to a presentative-representative conception of the essential nature and function of knowledge.

The difficulty in a presentative-representative pragmatism is to avoid the same sort of circular regress which appears in "purposive or voluntaristic intellectualism" of the Roycean type, in which knowing is true when it fulfils its purpose—its purpose being to know! Professor Macintosh mercilessly exposes this procedure. Yet when he reaches his own final statement of verification (p. 453), he finds it in immediate presentation, i.e., in immediate *knowledge*. Thus the appeal to "practice" ends in an appeal to another form of knowledge.

Strictly taken, this solution of the problem of verification makes immediate knowing infallible. Professor Macintosh sees this, but is able to dispose of it only by the Kantian utterance that "intuitions [presentations] without concepts [representations] are blind." But if presentations are "blind" and representations are uncertain (because they also are somewhat blind?), how can either verify the other?

There are indeed passages in which the verifying experience appears to be, not an immediate presentation, but a kind of conduct which involves a great deal more than presentation; and, in so far as knowing becomes a real part of such conduct, it also must be something more than presentation and representation. If it is not, it cannot make a detailed and continuous connection with practice, and its appeal to practice for verification is external and in vain. If we ignore conduct in our account of the origin and function of knowledge, we cannot appeal to it when we face the problem of truth and error. To such an appeal it will say: "Depart from me, ye workers of magic, I never knew you."

But no one has made a better case from his premises than Professor Macintosh. His discussion is everywhere well considered and courageous. He is aware at every turn of the difficulties and faces them squarely. Any failure to dispose of them must be charged, not to lack of skill in the course of the treatment, but to the limitations of the presuppositions—especially the metaphysical disjunction of the psychical and physical—with which the treatment starts.

A. W. MOORE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY SERMONS

Is there a fundamental difference in preaching to Scottish and to American university audiences? The sermons preached at Aberdeen¹ seem to present a marked contrast to those preached by Dr. Coffin² in America. While the volume of Aberdeen sermons represents twenty different preachers, there is a unity which is noted in the editorial preface as indicative that the sermons give some trustworthy knowledge of the teaching which prevails at present in Scotland. We should say that it is a very conservative teaching, and a somewhat theological preaching. Dr. Cooper thinks that the gift of tongues enabled the Corinthian Christians to preach the gospel in various languages to the visitors to that cosmopolitan city. Dr. Selbie says that all truth, even of physical science, "is wrapped up in Christ," whatever that may mean. The doctrine of the incarnation, Jesus as "Very God of Very God," is presented by Dr. Mitchell without any attempt to help the hearer to an appreciation of its meaning in experience. Formal theological phrases occur in many of the sermons, giving them a somewhat conventional homiletic character. Perhaps this would be quite acceptable in Scotland.

Very different are Dr. Coffin's sermons. He makes no use of formal theology. There is almost an entire absence of the set phrases of the older evangelism. There is a very definite recognition that the college student is thinking in new terms. The preacher takes it for granted that views have changed regarding miracles, Bible inspiration, Hebrew history, the interpretation of the advent narratives. He takes the hearer into his confidence, frankly preaching to him on the basis of his perplexity about some of these things. But he does not preach about critical matters. In almost every sermon he sets forth Jesus as the revelation of God. He means that the human, historical Jesus actually lived so wonderfully, taught so masterfully, died so sacrificially, that through him we know and trust and love God. The warm religiousness of these sermons is remarkable. They seem to answer the question: What is modern preaching? How shall a man speak his message frankly in this day? There is nothing negative, uncertain, apologetic. Varieties of interpretation, questions of authorship and of historicity are discussed

¹ *Sub Corona*. Sermons Preached in the University Chapel of King's College, Aberdeen, by Principals and Professors of Theological Faculties in Scotland. Edited by Henry Cowan and James Hastings. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915. 297 pages.

² *University Sermons*. By Henry Sloane Coffin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. 256 pages. \$1.50.

as matters of course. One comes to feel with the preacher that these problems all have their place for the student, and should receive careful attention, but that they are neither makers nor disturbers of religious experience. The great evangel, that we can know and trust God, that we can be forgiven and be saved, is clear and strong and makes earnest and direct appeal.

There are some strong sermons in the Aberdeen collection; and all are short, by the way, although Scotch. Principal George Adam Smith is not in his usual vein, for he has a special message on the war. Dr. Curtis has a wonderful discourse, largely of historical description, on the English Bible. It is a good example of what may be done in the use of historical material. Dr. Stalker has a most original sermon on Jesus' encomium of Mary, highly illuminative of Jesus' insight. Dr. Denney exhibits a fine homiletic skill in his sermon on the blessedness of living in the light of Jesus, and the compassion to be felt for those who do not. He finds in this compassion the great missionary motive.

The title of the book is suggested by the crown which surmounts the chapel at King's College.

THEODORE GERALD SOARES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN EDUCATION¹

The National Education Association conducted a prize-essay contest last year on the above-named subject. The prize offered was one thousand dollars, and the essays were limited to ten thousand words. Widespread interest was taken in the contest, and four hundred and thirty-two essays were submitted to the judges. The prize was awarded to Professor Charles E. Rugh, University of California, and special mention was made of the essays presented by Professor Laura H. Wild of Lake Erie College, Miss Frances Virginia Frisbie of Wilkes-Barre High School, Rev. Clarence Reed of Palo Alto, California, and Miss Anna B. West, Newburyport, Massachusetts. These five essays are printed in the above-named monograph, together with a compilation, prepared by Miss Sarah Whedon of Ann Arbor High School, of the points made in the remaining four hundred and twenty-seven essays. Taken together, this collection is perhaps the best presentation of the various

¹ *The Essential Place of Religion in Education, and an Outline of a Plan to Introduce Religious Teaching into the Public Schools.* Ann Arbor: National Education Association, 1916. 134 pages. \$0.30.

aspects of the problem of religious education in the public schools that has been made. All the writers hold that religion is an essential quality of life, and therefore must be present in any satisfactory scheme of education. They do not believe that the mere division of labor by which religion is left to home and church can meet the case—partly for the reason that home and church have neither time nor competence for the complete work of religious education, and partly because public-school education, if not religious, is irreligious. At the same time, religion is interpreted by these writers in the broadest terms. They speak of those fundamentals of religion which are common to Roman Catholic, Jew, and Protestant. Professor Rugh has laid most emphasis upon the significant fact that the public school as it exists today has already present to a large degree the religious elements and opportunities. The desideratum is not chiefly the introduction of new elements, but a religious attitude toward life, truth, and duty. History, literature, science, and art are properly approached in the religious spirit. The life of the school is a social life, with its sins, confessions, forgiveness, co-operations, and unselfish, altruistic service. The social conditions for the exercise of religious leadership are actually present. It is of most importance that teachers shall appreciate these opportunities. The teacher who cannot or will not do so will be of no value as a religious guide, even if perfect freedom in the selection of material is accorded. When the teachers become alive to the essential religiousness of their task, the essayists believe, it will be possible to go farther and adopt plans of correlation of religious material and practice with those at present in use. The suggestions for such correlation made in these essays are admirable. They would need to be adopted, however, with the fact always in mind that the public school belongs to all the people, and that nothing can ever be gained by unfairness in religious education. It is interesting to note that there is little sympathy manifested by these essayists with any attempt to compel school boards to permit religious instruction. Nothing is to be gained in that way.

THEODORE GERALD SOARES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

DRIVER, S. R. (ed.) *The Books of Joel and Amos*. Adapted to the text of the Revised Version, and with a few supplementary notes by H. C. O. Lanchester. [Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1915. Pp. 251. \$0.65.

The first edition of this useful book was prepared on the basis of the Authorized Version and published in 1897. The use of the Revised Version has involved little change in the notes, because Dr. Driver had used his own translation as the basis of the notes in the first edition, and this has been rightly preserved in the new edition. The few changes in matter made by Mr. Lanchester are marked by brackets. They consist mainly of citations of literature that has appeared since the first edition came out, and brief hints of more advanced views on certain literary questions than were represented by Dr. Driver. Mr. Lanchester is less cautious and conservative than his predecessor. The commentary as it now stands is admirably adapted to present-day needs.

J. M. P. S.

POLITEYAN. *Biblical Discoveries in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia*. With Foreword by R. B. GIRDLESTONE. London: Elliot-Stock, 1915. Pp. x+194. 2s. 6d.

An outstanding need of the traditional school of interpretation is a presentation of its point of view, methods, and conclusions from the standpoint of an adequate scholarship. This volume represents the conservative position as to the Bible with not the slightest dilution of modernism. But unfortunately the author's scholarship is not all that could be desired. Canon Girdlestone evidently suspected that, when he apologized in his Foreword for certain shortcomings on the ground that the author is an oriental composite of Greek and Armenian and therefore may not be held to the rigid standards of western scholarship. The book is interestingly written and is provided with two black-and-white maps and fourteen excellent plates of illustrations. But this is not enough to make the work worth while. The selection of materials is arbitrary, rather than systematic, and only a small proportion of the available matter is presented. Naturally, no complete treatment of so large a subject is to be expected within the limits of so small a volume. What is presented is marred by slovenly errors. For example, on p. 13, the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi is put in 1891 instead of 1901. On p. 32, Delitzsch is said to have "translated the word Sabbath as 'meaning rest for the heart'"; whereas the latter is really the rendering of the Babylonian phrase *um nuh libbi* and has no relation to the meaning of Sabbath. Sargon of Accad is placed at 3800 B.C. instead of *ca.* 2500 B.C. Hammurabi is likewise misdated on p. 55 at 1940 B.C. and on p. 180 at 2140 B.C.; the right date is 2123-2083 B.C. On p. 129 and elsewhere we read of the *Travels of Mohar*, the word evidently being considered as a personal name; as a matter of fact it is an official title applicable to a class of persons. On p. 136, Shalmaneser III is written instead of Shalmaneser IV, as more recent research has revealed. Likewise on p. 143, Tiglath-pileser III, instead of IV, is found. In an attempt to make Genesis agree with science, the old, fanciful claim that "day" in the Creation Story means "period" is repeated. Errors in proofreading and in the citation of titles of books are too numerous to mention.

J. M. P. S.

WARRUM, HENRY. *Some Religious Weft and Warp*. Indianapolis: Hollenbeck Press, 1915. 274 pages.

The point of view has everything to do with the perspective. When a lawyer, such as Henry Warrum, sees things at his angle and records them, the layman is ready to listen. The "Weft and Warp" of the above work consists of twenty-seven chapters, which present in the first fourteen a sketch of the religions of Babylon, of Zoroaster, Brahma, the Hindus, Buddha, Egypt, the Celts and the Teutons, the Mohammedans, China and Japan, Greece, Rome, and the Hebrews. The last thirteen chapters discuss the books of the Pentateuch, the historical books, Solomon, wisdom literature, and the Psalms, the Northern and Southern kingdoms, and their prophets, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the return and temple sacrifices and the gnostic movement and Judaism. The sketches of religions are painfully brief, though they could be understood by one who had already done some reading in the field of comparative religion. The last group of chapters (xv-xxvii) is quite uneven in character. Those on the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, and Ruth are well done, but the remaining chapters (xxii-xxvii) are too condensed. The Psalms, for instance, are disposed of within less than two pages. Jeremiah and Ezekiel are given less than twelve pages. The character of the material is quite up-to-date. Indeed, it is as progressive as would be useful and attractive to the intelligent and industrious layman of today. It is somewhat beyond the reach of those in our high schools who are anxious to take up some method of Bible-study.

Pr.

ERAINES, JEAN. *Le Problème des Origines et des Migrations*. Paris: Leroux, 1914. 174 pages.

Rarely does one read a more fascinating piece of scintillating speculation than that found here. Its pellucid style and its fragments of up-to-date knowledge in several fields are not enough to rescue it from the realm of mere fantasy.

Pr.

NIEBERGALL, FRIEDERICH. *Praktische Auslegung des Alten Testaments*, 2ter Band: Die Propheten. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. 304 pages. Paper M. 6; Linen M. 7. 20.

A popular up-to-date commentary on the Old Testament meets the most pressing need of the layman. Those who read German now have two volumes of such a work. It is gratifying to find that the prophets, the least popular (except Chronicles) of the Old Testament books, are now introduced and discussed in a form and language (for readers of German) that will open their difficult themes to popular understanding. The order of treatment reveals the author's critical position. It is: Amos, Hosea, Isaiah I, Micah, Jeremiah, Zephaniah, Nahum, Ezekiel, Isaiah II, Haggai, Malachi, Zechariah, Isaiah III, Joel, Habakkuk, Jonah (and Daniel). Each book is preceded by an introduction, and is discussed, not commentary-wise, but by topics or paragraphs. This makes the work both easy reading and orderly exposition. At the close of the book-exposition there is a conclusion which gathers up the main points and states the large principles for which the book stands. The author evidently used in his work the best new translations from the Old Testament Hebrew into German, since few hints are given that the original text may have been consulted in his very useful exposition. One more volume on the historical books will complete this commendable work.

Pr.

HUMBERT, PAUL. *Qohèleth*. (Extrait de la *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, No. 16, September-October, 1915.) Lausanne: Bureau de la Redaction, 1915. 27 pages.

Students will gladly greet the appearance of this learned article in brochure. The author's use of the latest and best literature on Ecclesiastes will give his work a permanent value for some time to come. Such a rescue from the tomes of technical journals or Reviews is always a boon to the specialist in any field.

PR.

GODWIN, C. H. SELLWOOD. *The Anglican Proper Psalms*. With a Preface by A. H. SAYCE. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co., 1915. 88 pages. 4s. 6d.

Critical and exegetical notes on obscure and corrupt passages in the Hebrew text of thirty-four psalms fill the pages of this booklet. The author has made use of some of the best textual sources for the emendations and corrections of the text. But in his general attitude, and in the interpretations adopted, which seem to color his textual proposals, as for example, in Ps. 51:8, he occupies a conservative position. There are some valuable and acute suggestions on difficult passages, as Ps. 68:28; 104:13, which at least give a better sense to the rather inchoate character of the Hebrew text. We are somewhat surprised that he should seem to use as his main lexical authority the Oxford Lexicon, which is now falling behind in the Semitic field.

PR.

ROBINSON, THEODORE H. *Paradigms and Exercises in Syriac Grammar*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915. viii+148 pages. 5s. net.

A good elementary Syriac grammar in English cannot but be welcomed with pleasure. Mr. Robinson has produced the first book of this nature to see the light in many a decade. The volume should prove a most useful tool in the hands of competent instructors. Rarely nowadays does one find sentences to be translated into Syriac—surely a most beneficial exercise. Mr. Robinson further gives much valuable information regarding the views and practices of oriental teachers of Syriac in India. For self-instruction, however, the book cannot be recommended unhesitatingly. At not a few points its methods and statements are hardly up to date. The description of Syriac as North Semitic, together with "Hebrew, Aramaic, Phoenician, Moabite, and Samaritan" (p. 1), the transliterations (p. 4), the designation of the "soft form" of the *B'godakpot* as "an aspirated form" (p. 7), the definition of the Emphatic State (p. 18), the statement: "The Imperative is formed from the 2nd person of the imperfect by the dropping of the preformative" (p. 54), the *Pam'els*, *Par'els*, *Pa'lis*, and others of their ilk (p. 70) are cases in point. The lack of all Syriac reading material except short sentences is a serious defect. A minor matter is the misspelling of a revered teacher's name in the introduction. For these reasons Mr. Robinson's book will find it difficult to compete with such standard, modern works as those of Brockelmann and Ungnad, especially as the latter is at least partly in English.

M. S.

SANDERS, FRANK KNIGHT, and SHERMAN, HENRY A. *How to Study the Old Testament*. New York: Scribner, 1916. vi+64 pages. \$0.50.

A book of outlines covering the Old Testament in one year of study, and based on Sanders' *History of the Hebrews* and Kent's *Historical Bible*. Each of the 104 outlines begins with a reading reference in the *History of the Hebrews* and usually one in the *Historical Bible*. The five or six facts to be carefully noted in this reading are indicated, followed by a limited number of questions designed to direct the student's study and save his time. The outline closes with optional reading references in Appendix 2 of Sanders' *History*.

The book is intended for private Bible students, and as a guide for a one year's college course (three hours a week). Beginners desiring to make a systematic study of the Old Testament from the modern point of view will find it of value; also teachers of the Bible who use these works of Sanders and Kent as textbooks. The facts for special note and the test questions are carefully prepared. Upon them the outlines depend for their value. They are brief and to the point.

A. A. M.

HODGE, RICHARD MORSE. *Historical Geography of Bible Lands*. A Manual for Teachers, with Fourteen Maps. New York: Scribner, 1916. vii+84 pages. \$1.00.

A manual for teachers with subject-material specially adapted to adult students, yet simple enough for use with pupils down to the age of fourteen. A student's workbook, entitled *Historical Atlas of Bible Lands*, accompanies the volume. The manual may also be used with profit as a textbook for teacher-training classes. It is divided into thirteen lessons intended for a three months' course, though it may be extended over a greater period by dividing the chapters and making a more detailed study.

Each chapter begins by indicating material, maps, etc., which should be in the hands of the teacher, also the student. The book calls for the use of a stereoscope with stereographs. The directions for using this material are explicit. The student is taken over an imaginary tour which begins, in the first chapter, at his own home town in the United States. All Bible lands along the route are carefully studied, and the chapter closes with an assignment for home work. The volume is practical and well adapted to its purpose. The material is so well arranged that there should be no difficulty in interesting the pupils. The maps are carefully prepared. The composite map of Bible lands and North America is helpful in giving the student an idea of distances. The publication will doubtless prove of unusual value to any teacher who will take up the work seriously and make careful preparation under its directions.

A. A. M.

PERITZ, IZMAR J. *Old Testament History*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1916. 336 pages. \$1.50.

A history of the Hebrew people from their beginning down to 70 A.D. While the book presents the results of modern scientific biblical research, critical questions are only discussed where silence would leave the subject obscure. The reader will find the subjects of each section (in bold-face type) very helpful, as also the marginal indication of the biblical text under discussion. The subdivisions of each chapter are

followed by suggestions for further study which frequently direct the student's attention to the modern value of the narrative.

Like the Old Testament itself, the aim of the book is religious education rather than education about religion; hence particular emphasis is placed upon distinguished personalities and religious, moral, and social ideas. Old Testament history is understood as "a divine revelation preparatory to and culminating in the person and teachings of Jesus Christ."

The history will serve as a good textbook for Bible classes of mature students from Sunday schools to colleges. The general reader who desires to inform himself in modern Old Testament research can here get the results without tedious technical discussions. He will find the book readable and interesting as well as educational.

One wonders why Part III includes chronologically only a portion of the last chapter. Also, should not the date for the death of Herod I be 4 B.C. instead of 4 A.D.?

A. A. M.

KENT, CHARLES FOSTER, AND JENKS, JEREMIAH WHIPPLE. *The Testing of a Nation's Ideals, Israel's History from the Settlement to the Assyrian Period*, in the series, "The Bible's Message to Modern Life." New York: Scribner, 1915. vii+149 pages. \$0.75.

This little volume has a twofold purpose, to show how the ideals which Israel inherited from Moses underwent the test of history and became crystallized during that period when she was most free to work out her own destiny, viz., from the settlement to the advent of the Assyrian conquerors; also to relate this struggle and these ideals to American history and to present-day personal, social, commercial, political, and moral problems. These studies, twelve in number, are based upon I and II Samuel and I Kings with a final chapter on Deuteronomy, chaps. 4-9, and each chapter is subdivided into six sections. The subjects of chapters and sections indicate clearly the didactic viewpoint.

The book is designed to meet the needs of general readers and to serve as a textbook for college and adult Bible classes. It is elementary and aims at being suggestive rather than exhaustive. The practical value of Hebrew history for modern life is more frequently hinted in questions than actually discussed. It should prove a helpful handbook.

A. A. M.

NEW TESTAMENT

ALLEN, W. C. *The Gospel according to St. Mark*. [The Oxford Church Biblical Commentary.] London: Rivingtons, 1915. xvi+214 pages. 7s. 6d.

This work is virtually a companion volume to the author's *St. Matthew* in the International Critical series. As in the earlier book, the reader will find compact, lucid exposition, good rabbinical illustrations, satisfactorily full textual material, and minute attention to stylistic details. Dr. Allen is at his best in the field of exposition proper; a sense for what is really important has enabled him to reduce his comments to the briefest possible space, while still giving more than is found in many bulkier works. His exposition, to be sure, never wanders far from the beaten track, but it is always sane and it is supplemented helpfully by a careful, very literal translation of the text.

The weakest side of the work is the entire absence of any historical criticism. Mark, to Dr. Allen, was a mere recorder of events, who was not even guided by any discoverable purpose in the selection of his material. There is nothing in the Gospel but accurate history; Peter was Mark's unfailing authority, and the various references to the Apostles' dulness are evidence of Peter's contrite memory (p. 22). The "veiling" theory of the parables in 4:11-12 is historic (pp. 79-80), although the *ἡ* in 4:12 may be due to a mistranslation (but why did Mark happen to hit on this particular mistranslation?). The extraordinary command to silence in 5:43 may have been meant to secure "rest for the girl" (p. 92). There is no duplication of incidents in 6:35-8:26 (p. 112), not even in the two accounts of the miraculous feedings. To suppose that chap. 13 contains anything not uttered by Jesus "is a serious indictment to bring against the author of the Second Gospel" (p. 173). The miracles all happened literally as described. And so on. With such a historical outlook it is not surprising to find the writer contending for a date *ca.* 40 A.D. (pp. 5-6).

The most regrettable element in this reactionary attitude is that it is put forward as something quite obvious; there is no attempt to meet or even to state the objections and difficulties that are familiar to every student of the Gospels. Unfortunately, obscurantism of this kind is symptomatic of a rather prominent movement in contemporary English theology.

B. S. E.

ABBOTT, EDWIN A. *Christ's Miracles of Feeding*. [Miscellanea Evangelica, II.] Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1915. xii+195 pages. \$0.90.

Dr. Abbott's monumental allegorical exposition of the Gospels pursues the even tenor of its way; the present pamphlet being an advance chapter of a forthcoming volume which will carry the reader almost halfway through Mark. Dr. Abbott's thesis is that the miracles of feeding are to receive eucharistic interpretation of some kind, although his method makes a discovery of his attitude to the historic facts rather difficult. The style may be illustrated by the following comment on John 21:9 (p. 167): "The meaning here may be that the 'coal fire' was 'laid' by the hand of God, the sign of that fiery trial through which the soul is to pass into communion with Him. This was a new revelation not given to the Five Thousand. They took the bread of the barley loaves and were filled with it as cattle with fodder. But this bread, or rather this one loaf, comes '*laid above*' fire; and the fire itself is no ordinary one, but fire as from the altar in heaven, '*laid*' by the hand of God." So St. Bernard might have spoken when addressing his monks.

B. S. E.

Praktische Bibelerklärung. [VI. Reihe der Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher.] Herausgegeben von Karl Aner. 2. *Aus dem Briefe des Paulus nach Rom*. Verdeutsch und ausgelegt von Hans Böhlig. Pp. 56. M. o. 50. 3. *Die Pastoralbriefe*. Verdeutsch und ausgelegt von Franz Koehler. Pp. 48. M. o. 50.

A series of expositions of the popular and practical character which marks these two small volumes has within it the possibility of great usefulness. The desirability of placing in the hands of pastors, and others interested, interpretations of the New

Testament from the point of view of the new knowledge of recent years has been clear to many who work in that field.

As the general title indicates, the emphasis is upon the practical and religious teachings of the books interpreted. Very concise but good introductions deal with the important questions of introduction which inhere in the various epistles. Both the aim and the limits of the series preclude full discussion. The closing salutations of Romans are considered to have been intended for an Asia Minor destination. The document containing them is contemporaneous with Romans and its inclusion in the larger epistle is due to contiguity in the *Kopialbuch* of Tertius. As to the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles in their present form the writer considers it to be psychologically and historically untenable.

While the expositions contain much that is suggestive and valuable there is room for improvement in method and editing. The method of selecting certain passages from the Epistle to the Romans and grouping them under a topic while other parts are entirely ignored may have advantages for the author's purpose but a complete and clear presentation of the thought of the letter can scarcely be thus given. The topical combining of portions of the text of the various pastorals without sufficient indication of their sources is a real defect. Any advantage of such combinations is nullified by the confusion and inconvenience caused by this strange procedure. The discussion of certain topics may thus be unified but the exposition of the Epistles is impaired.

A similar series in the English language, with the defects mentioned above removed, would doubtless find a cordial reception and render an excellent service.

E. W. P.

CHURCH HISTORY

SCHAFF, DAVID S. *John Huss—His Life, Teachings, and Death*. New York: Scribner, 1915. xv+349 pages. \$2.50.

In anticipation of a deepened popular interest in John Huss, connected with the five hundredth anniversary of his martyrdom, Professor Schaff has prepared this biography, "intended not only to set forth the teachings and activity of John Huss and the circumstances of his death but also to show the perpetuation of his influence upon the centuries that have elapsed since he suffered at the stake" (p. vi).

With a genuine enthusiasm for his hero, the author has patiently worked his way through the literature of the subject, except the relatively unimportant Bohemian writings of Huss. In his Preface, he has presented a very serviceable bibliography. The two chapters that follow on "The Age in Which Huss Lived," prepare the way for the controverted issue of "Huss's Debt to Wyclif." Discarding Lutzow's recent thesis of Huss's independence of Wyclif, Professor Schaff reverts to the older view of Gillett, Lechler, and Loserth. "As important as the influence of Paul on the mind of Luther, and more important than the influence of Calvin on the mind of John Knox, was the influence of Wyclif upon the opinions and the career of Huss" (p. 44). That he has restated the arguments with force must be conceded. But the case would have been much stronger if he had treated Lutzow's contentions with the seriousness that they merit. One cannot but feel that Lutzow's arguments have been brushed aside and not seriously considered. For vividness and completeness of detail relating to Huss's experiences at Constance, readers will probably find themselves still turning back to Lutzow. But for a clear presentation of the papal and political background of Huss's tragedy, Professor Schaff has achieved notable success. Irrelevant details

have been eliminated, and the big factors in this imbrolio have been set forth in fine perspective.

What from the author's avowed objective should have been his strongest chapter—"Huss's Place in History"—scarcely meets expectation. Here he loses himself in a bewildering discussion of lesser issues, feeling called upon to devote eleven pages epitomizing the "Treatise on the Church." He succeeds, however, in making clear the reformatory significance of Huss's teaching, the inspiration derived by Luther from the Bohemian, and the transcendent power of Huss's saintly martyrdom upon succeeding centuries. "It is doubtful, if we except the suffering and death of Jesus Christ, whether the forward movement of religious enlightenment and human freedom has been advanced as much by the sufferings and death of any single man as by the death of Huss" (p. 2).

P. G. M.

RUDWIN, MAXIMILIAN JOSEF. *Der Teufel in den deutschen geistlichen Spielen des Mittelalters und der Reformationszeit; ein Beitrag zur Literatur-, Kultur-, und Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915. xi+194 pages. M. 5.

Mr. Rudwin, who is instructor in German language and literature in Purdue University, is not an amateur in the study of the mediaeval drama, as he is already the author of studies on the prophet scenes of the mediaeval religious drama, on the relation of mediaeval religious plays to the liturgy of the church, and a short article upon the devil in German religious drama in the Middle Ages. The present monograph is more extended in scope, as it surveys both the mediaeval period and that of the Reformation. A very large amount of the literature of these epochs had been carefully read, and every allusion to the devil excerpted and the mass of them classified. Popular belief in a personal devil certainly was strong in mediaeval times, when one has such vivid and detailed knowledge of him as is here set forth by reference to chapter and verse in the sources. The author is perhaps justified in saying that belief in the devil was stronger than belief in God. But the mediaeval devil was not the Satan of Scripture. Commingled with that oriental conception is the ancient Germanic Loke and a swarm of sprites, fairies, witches, etc., In a word, the mediaeval German devil was a complex.

Mr. Rudwin unfortunately has fixed his point of departure in the later Middle Ages, when the earliest monuments of German literature in the vernacular appeared, and thereby has ruled out all study of the subject in the Latin chronicles and sermons. But it is in these earlier sources that the genesis and development of popular belief must be studied. The book would have been improved both in interest and value if more co-ordination and interpretation had been exercised. As it stands, it is an array of classified data upon the subject more than a study of the subject. The bibliography is extensive.

J. W. T.

WOTHERSPOON, H. J. *The Ministry in the Church in Relation to Prophecy and Spiritual Gifts (Charismata).* New York: Longmans, 1916. xvi+208 pages. \$1.35.

This volume contains a series of lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the autumn of 1914. The author's aim is to show that the prophets of the church in the first and second centuries had no administrative functions, and constituted what

he terms a charismatic ministry; but that on the other hand, the official ministry of the early church, consisting of the local officers, had gifts of the Spirit as well as the prophets. He further attempts to explain why the prophets as a class disappeared in the course of the second century, and asserts that the gradual diffusion of the prophetic spirit among all believers and the tendency in the church gradually to depreciate the marvelous and to emphasize the ethical was the reason. Although the author evinces a certain degree of acquaintance with early Christian literature, the book has very little value. The method pursued is not historical nor scientific. The subject is approached from a theological standpoint, and the author's prepossessions are apparent at various points. The reference on p. 38, n. 1, to present political conditions in Europe is not only out of place, but reflects upon the author's fair-mindedness and good judgment.

E. Z.

DOCTRINAL

LIDGETT, J. SCOTT. *God in Christ Jesus*. A Study of St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. London: Kelly, 1915. xi+388 pages. 5s.

Inasmuch as the author sends the book out with an apology for its repetitions and prolixity, one may pass to an appreciation of his sincere and devout spirit, while at the same time dissenting from his conclusions.

The aim of the work is really doctrinal though it takes the form of exegesis. It is "the setting forth of life in Christ as the spiritual realm in which God's gracious purpose is accomplished and man's redemption is enjoyed."

A faithful adherence to even a Pauline terminology hardly atones for the lack of vital connection with the present. Even the ethical ideals of the Epistle, splendid as they are in their time-setting, require regrounding and remotivating quite as much as expansion and application—a need which the author does not seem to feel.

J. W.

ILLINGWORTH, J. R. *The Gospel Miracles*. London: Macmillan, 1915. xvii+213 pages. 4s. 6d.

The immediate interest of the author is in the field of practical religion, but inasmuch as practical religion is so closely connected with our creed, a defense of an important element in the latter is regarded as the remedy for the present impotence of the former. The problem of the gospel miracles is the thesis of the book.

The concern of the author at this point is congruous with his system as a whole. The uniformity of cosmic laws is not due to any necessity of the divine nature but to the consistency of the divine will, which can therefore, if need be, modify their operations; this allows the divine energy to come in at successive points in history and makes possible the incarnation, the virgin birth, and resurrection, though such events indeed, transcending human experience, are not proper subjects for criticism. With the far-reaching effects of this logic it will not be necessary for the reviewer to deal.

But the author grants that the works of wonder were in some sense relative to their time and would possibly not have fulfilled the same function if enacted at the present day in the midst of a sophisticated and critical society; which leads us to wonder how he can hope that their mere record will function today.

The occurrence of the gospel miracles is to be believed, however, on account of the unique evidence offered by the history and existence of the Christian church. Their unique coincidence with Jewish prophecy, the intensity of St. Paul's conviction, and the graphic character of the gospel records, moreover the unique person about whom they are postulated, quite alter the case for gospel miracles as compared with any others for which the author has no place in his apology.

J. W.

COIT, STANTON. *The Soul of America*. A Constructive Essay in the Sociology of Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1914. x+405 pages. \$2.00.

Dr. Coit here sets forth the thesis that religion and patriotism are one and the same thing. The test of the vitality of a religion is to be found by asking whether it is a creative social and political force. In particular, the religion of the Old Testament was such a creative movement; and historical Christianity has disclosed the same power of political evolution and revolution. "It would therefore seem that if somehow the religion of the churches could in each country identify itself with the conscious sense of dependence upon one's nation as the source of one's spiritual life, Christianity and the churches would enter upon a new period of beneficent activity, unprecedented in the world since the first two centuries after Christ" (p. 16).

The primary essential in this revision of religion is the relinquishment of all appeals to supernatural forces. One may, indeed, continue intellectually to believe in God and in superhuman beings if he is rationally compelled to do so; but religion itself must be completely humanized. Churches are to become "parties" in a common social endeavor rather than "sects." Dr. Coit believes that the rituals and current theological phrases of our churches may be so modified as to serve this new purpose; and the latter portion of the book is devoted to showing how this may be brought about. Since the endeavor involves "the elimination of every trace of trust in moral intelligences who are not members of human society" (p. 157) the adaptation which Dr. Coit suggests will appear to churchmen like the elimination of religion itself. Noble as is the social passion of the author, he fails entirely to appreciate the strength and the importance of that cosmic mysticism which is basal in all strong religions.

G. B. S.

DRAKE, DURANT. *Problems of Conduct*. An Introductory Survey of Ethics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914. xi+455 pages. \$1.75.

This book was evidently prepared to stimulate the discussion of practical moral problems in college classes in ethics. The emphasis is therefore laid on concrete conditions in present-day life in America; and the subjects selected for examination are just those which naturally occur to the college student. The clear analysis of each problem is well suited to direct the discussion toward the main issues. In the hands of a competent teacher it should prove to be a useful handbook.

The first portion of the volume (somewhat more than one-third) is devoted to a sketch of the evolution of morality and an attempt to state the philosophy of moral standards. Professor Drake is a frank eudaemonist, and the book throughout reflects a utilitarianism which leaves one wondering whether the whole story can be told without a more serious appreciation of the idealism which furnishes the motive power to moral conduct.

G. B. S.

POWELL, JOHN WALKER. *What Is a Christian?* New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxiv+201 pages. \$1.00.

One can readily see that the popular addresses in this book would be interesting and edifying to an audience of laymen. They represent a virile, open-minded, and ethically earnest type of religion, concerned with issues of our modern life. By eliminating all traces of legal authority from the teachings of Jesus, Mr. Powell is able to make it appear that "common sense, stimulated and purified by a loyal devotion to the loftiest spiritual purpose," discovers a sufficient inner authority in Jesus' "principles" to yield a modern faith which is at the same time "Christian." The vagueness and flexibility of this norm enable Mr. Powell to find whatever he wants in the teachings of Jesus.

G. B. S.

HASTINGS, J. (ed.). *The Great Christian Doctrines: The Doctrine of Prayer.* New York: Scribner, 1915. xi+448 pages. \$3.00 net.

This is a conservative, traditional, and homiletical treatment of the doctrine of prayer. To the statements which the author makes on his own account, he attaches some of the best things collected from the writings of some great men of the church. In the second part of the book the author deals with two difficulties and objections to prayer, that regarding the world of law and that regarding the goodness of God and his perfect will. No novel treatment of the difficulties is made. The latter part of the volume deals with some practical questions regarding times, manners, and answers to prayer.

J. E. W.

FLEWELLING, RALPH TYLER. *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy.* New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 207 pages. \$1.00.

This work is an appraisal of the philosophy of Borden P. Bowne. Mr. Bowne's doctrine of personalism as the ultimate ground of being is considered to be the solution of the difficulties in which the various philosophical systems find themselves. The author gives a very brief statement of materialism, idealism, pragmatism, and of the works of Eucken and Bergson, and seeks to show that these systems are driven to the use of concepts that are best given rational content in the doctrine of personalism: That is, such concepts as "Natural Laws," "The Unknowable," and "Vital Impulse." The author does not seek to make any new contribution but to represent personalism as conceived by Bowne as a worthy attempt to solve the age-long problems of unity, truth, error, freedom, and evil.

J. E. W.

HALFYARD, SAMUEL F. *Cardinal Truths of the Gospel.* New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 252 pages. \$1.00.

The author, who is the professor of philosophy and theology in Wesley College, aims to present the essential doctrines of the Christian faith in present-day thought-forms. The "cardinal truths" are to be found in the teachings of Jesus. Concerning the great themes of religion "he has said the last word" (pp. 18, 19). The task of theology is to interpret his teachings by the best thought of the present. The author calls theology "a progressive science," but in his presentation the static element looms large. Though admitting that theology ought to draw its data from all sources, he

contends that Christian experience is the same in the twentieth century as it was in the first (pp. 38, 39). His failure to appreciate modern psychology prevents him from accomplishing thoroughly the very task which he attempts (pp. 211-16).

A. S. W.

MAINS, GEORGE PRESTON. *Divine Inspiration.* New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. xi+171 pages. \$1.00.

This is another volume from the same author as *Christianity and the New Age* which was reviewed in the *American Journal of Theology*, XIX (October, 1915), p. 629. Dr. Mains attempts to show the bearing of modern critical scholarship upon the doctrine of inspiration. For him inspiration is almost synonymous with vision, and operates through an awakened human vision. The Bible is a human book, neither inerrant nor infallible, the inspiration of which lies in its appeal to man's moral responsiveness. The personal element in inspiration is somewhat neglected, and the book impresses the reader as a restatement of the old theological doctrine shorn of some of its most apparent incongruities.

A. S. W.

GRAY, JOSEPH M. M. *The Old Faith in the New Day.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 258 pages. \$1.00.

The author is a Kansas City minister who writes with the purpose of provoking his brethren in the ministry to an appreciation of their task of presenting the old faith in the present. The book makes no claim to be a systematic treatise on theology, but is written in a forceful style and should stimulate him who desires to make his message vital. The constructive part of the book is christocentric. It makes recognition of our indebtedness to the past, but shows how theological conceptions have been transformed by science and democracy. The author makes a strong vindication of the mission of the church, and pleads for a vigorous, commanding message in the pulpit.

A. S. W.

HEERMANCE, EDGAR L. *The Unfolding Universe.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1915. xxiii+463 pages, \$1.50 net.

The author is a Congregational minister of a Minnesota town who has become convinced of the value of modern scientific method, and desires philosophy to benefit thereby. He defines the function of philosophy as the interpretation and arrangement into a consistent whole of the facts which the sciences have gathered. Any philosophy to be satisfying must be reached inductively. The author has evidently labored arduously to place himself abreast of recent thought in the leading sciences. While the book disavows any claim to be a "treatise of the new knowledge in the various fields," it nevertheless includes concise discussions of the accepted hypotheses current in the astronomical, physical, biological, chemical, psychological, and sociological sciences. The chapters are arranged in four divisions under the physical, the organic, the psychical, and the spiritual. In the fourth of these, religious or spiritual phenomena are discussed, and there is considerable material valuable to the student of the psychology of religion. The matter of the logic of religion concerns the author very little. Religion is defined as "an accumulation of ideas about a particular side of human life," the field being that of ideas relative "to the soul of man, especially after death, and to the spirits supposed to surround man." Although religion makes use of ideas,

it is surely something more than "an accumulation of ideas," and this the author realizes when he refers to religion as showing "actual communication between the minds of men and the mind which is external to them in the universe." The sphere of religious experience includes that of the subconscious, and in the subconscious we may find an explanation for such phenomena as communion, inspiration, prayer, and conversion. The author has assembled much material which would be valuable in a vindication of the place of religion as an anthropological necessity, and occasionally he touches upon this thesis which, were it developed, would give to the book greater co-ordination and a more powerful argument. The book is to be commended as a courageous beginning in the direction of bringing philosophic and theological thought into line with scientific method.

A. S. W.

SLATTERY, CHARLES LEWIS. *The Light Within: A Study of the Holy Spirit*. New York: Longmans, 1915. 325 pages. \$2.00.

The title of this exceedingly attractive book will be felt by many to be something of a misnomer, for it naturally would seem to imply a treatment of a special problem in mysticism. Yet nothing was farther from the author's mind than such a limitation of his subject; the study of the Spirit is a study of the effects of the Spirit, and these effects are seen in religious activity of virtually any sort. "The Light Within," to be sure, can be and is observed in mysticism, but it is in no way to be restricted to mysticism and can be observed with equal truth in philanthropy and social service, perhaps even in socialism. Nor is the field even to be bounded by Christianity, for a couple of interesting pages are devoted to a description of Bahaism, which is specifically classified as one of the results of the Spirit's activity. In other words, Dr. Slattery has really set no limits at all to his subject except those of his own good taste. Through the book there runs, indeed, a thread of historical discussion of the doctrine of the Spirit, but this thread is very slender and serves chiefly to give a certain unity to the author's meditations on the most diverse facts of history and the most diverse problems of today. But those familiar with Dr. Slattery's other works need not be told that these meditations are always interesting, always suggestive, always earnest, and always hopeful.

B. S. E.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

COFFIN, HENRY SLOANE. *The Ten Commandments with a Christian Application to Present Conditions*. New York: Doran, 1915. 216 pages. \$1.00 net.

We have learned, especially from his *University Sermons*, to expect fresh, illuminating, and compelling interpretations of Christian truth from Dr. Coffin. This volume contains ten sermons on the Ten Commandments, with such application of them to contemporary life as the great war makes peculiarly imperative. For this task a preacher must possess discrimination, sound practical judgment, and a clear style. Dr. Coffin is a master of these qualities. There is not a conventional viewpoint in his method. He is thoroughly modern. He understands the life of the generation, although we believe that he underestimates the place of profanity in actual life, evidently having generalized his conclusions too much from novels (p. 58).

The most suggestive and valuable sermons are the sixth and seventh. To preach to a Fifth Avenue congregation on the sins of murder and adultery would seem to be a hopeless task; but Dr. Coffin does it, with the firm kindness of the Master who, as he notes on p. 127, "respected the manhood of those He was forced to attack." These sermons will be of real service to preachers who desire to interpret the old truth to the new day, and general readers will find new incentives here for life according to the Christian ideal.

O. S. D.

KOEHLER, F. *Der Weltkrieg im Lichte der deutsch-protestantischen Kriegespredigt*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. 56 pages. M. o. 50.

In the small compass of this pamphlet the author, a Berlin pastor, has gathered the results of the study of about 800 printed sermons which have been preached in Germany since the outbreak of the great war. He maintains that the war has produced what may be called a peculiar *Kriegespredigt-Typus*. We believe that this is true and that the history of preaching does not afford another example, on so large a scale and with so many illustrations, of what may be termed war-preaching. The result of the study is arranged with scientific thoroughness under five captions: "God and War"; "War as Fate and Responsibility"; "War as Educator"; "War as Destroyer or Clarifier of Christian Ideas"; "The War and German Christianity." In their thought of God and war these hundreds of German preachers live in the Old Testament and talk the language of Joshua. As to responsibility for the war, it is laid with every possible epithet of reproach upon England, "the Cain beyond the Channel," upon France, "Godless and frivolous chambermaid among the peoples," and upon Russia, "sunken in the mud of superstition and immorality," in order. Certainly this new sermon-type does not lack in the vocabulary of vituperation. War is the great educator, the awakener to repentance, the leader to moral regeneration, the revealer of the nature of evil, the foe of individualism. The gospel is not the cause of war; the war is caused by those who fail to grasp the gospel. But it affords the great opportunity to practice the Christian virtues and to follow Christ. So the present war becomes for the Germans a "holy war"; man's judgment has nothing to do with its character; in God's sight it is a hallowed war, since it is serving the ends of his holy will. The war is a leader through death to life and is being waged by German Protestant idealism. It becomes worship and holy purpose to the German people, the fulfilment of the innermost meaning of German history. The Germans and the German God (so it stands: not "the God of the Germans" but "the German God") cannot be defeated.

We have been compelled to condense the review of the subject-matter of this amazing booklet and to refrain from extensive comment. The study is a contribution to the history of preaching.

O. S. D.

BERTHOLET, ALFRED. *Religion und Krieg*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. 35 pages. M. o. 50.

A study of the relation of religion and war by Professor Bertholet of Goettingen. The subject is treated from the standpoint of a historian of religion. Interesting examples of the relation of war and religion in the life of primitive peoples are given. The problem becomes complex, however, as God becomes a universal Father and

religion grows ethical. The answer of Quietism is given; the dream of a world without war is displayed; but the author's answer, which he thinks thoroughly Christian, is that war is a necessity of the state and nation and in this fact lies for the Christian satisfactory justification for it. In the light of his faith the Christian regards every historical necessity as the way chosen by God to lead humanity to the attainment of its highest ends, and war is such a means (p. 28). The author quotes Luther and von Moltke with heartiest approval on the necessity and the educating function of war.

O. S. D.

AMES, EDWARD SCRIBNER. *The Higher Individualism*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1915. 162 pages. \$1.10.

These sermons delivered at Harvard University are frankly modern. They find the meaning of religion in innermost naturalness rather than in obtruded supernaturalism. Religious life is expressed in terms of social values. One is conscious sometimes of listening to a psychologist, but it is not bad to have careful definition even in the pulpit. These are, however, genuine sermons, as attested by their warmth of feeling and spiritual appeal and by the fine literary beauty which belongs to noble preaching.

T. G. S.

Board of Missionary Preparation—Fourth Report. New York: Board of Missionary Preparation, 1915. 427 pages. \$0.50.

Facts and tendencies in recent years indicate that more rigorous standards in preparation are being formed for missionaries as ambassadors of the church in foreign lands. Increasing care will be exercised in the selection of candidates as to their spiritual, intellectual, physical, and social qualifications. The volume on *The Preparation of Missionaries* issued by the World's Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910 has been followed by four reports of the British Board of Studies for the Preparation of Missionaries and by four reports of the Board of Missionary Preparation for North America. Of these latter reports, the second (i.e., that for 1912, 95 pages) makes a survey of facilities available for missionary preparation and discusses courses of reading and fundamental qualifications. The third report (i.e., that for 1913, 201 pages) discusses preparation from the functional standpoint—that for ordained, educational, medical, and furloughed missionaries. The fourth report, now under review, considers preparation from the geographical standpoint. The six great differentiated mission areas of the world, viz., China, India, Japan, Latin America, the Near East, and Pagan Africa, are taken up in succession and invaluable judgments are given with reference to the special qualifications and the particular preparation that is needed for each field, with courses of study and bibliographies for assisting candidates. These six carefully prepared sections of the report are the result of the combined opinions and experience of the best interdenominational committees that could be formed in America, assisted and controlled by the experience of leading missionaries in each of the fields discussed. Furthermore, this volume contains a report of a conference of the representatives of thirty-seven theological institutions and twenty-nine foreign boards and co-operating organizations on the preparation of ordained missionaries. The findings of the conference (pp. 416 ff.) should be normative for individuals and institutions planning missionary preparation.

These reports of the Board of Missionary Preparation can without hesitation be recommended as affording a body of authoritative judgment, direction, and advice which no candidate or society or library interested in foreign service can afford to neglect.

D. J. F.

BROWN, ARTHUR J. *Unity and Missions: Can a Divided Church Save the World?* Chicago: Revell, 1915. 319 pages. \$1.50.

The subtitle is significant when we remember that there are 164 denominations in America and 183 in Great Britain. The problem is by no means easy even for those who are ready to make large concessions.

In thirteen chapters the author covers the whole ground, showing how the primitive unity was broken; how the present unfortunate situation arose; how denominational teachings are no longer distinctive, some assumptions that are misleading; how current objections to organic union no longer hold; and how partial knowledge is always dogmatic. He also discusses expedients for unity—such as alliances, federations, and territorial divisions; and shows how co-operative work is now practical in evangelism, education, medical work, and publications. Some organic unions have already been effected and others are pending. There is also a chapter on the Anglican proposals for union, and one on High Church Anglicans and American Presbyterians in Shantung University.

But perhaps the crux of the whole matter will be found in the chapter on: "The Accepted Essentials of Christianity." It is summarized as follows: "God our Creator sovereign and Father; Jesus Christ, the Divine Son of God our Saviour and Lord; the Holy Spirit; the transforming influence of God in human life; sin its guilt and ruin; repentance the first duty of man; salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ; service the inspiring duty of every believer; prayer through which we have access to God; fellowship with God in Christ; the Holy Catholic church, the body of Christ, composed of all those in every land who profess this faith and witness it to the world in worship and sacraments and the works of God for humanity."

J. W. M.

BENSON, LOUIS F. *The English Hymn, Its Development and Use in Worship.* New York: Doran, 1915. 624 pages. \$3.50.

Dr. Benson would have us remember, first of all, that the hymn is more than literature; it is liturgic verse, and as such belongs with the things of the spirit, in the special sphere of worship. His book is replete with just such fundamental deductions, with a restating of values, with the restoration of a proper perspective for hymnological study in the world of literature, church history, and liturgics.

The English Hymn is unquestionably the most valuable contribution to the history of hymns and the evolution of congregational song since the publication of Julian's *Dictionary of Hymnology*. In some respects Dr. Benson's work supersedes the *Dictionary*. It furnishes first sources, and considerable data hitherto inaccessible. It suggestively traces the history of the Christian church through three turbulent centuries and exhibits hymns as factors in these controversial times. Particularly admirable is the inspirational message which glows from every page, but which in no way detracts from the scholarly viewpoint. Indeed, the book is unique in this blending of judicial temper with quiet hortatory values.

The chapters on the "Liturgical Use of the English Hymn" and "Dr. Watt's Renovation of Psalmody" are trenchant with meaning at every turn, showing as they do the real motive for hymn writing, the surprising objection to human compositions, and the long struggle to give singing its true place in the service of the church. Another timely chapter is the "Romantic Movement in Hymnody and Heber's Place of Leadership in This Nineteenth Century Reform."

H. A. S.

GROSE, GEORGE RICHMOND. *Religion and the Mind*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1915. 112 pages. \$0.75.

The author answers in terms of genetic psychology such questions as "What is the relation of culture and religion?" "What has education of the mind to do with Christian character?" "Is there vital connection between intellectual efficiency and spiritual experience?" "Has culture moral obligations and spiritual tasks?" "Is there a religion of the mind as well as a religion of the heart?" "Has Jesus a message for the mind which is indispensable to higher living?" In answering these questions the author (president of De Pauw University) recognizes that efficient learning must ever advance to do the world's work. However, intellect alone cannot lead man to his fulfilment. Religion is a normal factor in every person which is essential before intellect can do its full work. Scholarship and religion are mutually dependent. The final aim of both education and religion is to produce a fully developed symmetrical manhood, and neither can do without the other in the making of real character. The author challenges students to pass every avenue of the world's life under scientific study; then to complete the process by putting it into the service of humanity in God.

The book will be valuable for those who are finding difficulty in transferring and reworking their inherited faith in terms of the scientific knowledge and procedure that is coming upon them. If all college professors had the attitude of the author, fewer students would be cast adrift.

J. M. A.

SMITH, CHARLES CLARK. *Parent, Child and Church*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 179 pages. \$0.75.

The author is an active pastor and the book grows out of his trying experiences with many young people who have failed somehow to find themselves as religiously controlled persons. The reason for this failure lies in the wrong attitude churches and parents have toward childhood. Holding the doctrine of original sin, the church has looked upon the early years as unimportant and has therefore made external and artificial approaches to children. The author demands that the church reconstruct its theology and work with children in terms of what they are. The child is a bundle of instincts, capable of marvelous direction and development. His hereditary capacity is directed by environment and developing conscious choice. The home, therefore, is the paramount instrument in religious education, and the real task of the church is the developing of the home so that it will fulfil this mission. The adoption of the author's conclusion by pastors and parents will make many changes in the present approach to children. The author may be somewhat in error scientifically by holding that there is a religious instinct and implying that acquired characters are transmitted. However, the book is a strong presentation of a timely subject.

J. M. A.

MISCELLANEOUS

AITKIN, J. R. *The Christ of the Men of Art*. With Frontispiece in color, twenty reproductions in photogravure and twenty-eight in half-tone. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915. 358 pages. \$8.00.

When one takes up a ponderous volume handsomely illustrated and printed on heavy paper, he expects to find a parlor book, rather than one which ministers to his desire for knowledge. If the reader comes to *The Christ of the Men of Art* with this anticipation he will be agreeably disappointed. He will find himself reading with interest the writing of one who knows something of the principles of painting and much of its history. He will follow with pleasure the successive waves in which the art rises and sinks and rises again. He will make acquaintance, not simply with the face of Christ, but with the different schools of painting and the characteristics of each. He will be especially pleased with the section on Byzantine mosaics and paintings, which have been so much studied during recent years. Mr. Aitkin gives us this valuable art criticism, while at the same time he makes a treatise for popular reading. The reproductions of paintings scattered through the book are themselves works of art. Where so much is excellent it is perhaps ungracious to note any lack. But nothing is said of the Christ of sculpture; and sculpture is as much art as painting, and the Christ of sculpture is as notable as the Christ of painting. In writing of the Christ of painting, the author might well have taken less pains to follow an illusive "likeness," and more to observe the widely different conceptions of the great painters. If he had done this, he would have shown that Angelo pictures Christ as a Jove hurling thunderbolts; Da Vinci, as having much—too much—of the feminine element; and Titian, as the elegant young rabbi.

F. J.

WALTER, J. E. *Subject and Object*. West Newton, Pa.: Johnston & Penney, 1915. 184 pages. \$1.40.

In a critical reconstruction the author has restated the claims of realism. His theory depends upon the statement that "the human mind is a permanent entity or substance which can be and is known." This is the only object of immediate knowledge. The distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge corresponds to "a division between soul and body, or subject and object." Yet it is admitted that our direct knowledge of mind is not coextensive with the mind's being. Subjective extension and subjective causation, serving in conjunction, enable external perception. Berkley's argument for spirit proves matter. Truth is correspondence of thought with its object, meaning "an object outside and independent of mind and consciousness." In the course of the discussion incisive criticisms of typical theories are presented. The constructive side of the work is interesting though it invites criticism. Though a realist, the author rejects Reid's solution and insists that belief must itself be accounted for. It is difficult to see, however, wherein an inferred reality on the basis of an immediately known subject can be knowledge of "an object outside and independent of mind." Nevertheless the author has given a valuable discussion with ample concern for present-day aspects of the problem. The discussion of pragmatism at the close of the work, for example, is an excellent presentation of its strength and weakness.

W. T. P.

JOHNSTON, G. A. *Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense.* Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1915. Pages vii+267. \$1.25.

Selections from the writings of Reid, Ferguson, Beattie, and Stewart, illustrating the Scottish philosophy of common-sense are here collected with an introductory essay by the editor. Nearly three-quarters of the material is from Reid and one-half of the remainder from Stewart, the systematizer of Reid's philosophy. The selections will give the general reader some knowledge of the spirit and method of the school, especially of Reid the originator. The introductory essay is brief and, therefore, affords only a bare outline of the purpose, content, and influence of the movement. Yet the outline is well wrought and will conduce to an appreciation of the limitations and worth of this school.

W. T. P.

KOHLER, KAUFMAN. *Hebrew Union College, and Other Addresses.* Cincinnati: Ark Publishing Co., 1916. ix+336 pages.

These twenty-five addresses reveal a character of rare strength and loftiness. Dr. Kohler is one of the greatest leaders of Reform Judaism. He believes his people have before them the greatest task to which God has ever called them, namely, to bring the modern world to the full appreciation of monotheism, truth, justice, and peace. The author is very frank, yet fair, in his criticisms upon historic Christianity. With orthodox Christianity he takes decided issue; with liberal Christians he finds himself in close accord. His splendid tribute to Jesus would be even more hearty and much less modified were he to carry his source-study of the Gospels to their logical issue. For it is not the Jesus of history in whom he finds such fatal inconsistencies and therefore weaknesses, but the church's picture of the Christ.

F. M.

KIRKPATRICK, S. C. *Through the Jews to God: A Challenge.* London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 157 pages. 2s. 6d.

A daring book, with the contents fully measuring up to the challenge implied in the title. The author, speaking out of long experience with orthodox Jews—and with words of love and appreciation all too seldom found in Christian writings—voices his firm conviction that *Catholic Christianity both must and can win orthodox Judaism to believe in Jesus as Messiah.* In that great and happy day, he continues, the world will be shaken from its lethargy as never before. Jewish Christianity, keeping its Jewish rites with its new-born messianic faith, and Catholicism representing the purest Christian rites and faith in Jesus' lordship as well, will together sweep the earth victoriously for the Kingdom of God. In comment one can only say: What a pity that such splendid zeal and fairness should be so thoroughly blinded to the hard facts of many centuries past. Never can the world go back—far back—to the Jewish-Christian or to the Catholic symbols, long since outgrown and discarded by the masses of thinking people.

F. M.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Handcock, P. S. P. *The Archaeology of the Holy Land*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. 383 pages. \$3.00.
- Langdon, Stephen. *Babylonian Magic*. Reprinted from *Scientia*, Vol. XV, 1914, N. XXXIV-2. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1914. 240 pages.
- Lotz, Wilhelm. *Hebräische Sprachlehre*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1913. vi+173 pages. M. 3.60.
- Skinner, J. *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah*, chaps. i-xxxix. [Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1915. lxxv+314 pages. 3s.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Box, G. H. *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*. London: Pitman, 1916. xviii+247 pages. 5s.
- DeLand, Charles Edmund. *The Mistrials of Jesus*. Boston: Badger, 1914. 292 pages. \$1.25.
- Hasting, James (ed.). *The Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*. Vol. I, Aaron-Lystra. New York: Scribner, 1916. xiv+729 pages. \$6.00.
- Kent, Charles Foster. *The Work and Teachings of the Apostles*. New York: Scribner, 1916. xi+313 pages. \$1.25.
- Ropes, James Hardy. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of St. James*. New York: Scribner, 1916. xiii+319 pages. \$3.00.
- Stokes, Anson Phelps. *What Jesus Christ Thought of Himself*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xiv+114 pages. \$1.00.
- Vernon, Samuel M. *The Making of the Bible*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1916. 191 pages. \$0.75.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Cadman, S. Parkes. *The Three Religious Leaders of Oxford and Their Movements—John Wycliffe, John Wesley, John Henry Newman*. New York:

- Macmillan, 1916. xvii+596 pages. \$2.50.
- Cleveland, Catharine C. *The Great Revival in the West, 1797-1805*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916. xii+215 pages. \$1.00.
- Cole, R. Lee. *Love-Feasts—A History of the Christian Agapé*. London: Kelly, 1916. 292 pages. 5s.
- Dwight, Henry Otis. *The Centennial History of the American Bible Society*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1916. 605 pages. \$2.00.
- Fournier, Paul. *Un groupe de recueils canoniques italiens des X^e et XI^e siècles*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, C. Klincksieck, 1915. 123 pages.
- Hitchcock, F. R. *Montgomery. St. Patrick and His Gallic Friends*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 164 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Horsch, John. Menno Simons: *His Life, Labors, and Teachings*. Scottsdale, Pa.: Mennonite Publishing House, 1916. 324 pages. \$1.25.
- Huttman, Maude Aline. *The Establishment of Christianity and the Proscription of Paganism*. [Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. LX, No. 2, Edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University.] New York: Columbia University, 1914. 257 pages. \$2.00.
- Legge, F. *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*. 2 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. lxiii+202; ix+425 pages. 25s.
- Vaccari, P. A. *Nuova Opera di Giuliano Eclanese—Commento ai Salmi*. Rome: Civiltà Cattolica, 1916. 16 pages.
- Whitley, W. T. *The Works of John Smyth, Fellow of Christ's College, 1594-98*. 2 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. cxxii+776 pages. 31s. 6d.

DOCTRINAL

- Anon. *Revelation and the Life to Come*. New York: Putnam, 1916. v+216 pages. \$1.00.

- Garvie, Alfred E. *The Evangelistic Type of Christianity*. London: Kelly, 1916. 147 pages. 1s.
- Merz, John Theodore. *Religion and Science: A Philosophical Essay*. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1915. xi+192 pages.
- Smyth, Newman. *The Meaning of Personal Life*. New York: Scribner, 1916. ix+363 pages. \$2.00.
- Sparrow-Simpson, W. J. *Reconciliation between God and Man*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 155 pages. 3s.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Henke, Frederick Goodrich. *The Philosophy of Wan Yang-Ming*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. xvii+512 pages. \$2.50.
- Jordan, Louis Henry. *Comparative Religion—Its Range and Limitations. A Lecture*. Oxford: University Press, 1916. 15 pages. 1s.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Foakes-Jackson, F. J. (ed.). *The Faith and the War*. London: Macmillan, 1915. xvi+261 pages. \$1.75.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Batifol, Pierre. *A un neutre catholique*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 31 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Baudrillart, Mgr. *Jeanne la libératrice*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1915. 32 pages.
- Begouen, Comte. *La guerre actuelle devant la conscience catholique*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 94 pages.
- Bridges, John Henry. *Illustrations of Positivism*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1915. xiii+480 pages. \$1.50.
- Carus, Paul. *The Venus of Milo: An Archeological Study of the Goddess of Womanhood*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. 182 pages. \$1.00.
- Colombel, Mme Emmanuel. *Journal d'une infirmière d'Arras*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 164 pages.
- Daudet, Léon. *Contre l'esprit allemand, de Kant à Krupp*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- DeBrinon, Fernand. *En guerre*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 76 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- De la Tour, P. Imbart. *L'opinion catholique et la guerre*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 61 pages. Fr. 0.60.

- De Sourgues, Maurice. *Les catholiques espagnols et la guerre*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 79 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Eddy, Sherwood. *The Students of Asia*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1916. 223 pages. \$0.50.
- Harbin, Robert Maxwell. *Paradoxical Pain*. Boston: Sherman, French, 1916. xxiv+212 pages. \$1.25.
- Hastings, James (ed.). *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. VIII, *Life-Mulla*. New York: Scribner, 1916. xx+910 pages. \$7.00.
- Joly, Henri. *Contre les maux de la guerre*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 43 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Kirkpatrick, S. C. *Through the Jews to God*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 157 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Kohler, Kaufman. *Hebrew Union College and Other Addresses*. Cincinnati: Ark Publishing Co., 1916. ix+336 pages.
- Lamy, Etienne. *Du XVIII^e siècle à l'année sublime*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 46 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Lechartier, G. *La charité et la guerre*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Lichtenberger, Henri. *L'opinion Américaine et la guerre*. Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1915. 63 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Masson, Frederic. *Les femmes et la guerre de 1914*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 40 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Narsy, Raoul. *La France au-dessus de tout*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 72 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Ombiaux, Maurice des. *La reine Elisabeth*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Perret, Robert. *L'Allemagne, les neutres et le droit des gens*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Rade, Martin. *Christenglaube in Krieg und Frieden. I, Im Krieg*. Marburg: Verlag der Christlichen Welt, 1915. viii+110 pages. M. 1.30.
- Rade, Martin. *Die Kirche nach dem Kriege*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1915. iv+53 pages. M. 1.20.
- Rade, Martin. *Dieser Krieg und das Christentum*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915. 34 pages. M. 0.50.
- Roure, Lucien. *Patriotisme—Impérialisme—Militarisme*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1915. 48 pages.

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE WAR UPON THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THOUGHT OF GREAT BRITAIN

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The subject on which I have been asked to write for the readers of the *Journal* is one which no individual can hope to treat with anything like adequacy. The channels of religious life in Great Britain are too ramified and numerous to allow of a single observer doing any sort of justice to the amount or the taste of the waters which are flowing along them during these flooded days. You can form impressions, either from personal observation or from such utterances as are available. But the latter are not always representative or characteristic, and even when they are, the impression which they make is likely to be subjective. This consideration applies, no doubt, to any estimate of religious life and thought, even in the piping days of peace; the data of church life are not to be picked up casually from statistics or from literature, and an outsider will be almost certain to misjudge the situation, unless he is in touch with the inner spirit, which rarely can be caught without prolonged intercourse. Yet war-time increases the difficulty. The tension under which the community is living affects the faculty of judgment in nearly all departments; the religious effect of the war cannot be gauged at the time being with anything like accuracy, owing to the transitional character of the period; and appreciations

of the situation, ecclesiastically considered, tend to be unreliable in proportion as they are clear-cut. Even when one feels that changes are afoot, it is a delicate matter to define their extent and significance.

For these and other reasons one would prefer to wait until the war is over before attempting to form any judgment upon the influence which the present upheaval is likely to produce in the religious world. One would require to stand farther away from it than is possible at the moment. But, on the understanding that anything one writes is to be read as provisional and tentative, one may venture to set down a few impressions received during the past twenty months. These, I should premise, are based mainly on English and Scottish evidence. What the Irish situation is I only know from hearsay. Still, there is a certain homogeneity in the situation. Christianity is Christianity after all, and one effect of a war situation is to bring out the common realities underneath the ecclesiastical divergences of interpretation. If a nation under war does not lay aside its besetting sins, it is at least obliged to lay aside every weight, and in the sphere of religion the weight of sectarianism is rapidly thrown away by those who are setting themselves to face the sharp demands of the crisis. The situation is thus more of a unity than in normal days. It is, upon the whole, less likely that the sympathetic observer will go wrong in his effort to detect the common features and the characteristic phenomena of the age.

I shall begin frankly by expressing my opinion that the influence of the war upon the religious situation is not nearly so powerful as an outsider might expect. I would even go farther and predict that it is not likely to leave any far-reaching changes behind it. Political students predict revolutions in at least two of the countries engaged in the present conflict, no matter how it ends, but very few competent observers of the religious or the theological situation would be prepared to make a similar forecast. So far as the present day is concerned, in the matter of religious life throughout Great Britain, the words of the author of Daniel have been fulfilled: "Many shall be purified and made white and refined [i.e., by their sufferings]; but the wicked shall do wickedly: and none of

the wicked shall understand [i.e., grasp the religious significance of the time, and act accordingly], but the wise shall understand." The war does not make more people good. It makes good people better; makes them pray more and tighten their hold upon the things unseen. But it intensifies the frivolity and selfishness of others, as it has always done. This war is not proving any magical panacea for unbelief and worldliness in Great Britain any more than in the other areas of the war zone. Those who looked for broad, public evidence of a religious revival are disappointed—as it was well that they should be. Attendance at the churches has in few cases increased to any extent. It has not fallen off, indeed, and the intercession services are probably as well frequented as ever. But there is no outward sign of any thronging to the churches on the part of those who formerly were loosely attached or wholly unattached. This is not altogether to be regretted. There might be a return to the Lord of Hosts rather than to the Lord, an exploiting of Christianity in the interests of patriotism of the lower order, which would really spell weakness instead of strength. Without being complacent, I think we may congratulate ourselves that there has not been any movement in this direction throughout Great Britain. We have not sung hymns of hate. The responsible leaders of religious thought have steadily avoided the temptation to make church-going a fetish. In war, as in peace, the churches may be filled by people who attend from more motives than those of pure worship. So far as I have been able to find out, these meretricious inducements and attractions have been eschewed; no hectic or convulsive means have been adopted to crowd church buildings. A stranger might look for exceptionally large audiences in church, and might draw unfavorable conclusions from their absence. But this would be a hasty inference. I think we must honestly confess that the daily intercession services are not so well attended as they ought to be, and that a phenomenon like this is ominous; only genuinely religious people can be expected to go to such services, and they do not go in anything like the numbers which the rolls of local church membership would justify us in expecting. On the other hand, the church services are carried on with much the same intensity and care as before. If they are

outwardly as quiet as usual, for the most part, this is a proof that the war has not produced, as it easily might have done, an excited, sensational type of religion, which would be as demoralizing as some of the revivals engineered by professional evangelists during times of peace.

Religious life, however, is not to be gauged by attendance at churches, although that is one expression of a nation's faith. When Felix persuaded Paul to speak of faith in Christ Jesus, the apostle "reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and the judgment to come," and the influence of spiritual Christianity can be felt in the national attitude toward moral issues. In the matter of temperance, in the stricter sense of the term, Great Britain has shown herself, under the lead of the king and of some prominent newspapers like the *London Spectator*, more alive than her government to the seriousness of the situation. This has been one of the really satisfactory effects of the war—the awakening of conscience on the part of many more than temperance fanatics to the inimical tendencies of the liquor traffic. The churches have naturally thrown themselves into the struggle with ardor, and although reform has been blocked for the time being by the politicians, a step has been taken in the education of the public mind which will never be retraced.

But, turning to the religious situation in its specific character, I should say that the pressure of the war has deepened three convictions. There are three Christian truths which appeal now-a-days with particular force to congregations: prayer, the atonement, and immortality.

In the main, it has been a healthy interest in prayer; that is, not in prayer as a superstitious means of inducing the divine favor, or as an involuntary cry wrung from panic, but in prayer as the expression of moral submission and humility. One of the most adequate utterances on this point came early in the war from an English admiral, and as few words have been more deeply appreciated than Sir David Beatty's, I venture to quote a sentence or two from his famous message, bearing on this very topic.

Surely [he wrote] the Almighty God does not intend this war to be just a hideous fracas, a bloody, drunken orgy. There must be purpose in it all;

improvement must be born out of it all. In what direction, France has already shown us the way. She has risen out of her ruined cities with her revived religion, which is most wonderful. Russia has been welded into a whole and religion plays a greater part. England still remains to be taken out of the stupor of self-satisfaction and complacency in which her great and flourishing condition has steeped her, and until she can be stirred out of this condition and until religious revival takes place at home, just so long will the war continue. When she can look out on the future with humbler eyes and a prayer on her lips, then we can begin to count the days toward the end.

Since these words were addressed to the nation, the stirring has commenced. People are praying and praying together quietly; the value of intercessory prayer has been learned by many afresh, and in this way there has been a distinct impetus to the practice of the Christian life.

As was to be expected, perhaps, the problem of prayers for the dead has been raised in an intensely practical form. The Shorter Catechism of the Scottish churches declares that "the souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness and do immediately pass into glory." But what of those who are not "believers," in the full sense of the term? Many die in battle who are not saints. Are their loved ones on earth to cease praying for their well-being? In many of the Reformed churches, the reaction against the mediaeval doctrine of purgatory swept men into a repudiation even of those simple naïve prayers for the departed, which since the second century had formed part of the spontaneous piety of the Catholic church. It has been interesting to notice how the stress of war conditions has modified this repudiation. Thus, a representative of the evangelical section in the Church of England, like Bishop Moule, has publicly expressed his sympathy with the impulse to include the departed in prayer. It is too soon yet to say whether this marks a change in the theology of prayer, but it is significant that the issue has been raised.

The atonement has been prominent in the thoughts of people, under the light of sacrifice. The war has shown that there are some things that can only be done by blood, not by pious talk. Chaplains from the front often report that the men fall back with ardor on the redeeming love of Jesus Christ. And the people at home see in the self-sacrifice of the soldier and the sailor what these

men would be the last to see or claim for themselves—an illustration of the Love which lays down its life for others. "Jesus, lover of my soul" is one of the favorite hymns of the troops at the battle line, not simply on account of its tune, but for its message; and one of the few religious and effective members of the present cabinet told a friend of mine that he was living day by day in the thought of Christ as our Sanctuary.

Even more vital has been the stress laid on immortality. Thousands of people have acquired an entirely new interest in the next world. It has developed superstitious forms and ministered to spiritualism in certain quarters, but apart from this, the Christian interest has been vivified, and few subjects are preached about which command closer attention.

Contra vim mortis
Non est medicamen in hortis.

Men and women in these days are finding that a number of religious gardens do not grow any satisfactory herb for the fear of death. Wise and Christian books on immortality are having a steady circulation. It is not possible to mistake the increasing desire for a gospel which has some definite message upon the life after death, although the theological result cannot yet be foreseen. And yet here as elsewhere the theological interpretation will count. Newman once said that "religion is never in greater danger than when in consequence of national or international troubles the schools of theology have broken up or ceased to be." The theology or religious thought of Great Britain is active; it is giving, as it should, a lead, as, for example, through the utterances of the Bishop of Oxford. But the material on which it works is hardly ready yet for any fresh reconstruction. Such a reconstruction is more than likely to come, but at present it is barely possible to do more than feel some of the impulses and unconscious tendencies, of which I have mentioned three. In the long run, the effect of the war will probably amount in the main to an alteration of emphasis, so far as one can judge from the facts of the situation under one's eyes.

It would not be accurate, however, to omit one effect of the war upon the religious situation, especially as it will not occur readily

to Americans. I mean the new estimate of the state in relation to the life of Christians as organized in communities of worship. The problem of church and state in Great Britain was threatening to become stale. It had reached the stage when some fresh treatment was necessary. That treatment, even before the war, had begun to be applied, but it was being applied by scholars who detected that a closer analysis of the meaning of the state, in the light of mediaeval theories, was necessary. The war has supplied an impulse on the practical side, which will have a much wider effect than many people seem to realize. This applies in particular to the churches which stand outside any state connection. Among them there was often a curious tendency to regard the state, to all intents and purposes, as indifferent if not antagonistic to the divine purpose; political service was viewed as a sphere into which individual members might venture, at their own risk and for their own ends, but such churches as churches rarely undertook any responsibility for the state, and seldom prayed even for the king and the commonwealth. This provincial attitude has been undermined. The so-called "free" churches have exhibited a fine patriotism, and this has not been simply on the part of individuals. These communities have been brought sharply into touch with the national requirements and the national interests. They have had their eyes opened to the function of the state as a moral as well as a material entity, and their conscience has been roused to a perception of the truth that no one, not even a church, can live to itself. On this line I anticipate an alteration in several directions. He would be a sanguine prophet who would forecast any immediate co-operation between the Church of England and the Nonconformist churches in that country. It is in the last degree unlikely that such a result will be hastened by the present war, even over the Kikuyu mission problem. But the Scottish situation is very different, and the union of the two great Presbyterian churches of that country, which before the war was afoot, is almost certain to be accelerated.

As a cognate phenomenon, we ought to note the movement for co-operation between the Nonconforming churches in England, which Mr. J. H. Shakespeare of the Baptist Union has been promoting. It is not accidental that this movement has taken shape

during the war. Men are looking forward already to the new situation which the cessation of war will create, and attempting to set their ecclesiastical houses in order for the new demands. If anything is certain, it is certain that men will come back from the line of battle with an impatience of little, petty divisions between the churches at home, with a contempt for the friction and the waste involved in some of the traditional subdivisions of ecclesiastical Christianity, and with a demand that the central things shall control everything. Already this spirit is being felt. If it leads to a United Free Church in England, the gain will be broad and deep. But whatever comes of the project in the way of organization, it springs from a quickened vision of the gospel as "no longer obscured by a false emphasis on secondary matters, but one which is worth living for, worth dying for."

The Church of England herself has undertaken a national mission, this autumn, which ought to be of powerful service to the life of the people. It is being organized with a careful attention to the spiritual needs of the day, and the unrivaled opportunities at the disposal of the authorities offer a chance of rousing the Christian conscience which all without as well as within that church may well hope will be seized. The moral leadership of the nation has been almost entirely left to the churches during this war, and it has not been left in vain. Several journals have spoken to the hearts of the people, and among the non-religious ones it is right to mention the *Times Literary Supplement*, whose leading articles have been couched in a high tone. There have been books of searching value issued by laymen as well as by clergymen. But the spoken word has almost invariably come from the pulpit. So far as the Church of England is concerned, it will come with power during the national mission. Anyone, for example, who listened to the address delivered by the Bishop of Oxford in his cathedral on the first anniversary of the outbreak of the war will rejoice to think that so intense and Christian a spirit is able to move the heart and conscience of the nation.

The need of such a mission of faith and repentance will not be questioned by any thoughtful observer of the times. The church has been called upon to render two supreme services to the country.

In the first place, to rally the spirit of vital self-sacrifice, which counts nothing too costly to spare for the cause of freedom and justice. This service has been rendered amply. The church has interpreted the need of military service to an unmilitary people, who were naturally shy at first of undertaking European responsibilities; she has done this without slipping into the easy ruts of militarism. The real obstacle to Christianity has been the caricature of it by a few pacifists, but the moral sense of the community quickly saw through these parasites, and they have been left to the pity and contempt of their fellows. On a broad scale, the churches have been able to concentrate their attention upon the need of maintaining the steadfast spirit of endurance among the people, of preventing silly outbursts of hatred, and of interpreting the duties of sacrifice, unity, and economy. The tone of church services even in time of peace is prone to suggest a lowering of vitality; Christianity is often presented in such a way as to make the hearer wonder if it can have any vital relation to the responsibilities of the age. The war has cleansed worship of that weak, amiable spirit. The churches may be said to have risen to the occasion, and fostered the temper of free and willing response to the state's call.

But the second duty of the church in a time of war is to keep an edge on the spiritual and moral forces which enter so powerfully into the efficiency of a nation. This has been done as it could not be done during the South African war, when the wisdom, to say nothing of the justice, of the conflict was doubted by wide circles in the country. Today, the development of events has made it more clear than ever that the war is for larger interests than those of the empire, and the conscience of the church is free from dubiety upon the issues. Such an absence of hesitation has contributed to the enforcing of repentance for national and individual sins. It is felt, and rightly felt, to be imperative that this searching of conscience should take place before the hour of victory. Many of our best people, in the Christian sense, have no doubts about the need of a crushing triumph in the interests of civilization. But they wonder whether they deserve it. They are asking themselves if anything in their own lives is hindering the triumph of God in

this war, if they are fit to be entrusted with victory, and if they are worthy to ask for it from his hands. These thoughts are abroad throughout the land, not in newspapers, but in the hearts of the true patriots. They are wholesome and fruitful. As the two archbishops of the English church put it in one of their pastoral letters:

We have in days of quiet made too little of the claim of God upon our lives. Can we wonder that in stern hours like this it is hard to kindle afresh the deep and simple thoughts which we have allowed to grow languid and uncertain? But such rekindling there must be. Give earnest heed to this most sacred of duties. Set yourselves, even in the midst of the exigencies and passions of war, to be loyal to the spirit of Jesus. Strive to keep openness of mind and soul for such message as the Holy Spirit may reveal to us at an hour when God is judging what is base and inspiring what is best in England's life. He may speak in the ordered ministry of word and sacrament, or in the roar of battle, or in the silence of a shadowed home. He does, for we have all seen it, give, to those who lie open to his gift, courage and understanding and patience and high hope.

These words reflect a widespread attitude throughout the churches. The humbling of soul before God is organic to the vital impulses of a religious patriotism, and it is the opportunity of the churches in this hour to bring out this intimate relation. Many of those who love Great Britain best are looking for the good gift of a national quickening along such lines. No one can say whether the end of the war will produce an atmosphere in which the social and political problems will be more easily handled. It is unlikely that it will do as much in this direction as some ardent spirits think. But religious people feel that here and now they ought to be doing something to prepare themselves for the closing stages of the conflict; not simply to pray for the success of their cause next year, but to pray for such a temper in the nation as will enable it to meet the fortunes of war and the final settlement with moral steadiness and a deepened sense of responsibility to God.

Feelings like this, which are surging through the core of the nation, stir a number of allied problems in religion. The war has set people thinking, often in a confused way, about ultimate problems like the justice of God, human suffering, the relation of Christ to national life, and organized Christianity. There is the ordinary cry about the bankruptcy of Christianity, a cry which, I am bound

to confess, seems to me to come as a rule from men who never impressed anybody with having put much capital into the business of Christianity before the war. More honest, I think, is the doubt whether war and national interests can be connected at all with the teaching of Jesus; and this has given a good opportunity for pointing out that Christianity is not the reproduction of rules and regulations for a sect without political responsibility in the first century, and that it has had a history in which God has been living and teaching. I have been struck with the comparative lack of an exaggerated emphasis upon the Old Testament. One almost expected that such a stress would be laid on the Old Testament, for the New Testament is, in the nature of the case, defective in national outlook, and men instinctively turn to the prophets and the history of Israel, with a passionate thirst for words corresponding to their day and danger. I do not think this tendency has been nearly so marked as it was, if I can judge from history, during the Indian mutiny or the Crimean war. Probably the more wholesome use of the Old Testament during this war, in our country, has been due to the work done by the historical criticism of the past twenty years. It is only in the little circles of the cranks and pacifists that the Marcionite heresy has re-emerged, and its emergence is so trivial that it only serves to throw into relief the general sanity of attitude on the part of the large majority.

When Walt Whitman finished his notes on the American Civil War, he said that the real war, with its seething hell and black, infernal background, would never get into the books. Neither will the bright religious spirit which shines through the shadows get into print; at least, only a few rays of it will. It would require an article by itself to estimate the religious literature thrown up by this war in English, some of it remarkable, especially in prose. Yet even the spontaneous expressions of feeling from men in the trenches, who fight, hating war and doing military duty as a strange work of God, even these would not convey more than a section of the religious reflections and reactions produced by the war in this country. The influential and fundamental effects are not to be tabulated, at any rate not yet. And, as I said at the beginning of this article, it seems to me doubtful if these effects will be found in

the long run to be very far-reaching. Like any supreme crisis, the war has accentuated both good and evil in the national life, and the religious world shares this influence. In the religion of Great Britain during the war period we have had our surprises; they have been surprises of deterioration as well as of rallying. But if one or two have failed here and there under the test, if occasionally indifference and selfishness have cloaked themselves under the robe of conscience, if there has been a lack of nerve and fiber—due in part to sectarian ideas of Christianity and a sentimental misconception of the gospel—on the other hand it would be affectation to deny that the large majority of those who count and will count after this in the Christian service have been true to the call of the hour. That is why, when one regards this war as a test, it is possible to admit, without undue regret, that it cannot be said to have exerted any marked effect in the religious life and thought of the country. A chemical test does not increase the material already present. It simply reveals the genuine and the false. In many quarters a purifying influence can be traced, in the shape of a larger simplicity of faith, an ampler generosity, a readiness to see good in other communions, a broadening of the ecclesiastical sympathies, and a sincere spirit of self-sacrifice. Undoubtedly, thousands have been touched to finer issues, not only in their personal religion, but in their mental interests, which have become less insular and parochial. An impartial critic, I think, would admit all this. He would also agree, I hope, that one of the most reassuring features of the situation, from the standpoint of religion, is that we have managed to avoid the spirit of hatred, as we did not during the Napoleonic war, when the hatred of Napoleon replaced the love of God for many. I am not prepared to say why or how this ugly feature has been kept out of the picture. It has not been because we were winning, for our military record as yet has been an almost unrelieved record of humiliation and defeat. It has not been because we have had no provocation, for the high reputation of the Turks and to a less degree of the Austrians as clean fighters has been accompanied by the terrible outrages of the Germans, and it has taken us all our time to keep down the pagan passion for reprisals, to “be angry and sin not.”

Still, however difficult it may be to account for the fact that the war has not poisoned our temper with hatred, we may humbly set that down to our credit; or, rather, we may thank God that he has enabled us to resist that particular temptation. I have known many cases of good people who have resented any omission on the part of their ministers to pray for our enemies, and one of the frequent petitions is that we may "remember always the good in others and the evil in ourselves." It is much to fulfil the duty of indignation and at the same time to remember what spirit we are of.

Finally, it is right to add that the war has had practically no hindering effect on our foreign missions. Here and there, as in Palestine and South Africa, the war operations have interfered temporarily with particular missions, and the abuse of their freedom by some German missionaries, who treacherously acted as spies and sedition-mongers, has led to their deportation from British territory. But the money for missions has flowed in unabated, in spite of the extra claims on the purse for war funds; in some cases the subscriptions have actually increased. And the interest is as keen as ever. The war, luckily, has not led to any suspension of activity in the mission field. We have not allowed ourselves to regard missions as of no military importance for Christianity.

THE NEW INTERDENOMINATIONALISM

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The new interdenominationalism is not wholly an American product, although its fullest realization is in the United States. Dissenting churches of England have expressed a common fellowship in various leagues and unions; and, even in matters of government and politics, evince a degree of solidarity, natural as over against an established church. In Canada the spirit of combination and unity has gone even farther, at first bringing into organic union the Baptists and Free Baptists of the maritime provinces, and then moving toward an organic union, not yet quite completed but awaiting final sanction, of the Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and Methodist churches of all Canada.

A BRIEF RETROSPECT

In the United States the centralizing tendencies have been manifest in three directions. In priority of time appeared first interdenominational organizations composed of individuals out of many churches, who, without compromise of creedal confessions or ecclesiastical relations, united for common tasks of benevolence and service either in definite areas or for special classes. Some of these organizations, like the Young Men's Christian Association and the United Society of Christian Endeavor, have become nation-wide and world-wide in the scope of their activities. To these may be added a great variety of societies which touch almost every form of philanthropic, social, and missionary endeavor. Next in time and importance arose the tendency to bring into a common center the representatives of different denominations, at first in the lesser areas of cities and states and at length in the nation, for consultation respecting infringement of rights, grievances, and competition; respecting secularizing tendencies, encroachments

of materialism, common perils, and foes; and respecting plans and policies for the realization of a dawning fellowship and the accomplishment of common tasks. At practically the same time this centralizing movement among denominations had a centripetal effect upon the members of denominational groups, the scattered and alienated fragments of ecclesiastical families. An effort was made in 1906 to bring into one body the Congregationalists, the United Brethren, and the Protestant Methodists of the United States. In the same year the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America and the Cumberland Presbyterian Church were reunited and an attempt made to include in the union other Presbyterian bodies. The Baptists of the North, having perfected for themselves in 1907 a Northern Baptist Convention, centralizing in its membership the membership of its previously unrelated benevolent and missionary societies, then received into the common brotherhood in 1911 the Free Baptist churches of the country, and in 1915 the General Baptists, both of which bodies recovered, in the Baptist family, an alienated fellowship. Triennially, the Baptists of the North and the South meet in a general convention; and once in five years the Baptists of the world hold a session of the Baptist World Alliance. The Methodist churches, divided in 1844 into a northern and a southern branch, are in this year of grace 1916, at the very time these words are written, considering a plan of reuniting all Methodism in the United States as the Methodist Church, without geographical designation and restriction.

All of these tendencies and movements toward combination and compactness, pronounced in the early years of the twentieth century, were at the same time both causes and effects of a growing conviction that the denominations, as such, should have a common center, into which might flow the details of work and of experiences which belonged, in part at least, to all, and out of which might issue the testimony of common convictions, the purposes of common plans, and the spirit of fellowship which expresses both the brotherhood of Christian disciples and the effectiveness of united strength. As early as 1882, Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D., now pastor emeritus of the First Congregational Church, Columbus,

Ohio, wrote for the *Century* a series of articles entitled, "The Christian League of Connecticut," in which was outlined, purely as an imaginary ideal, methods by which all denominations in the state of Connecticut might combine for better evangelization and more efficient social ministry throughout the towns and villages of the state. This series of articles produced a profound impression, and may be called the first classic treatment of the principles of local and state church federation. Out of this impulse issued several attempts at uniting, leaguings, or federating Christian forces. The oldest one in existence, established in 1887, is the Christian League of Methuen, in Methuen, Massachusetts. Another attempt, originating, however, in impulses apparently unassociated with the Connecticut plan, on suggestion of a Methodist pastor, caught up by a Congregational college president, and largely formulated by a Free Baptist, was organized in 1890 as the Interdenominational Commission of Maine, the oldest state federation. The oldest city federation took shape in New York City in 1895. Out of these movements and others like them came at length in 1899, in New York City, the first meeting which looked directly toward a national federation of local federated workers. William E. Dodge, president of the Evangelical Alliance, presided over this meeting, while Dr. E. B. Sanford, later a national apostle of federation, was the secretary. In 1900, in Philadelphia, this body became more definite under a constitution and under the name, "The National Federation of Churches and Christian Workers." Other meetings followed in different cities, and then there was held in Carnegie Hall, New York City, in 1905, an epoch-making assembly known as "The Inter-Church Conference on Federation," at which representatives of the different denominations of the country, for the first time in significant numbers, gave serious attention to a federation, not now of individuals acting upon their own initiative, but of delegates appointed by their own ecclesiastical judicatures, with authority to represent their several bodies; and in 1908, in Philadelphia, there was organized, as the outcome of preceding and concurring deliberations, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, as yet the most complete expression in organized form of the new interdenominationalism in America, if not indeed in the

world. The Federal Council reports a constituency of thirty denominations, including a membership of almost eighteen millions of communicants.

Coincident with this movement, culminating in the formation of the Federal Council of Churches, there has been a movement, simpler in some respects, more ambitious in others, which, originating in the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1910, under the name of "A World Conference on Faith and Order," seeks to bring all communions, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Protestant alike, into a united fellowship so as to recover the unity of original Christianity. This movement has received a cordial response from most of the churches of America and many of the communions throughout the world.

CAUSES UNDERLYING THE MOVEMENT

No historic movement is detached and isolated. It is a part of general history. No less true is this in the realm of religion than in the domain of secular affairs. All causes are not easily discernible. Scarcely is one cause separable from others, even in point of time. Among the causes and conditions which have made the new interdenominationalism possible may be named the following.

The international brotherhood, which has been spreading throughout the world, has had necessarily a powerful effect upon the churches. The thoughts of men more than ever before are, in the terms of man, all-embracing, universal. The very physical appliances and inventions which promote easy and rapid transportation, convenient and flexible communication, have their effect upon Christian organizations, even upon the philosophy and theology through which Christianity seeks to express and defend itself. The railroad, the steamboat, the telegraph, the telephone, the post-office, and the printing-press break down barriers, remove isolation, and establish community of interests in the church as well as in business and in society. A new interdenominationalism is inevitable when a new internationalism arises.

The progress of democracy has tended to bring men into fellowship. Very few are the fundamental, cardinal convictions of democracy. One may almost count them upon the fingers.

Prominent are the three which have been wrought out in American history: (1) that the right of government rests upon the consent of the governed; (2) that the people, having selected their own form of government, must be left undisturbed and unmenaced by other powers (this, in the United States, is the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine); (3) and that other peoples, and all peoples, who have established a government acceptable to themselves, must be protected by each and every nation which desires its own integrity and autonomy to be preserved. In other words, there has been growing up, as the natural corollary of democracy, a fellowship of nations, looking toward a parliament of nations and the perfecting of a code of international law. These few fundamental principles of democracy, a simple application of Christian principles to the governments of men, have profoundly affected the spirit and the attitude of the church in its various branches toward the common cause and the common interests.

A new scholarship has been uniting the Christian church during practically a hundred years. Christian scholarship is no longer dogmatic, nor even apologetic and defensive, in the sense in which it was not many years ago. It is now the scholarship of investigation, seeking after truth, less eager to defend a dogma than to establish a fact and discover the relations thereof to all other facts. It is both scientific and synthetic. Such scholarship knows no sect; it is the monopoly of no single church; it is interdenominational. Before the churches, as such, thought of standing on common ground, the scholarship of the churches had come to some practical agreements respecting the fundamentals of their common faith. The new fellowship really began at the top, intellectually, and the fellowship of Christian scholars was real before men understood the fellowship of Christians. The higher criticism, which brought upon many Christians what appeared to be a mortal terror, has really contributed to an underlying conviction of unity in the minds of the more intellectual and thoughtful members of the Christian church. Even where conclusions have differed, the fellowship of scholars, in the employment of common historic methods and in the unbiased pursuit of truth, has broken down the partition walls which had previously divided them into sects.

The experience of the church in this and in other lands has confirmed a dawning consciousness of unity. Inquisitions have proved historic failures. Repression and coercion but increase and scatter that which they undertake to annihilate. Heresy hunts have brought trouble and destruction; they have never purified and rebuilt. Men have learned, therefore, though slowly and painfully, that toleration is more expedient than persecution, if indeed not far more Christlike. The spirit of toleration spreading through the church, re-enforced by the experience of missionaries with other missionaries, both at home and abroad, has permitted the existence of intellectual variation in the midst of each communion; and nearly all Christians are at length aware that in their own denominations there are quite as wide varieties of faith and practice, tolerated in a right wing and a left wing of their own church, as prevail between denominations themselves.

The awakening of the church to the need of a social gospel and the recognition of social problems which can be solved only through the application and exemplification of Christian principles in political and social institutions, has resulted in a demonstration that a true basis of fellowship lies in service to man, wherein the will, directing action, is employed, rather than the intellect, in drawing distinctions and making definitions. People who work together, rather than those who debate together, become united. A common ministry in social service produces a united church. While theology may differentiate, ministry surely unifies men. All the efforts to apply to human needs the principles of the gospel by legislation, by remedial and correctional organizations, by the introduction of a new social order and the creation of a compact social consciousness, are resulting steadily in the formation of a united church.

The new education is one of the causes introducing the new era. Science is in vogue. Facts, demonstrable under the microscope and in the crucible, incontestable and indisputable, hold sway. The dogmatism of science is almost unchallenged. Even when a man cannot see a scientific fact, he dares not deny it. The new education is producing a set of men who, each in his own specialized sphere, say to the others, "You must accept what I declare,

because I proclaim scientific truth; and I accept what you proclaim because you too declare scientific truth." Specialization, producing experts, nevertheless tends to beget subserviency to authority; and the new education is almost obliterating the power of philosophical dissent.

A new interdenominational literature, grown puissant, threatens to monopolize the field of reading. The weekly journals, like the *Independent*, the *Christian Union*—later called the *Outlook*—and, of a somewhat different class, the *Christian Herald*, the *Sunday School Times*, and the *Christian Endeavor World*, have crowded the purely sectarian periodicals almost out of existence, while the denominational weeklies which survive the stress of competition have broadened and enriched their scope, both of matter and spirit, and deal with religious themes in a less biased and more human manner. The monthly and the quarterly periodicals which exist today are more social than sectarian. A protagonist of the doughty type, defending sectarian shibboleths, can scarcely now be found. In the weightier books, also, of history, interpretation, theology, social experiment, and devotion, we are reading the thoughts of an interdenominational literary school; we read the message without reference to the author's ecclesiastical affiliations. Indeed not one of us today keeps himself in literature immune from other-denominationalism. Whether aware of it or not, we have long been thinking interdenominationally.

Naturally enough, the church has felt the same pressure which practical men of affairs, owing largely to an economic impulse, have brought to bear upon all forms of activity, by which combinations, consolidations, and organized "trusts" have been created. Capital long since pooled its issues in corporations, the smaller constantly giving place to larger combinations. Labor gathered scattered individuals into local unions, and these in turn into associations and federations. All the arts and sciences, all the philanthropies and charities, and many of the purely social functions have tended toward centralized forms of expression. The economic cry has been, "Let us cut out waste; let us eliminate competition; let us reduce overhead charges!" It is not at all surprising that the men who have been reconstructing industrial and commercial enterprises, upon the

principle of consolidation, should bring into church circles and church councils the same principles and advocate their adoption and application with even increased insistence.

There has been a great "drift" in ecclesiastical affairs, as there has been in all human affairs, toward a common center. The considerations already named indicate this, perhaps in part account for it. But the "drift" occurs apart from human recognition. Forces of which men are but partially conscious conspire to produce more definite and larger results than men plan. Is it the influence of the Spirit? Are the divine purposes reaching accomplishment? Has the Spirit of God been brooding over the chaos of sectarian differences, petty littlenesses, and discordant turmoils, producing order, a cosmic order of a new creation? The twentieth century would appear to be a fit time for the fulfilment of that divine desire that "they all may be one."

PERILS OF CENTRALIZATION

No great movement, such as this of the new interdenominationalism, is devoid of extreme danger. Progress seldom moves in rigidly straight lines; its course is rather circular, or spiral, changing direction and moving upward. The straight course is liable to take one off "on a tangent." Tangential departures, overemphasis upon half-truths, insistence upon temporary conditions as though permanent, the ossification of spirit into cold forms, the intrusion of personal ambition in the place of the common weal, the misfit of men, and the unnecessary jolts in breaking with the past—all these and others are perils besetting the movement.

There is danger that the place of the individual may be lost. No system which reduces free and independent spirits to the level of mere cogs and wheels in a social machine is worth maintaining. There is a *Kultur* which perfects the state but loses the citizen. It would be most unfortunate to produce a church which had no Christians. The Middle Ages did this. Our modern age faces the peril. A hierarchy may grow out of superorganizations. While it would be folly to create a bugaboo out of nothing and raise a hue and cry when there is no cause, yet it would be even greater folly to ignore a peril into which the church of the past centuries more

than once has run. For a man no better thinking can be done than his own; his soul's activity is better than all other for him; even his errors, if honestly his, are better for him than truths, dishonestly come by, unassimilated, and in the soul unknown. The peril of losing the individual may be avoided if his soul-liberty be unimpaired.

The tendency to overorganization is an American sin. Seeking to combine two bodies, we not infrequently unite parts of the two, leave in separate existence fragments of the two, and have as the result of our efforts three bodies existing where previously there were but two. In such a case our movement toward unity has multiplied rather than reduced divisions. Aiming at unity, one, we divided two, and obtained three! This peril, by no means imaginary, constantly confronts the Christian church in all its endeavors after federation. The goal cannot be attained by legislation. It is impossible to effect combinations by subtle strategy, overtaking men and snaring them in the mesh of a new organization, unawares. Even when whole ecclesiastical processions seem to march, almost with one accord, into a new inclosure, the germ of a perpetuated existence or the seed of a new dissension has not been removed until the last straggler and the smallest group of individuals, by persuasion and reconciliation, have been brought into the fold. In discussing ecclesiastical unions we must not speak of majorities. Minorities are bodies, if objecting, unrelated, and ununited. Minorities make divisions. The new interdenominationalism which is coming has required centuries of preparation. It must take time for its consummation. It must preserve a unity behind the vanguard, while it seeks a unity before.

As all reality tends to lose its substance and be continued in mere form, so the spirit of a unified church may be lost at length in the external letter of agreements, platforms, constitutions, recorded rolls, committees, officers, and the other paraphernalia of an organized body. The very size of a vast organization renders its speedy mobilization impossible. It is easy for an official to say, "We represent thirty denominations," when it may be that not even one denomination is represented in the act referred to; and it is easy to say, "We speak for nearly eighteen million Christians,"

when it may be that not one of the eighteen millions, outside of the committee formulating the utterance, would express exactly the same sentiments. There is the great danger of assumption—of assuming a spiritual content, within the external forms of organization, when the content is lacking.

There is the peril of geographical localization and limitation. Even New York is provincial when compared with the whole country. The disposition to practice a too rigid economy in avoiding the expense of travel, to seek the propinquity of committeemen and commissions for the sake of easily obtaining a quorum, to eliminate critics and dissenters in the interests of an early harmony and a foregone conclusion, to prepare for action politically and railroad it through expeditiously in the interest of what appear to be clearly recognized, desirable ends, has its serious and far-reaching dangers.

The peril of diffuseness, of dissipation of responsibility, and departure from the central authority, is ever present. If the new interdenominationalism expresses itself in (1) a federal council, which in its quadrennial session numbers three hundred persons, representing twenty-six denominations, and this federal council represents itself by (2) an executive committee, which in its annual meeting numbers one hundred persons, representing twenty-five denominations, and this executive committee represents itself in (3) an administrative committee, which may meet at intervals as called, and in its meetings actually consists of from five to twenty-five persons, and then this administrative committee represents itself in (4) a subcommittee, or through (5) an officer, charged with some special task, and in many instances clothed with large discretionary power, to what extent is the resultant action representative of the great federation in whose behalf it has been taken? The final act is far from the seat of power, being four or five steps removed from the original, constituent bodies, and, at any moment, may be disclaimed as representative in any sense of the whole. Similarly with commissions, subordinate to the council, yet independent in certain fields, there exist in some instances "committees of direction" which are equivalent to executive committees, and executive officers, all of whom, partial in their representation, profess at

times to speak and to act for the whole. In weighty matters, in subjects of delicate, sensitive, or critical significance to any one member of an organization, or to the organization as a whole, there is liable at any moment to be an explosion, a revolt against an alleged representative character, which in no sense represents the persons or the parties involved. The responsibility of speaking and of acting in behalf of eighteen million individuals, each free, independent, thoughtful, and presumably conscientious, is well-nigh appalling.

The peril of officialism overtakes many an officer and many an organization. Form and routine, appointments and correspondence, system and finance, reports and statistics, produce a treadmill of toil; and he who becomes harnessed to the round feels the pressure of the mere mechanics of his office and is in danger of exalting these formal accompaniments of his services to the place of ends for which he and his organization exist.

There is the danger of making a federal organization the doer of deeds which belong properly to the constituent bodies of which the federation is composed. Denominations have their own specific functions. Few if any of these should be taken from them and vested in a central body. For the federation to assume acts which properly belong to its members is not only an injustice to them, but is really a violation of the federative principle. In so far as the federation becomes a substitute for any denomination, doing the work which belongs distinctively to a denomination, it tends to become itself another denomination, not so named, not perchance so recognized, but essentially such, because of this denominational functioning. One of the pitfalls into which federations have fallen throughout the country in the brief history of their existence has been this of seeking to perform deeds which should be performed by the constituent bodies themselves. Indeed, many men fail clearly to understand that the highest function of a federation is not to usurp the powers and functions of the church in any of its ecclesiastical forms, but to be the central council chamber in which the representatives of the denominations, like a council of war, shall report resources and successes, shall formulate common plans of strategy and advance, shall assign and recognize distributed obligations

and interrelated responsibilities, and shall harmonize and synchronize action so as to give a common testimony, so far as possible, and present a united front against all common foes.

There is often the necessity of experimenting, of groping after the tasks, which, as many feel indistinctly, lie before a united church, but which few, if any, clearly discern. The Federal Council has been passing through these experiences of uncertainty and has not yet fully "found" itself. At first the program was one of speedy and extensive organization. The whole country was to be divided into districts, with an office and officers in each district. Federations were to be organized on standard patterns with model constitutions and common names and designations. No little mischief resulted from these attempts to cast in one mold the differing forms of expressing the selfsame spirit, which was moving toward an ecclesiastical unity. Many a day must elapse before the mistakes of this standardizing propaganda will be forgotten by some of the communions and some of the sections of the country, which move slowly, hold conservatively to old ways, and take suggestions from without very charily.

Next in order the Federal Council specialized its endeavor through the medium of its Commission on the Church and Social Service, upon a social service propaganda, wisely directed and richly fruitful, designed to clarify the atmosphere by defining the bounds and character of social service, and by arousing people within the church to a recognition of their social obligations and people outside the church to a realization of the sympathy and interest of the church toward all human ills and all human welfare. A great service, which is still in progress, has been rendered in this direction.

Then the Federal Council, receiving the countenance and support of wealthy allies, began to specialize on an extensive peace program and propaganda. The great European war unhappily interrupted this movement, even breaking up a world conference at which American Christianity was largely and influentially represented. This movement, although interrupted, has not been terminated. On a large scale American benevolence is being mobilized through the medium of the Federal Council for an

adequate relief of the dire distress in all Europe. The ready charity which proposes to go forth in the name of American Christians will help, it is confidently believed, in the reception of the overtures of peace when the time for them to be made has arrived.

In the very recent past the Federal Council, by publications and conferences, has laid strong stress upon rural conditions as affecting country churches. Extensive studies, some in New England and New York, some farther west and notably in Ohio, have been made of rural conditions, revealing in many instances a decadent church and even a disintegrating social fabric.

The character of these investigations and their wide publicity have aroused public attention and awakened public interest. The community church, as a remedy, seems to receive both popular approval and expert sanction. But the community church, if unrelated to its past, if disconnected from all denominational ties, if a purely local interdenominational organization of individual Christians, then loses relation to the world movements of missions and the vital forces of historic fraternalism; and if connected only with interdenominational churches like itself, tends to become, with the others, a new denomination of interdenominationalism broken, as other denominations are broken, into local and state groups with a national organization over them all. Under such conditions the evils of multiplied organizations, which the movement seeks to remedy, would simply be increased. The task of doing good and only good, in the midst of many opportunities for the evils of maladjustment, is delicate and intricate.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CLOSER UNION

Men are social beings; they cannot live apart; they ought not to make needless and unnatural divisions. Organizations for the sake of service and ministry are needful, but organizations which result in alienation of sympathy, disfellowship in work and worship, and disapproval of men's consciences and convictions, are pernicious. Jesus Christ expressed unto all men his sympathy and compassion. The bruised reed he would not break, the smoking flax he did not quench. His example is one of forbearance, inclusiveness, all-embracing love. It would be difficult to think of him

today, were he again among men in the flesh, as joining one denomination to the exclusion of all others. In spirit he must be recognized today as in them all, in part at least, if not completely. It takes us all to know the Christ and to express the Christ to the world. Jointly, therefore, we may give the better testimony; and together we may the better prepare for him a place.

The best recovery of apostolic conditions, so far as they are possible today, is the recovery of the united church. It would be absurd to think in apostolic forms, or to speak in apostolic terms, of denominations as they are named and defined now. The apostles were in simple relations; they were "brethren" and "of the way." When "churches" appeared, the term had a geographical significance. The church at Corinth, for example, was a community church. The divisions spoken of in Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians, when some said, "I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ," did not indicate separate churches or distinct communions. There may have been separate congregations, meeting in the house of Stephanus, or in the house of Gaius, or in the house of Erastus, "the chamberlain of the city," or even in the house of Phebe; but however much the Christians of Corinth may have been divided, either because of convenience or by reason of factions, they all constituted one church—a church for a definite geographical area—the community church of Corinth. In like manner the churches at Thessalonica, at Colosse, at Laodicea, and at Rome obviously included all the Christians within these municipalities. The very language of the apostles indicates that all Christians constituted "the body of Christ." In the midst of diversity, a diversity of temperaments, talents, gifts, and tasks, there was essential unity.

Probably no greater incentive toward fellowship and unity has been felt among Christians than the expressed desire of the Lord Jesus Christ in his prayer, during the experience of his passion as narrated in the Fourth Gospel, when he prayed, "that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." The fulfilment of this prayer calls for at least spiritual unity, if not organic union; and the prayer remains unanswered until the

disciples of the Master have that fellowship which produces harmony of purpose, unison of utterance, and co-operation in action.

It may be urged that Christianity itself is not clearly discernible until men behold more than one type of Christians. For their own self-culture Christians need to combine, to meet frequently with each other, to hear the recital of divergent experiences, and become acquainted with unlike convictions; for in this way only can the essentials of the Christian religion, in their variety and comprehensiveness, be understood.

Divisions into sects have been called "the sin of schism," "the luxury of denominationalism." It is the wasteful extravagance and folly of self-will. Against the reproach of such waste and wrong no good defense is possible. There have been the Middle Ages and the Dark Ages for the Christian church, and the wanderings in the wilderness of sin. To clear her garments of the stain of ages and her name from the reproach of history, the church must recover her forfeited fellowship, with all her parts, and see plainly her dismembered members.

The church must speak an accordant and harmonious testimony. The weight of her testimony is weak, if not indeed destroyed, when in one corner she affirms, and in another corner she denies, the same thing. She has an evidence to truth which must be given over against Mohammedanism, Brahminism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and all the pagan religions of the world. Jangling voices are heard at first, because curious, but at length are scorned. On the foreign missionary fields the representatives of Christ early discerned their essential unity, and found it not only possible, but, in many instances, easy, to employ a common proclamation and to organize nearly identical institutions. The great fundamentals of Christianity are not the property of any one branch of the Christian church. These fundamentals are the sacred bread which the dispensers of good must give to the hungry nations.

There is a great field for the exercise of Christian comity, which needs cultivation. Denominations, their leaders and their agents, ought surely to show toward one another the same measure of politeness and courtesy which people in ordinary social life evince. Indeed, the courtesy and comity of the Christian church ought to

exceed any kind of consideration, thoughtfulness, or chivalry manifest in secular affairs. To ride, roughshod, over the peculiarities, or the prerogatives, of a Christian body is brutal, no matter who the offender may be. To disregard the rights of priority and possession is worse than selfish—in many instances it is nothing short of embezzlement and larceny, however sanctimonious the excuse for so doing may be. The disregard of the principles of hospitality and fellowship in the practice of proselyting merits oftentimes the harshest condemnation. And the entrance of one denomination into a field which belongs to another is little less at times than highway robbery and brigandage. The Christian way of assigning fields to the undisturbed responsibility of one denomination has most happily been exemplified both in the homeland and abroad, so that men of different denominations, making geographical maps of what may be called "spheres of influence," have really marked out the finer ethical and spiritual qualities of the undivided body of Christ, incarnate in his church. The sectarian plea, sometimes put forth, that no group of people should be deprived of the peculiar doctrines and dogmas of a given denomination ignores the fact that one avenue of approach to the great center of Christianity is sufficient for the pilgrim whose feet would bring him to that center. Only when we have been a long time at the center are we in condition to look back over the path we have pursued and compare it with other paths which might have been taken. Diversity and differentiation are not the means of evangelization. Philosophy and theology may scrutinize, compare, and synthesize; experience needs to go its single path. For the sake of the experiences of salvation, Christian people must not conflict, but should co-operate. Comity among denominations is soteriological.

Unless the Christian church can act more nearly as a unit than it has in the past, it will be sidetracked from human affairs and its influence will be regarded as negligible, even while men continue to revere the Christ. Already we have heard it rumored that men, outside of church membership, have applauded the name of Christ and hissed the name of the church. How can men, deeming themselves ground in the wheels of hard industry, crushed by the

oppression of greed and social injustice, listen to a church which busies itself with questions of precedent and procedure, with what seem to be the unimportant issues of sectarian distinctions and the wasteful luxury of purely denominational administration and conventionality? "The church is to do her work in the social order by bringing to bear upon it the idealism of her gospel and by infusing it with the impulse of her sympathy." How can this be, if the church is not a united church, at least in her ideals and her sympathy?

Our American conviction is, unhesitatingly, that church and state must not be united, must indeed have no entangling alliances. This does not mean that they are antipodal, that they are antagonistic, and must strive one with the other. On the contrary, as related to the higher welfare of society, they are moving in parallel, if not indeed in converging, lines toward a new social order, one being busied primarily with man and his soul, the other with his environment and his work. But how can the church be in worthy fellowship and partnership with the state, if her utterances are discordant, if her policies are chaotic, if her counsels are jargon, and her influence is dissipated in the maintenance of her divisions?

We are recognizing that communities are organisms, almost social beings, with a spirit, or *Geist*. Neighbors are intimately related in work and recreation, in property and person. They know each other's affairs; their sorrows and burdens are borne in common; their joys and successes are more or less mutual; their perils, their safeguards, their sins, their virtues, their religion, and their irreligion come almost within common circles. They have received the same education; they respond to very nearly the same kind of appeals; in business and politics, however much they may compete or clash, yet they remain side by side as neighbors, usually in good fellowship. Why should such people, so few as to be unable to support the luxury of many places of worship, divide up on Sunday in impoverished groups for the worship of their one common Father in the name of their one Lord and Master? Perhaps no task in all Christendom sets forth more urgently the need of this new interdenominationalism than the condition of these little local churches, historically sectarian, actually dying, which need

imperatively to know the fellowship of Christian brotherhood. Only when denominational authorities at the top, on well-recognized principles, with full understanding and approval, sanction the merging of these little ecclesiastical interests into one community church, can the little fragments feel the attractive influences toward a common Christian center and combine their resources in one house, under the ministry of one man of God serving one Lord.

When all other enterprises of men are becoming magnificent in size and importance, so that men speak boastingly of "big business," and the captains of industry receive rewards commensurate with their positions, not only in money value, but also in the opportunities for service to their fellows, how can the church expect to enlist and retain in her ministry men of the larger caliber, if she continues in her disjointed, schismatic state? Her leadership will conduct her to centralization, and, if she follows her leaders, she will retain them and enlist and create more.

There is a new theology among men. It cannot be disguised; it does not now need to be defined. The fact of its existence must be recognized; and then it must be known that, if it exists, like new wine in new bottles, it must clothe itself in new forms. The Christ himself cannot be retained among men, if the phrases referring to him and addressed to him have lost their vigor, their meaning, and have become cant—if the conceptions which men have formed concerning him, deep in their souls as the expression of their relations to him, have no outward manifestation in the institutions consecrated to him. The spiritual reincarnation of Jesus Christ, which must be perennially repeated, cannot be realized in our day unless the convictions of men find expression in their devotions.

One of the most significant and beautiful passages in the New Testament, susceptible, however, of grievous misunderstanding and abuse, is that in which the coming of the Spirit upon the company of the apostles and their associates is described. They were "of one accord" when the Spirit came upon them. The realm of the Spirit throughout the New Testament and confirmed by all human experience appears plainly to be unison of sentiment,

agreement in purpose and aspiration, "one accord." The fruits of the Spirit described by the apostle Paul are nearly all social. When the church has known her lean years, has it not been because of dissension and discord? Is there anything more potent among men, conditioning the divine presence and the divine power, than harmony and good will? When two or three are met together, when there is agreement as touching one thing, are there not great promises spoken?

THE OUTLOOK FOR DAYS TO COME

The historian who prophesies incurs peculiar peril. And yet is it not possible to foresee in part the future, when one has traced some of the developments of the past and is cognizant of the tendencies of the present? If there is a stream of progress flowing through time, does it not give its own forecast by its course, its volume, and its channel?

Undoubtedly the new interdenominationalism which is upon us is as yet simply a process. It is an attitude of mind rather than a fixed organization; it is a period of transition. Doubtless few, if any, of the forms in which it is now expressed will remain fixed as at present existing. None of the higher expressions of fellowship and of the spirit of unity have reached finality. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, weak in two directions, (1) in its lack of vital connection with the spiritual genius of the bodies which it represents, and (2) in its loose amalgamation of commissions almost entirely unrelated, has yet far to go in compacting its organization, in spiritualizing its activities, and in gathering into itself the interdenominational impulses toward unity, with the accompanying confidence which the central body must possess. A marvelous opportunity awaits the right kind of wisdom, unchallenged charity, and the sacrificial spirit of Christian service. The World Conference on Faith and Order is as yet "the voice of one crying in the wilderness," with the testimony and the appeal of essential unity.

If any of these movements gravitate into the control of a single denomination, or into the hands of a few men, no one can doubt that there will be quick and effective revolt against any ecclesiastical

oligarchy, any ruling hierarchy, howsoever created or named. No prelacy will be long tolerated in whatever guise of protestant forms or terms it may arise.

No one can doubt that the laity of our churches will be more in evidence, both controlling the church and performing its functions. The layman's day, which has dawned, has not reached its noon. The laymen first found fellowship; they found it in service. The laymen have carried the essential unity of Christians into many fraternal, benevolent, and philanthropic orders, into many socialized forms of industry and labor, and even into statutory expression through politics and legislation. The spirit of Christ, as regnant in society, may be voiced by the preacher, but is socially incarnated by the laymen. The laymen will require the compacting of Christians and the solidifying of Christian sentiment in small communities, through community churches and other forms of federation. The laymen will furnish the appeal, provide the means, and constitute the material for unity.

Theology, in the older sense of the word, dogmatic, apologetic, or biblical, will have less control over the church in the future than it had in the past. A philosophy of life will take its place. Life is larger than the functioning of a soul, temporarily housed in a tenement of flesh, fitting for mansions in the skies! God is now recognized as immanent in all creation; things secular have disappeared, because all things, in their time and place and proper proportion, have become holy; time, therefore, is not divided into sevenths, save for social convenience; places are not "cut off" (*templa*), save again as mental suggestions; and possessions are not tithed, save by those who have not attained to the ideas of Christian stewardship; the whole man is becoming Christianized. This is a great task; but it is the task before the church; and the church in meeting it must think more, and speak more, and act more in the terms of Christian socialism. The tests of orthodoxy, which may have served in the past, in the future will be discarded. The questions will not be asked, "Has he thought much, and believed correctly, and phrased rightly?" but rather, "Has he loved much, and served sacrificially?" The materialism and commercialism which now seem so largely to dominate society, and even to have

crept into the councils of the church, will, in the not distant future, be curbed and restrained by the growing spirit of altruistic brotherhood. Sin may be a perpetual factor to reckon with, and yet the sin of selfishness, though perhaps never entirely eradicated from human nature, is already finding its check in the growing spirit of social obligation.

So far as organizations are concerned, the movement now on by which the scattered members of denominational family groups are coming together will continue. One can look forward and easily say that, since fellowship is found more in service than in beliefs, the tendency of the future will be to gather the protestant denominations into two great groups, having reference to polity rather than to doctrines. There will be the tendency to gravitate toward a center congregationally governed, democratic in its types and principles; and another tendency to gravitate toward another center episcopally governed, with a larger measure of surrender of individual initiative and local independence to a central authority. None of the federations now in evidence seem to be final goals. They are expedients, transitory, though useful. Particularly is it true of local federations that their service appears largely as a means of transition. They may be called a *modus vivendi* or a *modus operandi*; they are not the formulation of the settled terms of compromise and fellowship. It may be reasonably expected that the federations of the country—speaking now of those in limited communities—will tend to move toward, and become parts of, some strong denomination, dominant in the region. This, with reference to a far-reaching policy, should not be objected to. The federated church is better than the union church; and the denominational church is better than the federated church. The union church is famous for its deficiencies; it lacks associational fellowship outside supervision, an adequate source of ministerial supply, approved literature, connection with, and responsibility for, education and missionary enterprises at home and abroad. The federated church has these, but has them fragmentarily, alternatingly, sectionally, and in parts which, while possibly totaling more than a whole, are never equal to the whole. The denominational church inherits all these associational advantages and

privileges, has them naturally, unitedly and in due proportion. The federated church, therefore, which tends to move toward a denominational center, becomes a part of the greater trek toward interdenominational centers. Of this we may be sure, that the centralizing movement of local churches is wiser, saner, more nearly correct historically, if kept within denominational bounds, than if encouraged and permitted outside of these bounds, as free movements, purely federative in character.

Interdenominational organizations, notably such as the Young Men's Christian Association, have sometimes been thought of as destined to be an adequate, organized expression of Christianity, taking the place of the organized church. It is true that they have some of the social marks of the church: they are an acceptable center for acquaintance and friendship; they are in many instances educational institutions, proclaiming truth, explaining the principles of life, and inculcating personal duties; they furnish partially an occasion, opportunity, and incentive to worship; and they are efficient means of ministry and service to the community and to the world, and, having taken on, as many of them have, the recognition of world-wide missions, they are exemplifying the mind of Christ in its universal inclusiveness. But such organizations present at least three serious deficiencies, which unfit them to be a substitute for the church of the future: (1) They lack historic continuity; they lack the ordinances, the ministry, the traditions, and the sacred associations of the church. (2) Necessarily they emphasize service, and so overemphasize it as largely to lose out of their own functions the element of worship, that spiritual exercise which unites the worshiper in fellowship with his God. (3) These organizations are partial, because most of them minister to but one sex, male or female, to but one age, young or old, or to but one class. The church has as its social unit the primary, fundamental social unit ordained of God, the family. The church of the future will not be less, but more, a family church, with a larger inclusiveness of children, with a wider reach unto both sexes, with a fuller, heartier, and more sincere manifestation of brotherhood and neighborliness.

One may say confidently that in the future Catholics and Protestants will discover a common fellowship. They are neighbors;

they are part of the same social fabric; they face the same perils; they grapple with the same foes; they are seeking to build up, and to realize here on earth, the kingdom of one common Christ. Each body may need purifying of some dross in varying proportions; neither is yet perfect. It is unreasonable to think that they should long continue in any sense hostile, or even perpetually keep apart. They are natural allies; they should be in alliance. Already there are not wanting signs of a growing friendliness and a heartier appreciation of each other. The World Conference on Faith and Order sets before itself consciously and distinctly this more embracing form of unity.

The mere mechanics of federation are of all things least important. Spiritual qualities are supreme. There is a new type of Christian evolving. He has respect for his own mental processes, because he is an independent, responsible being, endowed with liberty of soul and conscience. He thinks, therefore, his own thoughts, and is better respected in his thinking and for his thinking than in any previous day. He in turn, more fully than ever before, accords to others the same degree of soul liberty which he himself enjoys. So doing, he allows variety in experience and belief and accords liberty and toleration for all. The new type of Christian, therefore, even more conscientious than the old, is more charitable, more kindly, more altruistic, more fraternal. He asks no man to yield that which he himself does not surrender; he asks no man to conform to his standards, being himself unwilling to conform to the standards of any other man; he seeks the basis of unity, not in external conformity, but in spiritual qualities, in sincerity, in love of, and devotion to, truth, in fidelity to the highest claims as they become apparent. These marks of the modern disciple, becoming ever more numerous, are the promise of new interdenominationalism, the new Christianized social order.

ORIGIN AND VALIDITY IN RELIGION

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I. INTRODUCTORY

What is the present attitude of the Christian theologian toward the study of anthropological origins in their bearing on the history of religion? Even if it be circumspect rather than cordial, it is at any rate no longer actively hostile, as half a century ago it used to be. Thus the first attempt to found the Anthropological Society of Paris in 1846 was rendered futile by the church-supporting government of the day. Even when finally in 1859, the year of the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, such a society was duly constituted, its illustrious founder Broca was formally bound over to keep the discussions within orthodox limits, a police agent actually attending the sittings so as to enforce this stipulation.¹ But the progress of time has brought about a welcome change of spirit. Today I find myself invited as an anthropologist to make a statement in a periodical devoted to theology concerning the anthropological view of religion. The assumption clearly is that it may be fruitfully combined with the theological view; else why be at pains to consider it here at all? In short, sympathy is proffered in place of the old-world antipathy. The time is evidently ripe for trying to determine how, and to what extent, we anthropologists and theologians can help one another, while none the less remaining true to our several methods and aims.

Of course we have our several prejudices also. They may not be those of fifty years ago, but even so they are doubtless strong enough to count for a good deal. As an anthropologist, however, who has tried to take stock of the complex human impulses for which the word "prejudice" stands, I must confess to a certain respect for prejudice, as one of the major forces that move the world of men. Regarding it from this point of view, one's utmost hope is to see it,

¹ Cf. *Athenaeum*, July 24, 1909, p. 103.

not eradicated, but transformed. Prejudices have only to be purged by criticism, and they become principles; all principles being in the last resort, as I at least am inclined to believe, attitudes of faith, rather than expressions of pure reason, whatever that may be. Now there is at least one prejudice that the theologian and the anthropologist have in common, and that is the love of truth. The very nerve of science consists in the will to believe only the truth. Religion too is surely bound to regard this as the only genuine "will to believe." This cardinal prejudice, however, stands in need of critical confirmation if it is to acquire the enhanced authority of a principle. A thoroughly enlightened pursuit of truth—that, one feels, would bring theologian and anthropologist once for all into line. The end is plain enough. The difficulty is how to attain it.

Now it is notorious that philosophers are all in a maze about the nature of truth. Yet it is their business, I suppose, to co-ordinate the intellectual activities of man by exhibiting truth as a crystal of many facets which each departmental study may aspire to illuminate from a different side. Are we to wait, involved in controversy and confusion of spirit, until they are in a position to tell us what truth is? It would seem the sounder policy that each should play the philosopher for himself so far as to try to make clear the aspect in which truth is revealed to him through his special researches. This, then, I shall endeavor to do, speaking from the anthropological point of view. Let the theologian in his turn do the same from his distinct, and undoubtedly more comprehensive, point of view. Thereupon we shall have pooled our notions of truth, as it were; and the result must assuredly be to bring us nearer together.

So much then for the ultimate orientation of the present inquiry. I have insisted on the need of agreeing at the outset to will the truth and the truth only, because, though this may sound a platitude, it is really nothing of the sort. Few educated persons, it may be, would be ready to sacrifice truth to personal convenience. But most of us are cowards when it is a question of setting truth above social convenience. I do not say that truth and convenience, whether personal or social, are ultimately opposed. But it is obvious that the social convenience of the moment is at constant war with the tendency, manifested by the best minds of every

nation and age, to be honest with themselves at all costs. The impulse that bids such noble spirits manfully to refuse to cling to illusions cannot itself be an illusion. The last stronghold of faith is here—in the conviction that life is not a lie. So far then as we have this faith in common, there cannot be any final parting of the ways as between anthropologist and theologian. Whatever be our temporary versions of the truth, truth in itself must be one for all.

II. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The nature of the question before us is suitably expressed by means of an antithesis which is currently employed by philosophers in this as in many a similar context.¹ Let Origin represent the standpoint of the anthropologist, and Validity the standpoint of the theologian. It will be necessary to consider these terms apart before proceeding to ask how, if at all, they may be taken together, may be harmonized according to a higher synthesis.

a) *Meaning of Origin.*—Origin, of course, means beginning, and beginning is a relative term, at any rate so far as it applies to whatever is conditioned by time and change. Since absolute beginnings fall outside the sphere of the anthropologist, it follows that he may treat any former state of the thing under investigation as its original condition, according to the needs of a given inquiry. Since he can never complete the infinite regress, he can but proceed thus or thus far in his search for the primitive, as speculative interest dictates or evidential opportunity allows. Origin, then, covers all previous history, any chapter in that history serving as a possible starting-point. In short, Origin, as it concerns the anthropologist, presides over the use of the past tense of the verb “to be,” however wide be that use or however restricted.

Besides this merely historical meaning of the term Origin, there is another which is so intimately associated with it that the two are in practice usually confused. From signifying “beginning,” origin slips imperceptibly into meaning “cause”; though whenever we say origin in the place of cause we are employing the

¹ See, for instance, my essay, “Origin and Validity in Ethics,” in *Personal Idealism*, ed. H. Sturt, London, 1902, to which the present paper is intended to provide a sequel.

looser expression. Now in the context to which anthropology wholly relates, namely, the sphere of time and change, cause implies the notion of antecedence combined, as best may be, with the notion of necessity. If the anthropologist argues that the modern king is hedged in by a strict etiquette "because" the primitive king was sacred, or that we throw rice at weddings today "because" it was once a magico-religious way of imparting fertility, he means or ought to mean that not otherwise could the more recent institution have come into being. As it is, however, Origin may stand more or less indifferently for the merely historical or for the causal, for *post hoc* or *propter hoc*—modes of relation which it would be disastrous to identify offhand. Meanwhile, Origin, being at best a loose expression for cause, is likely to betray the would-be historian of origins into causal explanations unawares.

Now anthropology is at least history. It considers mankind as subject to time and change. Man in evolution—such is its favorite way of describing its object. Doubtless the term "evolution" tends to imply a progress rather than a simple process. The anthropologist, however, professes to be evolutionary primarily in the sense that he assumes a certain serial order, not by any means unilinear, to pervade the secular changes undergone by the human race. His first task, he would affirm, is to trace this order. Did he stop here, this task would be purely historical. But can he stop here? Is anthropology to correspond to what the word *ἀνθρωπολογία* means in Greek, namely, "gossip"? For in that case it would exist only to satisfy a wholly unpractical curiosity about mere particulars. Inevitably, then, the anthropologist allows a comfortable breadth to his interpretation of the standpoint of Origin. From beginning to cause—the transition, assisted by the ambiguity of the word Origin, is soon made. It becomes part of the anthropological creed that a certain necessity underlies the serial order of events into which human history has been unraveled; that the process, however complex, obeys an evolutionary law. Once admit, however, that all human lives are bound together as by a chain, a mood of unpractical curiosity no longer satisfies. In these leaves of the book of man, torn and fragmentary as they are, we may read our own fate. So much, then, for the standpoint of anthropology as desig-

nated by Origin. It is an interest in the history of mankind regarded both as history and as something more, namely, as a process with which we are ourselves in some sense causally connected and therefore practically concerned.

b) *Meaning of Validity.*—Validity means in general value or worth. The term, however, tends to have a special connotation. To be valid is not so much to be good as to hold good. Thus Lotze uses the equivalent word *Geltung* to signify the sort of value that attaches to an idea as such, namely, universality. Now for a principle to be valid in this sense, it might seem that it must be altogether independent of time and change. And indeed, it appears easy enough to think of certain propositions as holding good in this absolute way. Most people would allow that $2+2=4$ is valid everywhere and always; and, apart from mathematics, they might be almost as ready to concede a like validity to the ethical principle that "happiness implies virtue." Most people, on the other hand, would admit that the mere form of universality cannot justify the claim to absoluteness. On the face of it, $2+2=5$, or "vice is preferable to virtue" is no less free of limiting conditions. Some philosophers, however, would say that propositions of the latter type are immediately seen to be unthinkable. Speaking for myself, however, I must confess that my own way of testing such principles would be different. To contemplate them simply as ideas, with a view to discovering their validity, is a process likely in practice to generate a sort of mental stupor. So I should test them rather by inquiring whether they can be fruitfully applied to life or not. Further, even supposing it to be true that a few universal principles have an axiomatic validity such as must win instant and final acceptance from any mind which contemplates them fairly and squarely, yet it is clear that there are thousands of our ordinary judgments which we invest with the same form of universality without intending to imply any such necessity. I may say with all the sweep and emphasis of a universal judgment that "all men are fools," and yet come to recognize later on that I made the remark in haste. In regard, then, to this latter class of judgments, their validity, or value as ideas, is plainly relative to application, or in other words is conditioned by time and change. The form of universality

cloaks a merely hypothetical judgment—one that may be striving to rise above all limitations, but is none the less limited for all that. Here validity can mean no more than normality, or tendency to hold good. A judgment of this class is valid if, on the whole, it proves good enough to live by. Doubtless, the troubled mariner would prefer to steer by the everlasting stars. Failing their light, however, he is glad enough to lay his course by the shifting set of the tidal currents.

Can theology acquiesce in principles that, in respect of their validity, are less than absolute? Of course theology has a perfect right to prefer propositions of the axiomatic type. So would science, if it saw any chance (outside mathematics, at any rate) of obtaining them. Besides, theology has a special reason for this predilection. As the handmaid of religion, which is eminently practical and hence rooted in faith, theology is bound to try to supply logical certainties so that the practical certainties which religion needs may rest on firm foundations. Hence it has been inclined to ascribe infallibility now to the church, now to Scripture, now to some form of dogmatic philosophy. The very variety, however, of the means whereby assurance is sought sounds a note of uncertainty.

What, then, of theological principles that are less than absolute, that can claim only an empirical validity? It is at least theoretically possible that no others are available. The purpose of theology being to validate, to make good, the reality of the divine, two alternative theories concerning that reality have to be considered. One is that the divine nature is changeless. Even so, however, it will not necessarily be expressible in terms of a changeless definition or law for beings whose intelligence is in process of growth. Need it afford glimpses of itself that within certain limits show the divine nature for what it absolutely is? May not the validation (or, one might say, the revelation), while relating to the eternal, nevertheless make good the truth, not piecemeal, but rather by gradual approximation? The other possible view is that the divine nature is itself in evolution. On such a theory the divine experience, like the experience that we know in ourselves, would be eventually a trying. But if it were a dynamic movement of self-realization conditioned

by a real time, then any validation, or revelation, of it must surely be a dynamic process too. Only a pessimist would declare that, even so, human thought might still require certain unchanging universals round which to rally its streaming impressions. If these fixed points had no counterpart in the objective order, if God and the universe were moving on despite our pauses, miserable indeed would be man, the so-called rational animal.

So much for validity as representing the standpoint of the theologian. Some sort of intellectual certainty must be supplied by theology so as to support and undergird the practical certainty which religion must have. I have tried to show that, within the sphere of intellect itself, a practical or empirical certainty might be the only kind of certainty obtainable. Theology might thus have to acquiesce in a validation by means of trial and error, or, in other words, in an approximate and progressive form of revelation. It remains to be shown how in any case, though perhaps in that case especially, theology may profitably ally itself with science, and notably with anthropology, the science of human origins.

III. THE RELATION OF HISTORY AND SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

There are two points of view from which human nature may be envisaged, one of which let me call compendiously, if somewhat barbarously, the "historico-scientific," while the other may be named the "philosophico-religious." The former is the cardinal interest of anthropology, the latter that of theology.

The ideal relations between history and science for the one part and philosophy and religion for the other may be exhibited by arranging them in a sort of ascending scale. Of the four, history affords least insight into the nature of man, because its method of treatment is chronological. The historian may be conceived for our present purpose as a mere annalist, a recorder of passing events. Here he finds one serial order of facts to be chronicled and there another; and to make one out of the many ceases at a certain point to be his business. An anthropologist, for instance, who is content to play the mere historian will make out one history, let us say, for

pre-Columbian America and another for aboriginal Australia, without attempting to show their common bearing on the general evolution of man. We may say, then, that history as such is concerned with establishing a "that." Science, on the other hand, tries to go deeper. Thus, as regards the subject of man, its method is not chronological but comparative. It takes note of the points of likeness and difference displayed by this and that historical series with the object of determining general laws of seriation, of normal sequence or tendency. To a corresponding extent it is more abstract than history, because it seeks to distinguish in a given series of events the essential elements governing the development, while discarding the irrelevant details. So far then as science succeeds in discovering such a law of tendency, it may be said to yield a "how." And here we touch the limit of the anthropological ideal. It would embrace no more than "that" and "how"—the facts about man as facts, and as bound together according to their normal sequences. Beyond these limits one has the right to speak, not as an anthropologist, but, if at all, in some other capacity.

Passing on to philosophy, we may lay it down that its method is teleological. Its function is to supplement the "how" of science with a "why." Why? means What is the good? Such a question applies obviously to the facts of human history, but perhaps not so obviously to the facts of the material world. Nevertheless, it would be a poor kind of philosophy that knuckled down to any form of mere science, whether it be physical science or any other. After all, if we thought the subject-matter of any science of no good at all, we should lack all impulse to construct a science in regard to it. There is, however, a great contrast between the notions of law as they apply severally to the self-determining man and to an externally determined nature. Indeed, the problem of freedom *vs.* necessity is the most fundamental of philosophical difficulties. Nay, it is more than a problem; it is a crux, an insoluble antimony from the philosophic standpoint, because philosophy is merely a way of thinking. Because the problem will not think out, it does not follow that it cannot be lived out. Hence we need to move beyond philosophy to a still higher, and, in fact, the highest, plane of all. This is the plane of religion. Religion, to coin a word, is "teleo-

practical." Its function is to supplement "why" theoretical with "why" practical, to convert good as described by the mere intellect into such a form of good as may be absorbed into the economy of our thinking, feeling, and willing soul-life as a whole. All sound religion is optimistic. It answers the question "What is the good?" with an unhesitating "Why, all the good in the world." Of course it looks back for support to philosophy, just as philosophy looks back to science, and science to history. But it contributes more than it receives, being the higher synthesis, the fuller interpretation, which has come "not to destroy but to fulfil." Fact in detail, fact generalized, fact intellectually valued, fact vitally valued or, in other words, harmonized with the purposes of the best attainable life—such is the ascending scale which leaves religion in a position of highest authority, and of greatest responsibility.

Now theology is not religion, but only the philosophy of religion, though as such it is philosophy as it grapples with its most ultimate problems. Biblical studies by themselves do not make the theologian. He needs philosophy. He must be competent to throw light on such a question as how facts and values may be correlated, and may both together be conceived in terms of law as applicable to a world in evolution. When he has thought these things out as best he can, he may offer himself to religion as the intellectual guide it craves. Even so, however, he will find that he must, as it were, overtake religion. Religion cannot afford to wait until theology has made up its mind. Religion is the life of the serious man, and must perforce carry on, whether thought be at its side to render assistance, or, through loss of touch with the vital strivings of man, diverge into futile ideology. On the other hand, without help from the side of the intellect, religion will be but a blind force, and as such liable to terrible aberrations, as no one knows better than the student of religion in its more primitive forms.

Moreover, the philosophy which the theologian must profess is not simply the philosophy of God as distinct from that of man or of nature. Philosophy is one, and, to be philosophers, we must study it in all its aspects together. Let me suggest, then, that, so far from neglecting the philosophy of man, the theologian will do well to begin with it, and then proceed to the philosophy of nature, so as

finally to attain to a philosophy of God. The old maxim, "Know thyself," is a sound one. Philosophy, like charity, must begin at home. If one begin with the philosophy of nature, taking one's clues from the physical sciences, one is likely to be misled by the apparent serenity of the laws of matter and motion, and, as happens naturally enough in a materialistic age, to identify religion with the worship of a sort of cosmic machine. But there is even more serenity and strength to be discerned in human nature than in any machinery, man-made or cosmic, if only one can develop the eyes to see it there. When the theologian seeks to frame his final conception of the divine reality, he will be nearer the truth if he think of it less as a force than as a will. But to know it as a will, as free and purposive and creative, he must from the first know himself as man; that is to say, must ally himself with the study that views the history of human effort and advance both from without and from within, though chiefly from within.

IV. THE HISTORICO-SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF RELIGION

Definitions are relative to logical purposes. Hence the definition of religion that suits the historico-scientific purposes of anthropology is constructed solely in order to further the interests of the study of human origins. Now Origin, as we have seen, does not mean absolute beginning. The student of human origins begins wherever he most conveniently can. Now as one seeks to trace back the descent of man, one is brought up sharply at a certain point by a total lack of direct evidence. We know only the distinctively human. The pre-human is unknown, except in the way of pure speculation. Anthropology, therefore, has not much choice in the matter of a starting-point. It so understands its postulate of continuity that all the more important kinds of vital activity are treated as present in germ in the earliest known condition of man; whereas the pre-social, the pre-matrimonial, the pre-scientific, the pre-religious—all these are at best but possible aspects of the unknown pre-human character of the race.

Thus, for the anthropologist, religion is a universal attribute of man, because his historico-scientific purposes require him to have a free hand in the following up of origins right back to the point where

the direct evidence about human history breaks off. It may be well to remark in passing, however, that, when the anthropologist states every kind of man to be religious in the anthropological sense of the term, the theologian has no right to conclude that every kind of man is likewise religious in the theological sense of the term. The business of the philosopher-theologian is to identify religion, not with any kind of religion that any kind of man may profess, but with the right kind of religion a thinking kind of man ought to profess. To ignore the difference between the two standpoints is to confuse Origin with Validity. But, if it be remembered that anthropology is but a part of the propaedeutic of theology, no such trouble need arise. The anthropologist frames a definition of religion in view of certain strictly limited ends of his own.

What, then, is the anthropological definition of religion? Despite endless quarrels about words, it would seem that students of human origins are largely in agreement as regards the facts with which religion has to do. These facts belong partly to the subjective and partly to the objective order, and yet are so related that a certain quality is common to them all. To express this common quality I know no better term than "sacredness."¹ The religious life is sacred, and the objects that sustain it are likewise sacred. Religion draws its sustenance from two roots at once—from ourselves and from the not-ourselves. This two-sidedness or polarity of the sacred must be noted at the start, because we are thus prepared to expect a certain ambiguity in the forms in which it is historically manifested. Some of its most characteristic manifestations let us now consider.

Under conditions of primitive culture sacredness reveals itself both negatively and positively, both by contrast and by direct experience. Thus, on the one hand, the need is felt to break away from common things, to embark on a *vita nuova*, to cross a threshold and commune with what has hitherto been hidden as behind a veil. From this point of view consecration is a conversion. Positively, however, we have yet to learn what this change of front brings with it. What fruition ensues upon conversion—what access of vitality and force—what profit in the way of knowledge or friendship? When such a positive characterization of sacredness is given

¹ See my article on "Religion (primitive)" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed.

in terms of the experience that it involves, we are nearer to its true nature, because we envisage it no longer from without but from within. At the risk of repeating what I have elsewhere treated more fully, and with a better chance of illustrating my meaning by examples, I must say something more about these two aspects of the sacred in turn.

First let us as anthropologists examine sacredness in its negative capacity. In three ways is the insufficiency of ordinary life asserted by contrast with a mode of life which is somehow other. This otherness is variously indicated by saying that the sacred is supernatural; that it is separated; and that it is esoteric.

When the sacred is said to be supernatural, it is regarded as non-natural and at the same time higher or better than the natural. Nature stands for the whole order of commonplace happenings in respect to which reasonable expectation is normally satisfied. Whatever falls outside this order is non-natural. As such, it may affect mankind favorably or unfavorably. Both miracles of healing and "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" belong to this sphere of influence. Nay, since the savage, like his civilized brother, tends to take "the blessings of Providence" as a matter of course, whereas any mishap strikes him as unaccountable and portentous in the last degree, it comes about that the supernatural and the untoward are found in especially close association at the primitive level of thought. At any rate, the bad supernaturalism is likely, for the peoples of the lower culture, to obtrude itself of its own accord; whereas the good supernaturalism has usually to be invoked by them by way of counterblast. Thus, if the presence of the supernatural always operates with primitive folk as a call to the serious life, it is for the most part primarily a call to wrestle with the powers of darkness, and only secondarily and by way of consequence a call to seek alliance with the powers of light. In any case, dualism is paramount—a system of devils and gods conceived in sheer antithesis. It is only the more advanced religions that try to reconcile the appearance of evil in the world with the reality of good as expressed in the divine nature. Meanwhile, in early religion, the supernatural in either aspect begets seriousness inasmuch as it spells crisis. Savage life has few safeguards, while crisis is

everywhere. Hence every department of activity tends to be pervaded with a sense of the supernatural and sacred. Whenever the careless animal is put off and the circumspect man put on, be it in food-getting or in fighting, in merrymaking or in mating, then a touch of consecration is imparted, though it comes in the first instance as a touch of the spur, as something that goads him out of his natural jog-trot pace. Moreover, the history of religion would seem to show that the more the pace is quickened the more man comes to appreciate it. At any rate, the more his religious thought develops the more does man tend to perceive God rather than the devil behind the crises that he is forced to face.

Again, whatever is sacred is held to be separated off from the profane. The subject of primitive taboo is too vast for justice to be done to it here. Taking a great deal for granted, however, one may venture to affirm that, just as the supernatural is primarily conceived rather as bad than as good, so that which is taboo is forbidden to the profane crowd rather lest it hurt them than lest they hurt it. The profane are those who are living the ordinary careless animal life. If a certain food, for instance, is "profane," it simply means that anyone may eat it anyhow. Taboo, on the other hand, spells fear. One eats a tabooed food at one's peril. Now fear in itself may be a bad thing, but as an ingredient in an emotional complex it has its uses. Reverence, for example, or the sense of discipline, would be impossible but for the dash of fear that they contain. So it comes about that, by association with other emotional elements, the taboo-feeling proves a beneficent factor in religious evolution. Combined with curiosity, admiration, affection, and so forth, it in every case deepens and enlarges the feeling by introducing an element of self-restraint. A certain humility helps rather than hinders the serious life, since it invests the sacred with dignity, protecting it from the familiarity that would otherwise breed contempt. This is especially noticeable when the taboo-feeling fuses with the sense of social obligation. Sacredness and the customary sanction join forces, so that each lends a new majesty to the other. Thereupon, by a curious reaction, the sacred is no longer avoided merely lest the profane be injured, but, on the strength of the majesty bound up with its obligatoriness, it must be

avoided by the profane lest they soil and contaminate it. As religion advances, the latter becomes more and more the prevailing aspect in which the sacred is viewed. Its dangerous character fades out of sight, while its remoteness and inviolability are increasingly felt to be the marks of exalted worth. Correspondingly fear develops into reverence.

Thirdly, the sacred is treated as esoteric. Distinguishable from the taboo-feeling, though in some ways akin to it, is the tendency to deal with it secretly. Now the bad side of the esotericism which is so typical of all primitive religion is obvious. Hocus-pocus and terrorism follow in its train. Yet the effort to shield the intimacies of religious experience from the prying gaze of the unsympathetic is not less justifiable than it is natural. Religion must always preserve something of the character of a mystery, if only because the capacity for religious experience is different in different men, and their sympathy is likely to be limited in like degree. Thus, with the advance of religious evolution, though esotericism on the whole loses ground in face of what may be termed the catholic idea, the individual consciousness asserts a certain claim to privacy of worship and communion; and God is conceived, not indeed to listen to personal petitions that are purely selfish, but nevertheless to "hear in secret."

So much, then, for the negative aspects of the sacred. Now it is plain that to exclaim "Marvelous!" or "Beware!" or "Hush!" in the presence of the sacred tells us directly nothing more than that there is something at hand which must be regarded with special attention. What has yet to be shown is not merely that it is other, but how it is other. We need not be surprised, however, if primitive theology turns out to be deficient on the positive side, seeing that even advanced theology is relatively weak in the matter of constructive theory. Certain characterizations of the sacred, however, occur in savage thought which attribute positive quality to it in a rather tentative way. These may likewise be considered under three heads.

First, the sacred is powerful. Of all the positive ideas that center in the notion of the sacred, that of a transcendent power is, perhaps, the most fundamental. Whether it bring weal or bring

woe, in any case a mighty force is held to be at work. This sense of a power in men and things that surpasses the ordinary is the common root whence spring the rival developments of magic and religion. Both involve supernaturalisms. Both are traffickings on the part of man with the "super" element in the universe; only magic is the bad kind of trafficking and religion the good kind. I can only sketch in outline here a view of the relation between magic and religion which I have tried to justify at length in *The Threshold of Religion* and elsewhere.¹ Suffice it to say that the power which at first is conceived somewhat ambiguously as working weal or woe in a transcendent way comes gradually to reflect the moral quality attaching to man's attitude toward it. It is magical and bad, if man draws near to it in a masterful and overbearing spirit, if he uses it but to exploit it. On the other hand, it is religious and good, if the applicant for favor and grace is filled with a spirit of reverence, if, in the Iroquois phrase, he "lays down his own power" in its presence. It comes to this, that so long as man falls short of the perfect love that waits on perfect understanding he cannot afford to cast out fear, in the shape of humility and self-restraint. These virtues are the springs of the serious life, whereas a crass self-satisfaction is its bane. The life of the evolving man, the life of spiritual effort and advance, is conditioned by fear and hope—by the fear of self and by the hope of overcoming self with the help of something higher.

Next, the sacred is conceived as personal. Now power is not necessarily personal, and therefore comparable in quality with the will-power that we know in ourselves. There is power of a kind in poison, or in strong drink. In primitive religion, then, there appears at times a tendency to identify the bad kind of supernatural power with a sort of poison and the good kind with a sort of stimulant. In magic especially, where the human operator's mood is masterful, it is easy to represent the end sought as the control of an occult force no more personal in its mode of action than the force attributed by the old alchemist to his *elixir vitae* or his philosopher's stone. Even in religion, at the savage level at all events, a more

¹ See *The Threshold of Religion*, 2d ed., 1914, chaps. ii-iv; also "Magic or Religion?" in *The Edinburgh Review*, April, 1914.

or less impersonal grace may be acquired by contact with sacred objects. Thus the cult of the sacred bull-roarer or *churinga* is the very soul of the religion of Central Australia. Physical contact, as by rubbing on the stomach, causes a man to be "glad" and "good" and "strong." It is true that these sacred objects are vaguely connected with ancestors, with sacred animals, and so on. But to become "full of *churinga*," as the native phrase puts it, would seem to be largely an end in itself. I am therefore inclined to think that to attribute personality to the sacred is less fundamental, from the standpoint of the study of religious origins, than to attribute power. Even certain phases of advanced religion, for instance Buddhism, show that it is possible to conceive the divine in a largely or wholly impersonal way. Nevertheless I believe that to construe the power ascribed to the sacred as the power of a superhuman will is the normal tendency of human religion as it becomes reflective. As thought gradually concentrates more on the end of religion and less exclusively on the means—and all forms of intellectual advance display this tendency—divine power is no longer regarded as inherent primarily in ceremonies and ceremonial objects, but these things are treated as mere vehicles of communication between the mind of man and the mind of a Being not only able but willing to be man's helper.

Lastly, the sacred is good. For, whereas the magician tends to stand alone, and is deservedly a pariah because he plays for his own hand, religious men tend to associate in brotherhoods so that every form of social union, the family, the clan, the tribe itself, is in some sense a church as well. Thus, from the first, religion is associated with the ethics of social obligation, and the divine in its transcendent way makes for the common welfare as a matter of course. Now the social and the ethical are not to be identified offhand; and that private good is not necessarily selfish is gradually but slowly borne in upon the religious consciousness. The destruction of the pagan system of classical antiquity at the hands of Christianity, or the Lutheran Reformation, may be regarded as in large part due to the protest of the individual conscience against too much socialism in religion. But there has been no going back on the old-world instinct against private contracts with the gods. The serious life

may seem to lift the individual clean out of the world of human affairs, but even so he is bound to try to take the rest of humanity with him.¹

Here must perforce cease what cannot be more than a very summary account, from the standpoint of anthropology, of that notion of sacredness which I believe to be the best working clue to the interpretation of the vast complex of beliefs and practices summed up under the name of primitive religion.

V. THE BEARING OF THE HISTORICO-SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF RELIGION ON THE VIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHER-THEOLOGIAN

What moral is the philosopher-theologian to draw from the foregoing sketch of the tendencies at work in historical religion? As an anthropologist, I am inclined to break off abruptly at this point. Yet, though I am innocent of any desire to give the theologian a lead, it is perhaps only fair that I should state very briefly how it seems to me that my Origin and his Validity stand in a certain significant relation to each other.

Put very shortly, the moral of the history of primitive religion would seem to be this—that religion is all along vital to man as a striving and progressive being. My point is not merely that there is always to be found something that the anthropologist would call religion; because, as has been already said, that is largely a question of words, the universality of religion being implied in his postulate of continuity. But enough has been said to show that, corresponding to the anthropologist's wide use of the term "religion," there is a real sameness, felt all along, if expressed with no great clearness at first, in the characteristic manifestations of the religious consciousness at all times and in all places. It is the common experience of man that he can draw on a power that makes for, and in its most typical form wills, righteousness, the sole condition being that a certain fear, a certain shyness and humility, accompany the effort so to do. That such a universal belief exists amongst all mankind, and that it is no less universally helpful in the highest degree, is the

¹ On the relation between religion and ethics in primitive society see also my article on "Ethics (rudimentary)" in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. J. Hastings, Vol. V. especially *ad fin.*

abiding impression left on my mind by the study of religion in its historico-scientific aspect.

But is such a belief not only helpful but true? The philosopher-theologian in his search for the valid has to ask himself this further question, whether the anthropologist can throw light on it or not. Now there is a danger lest the anthropologist, limiting himself as he has a perfect right to do to the standpoint of science, proceed illegitimately to conclude that the standpoint is final, not merely for him, but in an absolute sense. Thus Sir James Frazer, after showing in his brilliant little book entitled *Psyche's Task* that primitive religion (he usually misnames it superstition) has proved useful to mankind in all sorts of ways, ends feebly with the assertion that it is a mere will-o'-the-wisp; for all that, it has shown on the whole a marvelous faculty of keeping away from the boggy spots and illuminating the ground that can be trusted. Now I imagine that Sir James Frazer pronounces religion to be an illusion because it seems to him to fail to acquiesce in what he is pleased to regard as the laws of nature. Such positivism, however, which treats the mere "how" of science as likewise an all-sufficient "why," is due to the failure to realize that science as such generalizes the observable tendencies of men and things without alleging any real necessity whatever. Philosophy, on the other hand, which is essentially teleological in its function, may well doubt whether there is any necessity which does not at the same time imply will. Even those necessities of thought on which all other necessary truth depends are the outcome of a will to think.

For the rest, it need not unduly trouble us that primitive religion has generated much evil by the way. Experience is experiment, as the psychologists say, and that truth emerges out of error holds good of religion no less than of every other form of the strenuous life. There is at any rate no difficulty in holding this from the standpoint of the historian of religion who treats it as something that has evolved and is still evolving. Now the philosophy of religion, as has been said above, shows a decided preference for some axiomatic and final form of religious truth; so that it may perhaps tend to deny that the development of belief has any bearing on its validity. But the last word, fortunately, is not with theology but

with religion. While theologians prate that religious truth is unalterable, behold it is growing and expanding before their very eyes. Religion is in evolution, nay, is the very rationale of evolution, since it construes what otherwise were simple process into a progress lighted by faith in the ideal. It is such a faith, I believe, that validates religion. The belief in the value of science is part of that faith, but a part only. Science, therefore, may join with theology in doing honor to the virtue of humility, whereby both may avoid dogmatism and advance by the joint aid of faith and experience.

BUDDHISTIC INFLUENCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

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The discussion regarding the dependence of early Christianity upon Buddhism has recently entered upon a new stage. No less a scholar than Garbe¹ now traces back to Buddhism several New Testament narratives and a statement in the Epistle of James. Formerly Garbe denied this dependence, thereby proving, to be sure, that his suspicion is unfounded when he charges with bias those who still hold to this opinion. On the other hand, he regards other New Testament narratives as furnishing the model for Buddhist writers, although he affixes a mark of exclamation to this view as stated by Faber.² A similar opinion has already been advocated by E. Lehmann,³ A. Goetz,⁴ and myself,⁵ but this thesis may be passed by for the present, much as it may need thoroughgoing investigation. The only thing I should like to do now is to inquire briefly whether, in the passages which he cites in support of this opinion, Garbe proves the influence of Buddhism upon early Christianity.⁶

The possibility of such influence is a well-known fact. This has recently been shown again, and in a more thoroughgoing manner than formerly, by Schoff,⁷ Goetz, and Faber. Yet certainly Garbe

¹ First in "Buddhistisches im Neuen Testament," *Das freie Wort* (1911), 674 ff.; then in "Postscript on Buddhism and Christianity," *Monist*, XXII (1912), 478 f., and finally in his book *Indien und das Christentum* (1914), pp. 12 ff.

² *Buddhistische und neutestamentliche Erzählungen* (1913).

³ *Der Buddhismus* (1911), pp. 90 ff.

⁴ "Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen," *Katholik* (1912, IV, 10), 19 ff.

⁵ *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments* (1909), pp. 244, 253.

⁶ Cf. also Witte, "Die Einwirkungen des Buddhismus auf das älteste Christentum," *Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft*, XXIX (1914), 289 ff., 353 ff.

⁷ "First Century Intercourse between India and Rome," *Monist*, XXII (1912), 138 ff.

is correct in calling it a *petitio principii* when Schoff says that commercial intercourse between India and Rome was so vigorous at the beginning of our era that "ideas no less than goods" must have been among the exports and imports of these countries. And although Schoff has referred to the *περίπλους τῆς ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης*, written between the years 70 and 75 A.D., yet Garbe concludes "that the sailors and merchants of that age had little interest in anything except their wares."¹ Certainly Megasthenes² could include the Buddhists among the *Γαυῶνες* whom he mentions, nevertheless he does not seem to have narrated anything specific about their founder; and Asoka himself, even if his missionary activity had been as far-reaching as he maintains, would have sought to spread the moral teaching of Buddhism rather than the history of its founder. Furthermore, the conclusion which Edmunds³ lately draws from the questions of Milinda, to the effect that a Greek king in the second century B.C. had cited "Buddhism" by chapters and verses, is quite untenable. Sure the Milindapañha arose at a later date—at the beginning of our era according to Winternitz,⁴ in the second century A.D. according to Garbe⁵—and books iv–vii in which the citations in question are found were first added at a still later time, as their absence from the Chinese translation (also known to Edmunds) shows. Nor can one say, as again Edmunds does, repeating in part earlier contentions of his,⁶ that Menander would surely have had "some specimens of the lore he admired" translated into Greek or into some other vernacular, or that the missionaries who began their translations into Chinese in the seventh decade of the first century must previously have acquired experience as translators into Parthian tongues. Still less is it permissible to change, as some have done, the *Ἰουδαίων* of Acts 2:9 to read *Ἰνδίων*, and on the basis of this change to have Indians present at the first Christian Pentecost. If the word is to be changed (and not struck out), some names other than *Ἰνδίων*

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

² According to Strabo xv. 1. 59 f.

³ "Buddhist Loans to Christianity," *Monist*, XXII (1912), 137.

⁴ *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* (1913), II, i, 140.

⁵ *Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte* (1903), p. 106.

⁶ "The Progress of Buddhistic Research," *Monist*, XXII (1912), 633, 635.

are more appropriate in this passage. But no change is necessary—not because the author does not intend to describe a miraculous use of foreign tongues, but because he may have employed in his enumeration of peoples some list already extant. Against the remaining really plausible arguments for intercourse between India and the West, it is to be urged again with Goetz and Faber that, apart from Megasthenes and Alexander Polyhistor,¹ who forms no exception in spite of his name, down to the second century A.D. no writer betrays any knowledge whatsoever of Buddhism. Clement of Alexandria² alone knows Buddha and his apotheosis; but, as remarked above, the movement which took its start from Buddha could still have exerted an influence even as far as Palestine or Western Asia in general—and this is all the more possible if evidence of still other influences from India in pre-Christian times can be established.

In the beginning, however, western Asiatic, more exactly Babylonian, ideas appear rather to have traveled to India. Thus Estlin Carpenter³ in particular, but also Goetz and Faber, think this is true of the flood-narrative, the story of exposing a divine child in a floating basket, the idea of a divine mountain, and the sacredness of the number seven. Goetz and Faber, as well as Garbe, would also hold that the stories which we read not only in the *Kandjur* but also in *Jataka* 546 are modeled after the story of Solomon's decision in I Kings 3:16 ff., since the biblical narrative cannot, according to Garbe, be brought down beyond the sixth century, while the Buddhistic story is later by several centuries—perhaps by five hundred years. Yet the story may be earlier in India, for I should doubt that it must have arisen in the West simply because it is found there in cruder form, as is sometimes alleged. Or is it really more agreeable for a child to be pulled by the hands and legs so that it begins to cry because of the pain, as in the Buddhistic version, than merely to be threatened with bisection—of which it is quite unconscious—as in the Old Testament? At any rate, as

¹ According to Cyril, *Contra Julianum*, iv. 133.

² *Strom.* i. 15. 71. 6.

³ "Buddhist and Christian Parallels: the Mythological Background," *Studies in the History of Religion Presented to Crawford Howell Toy* (1912), pp. 70 ff.

Garbe following Winternitz shows, the story narrated in Herodotus vi. 129, about Hippoclides, who lost his fiancée through immodest dancing, may be dependent upon the Indian fable about the peacock, preserved for us in Jataka 32; for it is certainly easier to account for the transference of a fable to human relationships than to explain the rise of a fable from an anecdote. Other fables found among Greeks as well as Indians will be found to come from India just because they appear there in more natural form. For example, frequently in Indian fables the jackal attends the lion as a servant, while in the corresponding Greek stories it is the fox who plays this rôle. In reality, however, it is only the jackal that follows in the trail of the lion. Finally, about thirty fables current among both Indians and Greeks are, as Jacobs shows,¹ found also among the Jews in the form known among the Indians. But since it is out of the question to suppose that the Jews had recast the Greek fables and then passed them on to India in this new form, it is much more probable that these fables forced their way from India first into Palestine and then into Greece. And even if in all of these instances no Buddhistic materials are involved, yet their presence would be possible, especially if the fact of a Buddhistic influence upon certain literary products of Christianity soon after the time in which we are at present interested were to be established.

In fact certain traits of the apocryphal gospels are traced back to Buddhism by Kuhn² and Van den Bergh Van Eysinga,³ partly also by Goetz, as well as by A. Meyer⁴ and also by Garbe. But at present we are concerned only with those traits found in writings which arose in the second century, viz., the so-called Protevangelium of James and the Gospel of Thomas.

It is narrated in the sixth chapter of the Protevangelium of James that Mary when six months old took seven steps. Similarly we are told in the Majjhima-nikāya 13, 123 that the Bodhisattva

¹ "Fables," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (1912), V, 676 ff.

² "Buddhistisches in den apokryphen Evangelien," *Gurupujakaumudi* (1896), 116 ff.

³ *Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen* (1904, 1909²), pp. 75 ff.

⁴ In Hennecke's *Handbuch zu den neutestamentlichen Apokryphen* (1904), pp. 137, 142.

took seven steps toward the north immediately after his birth. Garbe regards the latter story as the more original, because from ancient times the idea of seven steps is a well-established notion in India. But, as we have already seen, the sanctity of the number seven more surely originated in Babylonia. Even disregarding this latter fact, it is still possible to hold that the Christian legend about Mary's walking when six months old is more credible, and so older, than the Buddhistic story which narrates the same thing of the Bodhisattva immediately after his birth. But probably we have here to do with a theme which can exist in different places in versions independent of one another. So it seems also to A. Meyer who, following Griffith,¹ adduces still another, though more remote, parallel from Egypt.

When it is pointed out that all nature and humanity is said to have stood still before the birth of Jesus according to the Protevangelium of James, chap. 18, and also before the birth of the Bodhisattva according to Lalita vistara, chap. 7, the resemblance certainly is more striking. But why is the former representation to be regarded as derived from the latter? According to Garbe's own earlier arguments one is rather to assume the opposite. The Lalita vistara in its present form he dates at the earliest in the second or third century A.D., and then continues:

The obvious objection that the Buddhistic narratives can be considerably older than their literary form is doubtless correct; the possibility of greater age is to be unconditionally admitted. But he who makes this possibility, which rests merely on generalities, a basis for argument has no solid ground on which to stand. I myself am convinced that the Buddha-legend had already assumed a fixed form before the birth of Christ. But that is not to say that this primitive form already contained the narratives which stand in the later sectarian versions, which are to be taken into account when considering the question of borrowing. To be sure, I shall later use two narratives which are first attested in the fifth century A.D., in order to make probable the derivation of New Testament parallels from the Buddhistic stories; but in every such instance abundant reasons must be produced to show that the account, though its attestation is late, is really much older, and that it can be viewed as a source—or as an offshoot of a source—from which the Christian parallel came.²

¹ *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis* (1900), p. 44.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

But has Garbe met these requirements in the present instance? He refers only to the fact that the description of the miraculous pause is shorter in the *Lalita vistara*, but that is certainly not decisive for the question of priority. Indeed, it is not necessary here to suppose the dependence of one account upon the other, since there is an adequate motive for each, even without mentioning other passages, such as the legend of the sleeping beauty, which Estlin Carpenter cites. And when a motive for portraying the birth of an individual is operative in both these instances, then the two accounts could arise independently of one another if only we may presuppose the belief that an event of this sort must be announced by means of miraculous signs.

In the Gospel of Thomas, chap. 6, it is narrated that Jesus when brought to school explained to his teacher the mystical significance of the letters of the alphabet. Also in *Lalita vistara*, chap. 10, we read that Buddha on a similar occasion astounded his teacher with his accurate knowledge of the sixty-four kinds of writing, and that while his fellow-pupils were reciting the alphabet Buddhistic maxims beginning with the corresponding letters sounded forth. But at most there is only a general similarity between these two narratives, for as De la Vallée Poussin says, "There is nothing in the Apocryphon which recalls the variety of alphabets mentioned in the *Lalita*, or the manner in which the sounds of the alphabet are amplified by means of sentences or words (a proceeding characteristic of Indian sources); the 'allegories' rest, it seems to me, upon the form of the letters."¹ Even if Garbe does call this a genuine Indian thought, De la Vallée Poussin designates this statement as "at least hazardous," and certainly the rabbis knew how to fashion hidden wisdom out of the form of the letters. Moreover, the Egyptian legend mentioned above shows again that similar traits might be repeated in different connections independently of one another.²

Finally, Garbe remarks that "it cannot be an accidental agreement when in both the *Lalita vistara* and the Gospel of Thomas

¹ "L'Histoire des religions de l'Inde et l'apologétique," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, VI (1912), 517.

² Cf. also von Dobschütz in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, XXI (1896), 444.

(chap. 14) the teacher falls upon the ground unconscious when the miraculous child visits the school."¹ Here again De la Vallée Poussin refers to the points of difference: "In the Lalita the school-master, unable to endure the splendor of the child, prostrates himself upon his face on the ground; in pseudo-Thomas Jesus speaks insolently to the master, who strikes him on the head. 'The child in his anger cursed him [the master] and immediately he fell fainting upon his face on the ground.'"² The similarity between the two stories is indeed extremely slight and, as regards the relation to Buddhism of at least the two apocryphal gospels which alone interest us in this connection, scarcely justifies Garbe's judgment that De la Vallée Poussin is under the spell of the compulsion expressed in the word *l'apologétique* in the title of his article. De la Vallée Poussin's (and Lehmann's) objections in general to a dependence of canonical as well as apocryphal gospels upon Buddhism, the objections resting upon the assumption that had there been such dependence then still other legends must also have been taken over, I certainly do not myself regard as convincing; for even later, as may be decided in individual instances, there were at all events only a few Buddhistic narratives which have been taken over into Christianity. Hence it is possible, in spite of all that has been said above, that some passages even in the canonical gospels and in the remaining New Testament books were derived from Buddhism, as Edmunds for some time past, and recently even Garbe, partly influenced by Edmunds, maintains.

In the opinion of Edmunds the sending out of the seventy disciples and the story of the penitent thief are to be so understood, but this explanation scarcely needs refutation, since in this case other explanations are much more obvious. Against tracing the *αἰώνιον ἀμάρτημα* of Mark 3:29 to the Pali formula *kappathika kibbisa*, De la Vallée Poussin has earlier protested:

Shall we believe that not indeed a Buddhistic legend—a possibility itself extremely difficult to imagine—but even an isolated detail of teaching has penetrated as far as Mark? Moreover, even if the idea of an irreparable fault is not an uncommon thing,³ it is necessary to note that the Pali text cited

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 516.

³ Cf. also Steinleitner, *Die Beicht im Zusammenhange mit der sakralen Rechtspflege in der Antike* (1913), p. 83, 2.

positively rejects the idea of a sin which endured *in aeternum*, that the idea of an eternal punishment is foreign to the teaching of Pali or Sanskrit, that *aléwios* does not signify "what continues for a cosmic period," and that the entire gospel context on the remission of sins is positively opposed to the teachings of Pali Buddhism.¹

Furthermore, Garbe has again rejected, along with other corresponding theories advocated by earlier writers, the notion that the citations in John 7:38 and 12:34 go back to Buddhistic sources. But in the case of two narratives he has sided with Edmunds, and he endeavors to furnish new reasons of his own for assigning Buddhistic origin to two other passages. In conclusion, therefore, these four instances must now be especially examined.

1. The story of the aged Symeon in Luke 2:25 ff. has often been explained as derived from the story of the *pañcābhijñā* Asita. Recently this has also been advocated as a possibility by Winternitz. Only Edmunds, however, has referred, as especially decisive, to the organic connection of the story both in Luke and in the *Suttanipata* with a song of praise by the angels. Garbe, to be sure, adds the following correction: "The connection of the Asita-Symeon parallel with the praise of the heavenly host is not an organic one in both instances, but only in the Pali text, while in Luke the story of Symeon has no inner connection with the praise of the heavenly host, but stands only in its immediate vicinity seven verses removed."² Yet he holds the agreement to be so remarkable that it cannot be thought accidental. This agreement, nevertheless, exists only in the present text. Originally the story of the presentation in the temple probably had as little connection with the Christmas story as has the story narrated in chap. i announcing the birth of Jesus—a fact which has recently been pointed out again by Gressmann.³ Otherwise it could scarcely have been said in vs. 33 (whatsoever interpreters of the passage observe about it) that his father and mother were astonished at what was said by him. His uniqueness must have been known to them from the message of the angel. In the face of this fact it is of no avail to assert, in favor of the

¹ "Le Bouddhisme et les évangiles canoniques," *Revue Biblique*, Nouvelle Série, III (1906), 369.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

³ "Das Weihnachtsevangelium," *Religion und Geisteskultur*, VIII (1914), 75 f.

dependence of the gospel narrative upon Buddhism, that Asita's knowledge of the birth of the wonderful child, on account of which he hears the exultation of the heavenly host, has a much more adequate motive than has the knowledge of Symeon in Luke. The latter has a wholly sufficient basis in the fact that Symeon has been forewarned by the Holy Spirit that he should not see death until he has seen the Lord's Christ and that he is now in the spirit in the temple. That exultation of the heavenly host, on which Edmunds wishes to decide even the question of the correct reading in Luke 2:14, Garbe himself merely compares with the message of the angel in the Buddhistic legend, without seeking to prove the dependence of the former upon the latter. But, especially if the Symeon story did not originally follow the angels' exultation, it is much easier to explain this exultation from the usage of emperor-worship in Asia Minor (for the third evangelist certainly wrote in the vicinity of Ephesus). Under these circumstances it cannot even be said that a later writer was reminded of the story of Asita by the incident of the exultation of the angels, for originally the narrative about Symeon had nothing to do with that of the angels' song. And that this narrative standing alone cannot go back to the Asita story has already been inferred by Lehmann and Faber from the fact that Symeon and Asita make exactly opposite statements. Symeon *rejoices* that he can now die in peace since his eyes have seen salvation; Asita *laments* that he will die before he has seen the age of salvation. Hence the only point of similarity remaining is the fact that the new age incarnated in an infant is greeted by an aged man as representative of the old age—but could that not happen independently in different places?

2. Also the likeness between the Christian and the Buddhistic temptation stories, to which Bousset recently makes general reference,¹ is in details very slight. In the first place, in Buddha's case, even according to Garbe's own assertion, the temptation story relates to ascetic practices *preceding* Buddha's enlightenment. Accordingly Edmunds has wisely made no allusion whatsoever to this alleged parallel to the story of Jesus' temptation, which takes place *after* his baptism. To prove this dependence Edmunds cites,

¹ *Kyrios Christos* (1913), p. 57.

with Garbe's approval, a passage from the Samyutta-nikāya which is said to explain not only the first but also the second temptation of Jesus as recorded in Luke. But this attempt is doomed to failure at the outset, for the order of the three temptations followed by the third evangelist is undoubtedly not the original one. After Jesus has said to the devil "Depart from me," the devil cannot tempt him still a third time. Luke has merely transposed the temptations which stood second and third in Matthew, or rather in the Logia-source. He has done this because it seemed to him more natural that the way from the wilderness should lead over a high mountain to Jerusalem than vice versa. And even apart from this objection, in Buddhism the temptation to transform a substance *follows* the temptation to acquire world-dominion; or, rather, the latter is no temptation at all. Buddha debates with himself whether one could not rule righteously even without enriching one's self, and thereupon he is tempted by Mara to transform the Himalaya into gold—probably thus to reimburse himself for carrying on the government in that manner. This temptation has thus as little to do with the second one of Luke as with the first; and it is not necessary—as Garbe expresses himself—to agree, whether one likes it or not, to the view that in the gospel narrative "the more natural event provided by the situation" (viz., the changing of the stone to bread) has displaced the grotesque and gigantic features of the Buddhistic narrative.

Still less ought Edmunds and Garbe to have compared with the third temptation in Luke the temptation of Buddha which is narrated in the Mahaparinibbana-sutta either in 2:7 ff. or in 3:34 f. We can scarcely believe our eyes when we find it stated on behalf of this theory that the meaning of this temptation for Jesus was "to commit suicide." Can anyone who has ever really glanced at the text of Luke 4:9 ff. suppose this to be its meaning? When the devil challenges Jesus to leap down from the pinnacle of the temple does he not support his challenge by saying: "It is written, He shall give his angels charge concerning thee to guard thee and bear thee upon their hands lest haply thou dash thy foot against a stone"? And does not Jesus answer him: "It is said, Thou shalt

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

not make trial of God thy Lord"? Moreover, in view of II Cor. 11:14, and the passage in *Life of Adam* (chap. 9) upon which it is based, Garbe will be unable to maintain that an incarnate devil never appears in the Bible except in the temptation story. Nor did Edmunds need to allude to the fact that in both the Buddhistic and the gospel accounts the devil goes away disappointed, because this outcome is "simply self-evident and necessary under the given circumstances."¹ Furthermore, the details of both the Christian and Buddhistic accounts are explicable without resort to foreign prototypes—a fact equally true of the Zarathrustrian story which Garbe² also would refer back to the Buddhistic.

3. When Edmunds and Garbe, as possibly also Lehmann, refer to Buddhism to explain the episode of Peter's walking on the sea, which is recorded only in Matt. 14:28 ff., they seem to forget that previously Matthew as well as Mark and John told of Jesus' walking upon the sea, and this will most naturally have given rise to the further story about Peter. One might perhaps apply to this story the saying in Matt. 21:21: "If you have faith and doubt not you shall not only do what is done to the fig tree, but," etc. Indeed, this saying could refer especially to the fact that in the episode recorded by Matthew Peter was addressed thus: "O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?" If, instead of being given this interpretation, the story is traced back to the tradition about the disciple of Buddha in the introduction to Jataka 190, numerous differences between the two stories will be observed. While thinking of the master, Buddha's disciple began to walk across the Aciravati, but in the middle of the river, when his thoughts were no longer firmly set upon Buddha, he began to sink, until he forced his mind back to Buddha again, and thus arrived at the opposite shore in safety. Faber³ in particular has pointed out the differences between this Buddhistic and the Christian narratives. He says: "The latter is concerned with an account of faith, the former with an irresolute unconscious occurrence while in a state of trance; the latter with

¹ Faber, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

² As previously Darmesteter, "Le Zend-avesta III," *Annales du Musée Guimet*, XXIV (1893), xlvii.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

a spasm of terror, the former with a lapse of meditation." And even if one were to ignore this difference, still the corresponding thought was not at all so foreign to Judaism that it must have been derived from a Buddhistic source, even though the latter may perhaps be old enough to serve this purpose. Already in Job 9:8 it is said of God, "He alone stretcheth out the heavens and treadeth upon the high places of the sea."

4. Franke,¹ as also Garbe, wishes to refer the miraculous feeding (Mark 6:35 ff. and parallels) back to the narrative in the introduction to Jataka 78. According to this story Buddha at one time fed first his five hundred disciples and then all the inmates of a monastery with a loaf which was placed for him in his alms-bowl; yet much bread was left over, which was thrown into a hole beside the door. The similarity to the New Testament narrative is, as Garbe more specifically observes,

"less striking on account of the miracle as such [this is indeed more simply explained by reference to the Old Testament parallels, especially II Kings 4:42 ff.] but much more because of the fact that also in the New Testament narrative something, i.e., twelve baskets of fragments, are left over, and because of the recurrence of the number five. In the New Testament accounts, as everybody knows, five thousand men were fed with five loaves (and two fishes). The smaller number in the Buddhistic narrative, in contrast with the five thousand in the New Testament, establishes of itself a prejudice in favor of originality, and there is especially the additional fact that "the number five hundred is eminently Buddhistic, as we could prove by numerous texts."²

Yet in this particular Buddhistic narrative the five hundred does not at all designate the total number of those miraculously fed; and when the Christian story speaks of five thousand persons (apart from women and children, according to Matthew) and five loaves (along with two fishes), this choice of numbers will have to be called an accidental coincidence, resting upon the widespread sanctity of the number five in view of the fact that four thousand persons (again exclusive of women and children, according to Matthew) and seven loaves (with a few fishes) appear in the parallel narratives (Mark 8:1 ff.; Matt. 15:32 ff.).

¹ *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1901), p. 2760.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

5. Finally Garbe finds a Buddhistic ring in the whole verse in James 3:6: "And the tongue is a fire, the world full of iniquity; the tongue is enrolled among our members as that which defiles the whole body and sets on fire the wheel of birth, and is itself set on fire in hell." Yet H. Windisch¹ has correctly labeled the verse corrupt, the first words being a gloss from Sirach 28:22. Moreover, he has adduced from Greek authors so many parallels to the expression *ποχὸς τῆς γενέσεως* that it certainly is much easier to derive it as usual directly from the language of the Orphic mysteries.

Thus proof for a dependence of early Christianity upon Buddhism has not been produced even by Garbe.

¹ In Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament* (1911), IV, ii, 22.

THE MEANING OF CHARITY

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Whatever may have been the philological or linguistic reasons for the change of the familiar text which uses the term "love" for the older term "charity," the differences of a moral and social character in the meanings of the two terms are sufficient to justify the change. The term "charity" has evidently outlived its usefulness, and as a vestigial structure is at present really dangerous to the moral tissue in which it has become imbedded. There are therefore good and valid reasons for the discontinuance of the use of the term in the fact that it has lost all moral or religious significance in becoming corrupted to the purposes of narrowly practical interests. And the corrupted concept has vitiated much thought otherwise significant for social discussion, even though the illegitimate use of the term were unintentional or unconscious. It would not be necessary to postulate a preponderance of vicious purpose in order to argue an almost universal misuse of a supposedly moral term. But the change of terms has not touched the root of the matter. The question is not one which has any necessary relation to the use or misuse of language. It is rather a question of the moral and social bases of the concepts involved, or strictly, a question of the nature of the moral and social relations represented, whatever be the terms employed to represent those relations. The proper way to get at the difficulty is, then, by rigid psychological analysis, in order to discover the fundamental types of consciousness represented, and their moral and social value as determined from their relations within the moral consciousness.

When regarded from this point of view, the type of consciousness behind these concepts represents a human institution—one that has to do with the attainment of an ideal human good, and for this reason properly called either moral or political, as the instinctive accompaniments of the one or the other satisfies better

the requirements of the individual using them. What is this institution? What is its sanction in human affairs? What is its relation to the terms we have here under question? To answer these questions briefly will put the matter squarely before us. With regard to the first question, the institution connected with the charity type of consciousness is that of control. The term "control" is meant to be used in the sense it has assumed in contemporary social discussion; but for the purposes of this paper and to avoid a long process of elimination and to state briefly and positively the meaning of the term, let us say, in general terms, that the idea of control refers to the disposition of human affairs by humanity. If we state the matter thus, it will be easier to avoid the presuppositions and technicalities of the sciences of politics, religion, and sociology, and to restrict the discussion to the grounds of analytic psychology. To put it still more concisely, what we are driving at here is an understanding of the mechanism of human self-control, when that concept is used most broadly as meaning the autonomous act of humanity in directing the processes of its destiny. Nor will it be necessary to regard control as a strictly conscious process, although the determination of its nature will be facilitated by a knowledge of the nature of particular conscious processes in the individual life. As to the meaning of control in human affairs, the problem is a logical one and leads to metaphysical grounds; and the proper statement of the matter would involve the construction of a theory of evolution. If human destiny is a process, then its unaccomplished stages have a meaning for the interpretation of its accomplished stages. The distant future good of man must be at least a proximate and partial good now; that is, the idea of the unaccomplished has a regulative use in the direction of the process of its own accomplishment. This directive force of ideas is, then, the sanction of control in human affairs, and will be regarded as rational and logical in nature or blind and impulsive according as we give predominance in life to knowledge and intelligence or to will and instinct. But this force of ideas is in no sense deliberately legislative or legal, and there is here no purpose to attempt to establish the "natural" right of civil control. It is perhaps not necessary to assume an absolute

distinction between instinct and reason; in fact, it might be maintained that the severance of the two is just what renders the problem of control so difficult. The consciousness of an event or relation is at one time clear and luminous, at another vague and indistinct, or perhaps almost "unconscious." But we are unfortunately often not clearly conscious of the distinction between those things which we know adequately and those which we know confusedly. And we mistake the one for the other. That is, we accept an unrationalized instinct as the apple of the eye of the reason, and go wrong; not necessarily in practical cases, of course, but inevitably in the case of considerations of the grounds of practice in thought. This circumstance will suggest the answer to the third question proposed above, namely, that the relation of control to charity at least involves the assertion that charity is an instrument in the hands of the larger process of social evolution, and not necessarily therefore a matter of the effects and relations of which we are fully conscious. Our discussion is intended to show that, since charity is an element in a larger partly instinctive process, we are quite generally deceived as to its moral significance.

It seems to make, then, practically no difference whether our concept of charity be interpreted in terms of almsgiving or of love; i.e., whether its basis be material and economic, or subjective and purely spiritual, whether it represent the active and volitional side of our nature, or the passive and contemplative. The result in human affairs is the same in any case. Charity refers to the ideal of a better status for humanity, at least in the minds of persons competent to envisage the concept in the sense indicated above. It refers to humanity as organized and banded together in the interest of a higher destiny, and its common reference to the "lowly" and unfortunate is nothing but the recognition of the unsatisfactory relations that obtain among humanity as at present organized. And the mingled sense of pity with which we perceive the victims of the failure of our best motives to provide a competence for humanity is at bottom a regret that one of our purposes has failed—the purpose to contribute to the commonwealth of human good. The sense of charity is then one of the deepest instincts in human nature, and, being a deep-seated instinct, it is

essential to all social relations, as well as perhaps to all strictly personal purposes—"the greatest of these is charity." It is one of the most important of the instruments through which men hope to attain to the highest of their possibilities, and may therefore be called a means of control.

As a proper means of control in the higher personal life of morality and religion, what is the function of charity? The history of religious literature and of moral theory as well would seem to indicate that man has pretty generally regarded his final purpose as lying in the "beyond," that his utmost good inevitably is to be found outside the present, that his real home is afar off in a sphere where limitations are not what they are in this shut-in vale of tears. All of which means that the immediate awareness of the present status of the self is rarely satisfying. And in those cases where the consciousness of the moment is satisfactory, a very little analysis is sufficient to show that that consciousness is not the consciousness of the larger self—rather the consciousness that is self-satisfactory cannot be the self-consciousness at all; it is a consciousness whose object connotes the satisfactoriness of some remote and accidental organic feeling. We do not find ourselves in feelings of satisfaction, nor in any other immediate fact. Rather we are led indirectly to the discovery of ourselves only through a logical process set in motion by some distractive state the unsatisfactoriness of which is intense enough to goad us into a recognition of the problem involved in an experience being satisfactory or otherwise. Present fact perforce turns our faces toward the beyond. But shall we find the beyond constituted by the same kind of elements as that which drives us to it? It is the allurements of the "other" that prevails upon us to look to the future. But the "other" is not foreign. The present has two characters: its factual, ideally geographical, as it were; and its worthwhile, its meaning in immediate feeling. The ideal toward which we look lacks the former, except in the higher forms of constructive art; and that is its only difference from the present. There is no "real" difference between the ideal and the real. There is nothing wrong with the fact of life. It is the meaning of this fact with reference to our whole life and the feeling consequent on this relation which renders

it focally conscious, that may be real and right or unreal and wrong. The ideal and the real are in this sense both factual, and their existential characters are not subject to valuation; it is the relation between the two that may take a moral estimate. That the life of the intellect in science should eventually realize the meaning of that relation through the equation of the "mere" fact with the ideal of what the perfect state should be in terms of value, is what we mean by moral evolution; and the limit of the process—that is, a final balance of the moments of the process—is our concept of welfare.

There is, then, nothing wrong with my factual self. What I need is a set of conditions different in some important details from any I have known. This is a set of conditions, as I see it, under which a rational being would experience fact equated with value. It is the familiar life-conditions with the unsatisfactory elements removed. My idea of the good for me is that of myself as relieved from the limitations imposed by my present feeling states—not relieved of the feeling states, but of their lack of qualitative harmony with myself as fact. My enlarged, personal self is the goal of my purposes. It is a sum of cognitions unannexed by feeling, while the incomplete personality of the present is a nexus of feeling.

Charity is the relation, then, between the lowly state of my present more or less impersonal self and that kingdom where my lowly and despised state is lost in the exercise of the princely function of self-legislation unhampered by the limitations of the flesh, which, as feeling states, is, morally, to be regarded as impersonal. The object of charity is then the enlarged self, the I. I envisage myself as I might be and will that I might attain my potentialities. The incommensurability of myself as I am with myself as I can conceive myself to be is the logical ground of the charity relation; and the capacity for conception of this relation is the moral personality. Our analysis has shown that all moral relations are personal; they are all functions of the I. Then charity *must* "begin at home." I am myself the object of any and all charity I can understand; with any other object charity becomes an abstract and quantitative relation. As a moral relation it must remain a

character of the inner self-consciousness. Consequently my interest in the other fellow is secondary and derived. I see that he does not come up to the possibilities that are in him and that he cannot take advantage of the opportunities that lie about him. It is, however, in my attempt to apply my inner disinterested feelings to the other fellow's case that the purity of the charity idea is lost, and my charity becomes as sounding brass and a clanging cymbal. Then charity leads me to the false conclusion that I am my brother's keeper; then the light that is in me has failed. Here again it makes no difference whether charity means loving or giving, feeling or doing—whether it is the will with its consequent deed, or the affection with its quiescent state. A personal relation become objectified is rendered impersonal and therefore non-moral. And in rendering charity to Caesar we are attempting to objectify a personal relation. Nor does it make any difference what is the origin of the state in question, whether a biological instinct or an ideal of worth. When the whole relation is objectified, when we consider the unsatisfactory condition of another as compared with his ideal, we are unable henceforth to keep our thinking free from admixtures of our own purposes. The other fellow's affairs become entangled with mine, and it is my ideal welfare that becomes the object of my thought rather than that of my neighbor whom I began by attempting to help. It is a conscious relation which cannot be completely objectified without losing its real nature.

The disparity between my neighbor's state and what both he and I would regard as his ideal state constitutes for me his need. Now we have seen that when we objectify this relation we reduce it to the cold externality of fact; i.e., we depersonalize it. It is for us no longer the personal relation between self and object, but a relation between objects. But the standard of reference for all things considered as values is the self, and the self involved is the one which I can know, i.e., myself. I am not judging his personality, but that of which I judge is his morality, that is, his relation to his good, and the standard is I. There is no sense in my attempts at description of another's ego, except through the doubtful method of analogy. My neighbor's need is then the index to his moral status, and when I refer it to the personal standard, the need

indicates a state of his which we call lowliness. But from the high ground of the standard the situation means the discovery of superiority for the standard, it assumes uniqueness for the idiosyncratic function of the personality, and all personality that I can know is mine. Contemplation of my neighbor's moral status is highly complimentary to me. It discloses a trait in me in which I excel. His lack is my gain. It is highly comforting to reflect on the misery and lowliness and want of humanity at large, for it gives the sweet assurance that we are not as others; and this fact is probably what makes charity so attractive a "virtue" in modern life. The deep feeling for others' pain is a highly agreeable experience for most of us. And the religious devotee will not for all the world give up the bliss of the agony of tears which he can cause to flow on any and all occasions with no more provocation than the mere presence of the idea of the distressed in body or mind. And the stoniest and stupidest of hearts will with tears most uncharitably read the scriptural strictures on charity with a pleasure that passeth understanding. The poor in spirit are as objects of charity of lesser dignity than the charitable soul that judges them. Their need is a suggestion of the fact that in spirit they do not measure up to the standard of the personality by which they are judged. And what deceives us in charity is the fact that the personality that serves as a standard is the very same personality which does the judging when the need is discovered. The consciousness of another's need is thus a consciousness of a superior dignity as belonging to the self-consciousness. It establishes a unique position for the judger. The object of charity is then pitied, we feel sorry for the one whose want is great. And out of the generosity of our hearts we give him our sympathy, and while our giving is intended to equalize his opportunity with ours, it at least gives us the comfortable assurance of a loftier and worthier status for ourselves. Now the very fact that we argue that in giving sympathy we "bear one another's burdens" and "make each other's burdens lighter" is a proof that the effect wanted is to increase the general status of good or decrease the general weight of burdens. Sharing with the other fellow will tend to distract my attention from my own shortcomings, and thus increase the

warmth of the self-congratulatory feelings; and to get the fullest value, I will have charity for all mankind, will distract myself from my own condition by arguing that all humanity is probably in worse straits. There is comfort in reflecting that it might have been worse. It will at any time serve to center our consciousness, not necessarily upon a worse state, but away from the moment of present unpleasantness. There are abundant psychological reasons why out of the most bigoted and self-centered race-mind the world has known there should spring the religion of universal love and good-will to men.

But it is less than a step from pity to contempt. In fact, the basis of contempt is already contained in pity, and both are indigenous to sympathy. And sympathy is the essence of charity. A very short residence in this vale of tears suffices to carry us beyond the stage of reflective idealizing. In the development of the religion of charity the doctrine of non-resistance and caring not for the things of this world had very soon to be "interpreted." And interpretation flourished until we reach the conception of the church militant and the church triumphant, and the things of this world so fused in the interpretation that in time the church became the richest institution on earth—richest even in the point where moth and rust do corrupt. The early need of the spirit becomes the want of the economic man. And man's want is of the means of life. Nor is the life more abundantly his concern at this point. The earth has been so far "subdued" that he will be happy if he can guarantee for himself even the less abundant necessities of existence. Here we return to the concept of need, and the need is the necessity of existence, not the lack of spirituality. Inevitably then in this world need becomes an economic phenomenon. Our concern is, however, with the psychology of the matter. We have seen that charity leads to a distinction between persons, and it can now be shown that the distinction to which it leads is practically one which has invariably a material ground—economic in the crude sense. We have seen that a disinterested consciousness is always objectless, and that a consciousness with an object clearly defined is impersonal, or, to state it baldly, material. Consciousness of charity for another is then the consciousness of a

depersonalized object, and all impersonal objects are instruments in the hands of the consciousness that knows them. Hence personalized need can only be of and for the self-consciousness, the spiritual life cannot go outside itself for its object; and whatever we know as objects other than our own spiritual inner purposes are objects as instruments, which means that they are material. The other fellow's need is therefore for me a tool, and the object of his need is of the earth earthy.

Difference in dignity between my neighbor and myself thus becomes a question of worth, and worth tends to take always an economic signification. The object of charity we first pity, then despise. Lowliness and unworthiness now mean want of the goods of life, and the goods in this case are the external conditions of life. I am what I have; and because my neighbor has nothing, he has no being except as the mere material out of which through charity I can work out my salvation. The beggar must lie by the wayside—a part of the beneficent constitution of things—in order that I may have the material to prove my spiritual respectability. The poor we have always with us! That the beggar should himself *be* a value or possess worth could not occur to us. He is the imperfection of the flesh, and through his lowliness only can he come into relation to my worthiness; he is the negative condition of my attaining my due. All worth, with reference to charity, is in having.

It is of course neither possible nor necessary to argue that there is no good except economic good. What I wish to insist upon is that in all goods there is this economic aspect, that in everything we call good there is an external and objective reference. That a purely ideal good does not free itself from the immediacy of feeling, and hence cannot take on a generalized signification, seems to follow at once from the universality of the fact that our disinterested concepts tend always toward degeneration when considered with reference to their practical use. It seems that there can be no question of this fact when it is looked at historically or when the data are psychologically analyzed. A concept either becomes "abstract" or assumes the concreteness of immediate feeling. An idea in use becomes either a vague and meaningless

symbol, a "mere form," or it represents a concrete particular. Our doctrines all turn out to be either mystical, dark sayings, or they get a crudely concrete or material significance. It is thus clear that the practical use of ideas seems to involve epistemological degeneracy when their concreteness is assured, or moral unregeneration when their universal value is emphasized. But the point is that all our value ideas show the downward tendency toward economic materiality so long as prominence is given to their external or objective meaning.

The index to the spiritual superiority of the charitable mind is thus his worthiness, which naturally shows the tendency to become vulgarized into mere materialized worth estimated in terms of possessions. We do not here wish of course to go to the length of attempting to show that the necessary connection between spiritual worthiness and material worth is necessarily or even generally recognized by the worthy. But it could easily be shown that it is often thus recognized by reference to many cases in which charity is made use of as a business asset. In fact, the charity which "vaunteth itself" would prove the point. And the unfortunate thing is that we are all often deceived by such charity. We are here concerned to show that the "goodness" of charity, as it actually operates, is to confer upon the giver the consciousness of spiritual respectability and to distinguish him from the subject of his gift by "natural" and impassable limits. Its final meaning is, then, socially, to accomplish the undemocracy of caste—to establish between persons an ineradicable distinction into classes which are in "nature" mutually exclusive. And here it could be shown that the argument of "equality" is made use of to hide the conscious fact that men are divided into classes of different worth. The practical misuse of two moral categories will illustrate this point. I have reference here to the categories of "obligation" and "natural right."

When the Lord made a covenant with Israel the ground was smoothed for a perfect moral relationship. Not that it is desired to give a supernatural sanction for either morality or for contracts—there is no more a supernatural sanction for a contract, even a moral one, than for anything else, economic individualism to the

contrary notwithstanding—nor is a contract as usually understood necessarily representative of a moral relation. In fact, the contract often covers a multitude of moral evils, and is perhaps most often either immoral or merely negatively or restrictively moral. But the covenant with Israel represents the mutuality of obligation. The question is not whether the “party of the other part” has performed his function so as to guarantee my right; the only question that can arise is whether each party has met the obligation which his nature imposes upon him, and the question can occur only to the person who feels the obligation. Israel could not know a breach of obligation on the part of the Lord, and the Lord would not be concerned with a breach of obligation in Israel, whatever he might be able abstractly to “know” about it. That is, the obligation of another cannot be the object of moral concern for me. Israel’s sin is not a sin against God but a sin against the ideally perfect Israel. All I can know with reference to my contracts is a faithful performance or failure in proper performance on the part of the other person. And the performance of function is only indicatively or symbolically moral. But the real knowledge of obligation can only be of *my* obligation, which is disinterested and objectless, therefore personal. And all obligation is personal—as known it cannot be the expression of the other person’s personality, which is self-cognitive only and requires no object. I cannot thus know another’s obligation, and morality dictates that I cultivate my own vineyard. The other’s obligation is known only to himself, as mine is known only to me; it is the idiosyncrasy of the personality. The only relation between two personalities from the point of view of knowledge is one based upon logical analogy. It is an epistemological relation and is *only* known, that is, has no other being than that defined in and by cognition. God himself cannot then immediately and objectively know my obligation.

Now the corollary to the proposition that obligation is personal is that all personalities must be assumed equal; not in the quantitative sense that they are interchangeable, but in the sense that they are equal “before the law” in that each embodies or is the law. If they are not objectively known, they cannot be distin-

guished. The characteristic of the personality is not a distinction, even though personalities might differ in their unique functions of obligation. This is the ground of democracy with reference to social and political relations, and of "brotherhood" in the sphere of religion. But it follows further that in a brotherhood of moral personalities there is no place whatever for any distinction of "lowly" and "worthy," and hence no place for charity or any other concept which rests on inequality of individuals. Inevitably, then, charity vaunteth itself and is puffed up, for its only excuse for being is to mark a distinction that rests on no real difference, to give to the one who exercises it a place distinguished from the common herd. Far from being a "natural" character of man, it is the most clearly and materially artificial. It represents the first step toward man's fallen state. It is man's first self-deception, his first difference from God. Would we dispense with "love" and charity as fundamental religious virtues? The divine love is merely a recognition and an appreciation of the equipotentiality of all personalities and is a moral phenomenon with no peculiarly religious connotation. There being no "depraved by nature," there is no need or excuse for terms representing differences of dignity that do not exist. We are of course talking about the abstract love as represented in charity. Biological or natural instinct has no point in common with what passes as religious love, in spite of the fact that it is often confused with it. The concept of eternal righteousness, as the Jew would have it, or, as the Greek would say, universal justice, is the highest concept attained in moral experience, and what is not contained in that idea is subject to the moral degeneration which all practical concepts sooner or later show.

What is the moral experience which must take the place of what is designated charity? The fact that charity represents a universal human trait furnishes all the justification that any idea needs or can have. But its universality does not preclude that it is and must be universally misunderstood. The fact that charity is universal assures it a meaning, and the question is naturally, What is that meaning? There may be two aspects distinguished

in all meanings. First, there is the meaning for the inner personality of the consciousness for which a value exists. This we can define as the consciousness of identity with the personality of some object of cognition. It may be called obligation when obligation is understood as the unique meaning of the self-consciousness. It is peculiarly personal, the only "free" act of the personality, the act of cognition which gives self-knowledge. In the second place, there is the outer, objectified aspect of the self-consciousness, the consciousness set up as the standard of values. The proper designation of this objectified obligation is justice; but it must be hastily added that justice does not refer to any particular relation among individuals, but is the standard of judgment for those relations. Being the measure of such relations, it is not identifiable with any of them. It is the law of personal relationships as obligation is the ideal of the synthesis of those relationships. Each is an aspect of the autonomy of the personality, and between the two they exhaust the theory of morality and dictate what morality shall be practically. No moral person can therefore desire charity; in the state whose citizenry is composed of persons even God's mercy can find no place. Whoever asks clemency admits his guilt, he asks the coward's terms. The recognition of charity in its usual meaning precludes the possibility of any morality.

The charity attitude then negates morality in the recognition of distinctions of worth. Its final effect (and its unconscious purpose) is to perpetuate those distinctions in the interest of the "worthy." This it does through appealing to the instrumentality of the idea of natural right. It must be conceded at the outstart that some positive theory of natural right is indispensable. But it need not be perverted. As a moral personality I am free; but freedom gets interpreted as freedom from the necessity of recognizing obligation as being the law of my nature. And this comes to mean practically that, as a person of superior worth, even when worth is crudely interpreted in material terms, I have no obligation. Those who do not possess worth are bound, limited; and if I choose to loose their bonds, the act merely replaces the bond of natural conditions with a bond of gratitude to me. I have taken

the place of natural conditions, and my influence over the needy assumes the naturalness that inhered in his previous condition. Gratitude on his part is thus my right, and the right is natural—guaranteed in the constitution of things. Obligation becomes objectified, transferred from my personality to a quality which I recognize as of value (to me) in others, and is made proportional to the extent in which the needy person is dependent upon me materially. All obligation is thus on the side of the other fellow, and since I have the means to his freedom the obligation is due to me. He becomes my slave and the slavery is right and necessary in the constitution of things. Responsibility rests only upon him; I am free and my will is his law.

Thus we see that charity in its practical application tends to lead to the abandonment of all morality. In the social order it becomes a justification of slavery through economic means. In religion it leads to a bigoted paternal self-righteousness and to the finality of external authority. It would seem to have no function in any system of morality that can justify itself to thought. It leads to a distinction of persons in which any difference which carries any kind of power over others is justified in "nature," and finally adopts the point of view of heteronomy of will in the case of the person in need. And the acknowledgment of the externality of law is fatal to all morality. Hence if I adopt the charity point of view, any power I may have becomes a right, and good can then be accomplished only through my will. My neighbor's need establishes my right over him. My wealth makes him my servant; my intelligence makes him the instrument of my purposes; my spirituality makes him my protégé; my vice makes him my victim. In short, I am my brother's keeper; and under the influence of this fallacy the ideal of human brotherhood is indefinitely postponed.

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

V. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN THE NEW TESTAMENT AND OTHER RELIGIOUS WRITINGS APPROXIMATELY CON- TEMPORARY WITH THE NEW TESTAMENT

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The previous articles of this series have dealt with the usage of Greek writers from Homer down to, and along certain lines a hundred years beyond, the close of the New Testament period, with the usage of the corresponding Hebrew words, and with Jewish-Greek usage of the pre-Christian and early Christian period. Before taking up the New Testament writers themselves, it is desirable to consider briefly certain non-Christian religious writers who though of somewhat uncertain date reflect usages which may be antecedent to, or contemporary with, the New Testament.

A. THE USAGE OF THE MAGICAL TEXTS

In the magical texts, which have been brought to light by the researches of Parthey, Wesseley, Kenyon, and others and made the subject of study by Dieterich, Reitzenstein, Cumont, and others, the word *πνεῦμα* is of frequent occurrence, sometimes with *ψυχή* in parallelism or *σάρξ* in antithesis. Probably none of the literature is itself pre-Christian in its present form, and much of it belongs to the third and fourth centuries A.D.,¹ but the possibility that it reflects a usage coming from as early a period as the New Testament writers requires that it be taken into account.

Πνεῦμα is still used in the sense of air. The god is spoken of as *ὁ ἐπὶ κενῷ πνεύματι*.² More frequently, however, it is applied to

¹ See Parthey, in *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss.* (Berlin, 1865), p. 117; Wesseley, in *Denk. d. Akad. d. Wiss.* (Vienna, 1888), Abt. II, 37.

² Wesseley, *op. cit.*, p. 54, l. 1026.

the god (accompanied by an adjective *θεῖος*, *ιερός*, *ἅγιος*), either as a direct attribute or as a possession or manifestation of the god. So sometimes in connection with the use in the sense of air, or with both uses in reference to the god in close connection.¹ In particular *πνεῦμα* is used of the *paredros* or guardian-spirit by whom the soul of the initiate is cared for.² But *πνεῦμα* is also applied to the soul of the initiate.³ It is noticeable here that *πνεῦμα* alone is used as a simple anthropological term, denoting one of the two elements of man, along with *σῶμα*; but *ἄεριον πνεῦμα* as applied to the soul when separated from the body, and to the *πάρεδρος* by whom it is borne into the air. To the former also even the term *θεός* is applied. The human *πνεῦμα* is, sometimes at least, thought of as coming from God, and as that by the impartation of which life is created or of which the soul is composed; but, more frequently, perhaps, it is identified with the *ψυχή*.

It is instructive to find in these writings the two already familiar phrases *πνεῦμα θεῖον* and *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. The former, occurring in Menander in the fourth century B.C., in the *Axiochus*, the LXX, and Philo, and in the magical papyri, has in all cases the same fundamental meaning, "divine Spirit." In the Greek writers it is the power that controls the actions of men or the source of mentality in men: in the Jewish writers, the source of inspiration or of moral uplift; in the magical texts, the source of religious ecstasy or transformation. *Πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, first attested by the LXX, occurs also in other Jewish writings, including the New Testament, and in the magical papyri. Its presence in these two apparently unrelated groups may conceivably be due to an oriental idea and phraseology (of which even the "Holy Spirit" of Hebrew scripture may be an early expression) by which the two literatures have been independently affected. In view, however, of the absence of definite testimony to the existence of such an oriental idea and of the syncretistic character of the religions which gave rise to the magical papyri, it is perhaps quite as probable that the latter

¹ Cf. passage quoted by Kenyon, *Papyri in the British Museum*, I, 114; Wesseley, *op. cit.*, p. 54, 1, 1029, in Reitzenstein, *HM-R*, p. 137; Parthey, I, 1, 312; Wesseley, I, 146, 1, 243, in Reitzenstein, *HM-R*, p. 137.

² Parthey, I, 177, 1, 96.

³ Reitzenstein, *HM-R*, p. 136.

derived the term from Jewish or Christian writings. There seems at least little reason to deny that Judaism and Christianity may have influenced the contemporary religions as well as have been influenced by them. The chief value, accordingly, of the evidence of the papyri is in showing the wide currency of the word *πνεῦμα*, and especially of the phrases *πνεῦμα θεῖον* and *πνεῦμα ἄγιον*, rather than in throwing any considerable light upon the origin of New Testament usage. *Ψυχή* continues in use and with substantially unchanged meaning, although *πνεῦμα* has become individualized and its practical equivalent. Of any antithesis between the two terms there is but slight evidence. The adjectives *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός* each occur once. Reitzenstein maintains that, in the religious and magical writers of this period, the man who had received the divine *πνεῦμα* was thought of as *πνευματικός*; he who had not received it was still only *ψυχικός* (*op. cit.*, pp. 42 ff.). This is at least so far true as that the divine being or influence by which man is transformed in nature, reborn, is constantly called *πνεῦμα*, very rarely, it would seem, *ψυχή*, and the man who is by the divine *πνεῦμα* reborn is never as such designated *ψυχή*, but, in the post-mortem state at least, *πνεῦμα (ἀέριον)*. Σάργ, so far as appears, took on in the magical texts no meanings different from those found in the other Greek writings of the period.

B. THE HERMETIC LITERATURE

The so-called Hermetic writings have been known to Christian writers for many centuries. The early church Fathers (Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria) quote them in defense of Christianity. Stobaeus collected fragments of them. The Humanists knew and valued them. They were studied in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in modern times have again been diligently examined by many scholars. Parthey has published the text of the *Corpus Hermeticum* in full and Reitzenstein in part, and G. R. S. Mead has issued a translation of the whole body of extant literature, with extended prolegomena, commentary, etc.¹

¹ Parthey, *Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander*, Berlin, 1854; Reitzenstein, *Poemander*, Leipzig, 1904; G. R. S. Mead, *Thrice-Greatest Hermes*, London and Benares, 1906.

There is a wide difference of opinion as to the date at which this literature was produced. Mead believes that some of the extant portions of it are at least as early as the earliest Christian writings, while von Christ assigns them to the third Christian century, and thinks that they show the influence of neo-Platonism. To affirm that they influenced New Testament usage would be hazardous, but they perhaps throw some light on the direction in which thought was moving in New Testament times.

In this literature the common division of man into soul and body is retained from the long familiar usage (*Corpus Hermeticum* 1:30; 2:9; 8:1; 9:2; 11:10). In 10:10, it takes the form, mind and body. But the favorite conception is of man as consisting of five elements, arranged in the order of their dignity as follows: *νοῦς*, *λόγος*, *ψυχή*, *πνεῦμα*, *σῶμα*, mind, reason, soul, spirit, body (C.H. 10:13).

Mind is that which is most akin to God, for God is mind (C.H. 5:11), or the cause of mind (C.H. 2:14).

Ψυχή is that which has life. From the all-Soul there spring souls of creeping things, and these in ascending scale become by transmigration souls of fishes, land animals, birds, and men, while human souls may eventually become *δαίμονες* or *νοῦς*. *Ψυχή* in man has substantially the same meaning which it bears throughout Greek literature. It is the seat of intellectual and especially of moral life (C.H. 10:8, 19); an eternal intellectual essence (Stob. *Phys.* 41:6); incorporeal (*ibid.*, 41:2, 5); pre-existent and immortal (C.H. 8:1; 10:7, 15; Stob. *Phys.* 41:5).

The *πνεῦμα* is distinct from the *ψυχή* and inferior to it, its garment, an intermediate thing between soul and body, yet also incorporeal (C.H. 2:8; 10:13, 16, 17). Elsewhere it is represented as having intellectual qualities (Stob. *Phys.* 41:6). It is also spoken of as possessing generative power (C.H. 9:9).

It is apparently conceived of as a rarefied substance. In the series of envelopes it is that which lies between body and soul, preventing their contact and the body's consequent destruction (C.H. 10:17). As distinguished from *ψυχή* it is perhaps thought of as the seat of life, while the latter is the seat of mentality and morality, never apparently occurring in the sense of life.

This literature is permeated with the Platonic idea of the inferiority of the body to the soul and with the notion that the body is a burden on the soul, yet it is not wholly consistent in its representation. Matter is eternal, yet also has been born, i.e., has been given form; unborn matter was *ἀμορφία* (C.H. 12:8; Stob. *Phys.* 11:2).

Body, as in the Stoics (cf. *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1914, p. 584), is used in a double sense: (a) that which has extension (C.H. 2:11); and (b) the material portion of man (Stob. *Phys.* 35:9; 9:2; C.H. 8:3). The passions of the body befoul the soul, which in infancy is not fully detached from the cosmic soul, and so is a thing of beauty and purity (C.H. 10:15).

The vice of the soul is ignorance; and ignorance is induced by the body (C.H. 10:8). Its highest good, which is to be achieved by the life of piety, is on being released from the earthly body to become mind (*νοῦς*), which takes to itself a fiery body. According to one passage the fate of the impious soul is its being turned back toward creeping things (C.H. 10:8); according to another, which distinctly repudiates this view, it is to be re-embodied in a human body and to be scourged with its sins, the punishment being inflicted by the mind, which has become a demon (C.H. 10:19-21).

But, on the other hand, the natural bodily impulses are not as such condemned, the begetting of children in particular being pronounced a pious act, while to die without children is an impiety punished after death by incarnation in a sexless body (C.H. 2:17).

It appears, then, that despite the occasional pessimistic assertions that good unmixed with evil is impossible here below (C.H. 6:3), and that the hardest thing of all is that we need evil things and cannot live without them (C.H. 6:6), the real doctrine of this literature is not that the body by virtue of its quality as matter pollutes the soul, but that the body is a hindrance, its passions things to be overcome by piety, itself defined as knowing God and doing men no harm (C.H. 10:19). On the other hand, bodilessness, or rather the possession of a fiery body, is an element of the highest blessedness along with knowledge of God and active benevolence and beneficence.

Σάρξ is of very infrequent occurrence. When used it signifies either the muscular portion of the body (C.H. 6:6) or the body itself (*ibid.*, 3:3, 4).

C. NEW TESTAMENT USAGE

In considering the usage of the New Testament writers, it will be expedient in the interest of brevity to present first an exhibit of New Testament usage in general, and then in a discussion of the usage of the several writers and groups of writers both to explain and justify the conclusions indicated in the general exhibit.

I. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

I. Wind:

John 3:8α: τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται, καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει.

The wind bloweth where it will and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth.

See also Heb. 1:7.

II. Breath, breath of life:

II Thess. 2:8: καὶ τότε ἀποκαλυφθήσεται ὁ ἀνομος ὃν ὁ κύριος [Ἰησοῦς] ἀνελεῖ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ.

And then shall be revealed the lawless one, whom the Lord Jesus shall slay with the breath of his mouth.

See also Rev. 11:11; 13:15.

III. Spirit: an incorporeal, sentient, intelligent, willing being, or the element by virtue of which a being is sentient, intelligent, etc.

A. Embodied, viz., human spirit, that element of a living man by virtue of which he lives, feels, perceives, and wills; variously viewed:

1. As the seat of life, or that in man which constitutes him a living being.

Luke 8:55: καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀνέστη παραχρῆμα.

And her spirit returned and she rose up immediately.

See also Matt. 27:50; Luke 23:46; John 19:30; Acts 7:59; Jas. 2:26.

2. As the seat of emotion and will; especially of the moral and religious life, including thought as concerned with religion.

Mark 14:38: γρηγορεῖτε καὶ προσέχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ ἔλθῃτε εἰς πειρασμόν· τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής.

Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak.

See also Matt. 26:41; Mark 8:12; Luke 1:47; John 4:23, 24b; 11:33; 13:21; Acts 17:16; 18:25; 19:21; 20:22; Rom. 1:9; 2:29; 7:6; 8:16; 12:11; I Cor. 4:21; 7:34; 16:18; II Cor. 2:13; 7:1, 13; Gal. 6:1, 8, 18; Eph. 4:23; Phil. 4:23; II Tim. 4:22; Philem. 25; Jas. 4:5; I Pet. 3:4.

It sometimes seems to denote the human spirit as permeated with or dominated by the divine Spirit, either ethically (John 3:6b), or ecstatically (I Cor. 14:14, 15, 16).

3. As the seat of consciousness and intelligence.

I Cor. 2:11: τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ;

For who among men knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him?

See also Matt. 5:3; Mark 2:8.

4. Generically, without reference to these distinctions.

Rom. 8:10: εἰ δὲ χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην.

And if Christ is in you the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness.

See also I Cor. 5:3, 4; Phil. 1:27; Col. 2:5; I Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12; 12:9 (?); Rev. 22:6.

B. Unembodied or disembodied spirit: more exactly, a sentient, intelligent, volitional being whose mode of life is not conditioned by a body in the ordinary sense of the term; used of various beings so conceived, the specific reference being indicated by limitations of the word or by the context; thus of:

1. The Spirit of God, viewed as:

a) The cause of extraordinary phenomena in human experience, such as prophecy, tongues, healings, etc.

I Cor. 12:4: διαίρεσις δὲ χαρισμάτων εἰσὶν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα.

Now there are diversities of gifts but the same Spirit.

See also Matt. 10:20; 12:18, 28, 31, 32; 22:43; Mark 3:29; 12:36; 13:11; Luke 1:15, 17, 41, 67; 2:25, 26, 27; 4:18; 10:21;

12:10, 12; John 7:39 (*bis*); 20:22; Acts 1:5, 8, 16; 2:4, 17, 18, 33, 38; 4:8, 25, 31; 5:3, 9, 32; 7:51, 55; 8:15, 17, 18, 19, 29; 9:17; 10:19, 44, 45, 47; 11:12, 15, 16, 28; 13:2, 4, 9, 52; 15:8, 28; 16:6; 19:2, 6; 20:23, 28; 21:4, 11; 28:25; Rom. 15:19; I Cor. 2:10, 12^b, 13, 14; 7:40; 12:3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13; 14:2; Gal. 3:2, 3, 5; Eph. 3:5; I Thess. 5:19; I Tim. 4:1; Heb. 2:4; 3:7; 9:8; 10:15; II Pet. 1:21; I John 4:2a, 6a; Rev. 1:10; 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22; 4:2; 14:13; 17:3; 21:10.

In Acts 16:7; I Pet. 1:11; Rev. 19:10(?), the spirit in this sense is identified with that of the risen Jesus.

b) Active in an extraordinary way in the conception of a child.

Matt 1:18: *εὐρέθη ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου.*

She was found with child of the Holy Spirit.

See also Matt. 1:20; Luke 1:35.

c) Operative in the human spirit for the production of ethical results.

Rom. 8:4: *ἵνα τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα.*

That the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit.

See also Matt. 3:11; Mark 1:8; Luke 3:16; John 3:5, 6a, 8b; 14:17, 26; 15:26; 16:13; Acts 9:31; Rom. 5:5; 8:2, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15^b, 16a, 23, 26, 27; 9:1; 14:17; 15:13, 16, 30; I Cor. 2:4; 3:16; 6:11, 19; II Cor. 1:22; 3:3, 6, 8, 17, 18; 4:13; 5:5; 6:6; 13:13; Gal. 4:6; 5:5, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25; Eph. 1:13, 17; 2:18, 22; 3:16; 4:3, 30; 6:17, 18; Phil. 2:1; 3:3; Col. 1:8; I Thess. 1:5, 6; 4:8; II Thess. 2:13; II Tim. 1:14; Titus 3:5; Heb. 10:29; I Pet. 1:2; 4:14; Jude, vss. 19, 20.

In Rom. 8:9c; Phil. 1:19; Heb. 9:14, the Spirit in this sense is identified with that of the risen Christ.

d) The mind of God.

I Cor. 2:11: *οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ.*

Even so the things of God none knoweth save the Spirit of God.

e) Operative in the external world.

Acts 8:39: *ὅτε δὲ ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος, πνεῦμα κυρίου ἤρπασεν τὸν Φίλιππον.*

And when they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip.

f) Generically, without specific reference to the form of activity.

Luke 4:14: *καὶ ὑπέστρεψεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν.*

And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee.

See also Matt. 3:16; 4:1; 28:19; Mark 1:10, 12; Luke 3:22; 4:1 (*bis*); 11:13; John 1:32, 33 (*bis*); 3:34; Acts 1:2; 6:3, 5, 10; 10:38; 11:24; Rom. 8:11 (*bis*); Gal. 3:14; 4:29; Eph. 4:4; 5:18; Heb. 6:4; I Pet. 1:12; I John 3:24; 4:13; 5:6, 8; Rev. 22:17.

2. The spirit of man separated from the body after death:

a) In a heavenly mode of existence.

Acts 23:9: *οὐδὲν κακὸν εὐρίσκομεν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ· εἰ δὲ πνεῦμα ἐλάλησεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἄγγελος—.*

We find no evil in this man: and what if a spirit hath spoken to him, or an angel?

See also I Cor. 5:5; Heb. 12:23.

b) A ghost, specter, shade, visible on earth.

Luke 24:37: *πτοηθέντες δὲ καὶ ἐμφοβοὶ γενόμενοι ἐδόκουν πνεῦμα θεωρεῖν.*

But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they beheld a spirit.

See also Luke 24:39.

c) In Sheol.

I Pet. 3:19: *ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν.*

In which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison.

3. An angel.

Heb. 1:14: *οὐχὶ πάντες εἰσὶν λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα εἰς διακονίαν ἀποστελλόμενα διὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας κληρονομεῖν σωτηρίαν;*

Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation?

4. A demon.

Acts 8:7: πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα βοῶντα φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐξήρχοντο.

For from many of those that had unclean spirits, they came out, crying with a loud voice.

See also Matt. 8:16; 10:1; 12:43, 45; Mark 1:23, 26, 27; 3:11, 30; 5:2, 8, 13; 6:7; 7:25; 9:17, 20, 25 (*bis*); Luke 4:33, 36; 6:18; 7:21; 8:2, 29; 9:39, 42; 10:20; 11:24, 26; 13:11; Acts 5:16; 16:16, 18; 19:12, 13, 15, 16; I Tim. 4:1*b*; Rev. 16:13, 14; 18:2.

5. Without reference to these distinctions, referring qualitatively to any being not corporeally conditioned, or to all such, or to a group (other than any of the above), defined by the context; used both of beings conceived of as actually existing, and, especially as a descriptive term in negative expressions, of beings presented merely as objects of thought.

John 4:24: πνεῦμα ὁ θεὸς, καὶ τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας αὐτὸν ἐν πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ δεῖ προσκυνεῖν.

God is a spirit and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth. (The first instance only falls under this head.)

Rom. 8:15: οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον, ἀλλὰ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας.

For ye received not a spirit of bondage again unto fear; but ye received a spirit of adoption.

See also Luke 9:55; Acts, 23:8; Rom. 1:4; 11:8; I Cor. 2:12*a*; 12:10; 14:12, 32; 15:45; II Cor. 11:4; 12:18; Eph. 2:2; II Thess. 2:2; I Tim. 3:16; II Tim. 1:7; I Pet. 3:18; 4:6; I John 4:1 (*bis*), 2*b*, 3, 6*b*; Rev. 1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6.

C. Generically, without reference to the distinction between embodied and unembodied spirit.

John 6:63 (*bis*); I Cor. 6:17; Heb. 12:9 (?).

II. ΨΥΧΗ

1. Life, the loss of which is death; used only of men.

Mark 3:4: ἔξεστιν τοῖς σάββασιν ἀγαθοποιῆσαι ἢ κακοποιῆσαι, ψυχήν σῶσαι ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι;

Is it lawful on the sabbath day to do good or to do harm? to save a life or to kill?

¹ Cf. Enoch 20:6, ἐπὶ τῷ πνεύματι.

See also Matt. 2:20; 6:25 (*bis*); Luke 6:9; 12:20, 22, 23; 14:26; 21:19 (?); John 10:11, 15, 17; 13:37, 38; 15:13; Acts 20:10, 24; 27:10, 22; Rom. 11:3; 16:4; II Cor. 1:23; Phil. 2:30; I John 3:16 (*bis*); Rev. 8:9.

2. The soul of man as distinguished from the body and existing separately or capable of so existing.

Matt. 10:28: *καὶ μὴ φοβηθῆτε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτείνοντων τὸ σῶμα τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτείνει· φοβεῖσθε δὲ μᾶλλον τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι ἐν γέεννῃ.*

And be not afraid of them that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.

See also Acts 2:27; Rev. 6:9; 20:4. Less clearly so in I Thess. 5:23; Heb. 10:39; Jas. 1:21; 5:20; I Pet. 1:9; 4:19; Rev. 18:13.

3. Soul as a constituent element of man's nature, the seat of vitality, thought, emotion, will; the human mind in the larger sense of the word; most frequently with special reference to its religious capacities and experiences.

Matt. 11:29: *καὶ εὐρήσετε ἀνάπαυσιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν.*

See also Matt 22:37; 26:38; Mark 12:30; 14:34; Luke 2:35; 10:27; John 10:24; 12:27; Acts 4:32; 14:2, 22; 15:24; Eph. 6:6; Phil. 1:27; Col. 3:23; Heb. 4:12; 6:19; 12:3; I Pet. 1:22; 2:11, 25; II Pet. 2:8, 14; III John 2; Rev. 18:14.

4. Following the LXX, *ψυχὴ ζωῆς* signifies a living being.

Rev. 16:3 only. Paul uses *ψυχὴ ζῶσα* in a similar sense in I Cor. 15:45.

5. More frequently *ψυχὴ* alone denotes a human person.

a) A person, an individual man; sometimes in the redundant form, *ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου*.

Rom. 13:1: *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω.*

Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers.

See also Acts 2:43; 3:23; Rom. 2:9.

b) In enumerations.

Acts 2:41; 7:14; 27:37; I Pet. 3:20.

c) With possessive limitation, for self.

Matt. 12:18; Luke 1:46; 12:19a; Heb. 10:38. In Luke 12:19b without possessive limitation.

d) By further metonymy for the powers, possibilities, and interests of the self, the human person.

Matt. 16:25a: *ὅς γὰρ ἐὰν θέλῃ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ σῶσαι, ἀπολέσει αὐτήν.*

For whosoever would save his life shall lose it.

See also Matt. 10:39 (*bis*); 16:25b, 26; 20:28; Mark 8:35 (*bis*), 36, 37; 10:45; Luke 9:24 (*bis*); 17:33; John 12:25 (*bis*); Acts 15:26; II Cor. 12:15; I Thess. 2:8; Heb. 13:17; Rev. 12:11.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

1. Flesh: the soft, muscular parts of an animal body, living or once living.

Luke 24:39: *ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι πνεῦμα σὰρκα καὶ ὀστέα οὐκ ἔχει καθὼς ἐμὲ θεωρεῖτε ἔχοντα.*

Handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me having.

See also John 6:51 (*bis*), 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 63; I Cor. 15:39 (four times), 50; Jas. 5:3; Rev. 17:16; 19:18 (five times), 21.

2. Body: the whole material part of a living being.

II Cor. 12:7: *διὸ ἵνα μὴ ὑπεραίρωμαι, ἐδόθη μοι σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί.*

That I should not be exalted overmuch there was given unto me a thorn in the flesh.

See also Matt. 26:41; Mark 14:38; John 1:13 (?); Acts 2:26, 31; Rom. 2:28; I Cor. 5:5; II Cor. 4:11; 7:1; 10:3a; Gal. 2:20; 3:3; 4:13, 14; 6:8 (*bis*), 13; Eph. 2:11b, 15; 5:29; Phil. 1:22, 24; Col. 1:22, 24; 2:1, 5, 13; I Tim. 3:16; Heb. 9:10, 13; 10:20; 12:9; I Pet. 3:18, 21; 4:1 (*bis*), 2, 6; I John 2:16; 4:2; II John, vs. 7; Jude, vss. 7, 8, 23.

By metonymy for embodiment, incarnation. Heb. 5:7.

With *αἷμα*, the whole phrase signifying the body. Heb. 2:14.

3. By metonymy: the basis or result of natural generation.

a) The basis of natural generation and of kinship (the body or the body plus whatever is concerned with generation and kinship).

John 3:6a: *τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ ἐστίν.*

That which is born of the flesh is flesh. (Only the first instance falls under this head. Cf. 6 below.)

See also Rom. 4:1; 9:3, 5, 8; I Cor. 10:18; Gal. 4:23, 29; Eph. 2:11a.

b) As a collective term, equivalent to "kindred."

Rom. 11:14: *εἰ πως παραζηλώσω μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ σώσω τινὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν.*

If by any means I may provoke to jealousy them that are my flesh, and may save some of them.

In this use the term passes beyond the limits of the physical and comes to include all the elements of a human being.

4. A corporeally conditioned living being: usually referring exclusively to man, yet sometimes including all corporeal living beings, and in any case designating the beings referred to not as human but as corporeal.

Matt. 16:17: *μακάριος εἶ, Σίμων Βαριωνᾶ, ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου ὃ ἐν [τοῖς] οὐρανοῖς.*

Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jonah: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven.

See also Matt. 19:5, 6; 24:22; Mark 10:8; 13:20; Luke 3:6; John 1:14; 17:2; Acts 2:17; Rom. 1:3; 3:20; 8:3b, c (?); I Cor. 1:29; 6:16; Gal. 1:16; 2:16; Eph. 5:31; 6:12; I Pet. 1:24.

5. By metonymy for the creature side, the corporeally conditioned aspect of life, the external as distinguished from the internal and real, or the secular as distinguished from the strictly religious.

John 8:15: *ὁμοῖς κατὰ τὴν σάρκα κρίνετε, ἐγὼ οὐ κρίνω οὐδένα* (cf. 7:24).

Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man.

See also I Cor. 1:26; 7:28; II Cor. 5:16 (*bis*); 7:5; 10:2; 11:18; Gal. 6:12; Eph. 6:5; Col. 3:22; Philem. 16.

6. The product of natural generation apart from the morally transforming power of the Spirit of God; all that comes to a man by inheritance rather than from the operation of the divine Spirit. The term as thus used does not exclude, may even specifically include, whatever excellent powers, privileges, etc., come by heredity, but whatever is thus derived is regarded as inadequate to enable man to achieve the highest good.

Phil. 3:4: *εἰ τις δοκεῖ ἄλλος πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί, ἐγὼ μᾶλλον.*

If any other man thinketh to have confidence in the flesh, I yet more. (Note the context.)

See also John 3:6b; Rom. 6:19; 7:5, 18, 25; 8:3a; II Cor. 1:17; Phil. 3:3.

7. That element in man's nature which is opposed to goodness, that in him which makes for evil; sometimes thought of as an element of himself, sometimes objectified as a force distinct from him, this latter usage being, however, rather rhetorical.

Rom. 8:6: τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος.

For the mind of the flesh is death.

See also Rom. 8:4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12 (*bis*), 13; 13:14; Gal. 5:13, 16, 17, 19, 24; perhaps Eph. 2:3 (*bis*); Col. 2:11, 18, 23; II Pet. 2:10, 18, though in all these latter cases *σάρξ* may itself mean simply body, and the implication of evil lie in other members of the sentence.

In 6 all the good that comes to man by nature is credited to the *σάρξ*, the evil of it is its moral inadequacy; in 7 the right impulses are credited to the *νοῦς* or the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*, and the *σάρξ* becomes a force positively and aggressively evil.

From this exhibit of New Testament usage in general we may pass to consider the usages of particular writers.

PAULINE USAGE

One of the marked peculiarities of the New Testament vocabulary which is especially characteristic of Paul is the frequency of the words *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ*, especially the former. *Ψυχή* is indeed not infrequent, but while the others rise into a prominence which they have in no other literature that we have examined, *ψυχή*, which almost everywhere has been far more frequent than either of the other words, is now much less frequent than either.

The apostle Paul's use of *πνεῦμα* is plainly kindred with, and almost beyond doubt directly or indirectly influenced by, the Old Testament usage of *רוח*. If one turn to the Greek writers contemporary with Paul, he will find the meanings "wind" and "breath" most frequent, the meaning "spirit" rare, and the religious sense of the term as referring to the Spirit of God or the spirit of man as the seat of religious life almost without example. Even in the Jewish-Greek writings other than the LXX, these latter meanings are relatively infrequent. In Paul, on the other hand,

πνεῦμα never means "wind," the meaning "breath" occurs but once, and that in an epistle not quite certainly his, while its use in reference to the Spirit of God occurs on every page, and the instances in which it denotes the spirit of man are also quite frequent. Both these uses indeed are much more frequent in Paul than in any preceding literature, even the Old Testament, a fact which indicates that in the mind of Paul himself or in a circle of thought by which he was influenced something occurred to exalt the importance of the term in the senses referred to.

If one seek for an author later than the Old Testament by whom Paul may have been influenced, there is none more probable than Philo Judaeus (see *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1916, pp. 404 ff.). But Paul's idea of spirit is by no means identical with Philo's, being simpler and more self-consistent, and more like that of the Old Testament. It may be doubted, therefore, whether Paul was very strongly influenced by Philo at this point.

The occurrence of the phrase *πνεῦμα ἁγίον* in the magical papyri, in such a way as to indicate that it is a familiar term in the vocabulary of those who wrote these documents, raises the question whether it is under the influence of this literature that Paul and the other New Testament writers employ this phrase and use *πνεῦμα* so frequently of the Spirit of God. It may be that further research will show this to have been the fact. But, as indicated above (p. 564), the existing evidence falls short of establishing more than the possibility of it, and it must for the present remain more probable that the development of which the Pauline writings give evidence has its chief basis in the Old Testament literature and its chief impulse in the Christian movement. Indeed, in view of the relative infrequency of the idea and the terms in contemporary Jewish literature and their much greater prominence in Paul than in most other New Testament writers, with the exception of the Johannine literature, the most probable hypothesis seems to be that the apostle himself is largely responsible for the marked development in the usage of *πνεῦμα* with reference to the Spirit of God and the spirit of man as the seat of religious life.

The secular Greek writers, it will be recalled, very rarely employ *πνεῦμα* of the human spirit, or soul, but almost uniformly *ψυχή*.

Paul, on the other hand, like the LXX and the later Jewish-Greek writers, frequently uses *πνεῦμα* in this sense, and, like them, not infrequently with special reference to its religious capacities or experiences. The only respect in which he shows any definite development in the use of *πνεῦμα* of the human spirit beyond the Jewish-Greek writers is in that he seems occasionally by a sort of blending of usages to employ it of the human spirit as permeated or dominated by the divine Spirit.

In the consideration of the Pauline use of *πνεῦμα* to denote the Spirit of God, and the differentiation of Pauline from earlier usage, four facts are important to observe. First, the relation of the Spirit of God to God is analogous to that of the spirit of man to man (I Cor. 2:11). In other words, whatever the origin of the phrase, it has become for Paul anthropomorphic, denoting an existence which has, in relation to God, powers or functions analogous to those of the human spirit in relation to man. In this statement of the apostle we seem to approach very closely to the identification of God and the Spirit of God. The Spirit is not here something which proceeds from God, but is the very center of the divine consciousness, and if we suppose that of the two elements of man there is in God none corresponding to the material body, the Spirit of God would seem to be God. Paul, to be sure, does not expressly say, as the Fourth Gospel does, that God is spirit, or that he has no body. To affirm, therefore, that he definitely identified God and the Spirit of God is doubtless in a measure to substitute inference for evidence. Yet the passage is important as showing how near the apostle approached this affirmation.

The second notable fact is that in Paul the Spirit as a transitive force is operative only in men, and in them as a force either producing extraordinary powers, such as prophecy, tongues, and the like (see especially I Cor., chap. 12), or regenerating moral character (see especially Gal. 5:13-25). On the now familiar distinction between the charismatic expression of the Spirit and his ethical working, or on the apostle's toleration of the former idea and his exaltation of the latter, it is superfluous to dwell.

In the third place, it is significant that from the point of view of religious experience Paul identifies the Spirit of God and the

heavenly Christ. Both are alike the indwelling cause in the soul of man of the present religious life and of the future resurrection and blessedness. There is but one experience and but one cause of it, which may be spoken of as the Spirit of God or as the Spirit of Christ or as Christ. This appears not only from such passages as Gal. 5:16, 18, 25, compared with 2:20 and 5:6, reinforced as they are by many others, but most strikingly in Rom. 8:3-11, where the interchange of terms with reference to the same experience and without change of meaning is unmistakable, and in II Cor. 3:17, where he seems directly to affirm that Christ is the Spirit.¹ Adequately to discuss the cause of this duality of expression for a single idea would require more space than is here available. But it is evident that the two terminologies have a different historic origin. The Spirit-phraseology has its roots in those usages which we have been examining in previous articles. The Christ-terminology, itself, of course, derived from Jewish thought, as employed in the description of the Christian experience and expectation has its starting-point in Paul's own interpretation of his Damascus experience as a revelation of the Son of God in him. Unable to discard either phraseology for the other, he uses now one, now the other, now both together.

In the fourth place, it must be noted that the apostle has not altogether left behind those forms of thought and expression which are inherited from a time when the Spirit of God was thought of without clear ascription of personality, and even quantitatively. See, e.g., I Thess. 1:5; Rom. 5:5; 8:23; I Cor. 2:4; II Cor. 1:22; Gal. 3:5; Phil. 1:19. This type of expression is not indeed the dominant one in Paul, yet giving due weight to it and to the apparent reluctance of Paul directly to identify God and the Spirit, we may say that in his thought the Spirit of God is the personalized power of God, operative in the spirits of men, not distinguishable, in experience at least, from the heavenly Christ. If this is to us a difficult mid-station between identity with God and personality distinct from God, it is nevertheless apparently about the point which Paul occupied.

¹ If indeed *ὁ πνεῦμα* here means God, we have an explicit affirmation of the identity of God and the Spirit, but this is a less probable interpretation than the one indicated above.

It is probably significant of the reflection which had been going on respecting the nature of *πνεῦμα* that in Paul for the first time we find the term used generically to denote the whole class of intelligent beings who are not conditioned by a fleshly body, and less frequently in a still more inclusive sense as embracing intelligent beings whether embodied or unembodied. See III, B, 5, and C in the list of meanings.

The Pauline usage of *ψυχή* is, formally at least, almost identical with that of the LXX, itself largely a reproduction of the Hebrew use of *נֶפֶשׁ*. None of the Hebrew senses is lacking, and none of the senses found in later Greek but not in Hebrew is present. In one notable passage, however, in which the apostle quotes a phrase from the Old Testament, he gives to the terms *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* an antithesis of meaning which they bear neither in the Old Testament nor, so far as has been observed, in any writer between the Old Testament and Paul. Discussing the resurrection and the body which is raised, quoting freely from Gen. 2:7, he says: *ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*, and adds *ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* (I Cor. 15:45). The contrast is twofold. Adam is alive; Christ is able to make alive (the dead). Adam became *ψυχή*, which, according to a common usage of the Hebrew *נֶפֶשׁ* and *ψυχή* in the LXX, is a living corporeal being. Christ became (by resurrection—note the context and Rom. 1:4) *πνεῦμα*, i.e., not a wholly unembodied being, for this very chapter maintains the contrary respecting those who are raised from the dead, but one no longer having a terrestrial body of flesh and blood (vss. 40, 50). Such a contrast between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* is wholly foreign to ordinary Greek thought, to which *πνεῦμα* is the substance of which the soul is composed. Nor have we found in any Greek writer a placing of the *πνεῦμα* above the *ψυχή*. It is still more foreign to the usage of the Hermetic writings, which make the *ψυχή* superior to the *πνεῦμα*. There is a certain approach to it in Philo, in that he makes the *πνεῦμα* superior to the *ψυχή* and, of course, like the LXX, sometimes uses *ψυχή* of a person, not simply the soul. The use of *πνεῦμα* to denote an incorporeal being is also not without precedent. But the distinctive feature of this passage, the use of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* to describe two

types of beings, the earthly, embodied, and the heavenly, super-corporeal, and the association with the latter of the idea of life-giving as contrasted with the simple life-possession of the former, has no observed precedent.

The consideration of the Pauline use of *σάρξ* brings us into the heart of one of the most difficult and important aspects of our whole study. That *σάρξ* sometimes has a physical sense is beyond question; that it has in Paul an ethical sense is scarcely less clear. What is important to determine is whether when it takes on its distinctly ethical sense, so as to denote a force that makes for sin in the lives of men, it still retains its physical sense, and whether as a force that makes for unrighteousness (be this physical or non-physical), it is an influence that may be resisted or a compelling and irresistible force. If the flesh in the physical sense is the latter, then the apostle must, logically at least, hold that the touch of the flesh is essentially polluting, and that there can be no salvation except through the release of the soul from the body. If, however, the *σάρξ* that makes for evil is not a physical thing, or if the *σάρξ* as physical is only an influence, an occasion of temptation, not a compelling force, salvation may be a spiritual, not a physical, process. These questions are of great importance. The answer to them will go far toward determining the whole character of Paul's conception of religion.

It must, of course, be recognized on the one hand that the apostle has nowhere definitely formulated his doctrine, and on the other that there are several passages which at least on superficial reading seem to express a hard-and-fast ethical dualism. Such, for example, are Gal. 5:16-25 and Rom. 8:1-11. In attempting to decide the question thus raised the following facts must be taken into account:

First, throughout a large part of the whole period covered by our previous study there have appeared here and there evidences of a tendency to regard matter, or the human body as a material thing, as injurious to the intellectual or moral interests of man. This persistent conception takes various forms. Sometimes, as in Plato, the ultimate cause of disorder in the physical universe is found in the recalcitrancy of the matter of which it is composed.

Sometimes, as in Plato again, the body is disparaged as a hindrance to philosophical thought. Sometimes, as in the Orphic teaching, incarnation is regarded as a punishment imposed upon the soul for sins committed by it in a previous state. Sometimes, as in Philo, there is emphasized the ordinary fact of experience, viz., that the bodily passions incite men to immoral acts. Nowhere is this conception expressed in a definitely formulated doctrine of an ultimate ethical dualism of spirit and matter, or of mind and matter, or of flesh and spirit, nor is it anywhere affirmed that sin in the universe is a necessary consequence of the matter in it, or sin in the individual, of embodiment, or that all good comes from the spirit by virtue of its immateriality.

That such a view was held by the Gnostics comparatively early in the Christian period seems to be true. But the evidence does not seem to show that this development had already taken place in the New Testament period itself. Palestinian Judaism, which Paul's use of the word "spirit" suggests had influenced him much more than had non-Jewish thinking, had not developed the thought of the evil of the body or of matter as the cause of evil. In the Old Testament the flesh is weak but not sinful. Weber, indeed, in his *Theologie des Talmud*, maintained that rabbinism held an ethical dualism finding the evil impulse, the *yezer hara* in the flesh. But, as mentioned in a previous article, Professor F. C. Porter has demonstrated the erroneousness of this view and shown that rabbinic Judaism held no doctrine of the evil of matter.¹ Even Philo, who agrees with Plato that the body is a drag upon the soul, holds no consistent doctrine of the evil of matter or of the body as the cause of sin. Our approach to the study of the New Testament ought therefore to be with open mind on this point. There was an intellectual soil out of which there might easily spring the doctrine that embodied man is *ipso facto* a sinful man. But apparently it had not yet sprung up. If it had, it would not be certain that the New Testament writers would adopt it; nor, if it had not, would it be impossible for Paul to create it. We should therefore interrogate Paul and the other writers who followed him without prejudice.

¹ "The *Yezer Hara*: a Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin," in *Yale Biblical and Semitic Studies*, New York and London, 1901.

Secondly, the New Testament usage of *σάρξ* is not simple but highly developed. There are found here not only the simple meaning "flesh" and that relatively easy metonymy "body," but those other meanings derived from the Hebrew, "corporeal being," "person," "kindred" (cf. *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1914, pp. 74-77, with pp. 574 ff.). Not only so, but in Paul and in writers influenced by him there appears a still further development of usage. The meaning 3, *a*) (see p. 574) is but a slight departure from the meaning "kindred" which the word had already taken over from the Hebrew. So also 5 is by easy metonymy developed from 4. Nor is the case materially different with 6. When *σάρξ* has come to mean the basis of natural generation (3, *a*), it is but a short step to using it also for all that comes by heredity, the whole complex of life's relationships into which one enters by being born of whatever parents one is born of. This step Paul seems clearly to have taken in Phil 3:3-7. By virtue of the flesh he was not only a circumcised son of the race of Israel and of the tribe of Benjamin, but an orthodox Hebrew, a Pharisee, a persecutor of the unorthodox, and, as concerns the righteousness that can be achieved under legalism, above reproach. Thus it denotes the whole of his personality and possessions except that which comes through a distinct personal religious experience. At this point it is important to observe three facts.

a) The word is at this point of the development no longer an exclusively physical term. Indeed, it is not such in any of the preceding meanings, 3, 4, 5, unless possibly in 3, *a*). But here more clearly than at any preceding point the term has become super-physical.

b) The term carries with it no suggestion of positive evil. All the things that Paul comprehended under the term "flesh" are in themselves good, and so regarded by him except the persecution of the church, and even this he cites as an illustration of his zeal for God. His conversion is not the repudiation of the evil, but the turning from the good to the better. The doctrine that underlies the passage is that true life is achieved only when to all that nature gives, though it has given its best, there is added the gift of the Spirit of God.

c) Thus the idea of the *σάρξ* is here brought into definite relation to the *πνεῦμα*. The *σάρξ* can do much; it is the *πνεῦμα* only that can produce the true, the perfect.

But to this step there is added one more, by which for the first time the term takes on a distinctly ethical sense. Had we only Rom. 8:1-11 to deal with, it would not be clear that this is the case. For this whole passage might perhaps be explained from the point of view of Phil. 3. It is the weakness of the flesh that is emphasized in vs. 3, and the walking according to the flesh might be thought of as the conduct of those who are controlled by those things in life that come by heredity, not by the spirit, good though the former are. And even when it is said that the mind of the flesh is enmity against God, this might mean only that the love of things that one inherits—the life of the man who follows the current of heredity—inevitably issues in the rejection of the will of God. But it is clear that in any case the apostle has here pushed his thought of the evil consequences of following the flesh much further than he does in the passage from the later letter to the Philippians. And when we turn back to Gal. 5:16-25 we seem to see clearly that the apostle had already come to include in his thought of the flesh not only the good things that are inadequate, but those impulses to evil which also seem to be born in us; in other words, to let the flesh stand for one aspect of heredity—the inborn tendency to evil. But if so, there are certain additional facts that require to be observed.

a) It is almost beyond question that the meaning which we find in Gal., chap. 5, represents an advance upon that found in Phil., chap. 3, not the reverse. As out of the meaning 3, a), basis of natural generation, there arises 6, the total product and outcome of heredity, so out of the thought of the moral inadequacy of the latter there might spring the conception of the hereditary tendency to evil.¹

¹ In Rom. 7:17-8:8 we seem to have as it were an epitome of the working of the apostle's mind. In chap. 7 it is not the flesh that is the evil force, but sin stimulated by law. The flesh is inadequate, unable without God's Spirit to respond to the inner imperative. In 8:3 it is still the weakness, not the power for evil, of the flesh that is spoken of, and only in the latter part of the passage does the idea of weakness and unresponsiveness gradually merge into that of hostility to God.

b) This being the case, the fact that the meaning which represents the latest step in the evolution appears in one of Paul's earliest letters, and that the earlier, non-ethical meaning appears in one of his latest letters, shows that development of the distinctly ethical meaning did not involve the repudiation of the thought expressed by the unethical sense.

c) The relation of the several meanings of the term makes it improbable that the *σάρξ* which is hostile to God, and the works of which are evil, is a purely physical thing, or that it is evil because it is material. The strictly material sense is left behind several steps before we reach the distinctly ethical meaning. To introduce it at this point is superfluous and illogical.¹

d) Not even to the *σάρξ* as a force that makes for evil does Paul ascribe compelling power. In faith with its consequent vital fellowship with God, there is a power adequate to overcome the force that makes for evil (Rom. 6:1, 2; Gal. 5:16, 22, 23).

e) So far from sharing the feeling expressed by Plato, Seneca, and Plutarch that true blessedness is achievable only by getting

¹ Against this interpretation of the apostle's thought there may be urged his phrase *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* in Rom. 8:3, and the *τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου* of 7:24. But the former phrase by no means of necessity involves an analytic judgment that the flesh in the likeness of which Christ came is by its nature sinful, intrinsically tainted with sin; nor is the flesh by any necessity of usage or context to be taken in a purely physical sense. The latter interpretation indeed, with or without the former, would make Paul a docetist, which he certainly was not. The view most consistent with Pauline usage is that which takes *σάρξ* as standing for a corporeally conditioned being (referring to man of course) and *ἁμαρτίας* as in effect the predicate of a synthetic proposition. The whole phrase then means simply that when Christ came he did not differ in outward appearance from sinful men. If 7:24 were an expression of desire for deliverance from the body in death, one might plausibly argue that Paul conceived of the body as the cause of sin and release from it as the only way of escape from sin. But this is manifestly not the case, since Paul never thinks of Christ as the author or cause of death, as on this view vs. 25 would imply that he did. It is rather a moral victory which he desires, and doubtless in the present life. That he uses the word "body" at this point instead of "sin" bears witness to the apostle's deep sense of the intimate relation between the evil impulses, which he has previously personified under the name "sin," and the body (cf. vs. 23 and I Cor. 9:27), and the addition of *τοῦ θανάτου* reflects his belief that sin is the cause of death. The passage is one of several that bear testimony that Paul was not blind to the obvious fact of human experience that the tendency to sin is closely associated with the physical nature; but it by no means follows nor is it probable that the body as such is, in his view, the compelling cause of sin.

rid of the body, Paul believed that the soul could not be wholly happy without a body. This thought, which is somewhat more clearly expressed in I Cor., chap. 15, and II Cor., chap. 5, and suggested by I Thess. 5:23, is implied in vs. 11 of the very passage now under consideration. The culmination of the work of the Spirit is that through it God makes alive our mortal bodies. It is true, indeed, as I Cor., chap. 15, shows, that the making alive involves a transformation into a spiritual body; but a spiritual body is still a body; and that not the transformation of the body but the permanent possession of it is what the apostle here has chiefly in mind is shown by the fact that he makes no mention in vs. 11 of the former, but speaks only of bringing to life again our mortal bodies. Had the apostle thought of the body as such as the cause of sin, he must here have spoken, not of its being made alive (in the resurrection), but of its being destroyed, or of the spirit as being released from it.¹ Had he thought of its materiality as the cause of sin he must at the least have spoken here of its transformation; cf. Phil. 3:21.

Thus in three respects the evidence is against the view that Paul found in the flesh as a physical thing a compelling force for evil. The flesh that makes for evil is not the body or matter as such, but an inherited impulse to evil. This force is not compulsory, but can be resisted by the power of the spirit. The body is not an evil, but a factor of the best life. The inherited evil impulse is, of course, related to the bodily life. The body is inferior to the spirit and the occasion of temptation. But embodied man may, by the power of the spirit, triumph over all evil tendencies.

The foregoing discussion of *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* suggests what further examination confirms, that when these two terms stand in

¹ It may be alleged that the usage of the time requires us to understand Paul as actually personalizing, not simply personifying, sin, that by it he means a demon and that the abode of this demon is for him in the flesh, in the sense either of the body or of the whole physical environment. (See Dibelius, *Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus*, pp. 119 ff.) The writer finds himself unconvinced by the arguments that seem to some to establish this view. But even if it be correct, it does not materially affect our interpretation of *σάρξ*, but only requires the substitution of the idea of a demon for the more vague expression "hereditary impulse" used above.

antithesis, as they frequently do in Paul, it is by no means always the same meanings that are contrasted. In Gal. 6:8; I Cor. 5:5; II Cor. 7:1; Rom. 2:28, 29; Col. 2:5, the contrast is between the flesh, or the body, and the spirit of man—an antithesis that in most Greek writers would have been expressed by *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*—but in most of the foregoing cases at least with an emphasis on the religious capacity of the *πνεῦμα* that would not have been conveyed by *ψυχή*. In Gal. 6:8 the sowing to the flesh is the devotion of one's goods (see vs. 6) and energies to the satisfaction of the demands of the body; sowing to the spirit is devoting these things to the development of the spirit-life, which is both intellectual and religious. In Gal. 3:3 the flesh is, as in the preceding cases (see especially Rom. 2:28, 29), the physical flesh, that in which the circumcision which they were urged to accept took place; but the spirit is the Spirit of God, which they received (vs. 2) when they accepted the gospel and by which miracles were wrought among them (vs. 5). In Gal. 4:23 *σάρξ*, as in Rom. 9:3, 5, 8, is clearly the basis of natural generation, the contrast being with the promise in fulfilment of which Isaac was born extraordinarily; in the application of the allegory *ὁ γεννηθεὶς κατὰ σάρκα* (vs. 29) refers to the Jew who depends upon his heredity for salvation (the word thus verging toward meaning 6) in contrast with one whose life is according to the Spirit of God, or possibly with one who has been born according to the Spirit, an idea suggested in Rom. 6:4 and further developed in John 3:6. In Rom. 1:3, despite the similarity of the phrases to those in Gal. 4:23, 29, *σάρξ* is probably to be taken as denoting a corporeally conditioned being, and *πνεῦμα* as a generic term for an unembodied being (III, B, 5), *κατὰ* meaning "viewed as" and the whole passage indicating the high rank of Jesus among earthly (corporeally conditioned) beings, and, secondly, among holy heavenly (not corporeally conditioned) beings. Somewhat similar is the contrast in I Tim. 3:16, but *σάρξ* probably denotes the body or the corporeally conditioned mode of life, and *πνεύματι*, by a further metonymy suggested by the desire to parallel *ἐν σαρκί*, denotes an incorporeal mode of being rather than an incorporeal being. In Phil. 3:3 *πνεῦμα* manifestly denotes the Spirit of God, and *σάρξ*, as already

pointed out, all that man obtains by heredity. In Rom. 7:5 *σάρξ* probably means the totality of the life apart from the spirit (as in Phil. 3:3), while *πνεῦμα* in 7:6 stands for the human spirit as the seat of religious life. In Rom. 8:4-11 there is, as indicated above, a gradual transition from this meaning of *σάρξ* to the more positively ethical sense, while in vss. 12, 13 there is probably a return to the earlier meaning. Throughout these verses *πνεῦμα* denotes the Spirit of God, and sometimes the Spirit of Christ. The absence of the article gives the phrases in which it is lacking a qualitative force, by which it approximates to the generic sense, as inclusive of the divine and human spirit, but probably always retaining in the apostle's mind a reference to the divine Spirit. In Gal. 5:17-25 the flesh is the force that makes for sin, and *πνεῦμα* is the divine Spirit, the omission of the article having the same effect as in Rom., chap. 8.

THE USAGE OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS AND ACTS

In the Synoptic Gospels *πνεῦμα* always means "spirit." The meanings "wind" and "breath" do not occur. As applied to the human spirit, the reference to the religious life is less frequent than in Paul, and the idea of the human spirit as permeated by the divine does not occur. On the other hand, we find here instances of *πνεῦμα* denoting that in man which departs at death, or returns in revivification, for which Greek writers use *ψυχή* only, but Jewish-Greek sometimes *ψυχή* and sometimes, following the Hebrew, *πνεῦμα*. Cf. I Kings 17:21 (Hebrew and LXX); Jos., *War*, VII, 185, and II, 156. Akin to this latter is the use of the term of a ghost, a specter. Akin also, as is shown in Jos., *War*, VII, 185, is the use of *πνεῦμα* to denote a demon. This usage, not found at all in Paul, is frequent in the Synoptic Gospels. In the body of the synoptists *πνεῦμα*, referring to the Spirit of God, is used almost exclusively in the charismatic sense, referring to the Spirit as the cause of such extraordinary phenomena as prophecy, and of power over demons. Only in the John the Baptist prediction of the baptism in the Holy Spirit by his great successor, and in connection with Jesus' own baptism and temptation, does the term seem to approach an ethical

reference, and even here there is no sharp distinction of the ethical from the charismatic.

The use with reference to the conception of Jesus in the womb of his mother, found only in the infancy sections of Matthew and Luke, is without parallel in literature earlier than the New Testament or in the earlier parts of the New Testament itself. It apparently represents a unique development of the charismatic sense of the word.

The synoptic usage of *ψυχή* and *σάρξ* calls for little comment. It is substantially that of Jewish-Greek writers generally. There is no occurrence of the characteristically Pauline uses of *σάρξ* or any suggestion of Pauline influence. The whole evidence of the Synoptic Gospels tends to confirm the impression gained from the study of Paul, that his usage is not as a whole a reflection of common usage in his day, but to an important extent the result either of exceptional influences or of his own thinking.

The only important respect in which the usage of Acts differs from that of the synoptists is in the non-appearance of *πνεῦμα* in reference to the conception of Jesus, and in the ascription to the Spirit of God of power in the external world (Acts 8:39; cf. II Kings 2:16).

THE USAGE OF THE JOHANNINE WRITINGS

The Fourth Gospel contains one instance of *πνεῦμα* meaning "wind" (3:8), introduced for the purpose of comparing the action of *πνεῦμα* as spirit and *πνεῦμα* as wind. Aside from this exceptional case and the employment of the word of that which departs in death (John 19:30) the Johannine use of the word is very similar to that of Paul. It is used neither of a demon, as so commonly in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, but not in Paul, nor in reference to the conception of Jesus in his mother's womb. In reference to the Spirit of God *πνεῦμα* occurs in three ways. In chap. 1 it is used in evident dependence on the synoptists, of the descent of the Spirit on Jesus at his baptism. In chaps. 3 and 6 it is used, much as in Paul, of the Spirit as the source of life to men. In chaps. 14-17 it is employed of the Spirit as not yet present, but as coming to supply the place of Jesus. Here, as in Paul, there is no

clear distinction of function between the Spirit and the heavenly Christ. The Johannine representation is the Pauline conception converted from experience into prediction of experience.

To these references to the Spirit of God there must be added the unique statement of John 4:24 that God is spirit or a spirit. This, as already pointed out, Paul never says, but this use of the word as a generic term for incorporeal intelligent being is illustrated in Paul. The proposition itself had been affirmed two hundred years before by Posidonius, but with the addition of the expression *νοερόν καὶ πνῶδες*. The absence of these adjectives in John marks not only the elimination from the idea of God of the notion of materiality suggested by *πνῶδες* (or at least its reduction to a minimum), but the inclusion of the idea of intelligence in that of *πνεῦμα*, marked by the fact that it is no longer necessary to add *νοερόν* to express this idea.

Πνεῦμα used in reference to men denotes the seat of intellectual or emotional life, chiefly with reference to the religious aspects. John 3:6 *b* is without exact parallel, but explicable in view of *πνεῦμα* to denote the spirit of man permeated with the Spirit of God. See I Cor. 14:14, 15, 16. For the idea of a human spirit under the ethical domination of the Spirit of God, Paul uses *ἐν πνεύματι* (Rom. 8:9) and other similar phrases, but closely approaches the Johannine use in Rom. 8:10.

In I John we find the same use in general of *πνεῦμα* with reference to the Spirit of God. The generic use comes out distinctly in its employment as an inclusive term covering both the Spirit of God and those other beings which purport to be such, but whose anti-Christian utterances betray their real character. See I John 4:1 ff., and cf. list of meanings, III, B, 5. Here also we are on familiar Pauline ground. Cf. I Cor. 12:10.

The Apocalypse has no usages that call for special discussion.

Ψυχή in John and I John is used chiefly in the phrase "to lay down one's life." The instances in the sense of soul are of the familiar type.

The use of *σάρξ* in John, chap. 3 (the others require no discussion), reminds us of the Pauline use in Phil. 3:3, 4. In John, as in Paul, there is the thought that the Spirit of God is essential to true

human life, and the use of *σάρξ* in antithesis to *πνεῦμα* in a way to suggest that it denotes that which comes by heredity and is not dominated by the Spirit. Paul the Pharisee might almost have sat for the picture of Nicodemus; and the language of Jesus to Nicodemus, affirming the inadequacy of all that had come to him by heredity and the indispensableness of the transforming power of the Spirit, reads like an affirmation in general terms of what Paul had learned by personal experience.¹

But though there is this clear affinity between the Johannine and the Pauline thought, neither the Fourth Gospel nor I John furnishes any certain example of the Pauline use of *σάρξ* meaning the force in men that makes for evil. I John 2:16 might seem to be such a case, but the parallelism of the phrase "the lust of the eyes," in which no evil sense attaches to eyes in themselves, makes it probable that there is none such in the word "flesh," but that in itself it simply means the body, the evil sense of the phrase being suggested by the word *ἐπιθυμία* (cf. Rom. 7:7). It is clear in any case and most important to observe that to the flesh in the physical

¹ Considerations of space forbid an extended discussion of all the interpretations which have been or might be proposed for this verse. It must suffice to call attention to a few points of importance. (a) There is no presumption in favor of an interpretation that takes the two instances of *σάρξ* in the same sense, for this is not the case with the two instances of *πνεῦμα* in the second clause. The first is the Spirit of God; the second cannot be this, but must refer in some way to man, and indeed quite clearly in the sense of man filled with the Spirit of God and thus born anew. The two senses must manifestly be related but not necessarily identical. (b) Aside from objections to a strict identity of meaning, the interpretation, "that which is born of the body is body," is foreign to the context; for that which Nicodemus possessed was manifestly far more than a body. (c) Nor is the meaning "that which is born of a corporeal being is a corporeal being" more satisfactory, for if the idea of moral deficiency be not included in the term, it is impertinent to the discussion, and if this idea is associated with both instances, it would imply what is again wholly out of harmony with the context, that the moral deficiency of the child was conditioned on the moral state of the parent. (d) Nor can it be translated "that which is born of a sinful being is a sinful being," for similar reasons, and because there is no evidence that *σάρξ* means a sinful being. The interpretation which is most consonant with the context and best sustained by lexical usage may be paraphrased somewhat thus: That which is born by natural generation is, however good, inadequate to fit one for the Kingdom of God. Only that which is produced by the Spirit of God is like unto it, being a human spirit filled with the divine. The whole sentence is a formulation in intentionally sharply antithetical phrase of the same doctrine that is implied in Paul's experiential statement in Phil. 3:3 ff.

sense this writer attached no taint of moral evil. For it is one of the cardinal points for which he contends that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, evidently meaning to affirm the reality of the bodily life of Jesus (I John 4:2; cf. II John, vs. 7), yet clearly also believing in his sinlessness. Of similar purport is John 1:14; for though the term *σάρξ* does not mean flesh in the physical sense, but a corporeally conditioned being, yet no one who believed, as this writer did, that Jesus was sinless could affirm that he became a corporeal being if he also believed that to be corporeally conditioned was *ipso facto* to be sinful.¹

It may be said, however, that by their opposition to the doctrine that Jesus Christ is not come in the flesh, these writings testify to the existence, in their time, of the belief that the flesh is necessarily polluting. But not even this is a certain or even probable inference from the evidence of this letter. For I John 5:6-8 shows that the docetism which this epistle opposes is that which affirmed that the Christ entered the body of Jesus in the baptism and withdrew before the crucifixion; and this type of docetism has its basis, not in the affirmation of the evil of matter, but in the desire not to affirm that the Christ suffered.

On the one hand, therefore, the evidence of the Johannine writings shows that in the circle from which they issued the flesh was not regarded as causing sin, and on the other fails to show that they were directly in contact and conflict with such a view. This fact is not without its reflex value in confirming our conclusion that Paul, who wrote earlier in a similar environment, or under less influence from Greek thought, did not impute sin to the body as its cause.

THE USAGE OF THE REMAINING BOOKS

The uses of *πνεῦμα* in Hebrews are quite diverse and interesting, but present no special difficulty. Nor do *ψυχή* and *σάρξ* call for

¹ The abstinence of this writer (or these writers) from such language as Paul uses in Gal., chap. 5, and Rom., chap. 8, may be due to a wish to avoid words which by their ambiguity might seem to imply that there was moral taint in incarnation, and so suggest that Jesus either did not really come in the flesh or that he was not sinless. It may be due to their disposition to trace all sin to the devil. What is of importance is that the idea of a necessary moral taint in the body as composed of matter is definitely excluded.

extended discussion. Respecting *πνεῦμα* we may note its use alongside of *ψυχή* as an element of man's nature (4:12), as in I Thess. 5:23, but probably neither here nor there as expressive of a tri-chotomous view; its reference to the eternal Spirit of Christ, but qualitatively spoken of (9:14); and its broadly generic use (1:14; 12:9). *σάρξ* has no ethical implications.¹

Limitations of space forbid the extended discussion of such interesting passages as I Pet. 3:18; 4:6; II Pet. 2:10, 18. It must suffice to call attention to the fact that whatever the precise sense of the terms or the grammatical force of the datives, the basis of the antithesis between the *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is the idea of corporeality and incorporeality. *Ψυχή* in I Peter is noteworthy because of its distinctly religious sense and its futuristic aspect. The *ψυχή* is the soul as the seat of religion (2:11, 25), capable of existence after death, and its salvation is to be revealed in the last time (1:5, 9; 4:19). Cf. the similar use in Jas. 1:21; 5:20. This usage has apparently had more influence than any other in the New Testament in fixing the meaning of the word "soul" in modern religious terminology. In II Pet. 2:10, 18 *σάρξ* may perhaps denote the body as itself the cause of sin. It would not be strange if this writer had already come to hold this view which was held by others in his day or soon afterward. On the other hand, the passage does not strictly imply anything more than that the writer recognizes the fact, recognition of which involves no philosophic theory, viz., that the body furnishes incitements and temptations to sin, and to follow these is sin. It is perhaps not without significance that in the kindred Book of Jude it is clear that *σάρξ*, though used in speaking of sensual sins, itself means only the body. Note especially vs. 8, in which it is not the *σάρξ* that defiles but that is defiled. It is most probable that the usage of II Peter is the same.

¹ In Heb. 12:9, it is most consonant with the context and the Alexandrian character of the book to understand that "fathers of our flesh" refers to our human fathers as those who beget our bodies, and that "the Father of the spirits" designates God as the source of the spirits of men. Nor is the absence of a possessive pronoun in the second phrase a serious objection to this view. See Matt. 26:41; 27:50, and cf. John 11:33 with Mark 8:12. This interpretation need not, however, imply that each spirit is a fresh product of divine generative power. The phrase probably means only that the spirit comes eventually from God, and is not a product of natural generation. See Wisd. Sol. 8:19.

Πνευματικός, Ψυχικός, AND Σαρκικός (Σάρκινος)

The problem of the relation of these adjectives to one another demands a few words. The difficulty pertains almost wholly to *ψυχικός* and the manifestly derogatory sense which it bears in the New Testament.¹

In I Cor. 15:44 the ordinary body of men in this life is described as *ψυχικὸν σῶμα*, in contrast with the post-resurrection body, which is *πνευματικόν*.² The term is associated (vs. 45) with the fact that Adam was a *ψυχή* and of the earth earthy (vs. 46), in contrast with the risen Christ, who is *πνεῦμα* and in heaven. The basis of the antithesis between the two adjectives is in the antithetical use of the two nouns. The way in which the words are introduced seems to imply that *ψυχικός* in this sense is already familiar, and this is probably the case, despite the fact that no earlier examples of such a use have been pointed out, and that there is only a suggestion of a basis for it in Philo.

In I Cor. 2:14 *ψυχικός* occurs in antithesis to *πνευματικός* in vs. 15, and as a synonym of *σάρκινος* in 3:1, which is further defined by the phrase "babes in Christ." These facts indicate that *ψυχικός* denotes one who is not possessed of the Spirit of God—not *πνευματικός* in the sense of Gal. 6:1. This conception is nearer than that of 15:44-46 to Philo's view, that there are some men who have only *ψυχή*, lacking the gift of the Spirit of God; cf. above, p. 577. This idea is still more clearly expressed in Jude, vs. 19, *ψυχικοί, μὴ πνεῦμα ἔχοντες*, though whether *πνεῦμα* refers specifically to the

¹ The meanings of *πνευματικός* are clearly associated with those of *πνεῦμα*. They are about as follows: (a) of persons, dominated by the Spirit of God (I Cor. 2:15; 3:1; 14:37; Gal. 6:1); (b) of things, proceeding from, given by, the Spirit (Rom. 1:11 [?]; 7:14; 15:27; I Cor. 2:13; 9:11 [?]; 12:1; 14:1; Eph. 5:19 [?]; Col. 1:9 [?]; 3:16 [?]); (c) pertaining or adapted to the spirit of man (Rom. 1:11 [?]; I Cor. 9:11 [?]; 10:3, 4; Col. 1:9 [?]; 3:16 [?]; I Pet. 2:5); (d) pertaining or adapted to a spirit, i.e., a supercorporeal being (I Cor. 15:44, 46; Eph. 6:12).

The meanings of *σαρκικός* and its synonym *σάρκινος* are also easily derived from the meanings of *σάρξ*: (a) consisting of flesh (II Cor. 3:3); (b) pertaining to the body (Rom. 15:27; I Cor. 9:11; II Cor. 10:4; I Pet. 2:11; Heb. 7:16); (c) possessing only the things that come by natural generation, not those that are given by the Spirit (Rom. 7:14; I Cor. 3:1, 3; II Cor. 1:12).

² Cf. the fiery body in which, according to the Hermetic literature, the soul is clothed after death.

Holy Spirit qualitatively expressed (cf. vs. 20) or to the human spirit permeated with the divine is open to doubt. With this use of the term that in Jas. 3:15 is practically identical.¹

FINAL SUMMARY

It remains to state briefly some of the more important results to which, in the judgment of the writer, this study leads.

1. The New Testament use of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and *σάρξ* is not simply a reflection of earlier usage, but has certain marked differences from that of any earlier literature. As respects *ψυχή*, these differences are slight, being chiefly a retirement of the word into less prominence, and a certain emphasis on the religious aspects of the term. The difference is greater in respect to *πνεῦμα*, but greatest in respect to *σάρξ*.

2. New Testament usage is much nearer to that of Jewish-Greek writers, and indeed to that of the Old Testament, than to that of Greek writers in general, or to that of any other literature of which we have knowledge.

3. The peculiarities of New Testament usage appear most strongly in Paul, and it is probable that it is to him that we owe them, either as originator or transmitter, and most likely the former.

4. Of the characteristics of New Testament usage which differentiate it either from all previous usage or from that of non-Jewish Greek, the following are the most important:

a) *Πνεῦμα* is no longer prevailingly a substantial term, as in Greek writers, but, with few exceptions, individualizing, as in Jewish Greek, following the Hebrew.

b) Its most frequent use is with reference to the Spirit of God. For this there is only the slightest precedent in non-Jewish-Greek writers. New Testament, especially Pauline, usage shows a marked advance even on Jewish Greek.

c) For the exaltation of *πνεῦμα* over *ψυχή* there is no observed previous parallel. It marks an advance on Philo, for which there

¹ On a usage of the magical papyri which seems to Reitzenstein to point to the source of the Pauline antithesis of *πνευματικὸς* and *ψυχικὸς*, but which seems to the writer to furnish a slender support to the view, see Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Mysterien-Religionen* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1910), pp. 42 ff.

is no precedent in non-Jewish Greek, and only partial and imperfect parallels in the magical papyri. It is the reverse of Hermetic usage.

d) The use of *πνεῦμα* as a generic term for incorporeal beings (inclusive in Paul of those who have heavenly bodies) is found in Paul and those who followed him. No precisely similar use is found in earlier writers, though a basis for it is found in the application of *πνεῦμα* on the one side to God and on the other to the demons.

e) The clear distinction between the charismatic and ethical work of the Spirit of God and the exaltation of the latter over the former is probably original with Paul; it at any rate receives from him an emphasis found nowhere else before his time, or in the New Testament.

f) The extension of the meaning of *σὰρξ* from the basis of natural generation and kinship to mean all that one acquires by kinship and heredity, and its still further extension, or rather limitation, to denote the force in men that makes for evil, the hereditary impulse to sin, are, so far as we can see, Pauline contributions to the usage of this word.

5. Neither the evidence of contemporary usage nor that of the New Testament itself warrants us in finding in Paul or in the Johannine writings the notion that the flesh is by reason of its materiality a force that makes for evil, or that a corporeal being is by virtue of that fact a sinful being. It may perhaps be found in II Peter, but probably not even there.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE CENTENNIAL OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY¹

The proposal, one hundred years ago, to organize a national Bible society, to which the state societies already existing should be auxiliary, met with the opposition certain to be encountered in that day by a scheme that looked toward the "centralization" of responsibility and of power and the ignoring of denominational differences. The plan was denounced as "unseasonable," "unprecedented," "useless," probably injurious, and in any case impracticable. A federation of religious denominations might easily extend its grasp over the entire land and in no long time become a menace to free government. To some apprehensive souls it was plain that it could not be pleasing to the Almighty that the tainted money of unregenerate men should be used in the circulation of his Holy Word. But this clamor was as short-lived as it was inevitable. It did not appreciably hinder the movement. Dr. Dwight quotes the apt Arabic proverb, "The dog barks, but the caravan moves on." In the city of New York, in May, 1816, the American Bible Society was organized, "of which the sole object shall be to encourage a wider circulation of the Holy Scriptures without note or comment." It was stipulated further that "this Society shall according to its ability extend its influence to other countries, whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan." The Society was received at once with marked favor. Its birth was a notable and extraordinary religious event. Congratulations poured in from many religious bodies in the United States, in England, in Germany. It was almost too good to be true that the eminent theologians who were accustomed to battle valiantly with each other in defense of the truth should be found in cordial co-operation for its diffusion.

Dr. Dwight has told in lucid, straightforward language, with much pertinent anecdote, with perhaps a superabundance of detail, of the majestic and widening course of the American Bible Society during the century of its history. Its "large and simple idea," namely, to provide Bibles wherever they were needed and in whatever language they could

¹ *The Centennial History of the American Bible Society.* By Henry Otis Dwight. New York: Macmillan, 1916. 2 vols., 605 pages. \$2.00.

be read, appealed to the sympathy and support of Christian people of every name and creed, and brought upon it at the same time unforeseen and weighty responsibilities. But its record shows that no call has been unheeded, that no task, however novel or exacting, has been declined. Before its first year closed the Society had sent out 10,000 copies of the English Bible, and had begun to supply to immigrants Bibles in French, German, Gaelic, Spanish. The next year it courageously printed an edition of the Epistles of John in the language of the Delaware Indians, from a manuscript furnished by a Moravian missionary. From that decisive hour the American Bible Society has confessed in its ever-widening activities that its field is the world. It became the steadfast and generous coadjutor of all Protestant missionary organizations, by supplying to them the indispensable printed word. Indeed, it was itself a great undenominational missionary society. Through a skillfully organized army of agents, men who seem, to quote President Wilson's fine phrase, "like the shuttles in a great loom that is weaving the spirits of men together," it undertook to distribute Bibles and Testaments the world over. Where did not these indefatigable and undaunted colporteurs penetrate? We hear of them offering the Scriptures to sailors in all the ports of the seven seas, to soldiers of contending armies, to the inmates of prisons and hospitals, to hungry souls in Catholic and Mohammedan lands, who must read the longed-for and forbidden book by stealth, at the risk of imprisonment or worse. Heart-moving stories are told of the eagerness with which these books were sought. In 1879, by permission of the Russian government, colporteurs with tons of Bibles accompanied the forlorn bands of exiles journeying to the remote settlements of Siberia. It is related that a wagoner on the road from Tomsk to Irkutsk had never seen a New Testament until he came upon the copy with which a colporteur had supplied each of the station roadhouses. By reading what he could at each halt, and finding the book again at the next station, he had, at the end of his thousand miles' journey, read out of scores of different volumes the entire New Testament. The Society has its answer ready for those who deride haphazard distribution of the Scriptures. And the experience of a century has established immovably its conviction that where the Bible is read, though it be without note or comment, the spirit of man is renewed and ennobled.

"The Bible has become," says Dr. Dwight quaintly, "the most popular book in the world." The Society has issued in the past century 110,000,000 Bibles and Testaments, in one hundred and forty-two

different languages. But the demand is still enormous; and at its centenary, summing up its achievement, it perceives that its task is just begun.

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MCNEILE'S COMMENTARY ON MATTHEW

This is the latest addition to Macmillan's series of commentaries on the New Testament.¹ Dr. McNeile, who is a clergyman of the Church of England and a theological lecturer in the University of Cambridge, has written previously on New Testament subjects, but the present volume is his most important work. In plan and scope it may be compared with Professor Swete's commentary on the Gospel of Mark in the same series. In his preface the author acknowledges his indebtedness both to English (he apparently means "British") and to German scholars, though he often finds himself unable to accept the conclusions of the latter.

In the introduction, which seems to the reviewer too brief, Dr. McNeile discusses the career and teaching of Jesus, and the purpose, date, and authorship of the First Gospel. The evangelist, who of course is not to be identified with the apostle Matthew, lived somewhere in Syria, and in writing his gospel he used, besides Q and Mark, certain Palestinian traditions "of very varying value." The work "clearly exhibits reflexion, not recollection; it is a portrait of a Person rather than a chronicle of events" (p. xxviii). The composition of the gospel is rightly placed within the last two decades of the first century (80-100 A.D.). In regard to the singular juxtaposition of Jewish and "catholic" elements in Matthew, the author rejects the various theories which account for this phenomenon by assuming either that the Logia underwent a recension or that the gospel has been more or less modified by an editor with "catholic" tendencies. He holds, on the contrary, that Matthew correctly represents the teaching of Jesus in this respect, though "not with the same complete balance" (p. xviii). There was, to be sure, much in the message of Christ which was of a thoroughly universal character, but in the opinion of the present writer the First Gospel has certain clearly marked "catholic" traits which cannot plausibly be ascribed to the teaching of Jesus. The evangelist believed that

¹ *The Gospel according to St. Matthew.* By Alan Hugh McNeile, D.D. London: Macmillan, 1915. xxxvi+448 pages. \$3.75.

Jesus was the Messiah, and that the peculiar privileges of the Jews had passed into the possession of Christ's followers. His aim, according to Dr. McNeile, is "to justify this transition by shewing from the life of Jesus how it was not the claim of a heretical sect who misread the Bible by the light of their own presumptuousness, but the realization of a divine purpose and the verification of divine prophecies in the sphere of history."¹ Dr. McNeile's introduction contains no such detailed investigations as are to be found in Hawkins' *Horae Synopticae* and in Allen's commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. The student who wishes to become thoroughly acquainted with the difficult questions connected with the First Gospel and to learn what theories have been put forward to solve these problems, will have to consult the standard "introductions" to the New Testament in English or German.

The text adopted by the author is that of Westcott and Hort, in the reprinting of which the reviewer has noted only one mistake (τῷ for τῶ in 18:35). He regrets, however, that ε subscript has been retained in the infinitive of verbs whose stem ends in *a*. Dr. McNeile uses the correct form in his notes, and the retention of the incorrect spelling in the text must be an oversight. Variant readings to which reference is made in the notes are given in an *apparatus criticus*, but the author has not attempted to treat textual questions fully. He says in his introduction: "Textual criticism is like an ordnance survey; most readers need a map in which the broad features are not obscured by multiplication of detail" (p. xii).

The notes contain much learned material, which is clearly and concisely presented. In many cases, however, the scholar will desire a fuller discussion than Dr. McNeile has given. To mention a few examples: On 4:23 (p. 47) much more might have been said about the meaning and use of the word *εὐαγγέλιον*. Again, on 10:37 (p. 148) we are told that "*φιλεῖν* is to *ἀγαπᾶν* as *amare* to *diligere*," and Prov. 8:17 and Dio Cassius xlv. 48 are quoted to illustrate the distinction. Nothing is said about the use of these two verbs in John 21:15-17, where, according to scholars as unlike in many respects as Dods and Bauer, there is no difference of meaning between them. Finally, on 12:46 (p. 184) reference is made to several discussions of the various views held concerning the *ἀδελφοί* of Jesus; but the different views are not given even by name, and the author's own opinion is not expressed.

¹ P. xviii quoted from Moffatt's *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, p. 244.

More references to books and monographs in the field of New Testament scholarship, especially to the leading commentaries, would have added greatly to the value of the notes. At the end of the commentary (p. 437) כְּלִי-הַיְימִים should be כְּלִי-הַיְימִים.

Dr. McNeile's conservatism appears in his discussion of the word *ἐκκλησία* in 16:18 (pp. 241 f.). He holds that vss. 17 and 18 are a genuine saying of Jesus, and that *ἐκκλησία* probably represents the Aramaic כְּנִישָׁא. To J. Weiss's objection that the expression "my church" "assumes an emancipation from the church of the Jewish people . . . which Jesus can scarcely have expected or striven for in this manner," the author replies that "no moment was more suitable for preparing His followers to become a new body, isolated both from the masses and from the civil and religious authorities." Again, after mentioning several explanations of the Feeding of the Five Thousand which eliminate the miraculous element, Dr. McNeile says: "But modern thought is learning not to reject records of miracles simply because they are miracles; their possibility must, in each several case, be judged in relation to the paradox of a transcendent God working immanently, and to the mystery of the Incarnation" (p. 217; cf. also pp. xiv f.).

The volume contains a number of longer notes on subjects which seemed to demand more extensive treatment, e.g., the Virgin Birth, the Sermon on the Mount, the Feeding of the Five Thousand, the Transfiguration, the Eucharist, and the Resurrection.

Besides an index of subjects there is also an index containing words not found elsewhere in the New Testament and words not found elsewhere in the Synoptic Gospels. A list of the Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic words discussed in the notes would have added to the usefulness of the book.

The author is a cautious and careful scholar, and the commentary which he has written contains much sound learning and good judgment. Though it has been necessary to indicate certain *desiderata* from the scholar's point of view, the scholarly minister and the theological student will find the notes and discussions in the present volume adequate for all ordinary purposes. Typographically the book is a model of clearness and accuracy. Dr. McNeile's work is a good representative of modern Anglican scholarship, and it is safe to say that it will long occupy a prominent place among English commentaries on the First Gospel.

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STUDIES IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Much of the recent theorizing on the relation of Christianity to alien religions has been based on imperfect knowledge, and there was ample need for a work like that of Mr. Legge,¹ who has set himself not so much to propound conclusions as to collect and sift the available facts, and above all to bring his readers into contact with original documents. In many respects he is admirably qualified for his task. He has read widely and accurately over the whole field, and on Egyptian religion (which affords the key to many of the most difficult problems) can speak with the authority of an expert. He possesses in a high degree the faculty of detailed analysis, but has also an imagination and a sympathy which can seize the living element in bygone forms of faith. Not least, he is content to move cautiously and to refrain from idle conjecture when the path is hopelessly perplexed.

The two volumes correspond with the broad division of "forerunners" and "rivals," the religions which prepared the way for Christianity and those which competed with it for the allegiance of the Roman world. This division merges, however, in another and more scientific one: (a) oriental religions; (b) magical religions, as typified in the various phases of Gnosticism; (c) Manicheism, which aimed at sweeping into one vast synthesis the three prevailing religions of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Christianity. After a preliminary chapter on the conditions arising from the linking of East and West by Alexander's conquests, Mr. Legge discusses the cults which centered in the worship of Isis and Serapis. He reaches the conclusion that these cults affected Christianity not so much directly as through the heretical sects which borrowed from them, and he thus passes to an elaborate study of Gnosticism occupying a full half of his book. He regards Gnosticism as in its essence magical—an attempt not to propitiate the divine powers but to compel them by means of a secret knowledge. As the true precursors of the whole gnostic movement he deals with the Orphics, and with the Essenes, who were subject, he believes, to Orphic influence. The chapter devoted to this obscure sect is perhaps the least satisfactory in the book. It is only by a straining of our scanty evidence that the Essenes can be described as Gnostics, while their affinity with Orphicism is more than dubious. Mr. Legge now enters on his examination of Gnosticism proper in five of its typical forms—Simon Magus, the Ophites, Valen-

¹ *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity, Being Studies in Religious History from 330 B.C. to 330 A.D.* By F. Legge, F.S.A. 2 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. lxiii+202, 423 pages. \$7.50.

tinus, the Coptic writings, and Marcion. He views the whole movement as "a stop-gap or temporary faith, which for 200 years acted as a halfway-house between heathenism and Christianity." The Ophites adopted the myths and beliefs which had sprung out of the cults, and correlated them in a more or less superficial manner with speculative and Christian ideas. Valentinus converted these Ophite conceptions into something like a real theology. His construction is essentially symbolical, shadowing forth in its system of aeons the process whereby the world and man are derived from God. The chapter on the Pistis Sophia is particularly notable. From his familiarity with Egyptian ideas, Mr. Legge is able to throw genuine light on this first-hand gnostic document, which has hitherto baffled all interpretation. But his judgment is surely at fault in assigning to an early date, and in all probability to Valentinus himself, a work that seems plainly to belong to the gnostic decadence. From Gnosticism Mr. Legge returns to religions that lay outside of Christianity. For his account of Mithraism he necessarily leans on Cumont, but at many points exercises an independent judgment. He makes it clear that the cult of Mithra was never, in spite of its wide diffusion, a dangerous competitor of Christianity. Its communities were small and exclusive, and resembled Free-Mason groups rather than worshipping congregations. Stress is laid also on the complaisance of Mithraism to other religions, which makes it probable that not a few of its analogies with Christian practice and belief were due to conscious borrowing. The chapter on the Manicheans is peculiarly interesting, since it incorporates a number of the documents recently discovered in Turkestan and China. These are now presented for the first time in accessible form, and enable us to interpret the Manichean teaching from direct sources.

The vast field covered by the work will be apparent from this brief survey of its contents, and it may seem ungrateful to complain that its scope was not extended further. But the chapter on the Alexandrian divinities might well have been supplemented by another on the Phrygian and Syrian cults, which only come in for incidental treatment. Some account of the Hermetic literature would also have been welcome, and would have raised a number of vital questions which are left untouched. We cannot but feel that the space devoted to Gnosticism, in spite of the value of the individual chapters, is out of proportion to the general scheme of the book. Gnosticism was no doubt related in the closest manner to the various Hellenistic cults, but it cannot be fairly regarded as an independent religion, competing with Christianity. Mr. Legge

himself emphasizes the fundamental Christian character of much of its teaching, and tends occasionally to exaggerate it. Is he warranted, for instance, in his view of Gnosticism as one of the main feeders of the church? On this point we prefer the testimony of the Fathers, who denounce the great heresy for stealing its recruits from the regular Christian army.

The book is chiefly valuable as a storehouse of facts and documents; and at the present stage of our knowledge this collecting of data is the best service that can be rendered to the study of the Hellenistic religions. Mr. Legge, however, is more than a compiler of sources. All his data are carefully sifted and arranged, and are furnished with illuminating commentary. Where the book falls short, to our mind, is in its handling of the larger problems to which the subject gives rise. Little attempt is made to determine the bearings of the alien religions on Christianity, or their connection with the general intellectual life of the age. Mr. Legge tells us that he has purposely excluded from his survey the philosophical systems, and a restriction of this kind was necessary for the purpose he had in view. But it is hardly possible to estimate the full significance of the mystery religions apart from the philosophical ideas with which they were interwoven. Their key must be sought in the later Stoicism as well as in primitive ritual and mythology.

A work so comprehensive easily lends itself to criticism, and specialists will take issue with the author on numberless points of detail. But they will be the first to recognize that he always writes with a full and accurate knowledge, and that in not a few cases he has let in the light where previously there was darkness. As a work of reference and suggestion his book will prove indispensable to all serious students of those religions whose importance for Christianity we are only beginning to realize.

The latest volume of the "American Lectures on the History of Religion" fully sustains the high standard we have learned to expect from this notable series.¹ Dr. Carpenter is not only a scholar of the first rank, but a writer of skill and distinction; and his book will appeal to a large circle of cultivated readers as well as to students of theology. The aim of the lectures is to trace the inner development of Christianity in the crucial period from 100 to 250 A.D., when the religion which had sprung up in the soil of Judaism was taking root in the larger gentile

¹ *Phases of Early Christianity*. By J. Estlin Carpenter, D.Litt. New York: Putnam, 1916. xvi+449 pages. \$2.00.

world. Dr. Carpenter conceives of our religion during this period as not yet committed to any uniform system. It was subject to influences of the most varied kind, and allowed room within itself for manifold types of doctrine and institution. About the middle of the third century this wide variety was felt to be dangerous, and the church was called on to decide whether it should be reduced to a rigid uniformity, or whether the principle of authority could be reconciled with freedom. Dr. Carpenter is concerned with the "phases" which manifested themselves during that period of free growth. Starting from the idea of salvation as the underlying motive of all early Christian thought, he devotes his six lectures to different aspects of this idea. He considers first the broad conception of Christianity as personal salvation; then the person and work of the Savior; then the church as the sphere and the sacraments as the means of salvation. The two concluding lectures deal with salvation by gnosis, and with the parting of the ways in the age of Origen and Cyprian. Under each of these main headings we have an examination of the various theories of salvation which were put forward from time to time in different sections of the church. The plan of the book is somewhat difficult to grasp, and not altogether happy. The author seems to be attempting to do two things at the same time: on the one hand, to distinguish the modes in which the Christian message was apprehended, and on the other, to present an ordered history of the early development. The effect is rather confusing, and at times misleading. Phenomena which marked the whole period in question (e.g., sacramental piety, gnosis) are so described as if they belonged to some given stage in the history. The sense of diversity which the author wishes to convey is half forgotten in that of continuous movement. But the scheme adopted has its own advantages. Instead of a series of more or less disconnected studies Dr. Carpenter is able to present a brilliant historical sketch of the whole progress of Christianity in one of its most vital periods. He traces the steps of its advance, and reviews different influences that acted on it from time to time. He finds room for admirable pictures of the great personalities—Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, Cyprian—and makes us feel that the doctrinal development was the work of living men, struggling with real problems. The value of the book is due in no small measure to this insight into the permanent issues at the heart of ancient controversies and speculations; and the author is here assisted by his wide acquaintance with comparative religion. Again and again the ultimate drift of some early Christian idea is illuminated by parallels from Indian

or Persian or Egyptian thought, where the same problem is met in a similar way.

The book covers practically the whole field of Christian life and thought in two crowded centuries, and the fulness of treatment which we could often have desired is out of the question. For the same reason Dr. Carpenter is too often compelled to limit himself to the ideas immediately before him, without sufficient inquiry into their genesis. In most cases they grew out of modes of thought already present in the New Testament, but the process whereby they were modified or refashioned is only hinted at. Sometimes, too, there is a lack of definiteness, due to the need of passing rapidly from one stage of the development to another. For instance, the messianic salvation of primitive Christian belief is not clearly enough distinguished from the redemption which had its roots in Hellenistic dualism. Gnosis as a supernatural enlightenment is connected so closely with philosophical speculation that a casual reader will be likely to miss the essential difference. Shortcomings of this kind are inevitable in an attempt to compress a vast amount of material into a limited space, but they do not seriously affect the value of the book. It is safe to say that the history of the church in its formative period has never been presented more ably and attractively than in Dr. Carpenter's lectures. By the very fact that he looks at the development in its manifold "phases" he is saved from the one-sidedness that has marred much recent work. He recognizes that the movement which finally gave rise to the Catholic church was a highly complex one, and that all the factors must be taken into account before we can understand the result.

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HELLENIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY¹

The work of Glawe in his *Hellenisierung des Christentums* is not in the nature of an attempt to trace the manner in which Hellenic influences have affected the character of Christian theology during the time under consideration. His aim is rather to indicate the extent to which theological writers in those times have recognized the presence of Hellenism in the traditional Christian faith from the early times, or, more exactly, to

¹ *Die Hellenisierung des Christentums in der Geschichte der Theologie von Luther bis auf die Gegenwart*. By Walther Glawe. Berlin: Trowitzsch und Sohn, 1912. xii+340 pages. M. 10.

show "that a problem which has such a lively interest for the theological world of our day was not only anticipated by theological investigators of earlier decades and centuries, but was worked at by them very energetically."

The study of the last four centuries of discussion of this subject is arranged in four divisions: first, the origin and progress of the idea of Hellenistic thought during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; secondly, the most extensive claim made for the idea by Souverain, in 1700, in his great work, *Platonism Unveiled*; thirdly, the finest and clearest recognition of it as seen in the works of Mosheim in the first half of the eighteenth century; fourthly, the general acceptance of Mosheim's views in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

By the Hellenizing of Christianity the author does not mean a syncretism, with Christian and Hellenistic strands mingled, such as one finds in the works of Marsiglio Ficino; nor a mutual approach of Christianity and Greek philosophy, such as one finds in Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists; nor, again, a treatment of Christian theology according to the principles of Aristotelian or Platonic philosophy, such as Gottfried Arnold shows to have taken place in mediaeval and Reformation theology; but the permeation of the traditional Christian truths by Greek philosophy and the religious views of ancient Hellenism at the time when Christianity took its first decisive step out into the larger world and people began to give their ideas the more comprehensive form which the contact with a heathen, and more especially a Hellenistic, environment made necessary.

The view that the Scriptures were in themselves holy and contained the Christian truth in its purity impeded for a time the prosecution by Protestants of the question of Greek influence in early Christianity, but the Reformation opened the question in principle and it soon came in for distinct recognition. It came forward first in the works of Erasmus and Melancthon. The work of the Reformed scholar Isaac Casaubon, *De Rebus Sacris et Ecclesiasticis Exercitationes*, published in London, 1614, drew attention to the extensive parallelism between Christianity and Hellenism and instigated an extensive investigation by later scholars. The Trinitarian controversies of the seventeenth century gave the question prominence, since each party sought to condemn the other by tracing its peculiar tenets to heathen, rather than Christian, sources. The worth of the discussion was compromised by prejudice. On the Antitrinitarian side the Socinian Daniel Zwicker, Christopher Sandius, and the Arminian Jean le Clerc were most prominent. The vast range of

quotation by Le Clerc showed his great erudition and necessitated an answer. The Trinitarians found the Greek influence abundant in early heresy and the Protestants among them found it in Catholic piety and morality. George Bull in his *Defensio Fidei Nicaene* and his *Primitiva et Apostolica Traditio*, Peter Allix in his *The Judgment of the Ancient Jewish Church against the Unitarians* controvert the appearance of Hellenism in the Creed; so also the Catholic Abbé Fayit; but Pierre Jurieu of the French Reformed recognized it. Thus the controversy was fairly opened, but no genuine historian had approached it. The interest of controversy prevailed.

But ere long the proper study of the Fathers and the beginnings of a genuine church history pervaded by the critical spirit brought in a recognition of the positive contribution of Hellenism to the Christian doctrines. The names of André Rivet, Jean Daillé, Georgius Hornius, John Pearson, Tobias Pfanner, Gerhard Vossius, Jacob Thomasius, Theophilus Gale, Daniel Colberg, Friedrich Bücher, and at last the name of the Pietist, Chiliast, and Theosophist, Gottfried Arnold—some of them led by the interest of controversy and others independently of it—indicate the progress of the study of history in the direction of establishing the firm hold of the Hellenistic idea. The Englishman Jacob Windet and the Hollander Campegius Vitringa work the same result in the field of New Testament exegesis. Thus, beginning with the charge that the heretical movements represented the influence of Hellenism in early times, the conclusion is approached that the same influence was a factor constitutive of the orthodox doctrinal structure. Finally, the great work of Souverain, *Le Platonisme Devoilé, ou Essai touchant le verbe platonicien*, proved conclusively that not only in a formal, but also in a material, sense Hellenistic thought contributed to the fundamental content of the faith. Souverain, however, overrated the fateful character of the Platonic influence, as his chief opponent, the Jesuit Baltus, went to the opposite extreme of denying all importance to it. The great corrective of both was supplied by the historical investigations of Johann Lorenz Mosheim, who made the whole problem of the ethnicizing of Christianity one of purely scientific investigation and laid down the lines of the future study of the question. Later investigation worked out the results of his methods.

In his estimate of the results of the more recent investigation of the subject, Glawe finds that, while the lines that present the course of the Hellenizing of early Christianity are more fully drawn than in former times, the picture remains substantially the same. There are three

main points of view from which the Hellenizing process is estimated: first, as a process that transformed Christianity both in form and in material; secondly, as a natural outcome of converging lines of development; thirdly, an acknowledgment that the formal Hellenizing of the religion of revelation was a historical necessity. The names of outstanding scholars are attached to each of these divisions.

The work closes with a *Quellennachweis* arranged in historical order and a *Register*. It constitutes an extremely valuable compilation of information concerning the views of Reformation and post-Reformation students on the origin of Christian doctrines, and a good work of reference, but the style is poor and the story is not told in an interesting manner.

GEORGE CROSS

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LAGARDE'S *LATIN CHURCH*¹

This volume is not a developmental, constructive history, in which the Latin church is seen unfolding from age to age. It is rather a series of interesting and suggestive historical sketches of various movements of thought and life and institutional development, each complete in itself, and each more or less independent of the rest. The principle of development is seen clearly enough in the individual chapters, but by reason of the topical treatment is by no means so evident in the volume as a whole.

The story of the various movements within the church is told in sixteen chapters covering the following themes: expansion, inner life, monasticism, pontifical elections, the church state, papacy and empire, political progress of the papacy, papal finances, episcopal elections, celibacy, heresies speculative and anti-sacerdotal and conflicts with heresy, ecclesiastical studies, writings. We see the extension of the territory of the Western church; the ecclesiastical conquest of the Frankish kingdom, of Spain, England, Germany, Scandinavia, and Slavic lands, through political influence, missionary zeal, or the persuasive power of the sword. The story is told of the unfolding of the inner life of the church, the development of its sacramental system—baptism, Eucharist, penance, etc.—relics, indulgences, Ave Maria, rosary. Monasticism is traced; studies are made of the epoch-making work of St. Benedict and Columban, of reforms emanating from Cluny

¹ *The Latin Church of the Middle Ages*. By André Lagarde. Translated by Archibald Alexander, Ph.D. [International Theological Library]. New York: Scribner, 1915. vi+600 pages. \$2.50.

and elsewhere, of the mendicant and military orders—to say nothing of many less important movements. The history of papal elections is narrated from the time when the pope was chosen by the clergy and people of Rome, through the centuries of conflict between imperial authority—Eastern, Frankish, and German—and the growing independency of the papacy, culminating at last in constitutional requirements safeguarding the freedom of papal elections.

The Papal State grows from the earliest inheritances of the papacy, the “Patrimony of Peter” as it came to be called, through the cession of Pepin, on through the ebb and flow of the political fortunes of the papacy till Julius II gives it its final form in the early sixteenth century. Papacy and empire are depicted in their age-long struggle for supremacy, the papacy at first subordinate, then laboring abortively for theocratic sovereignty, finally winning a partial victory in the thirteenth century. The religious advance of the papacy is traced, as Rome seeks to superimpose her authority, futilely so far as the East is concerned, but successfully in the West, where the churches of Africa, Italy, Britain, and Gaul swing into line under the banner of Rome.

One of the most interesting chapters in the book is a discussion of the papal exchequer. The ingenious methods employed by Rome to increase her income are described with considerable detail: Peter’s pence, the “census” from kingdoms and monasteries placed in the care of the papacy, annates, tithes, the *servitia* from ecclesiastics for their appointment and consecration, the Pallium tax, visitation revenues, the “spolia” or income from vacancies, indulgences, dispensations, etc., together with a description of the papal banking system. Another enlightening chapter deals with clerical celibacy, its origin, history, and disastrous results from the standpoint of morals. The struggles of the church with heresy are described in two chapters, speculative heresies—adoptionism, Monothelitism, image-worship, Filioque—and the anti-sacerdotal heresies—Cathari, Albigenses, Protestant Reformers. A succeeding sketch is devoted to the instruments employed by the church for the suppression of heresy, namely, the Crusades, Inquisition, and councils. The closing chapters deal with the relation of the church to the intellectual life—clerical ignorance, educational reforms (Carolingian), scholasticism, universities, renaissance; also the literary contribution of the Middle Ages, especial reference being made to the writings of Gregory I, Bede, Alcuin, Scotus Erigena, Anselm, Gerbert, Abelard, Bernard, Roger Bacon, Aquinas, William of Occam, D’Ailly, Erasmus, and many others to whom briefer and sometimes wholly inadequate reference is made.

The volume is scholarly and substantial, and will prove of considerable value to students of the mediaeval church. Its defects lie, in part, in the method pursued, that of topical treatment. The reader fails, generally, to carry away any adequate picture of a particular age, with all its varied movements of thought and life. There is, for the same reason, much repetition. The book suffers, too, from inevitable abbreviation made necessary by the condensation of so large a theme into such comparatively small compass. The stage is overcrowded. The movement is kaleidoscopic. Personality and color, both so transcendently important in the writing of history, give way, perforce, to cold, dated, historical particulars. A more fundamental criticism from the standpoint of the English reader concerns the author's reference to the literature of his subject. The book is a translation from the French. Generous use is made of source material, with extensive references to French and German historical works dealing with different phases of the subject. Corresponding English works are generally neglected. The literature referred to by the author, all-sufficient perhaps from the French standpoint, should have been supplemented by a carefully edited list of available works in English, unless it is to be assumed that all readers of the book are equally familiar with European tongues. The series in which this volume appears, however, was evidently intended to meet a more popular demand.

The reader of this volume is also led to wonder why the translator did not have incorporated into his work full English equivalents for Philip le Bel, Charles le Bel, Louis the Debonnair, etc. Inconsistency is shown, too, in offering the reader now "St. Jean d'Acre" and now "St. John of Acre." The spelling of various other names, as to whether they should be given their customary Latin forms or their French forms, may also be called in question. To raise this question, however, would be to indicate the chaos and lack of uniformity in historical works in general.

HENRY H. WALKER

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JONES'S *SPIRITUAL REFORMERS*¹

The indebtedness of the student of the history of religion to the work of Professor Jones in his sympathetic examination of the Quaker movement and similar movements has been greatly augmented by his recent

¹ *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*. By Rufus M. Jones. London: Macmillan, 1914. li+362 pages. \$3.00.

studies of the views of certain thinkers of the earlier and later days of the Reformation, who stood outside the orthodox Protestant churches. Some of the names, as Hans Denck, Sebastian Franck, Caspar Schwenkfeld, Jacob Boehme, Sir Harry Vane, Benjamin Whichcote, are well known to the majority of the readers of Christian history; but others, such as Sebastian Castellio, whom the author calls "a forgotten prophet," the Collegiant or Rhynsburger associates of Dirck Coornhert in Holland, John Everard, Giles Randall, Francis Rous in England, the author rescues out of general oblivion. All, whether well known or little known, are made to stand out in strong and pleasing colors. The general effect is to confirm very decidedly the author's contention—which indicates, perhaps, the aim of the book—that

Quakerism is, thus, no isolated or sporadic religious phenomenon. It is deeply rooted and embedded in a far wider movement that had been accumulating volume and power for more than a century before George Fox became a "prophet" of it to the English people. And both in its new English, and in its earlier continental form, it was a serious attempt to achieve a more complete Reformation, to restore primitive Christianity, and to change the basis of authority from external things, of any sort whatever, to the interior life and spirit of man.

Jones notes the close affinity of many of these reformers with certain Anabaptist views, but declines to class them as Anabaptists, preferring to limit the term, hitherto so loosely used, to those having the three following characteristics: (1) the treatment of the gospel as a new law, (2) the recognition of a true visible church observing adult baptism and preserved holy by strict discipline, and (3) the substitution of the commandment of love for magisterial authority in matters of faith. On this account he calls Hans Denck, for example, an Anabaptist no longer. In any case the spiritual affinity of the type of Christianity that might be called Quakerism with the Anabaptists is so intimate at important points that it would be fairer, perhaps, to regard these as two varieties of one great religious struggle for the inwardness, freedom, and spontaneity of personal faith, and Christianity as the religion in which these come to their fulfilment through Jesus Christ.

In an introduction of forty pages the author offers a philosophical interpretation of the nature of "spiritual religion." He finds in it three principal tendencies, the mystical tendency, the humanistic or rational tendency, and the distinctive faith tendency of the Reformation, indissolubly woven together. All three are to be held essential to religion itself everywhere. The psychologist's approach to the study of religion

is noted and appreciated, but its limitations and defects are inherent in a method which never goes beyond the mere phenomena to an "appreciation of religion." This spiritual religion should not be called mysticism, for the latter is too negative toward the outer world, has a God of abstraction, and has "staked its precious realities too exclusively upon the functions of what we today call the subconscious." The spiritual reformers held a broader view of man and the world, a view in which the reason that is in man and the world is recognized, and yet not identified with religious illumination, which has always a moral, practical character. They also appreciated the significance of history and held to the revelation of God mediated through the actual historical Christ, whose triumph they expected in a historical sense. These men stand apart from the main current of the Reformation and represent a higher interpretation of Christianity. In it is to be found "the genuine beginning in modern times of what has come to be the deepest note of present-day Christianity, the appreciation of personality as the highest thing in earth or heaven."

It is impossible, of course, in a brief review to follow the work in detail. It is everywhere illuminating and its quotations from the originals, though marked inevitably by a degree of monotony, are made with fine discrimination and establish conclusively the author's main thesis, referred to above. The large space given to Boehme and the evident dependence of many of the "spirituals" upon his works are indicative of the presence of a powerful speculative philosophic impulse in the whole movement. It should be added, perhaps, that Jones writes not merely as a historian but as a philosopher, and his expositions rise not infrequently to the height of genuine eloquence. The work is timely and will strengthen the hands of those who seek to establish a type of Christianity transcending traditional Protestantism as truly as orthodox Protestantism transcended Catholicism.

GEORGE CROSS

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THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE¹

It is abundantly evident that one of the most important tasks in the interpretation of religion is the extensive and intensive study of first-hand utterances. Until we know exactly what people are trying to

¹ *The Drama of the Spiritual Life. A Study of Religious Experience and Ideals.* By Annie Lyman Sears. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxiv+495 pages. \$3.00.

express in their religious life, we are not in a position to define with accuracy the nature of religion. Miss Sears has brought together in this volume an exceptionally suggestive variety of material from a wide range of sources, both Christian and non-Christian. These citations are interwoven with her own exposition in such a way as to reinforce her interpretation. In intent, therefore, her study is an inductive examination of significant religious utterances.

As a matter of fact, however, the book is shot through with a specific doctrine as to the nature of religion, and one gets the feeling that the citations from literature have been collected and arranged primarily to embellish the author's theories. In brief, she is dominated by a love for exhibiting any experience as consisting of a paradox, in which two conflicting motives strive for complete mastery and must be reconciled in some higher unity. The necessity for this reconciliation is an evidence of an ideal realm to which appeal may be made for the ultimate solutions of our problems. The book sets forth these paradoxes in profuse detail, with many repetitions; and the material for investigation is turned to account to illustrate one side or the other of the conflict, which must be resolved by appeal to a higher unity.

The author is a disciple of Professor Royce, and his recent emphasis on the social character of the object of religious worship is reflected in her discussions. As opposed to Professor James's suggestion that we reach God through the activities of a mystic subliminal consciousness, Miss Sears insists that worship is a rationally defensible communion with a social Other; and that the character of this Other is found to be such that in worship and trust of this Other we find the contradictory demands of our religious experience satisfied.

The bulk of the book is concerned to show how a "way of life" may be attained which will enable the distressed man with his divided state of consciousness to attain peace and unity of mind. The topics under which she deals with the problem of salvation are characteristic. The religious man is attempting to resolve the disjunction in his experience between the mystical and the ethical, the individual and the social, grace and merit, necessity and freedom, the inner and the outer, the temporal and the eternal, the dynamic and the static, and the many and the one. This list shows how easily Miss Sears passes from distinctively religious experience to epistemological problems. Sooner or later the details of any concrete contrast are taken up into the problem of finding a metaphysical unity for the mind distracted by the hopelessly insistent paradoxes of our experience.

The primary value of the book consists in its admirable suggestion, found in the title, that religious experience is essentially dramatic, and in the illustrative material, taken from literary as well as from distinctively religious sources. One who shares the idealistic philosophical point of view of the author will be genuinely delighted to see how everything is so easily turned to grist for her mill. The unsympathetic reader will find the book diffuse, repetitious, and decidedly one-sided in its treatment of the theme; but even he will be grateful for the abundant collection of material here put at his disposal.

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DOGMA AND THEOLOGY¹

The author uses the term "dogma" in a somewhat new sense. He defines it as "a final revelation in germinal statement. It is the expression of the original and supernatural *datum* of the purely given which creates religion" (p. 12). By revelation he means God giving himself, not truth about himself. He supposes "an historic coming and action of God on man" in Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit. This act of grace spreads through the world by means of men as agents. This requires some intelligible statement of "God's will and grace and act." This statement is sacramental; it conveys the grace which converts the world. This statement of the irreducible gospel of our faith is its dogma. This is the original and supernatural datum upon which the church rests. Being a supernatural thing, it belongs to a supernatural body. The historical act, the statement of which is dogma, was the "Cross of Christ," Christ's act of death and rising as God's final and endless act of holy and redeeming love. Christ's teaching and work are of very minor importance; his significance lies in this act. He did not even explain this; that task was left to Paul, who was specially and divinely illumined as the interpreter of this divine deed. Hence, for the statement of the act, the dogma, we should look to Paul. Such a statement we have in his Epistle to the Corinthians: "God hath given us the ministry of reconciliation, which is that God was in Christ, reconciling the world, not imputing their trespasses unto them. For He hath made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him." This is the church's dogma, the supernaturally given source of all saving knowledge.

¹ *Theology in Church and State*. By Peter Taylor Forsyth. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. xxvi+328 pages.

But this condensed statement bears in itself a wealth of teaching cosmic in its compass. The scientific explication of this truth by the church is its doctrine. The church rests on dogma, but the doctrine rests on the church. Doctrine is the church's corporate confession into which its dogma expands. It will necessarily change with change of intellectual conditions. Theology is doctrine in the making, it is individual, or confined to groups of individuals. The function of the theologian is to prepare material for doctrine. Theology is the growing-point of doctrine. Thus we have dogma, doctrine, and theology. Dogma is a divine insert into human experience—it is static and unchangeable; doctrine is the result of the activity of a supernaturally re-created humanity, and is an evolving, growing thing; theology is doctrine not yet incorporated in the church's confession.

This schema is used by the author to define the relationship between the church and the state. He recognizes that absolute separation and neutrality between church and state is impossible. The distinction between them is very real and vital, but there are also such deep and abiding connections as to make some sort of interaction inevitable. The church can be in a position to deal with this matter in an effective manner only as it comes to clear self-consciousness. It is not a mere human association, but a divinely created corporate personality; it rests upon its dogma, a divine gift. It cannot therefore receive a charter from the state, as merely human associations may; it has its charter from God. The state also is a moral personality, and it too functions in the Kingdom of God, but it is a means to the coming of the Kingdom while the church is its supreme trustee. The state then should recognize the church as a divine institution existing in its own right. Only on such a basis can the relationship between church and state be satisfactorily defined.

The whole discussion of the book rests upon the peculiar position of the positive theology, of which the author is the foremost English representative. That this "dogma" is a sacramental truth conveying divine grace, and is the creator of the church, is not a self-evident matter, but is one interpretation, among many, of a complex historical situation. In view of the present tendencies in theological thinking, it does not seem likely that the conception of dogma and of the church here presented will win wide acceptance.

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AN INTERPRETATION OF BERGSON

D'Arcy's *God and Freedom in Human Experience*¹ will be welcomed by those who are prepossessed by the thought that the orthodox faith needs only an up-to-date apologetic to remedy whatever damages recent years have worked. But to those who desire a thoroughly inductive procedure in the clarifying of religious thought and are concerned for intellectual integrity of method rather than complete orthodoxy of conclusion, it will be a disappointment.

The philosophical standpoint of the author is indicated in the following extract from the preface: "It is the conviction of the writer that we are on the eve of a new statement in theology, with the help of that transfiguration of Idealism which he believes will take place when the principles set free by M. Bergson have had their due influence upon philosophic thought."

It appears to the present writer that the author has accepted Bergsonism too uncritically. It is certain that the majority of American psychologists would deny the validity of Bergson's disjunction between intelligence and instinct, between reason and intuition. The two things are surely not so separate and different as the great Frenchman claims. Nor can it be proved that the intellect has developed exclusively through our dealings with solids. The categories of "fluidity," "living continuum," "real duration," are surely no less intellectual than the geometrical ideas. If all our concepts are formed by the aid of language as symbols of experience, whether that experience be tactual, visual, kinaesthetic, moral, or aesthetic, and even the most vague feelings tend to become symbolized through the needs of our social intercourse, there seems no reason to put intellectual processes on one side, and intuitional or instinctive, or vague, emotional processes on the other as utterly different. No doubt the intellectual process is a kind of abstraction-function, but it does not therefore necessarily reduce or impoverish reality. Rather it enriches it by making it more tractable and opening up its possibilities. To say of those scientific processes of thought which subdue natural forces to our use, which discover ten mysteries where before we saw but one, which make possible social co-operation in the most far-reaching enterprises—to say that these reveal lower levels of reality is to say that which, from the functional view of mental processes, is well-nigh unintelligible. We do not geometrize just for the sake of

¹ *God and Freedom in Human Experience*. By Charles F. D'Arcy. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1915. viii+307 pages. \$2.50.

geometrizing. We do not abstract from the more sensuous experience just for the sake of abstracting. It is always a functional operation. Always there is some vital purpose at issue. We are not discovering lower levels of reality. We are rather enlarging and enriching our experience and thus introducing into it greater worth or more reality.

One notes a serious difficulty, found by D'Arcy in Bergsonism, which comes out in chap. ix, "Freedom and Purpose." Certainly the freedom which Bergson finds in creative evolution is too much freedom for theological purposes. Bergson's God, the *élan vital*, like the British, "muddles through" without any clearly conceived goal or plan. The radical finalism which Bergson condemns is like the German system "preparedness" raised to the *n*th power. But theology cannot be satisfied with a God who simply muddles through. And so in the chapter referred to D'Arcy seeks a view of things in which the teleology of the Supreme Spirit may be sufficiently Bergsonistic to relieve the human elements in his consciousness of being mere automata or puppets, and yet a sufficiently real teleology to guarantee the outcome. But according to Bergson, if we use the intellect, life is a mechanism, which, "inverted," is radical finalism; "all is given" and there is no freedom; if we use the method of intuition we have utter freedom. And for Bergson utter freedom is good enough. But D'Arcy seeks a freedom which is modified and which means some real and efficient finalism—which leads one to think that the author has not been consistent in his use of Bergsonist principles.

Perhaps the most important practical difficulty which this book presents is that which the absolute-idealist viewpoint in general presents. It may be conceivable that the Supreme Spirit takes our lives up into the manifold richness of his own, on the analogy of the way in which our minds take up the lower levels of reality into their more concrete experience. But the "degrees of reality" scheme of things does not seem to make it possible for our less real experience to have any real conscious share in the divine consciousness, for us to have any real communion with God. Whatever the super-personal may be, it is more truly an abstraction, from the standpoint of our concrete experience, than the infra-personal is. Between the various degrees of reality there seems to be, from the standpoint of the lower, at least, a great gulf fixed. God may commune with man, but how can man commune with God? In the chapter on mysticism, in which this problem particularly is dealt with, there are some very true and suggestive things said, but the author does not really meet the issue successfully.

The truth is that Bergson's philosophy is a tantalizing mixture of instrumentalist logic and rationalistic metaphysics, and the application of such hybrid principles to the religious problem can hardly yield clear and conclusive results.

A. CLINTON WATSON

ROCKFORD, ILL.

WORKS OF JOHN SMYTH¹

We heartily welcome the appearance of these two handsomely printed volumes, the publication of which has been made possible in part by the Hibbert Trustees, and in part by Sir George W. Macalpine, who has more than once most generously aided the cause of English and American scholarship. The work is ably edited by Dr. W. T. Whitley, honorary secretary of the Baptist Historical Society.

In 1881 Dr. Henry Martyn Dexter, following a view anonymously advanced in the *Independent* by Dr. William H. Whitsitt, published *The True Story of John Smyth, the Se-Baptist*, in which were given some details of Smyth's life. Now, after the lapse of thirty-five years, we have the works of this same John Smyth preceded by an elaborate account of the life of their author. During the interval a good many new points concerning the early English Dissenters have been discovered. Some of them relate to Smyth. In the book before us the editor states his belief that he has brought together the chief facts, but disclaims that he has made any important original addition to them.

This statement is probably correct, for though Dr. Whitley's account of Smyth covers over one hundred pages, it contains little besides the setting that is new. The presence of such a detailed setting explains the great difference in extent between this and the earlier accounts. The Smyth who is here portrayed is indeed not exactly the Smyth of Dr. Dexter, for Dr. Whitley as a Baptist is much more sympathetic in his treatment of Smyth, who was really a man of very lovable character. At times, however, Dr. Dexter and Dr. Whitley agree. The present result may indeed be more literary in form and more complete, but it can hardly be more interesting, while something in the unity of the presentation appears to us to have been lost.

¹ *The Works of John Smyth, Fellow of Christ's College, 1594-98*. Tercentenary Edition for the Baptist Historical Society, with Notes and Biography. Edited by W. T. Whitley. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1915. cxxii + 776 pages. 31s. 6d.

The story of Smyth's checkered career in brief, as here outlined, is as follows:

He entered Christ's College, Cambridge, as a sizar in 1586 and received the degree of bachelor of arts in 1590. In 1593 he obtained his Master's degree and became a Fellow of the college in 1594. In the same year he was ordained by Wickham, bishop of Lincoln. After Ladyday, 1598, he vacated his fellowship. In 1600 he was elected lecturer to the city of Lincoln, where he served for about two years. During 1602 he was inhibited and dismissed from his post. The years 1603 and 1604 he spent in litigation, writing, and publishing. In 1605 he practiced as a physician and lectured at Gainsborough, where in the following year a separatist congregation was organized. In 1608 Smyth emigrated to Amsterdam with the church. Here he was soon involved in various religious controversies and was kept busy writing books. In 1609 he and his followers became Anabaptists, but trouble of one kind or another awaited them. In 1612 Smyth died, and was buried on September 1.

The chief point of interest for us in Smyth's life lies perhaps in the fact, which is clearly brought out by Dr. Whitley as well as by other scholars, that he baptized himself by sprinkling or affusion, and not by immersion as so many American Baptists would have us believe. On this point there can no longer be any uncertainty, and Dr. Whitley in the following words heralds this opinion as the official view of the modern English Baptists (pp. xlv-xcv):

Did Smyth baptize himself? The answer may be seen at page 660 of this edition in his own words. The manuscript in his own writing is yet at Amsterdam, with his signature "Incoeperint seipsos baptizare"; and if there be a slight ambiguity, his last book discusses whether men "may, being as yet unbaptized, baptize themselves (as we did)." Clearly one of the group baptized himself, and within a year Clifton, Ainsworth, Robinson, I. H., and Gerritsz, all actually in Amsterdam and knowing Smyth, said that he was the man. That point caused a difference of treatment in his case as distinguished from all the others. It is beyond dispute that Smyth baptized himself.

But what did he do? What act did he perform? Here again obstinate incredulity has attempted to transfer the Baptist customs of England and America in the eighteenth century back to Holland in the seventeenth: and a most heated controversy raged in America for a generation before people would be guided by contemporary evidence. This is both clear and ample, and only a few representative statements need be adduced. Joseph Hall challenged Robinson next year: "If your partner, M. Smyth, should ever perswade you to rebaptize, your fittest gesture (or any other at full age) would

be to receive that Sacramentall water, kneeling. . . . Show you me where the Apostles baptized in a Basin . . . as your Anabaptists now doe" (*Common Apologie*, xxxvi, xxxvii) . . . Smyth speaks of the "basen of water" used at baptism by Puritans generally, though it was technically illegal, in a way that implies he himself habitually used it; page 568. The very title-page of this publication quotes two texts as to the mark on the forehead, and repeated allusions throughout the book imply the application of water there. Within a short time the whole transaction was closely examined by the Dutch Waterlander church, who reported that they had enquired into the foundation and form of their baptism, and had not found that there was any difference, in the one or the other, between the English and the Dutch. . . .

Thus the uniform custom of Smyth's former friends, the silence of his opponents on the spot as to any strange act, the express statement of the Waterlanders as to the similarity of form, make it clear that there was no innovation as to the act performed, but that water was applied to the forehead. . . .

The works of Smyth here published are the following: *The Bright Morning Starre*, 1603; *A Paterne of True Prayer*, 1605; *Principles and Inferences*, 1607; *The Differences of the Churches of the Seperation*, 1608; *Certayne Demaundes from the Auncyent Brethren of the Seperation*; *Paralleles Censures, Observations*, 1609; *The Character [= Mark] of the Beast*, 1609; *Propositions and Conclusions concerning True Christian Religion, contayning a Confession of Faith of Certayne English People, Liuing at Amsterdam*, 1611; *The Last Booke of Iohn Smith called the Retractation of his Errours, and the Confirmation of the Truth*.

Smyth's writings which still exist in manuscript and which appear here for the most part for the first time are the following: [*Application for Union with the Waterlander Church in Amsterdam*, 1610]; [*The First Baptist Confession*, 1610]; [*Defence of Ries' Confession*, 1610]; and *Argumenta contra Baptismum Infantum* [1611?].

The printing of the text of Smyth's various productions has been done with all the care which one is accustomed to find in the work of the Cambridge Press, and the transcription appears in general to have been satisfactory. We have noted minor inaccuracies in spelling, but these evidently are not excessively numerous. Hereafter the average student will seldom need to consult the original editions or the manuscripts preserved at Amsterdam. There are some minor points in the biography with which we cannot entirely agree, but we nevertheless hope that these volumes may be found in many American libraries.

CHAMPLIN BURRAGE

JOHN CARTER BROWN LIBRARY
PROVIDENCE, R.I.

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

VACCARI, P. A. *Un Commento a Giobbe di Giuliano di Eclana*. [Scripta Pontificio Institutii Biblici.] Roma: Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1915. viii+218 pages.

The rather stormy career of Julian of Eclana, born about 386 A.D., and his vigorous and voluminous writings on theological and ethical themes, made him an important character in the early centuries of the Christian church. His relations with Augustine and his one-time close friendship with Theodore of Mopsuestia, likewise persecuted for his Pelagianism and liberal views on biblical interpretation, have attracted the attention of modern scholars. Out of his numerous writings our author has secured what he terms the codex Cassinese of Julian's commentary on Job, though it is found in the *Expositio Philippi presbyteri discipuli beati Hieronymi*, a part of the *Spicilegium Casinense*, printed in 1897. The author sets forth the tenets of Pelagianism, maintained by Julian, which permeates more or less strongly all his writings. The language and style of the manuscript, together with its system of exegesis, constitute the body of the book. Among the principles of exegesis we note the use of the double sense, a modification of the triple sense employed by Origen. In the final chapter and the Appendix the author has diligently gathered up and estimated the sources used by Julian in the production of his exposition. While there is little of value for the study of Job there is much to reveal the methods and the monumental learning of such scholars as Julian of Eclana.

PR.

LOTZ, WILHELM. *Hebräische Sprachlehre*. Grammatik, Vokabular und Uebungsstücke. 2te Aufl. Leipzig: Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1913. vi+175+16 pages. M. 3.

There is no more difficult task today than the preparation of a really practical, consistent book for beginners in Hebrew. Every one now in use must be supplemented by the teacher if it serves well its purpose. The foregoing title is no exception. Only an expert teacher could use this book. Its inconsistencies in transliteration and vowel system alone would confuse anyone except a scholar. Some of its reversals, such as that of beginning the inflection of the verb with the first person, are only confusion to the one who studies other Semitic languages. While the book would not be usable in our classrooms the author doubtless, by his own personality and knowledge, could successfully teach the rudiments of the language to classes under his own care.

PR.

VERNON, SAMUEL M. *The Making of the Bible*. New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1916. 191 pages. \$0.75.

The seriousness of the title did not impress the author of *The Making of the Bible*. Of the twelve chapters in the booklet, only four treat the theme, the other chapters being quite irrelevant to the subject. And those four are chatty and superficial, as when it is said the Septuagint was translated about 250 B.C. "by seventy, or, to speak more accurately, seventy-two of the best scholars of the age" (p. 102). We need true statements of the facts, at least.

PR.

SKINNER, J. *Isaiah, Chapters I-XXXIX*. [Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1915. lxxxv+314 pages. 3s.

Investigation and research into the history and literature of the times of Isaiah, since the appearance of the first edition in 1896 of the Cambridge Bible on *Isaiah*, have necessitated the revision of that issue. The author has rewritten most of the Introduction, and thereby added ten pages to its size; and to the commentary proper and index about twenty pages. He has made few changes in his critical positions but has added valuable archeological material to the text, such as that furnished by the new cylinder of Sennacherib. The commentary shows the use of the latest contributions to the theological and critical study of the greatest of the Old Testament prophets.

PR.

NEW TESTAMENT

STOKES, ANSON PHELPS. *What Jesus Christ Thought of Himself*. (An Outline Study and Interpretation of His Self-Revelation in the Gospels.) New York: Macmillan, 1916. xiv+114 pages. \$1.00.

In this little book Mr. Stokes of Yale presents a study in simple unacademic fashion of the various passages in the Gospels which throw light for him upon that elusive subject known to New Testament scholarship as "the self-consciousness of Jesus." The material in this treatment has been arranged specifically to meet the needs of Bible classes in the colleges of today. The purpose of the author is confessedly twofold: to advance from the New Testament records clear yet concise evidence as to the view which Jesus held concerning his own person, and also to offer an interpretation of this "self-revealed personality." The humanity of Jesus is treated under the heads of his consciousness of limitations, of deriving all from God, and of subordination in prayer. The divinity—a term more acceptable to the writer than deity—of Jesus is set forward in a simple and yet compelling style. This occupies seventy out of the hundred and fourteen pages of the book and appears to be the main contribution. "Jesus Christ" is the appellation which to the author meets the demands of the Savior's personality more fully than does the single name "Jesus," and the authority for the wearing of this title is demonstrated in his being Master of the past, the present, and the future. In the preface the reader is prepared by the author for "some slight supplementary use of the Fourth Gospel." Such terms are altogether too modest. The most sweeping claims for the historical primacy of the Fourth as over against the Second Gospel may live very comfortably in the atmosphere of the section dealing with the divinity of Jesus Christ. On p. 68 the Greek of John 4:48 in the word *terata* is accepted as the language of Jesus himself and as therefore throwing light on his view of miracles. Indeed throughout the entire book there is found the constant tendency to treat New Testament records as *ipsissima verba* of Jesus and to ignore the viewpoint of the individual writers of these different documents. On p. 38 the statement is made that "in the two centuries before Christ the messianic hope was revived in many apocalyptic writings, such as the Songs of Solomon and the Book of Enoch." This must be a printer's error and should read not Songs but Psalms of Solomon. On p. 43 the author attaches significance to the phrase "in the name of the Lord," asserting that it is twice repeated in Luke 19:40. The repetition is found in the Authorized but not in the Revised Version of the New Testament.

The last chapter dealing with the author's interpretation of the self-revealed Christ is a distinct contribution. The book, we have no doubt, will be read widely. Whether or not it brings us to the portals of Jesus' mind is another matter.

T. W.

Box, G. H. *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*. With a Foreword by the Lord Bishop of London. London: Pitman, 1916. xviii+247 pages. 5s.

From the last generation's voluminous discussions of the birth of Jesus certain facts seem to have emerged with tolerable clarity. It is rather more than reasonably certain that the accounts of the virginal conception of Jesus in Matthew and Luke are integral parts of the prologues of these Gospels and that the prologues are integral parts of the Gospels themselves. It is becoming more and more admitted that these prologues are products of Palestinian, not of gentile, influence. It appears, also, that the extant Jewish traditions of the Messiah's birth have been untouched by the abundant gentile stories of virgin births of heroes and deities. And it is a familiar fact that these gentile stories are based on much crasser concepts than those in the gospel narratives. These contentions form the bulk of Mr. Box's case, which is argued with great sobriety and abundant scholarship. But at this point the reasoning takes a sudden leap: "As no source for these stories has been discovered, the facts as related *must* be historical." This conclusion is much too dogmatic. First-century Judaism was vastly more complicated than the later rabbinical material indicates and there is no historic justification for sweeping denials of the possibility of gentile influence on the religion of the common people. In particular, Jewish and gentile Christianity were by no means mutually exclusive systems, and the possibility of the latter's acting on the former must always be reckoned with. And that even in Judaism virgin-birth concepts could appear autochthonously is quite conceivable. From the refutation of extravagant "religious-historical" arguments of writers like Soltau to the actual corroboration of the narratives in question there is a great gulf fixed.

In matters of detail, Mr. Box follows Ramsay's rather strained solution of the Quirinius problem. The discussion of the textual evidence in Matt. 1:16 is brief but very candid. As was to be expected from the author, the collection of Jewish material is full and interesting, but more should have been written on the Mithraic parallels. Perhaps the most important pages in the book are those given to the canticles in Luke, chaps. 1, 2; the treatment here is excellent. On the other hand, singularly little space is devoted to the value of the doctrine in question; many readers will wonder justly how such importance was gained by a tenet which (p. 136) "formed no part of the apostolic preaching."

B. S. E.

DELAND, CHARLES EDMUND. *The Mis-Trials of Jesus*. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1914. 292 pages. \$1.25.

This book represents a very commendable attempt on the part of a studious layman to produce a piece of thorough research. It is through no fault of his diligence or sincerity that he has failed to add to the technical literature of the subject, but attention should be called to the interesting extracts given from his correspondence with Jewish scholars.

B. S. E.

DEAN, J. T. *The Book of Revelation*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915. 191 pages. 2s.

This little volume is a popular but sensible interpretation of the last book of the New Testament. The Book of Revelation has been made the subject of so much fanciful exposition, particularly when explained for popular reading, that one must feel considerable gratification in taking up a "handbook for Bible classes and private students" in which the book is expounded in the light of the actual historical situation from which it came. Thus interpreted, it is easily understood, as the present commentary demonstrates. If the commentator, who uses the English text, had based his interpretation on paragraphs, instead of on words and phrases, his commendable little book might have served still better the needs of the general reader.

S. J. C.

CHURCH HISTORY

STEWART, H. F. *The Holiness of Pascal*. Cambridge: University Press, 1915. ix+145 pages. 4s.

This little volume contains the Hulsean Lectures for 1914-15. As usual in these lectures, we have a cross between lectures and sermons. But in this case even where the treatment is sermonic it is always well based in accurate knowledge. This appears the moment we state that at the end of the work there are 44 pages of critical notes and citations. The book is therefore dependable when subjected to the critical tests of scholarship.

The author does not propose to tell the story of Pascal in detail. Yet to the one who knows nothing of Pascal there are sufficient facts to give one a very good idea of the man as he really was. On three points where there is general misinformation Mr. Stewart sets matters right: First, Pascal was not of the inner circle of Part Royal. He was never a solitary. Secondly, he did not, when he returned to religion, turn his back forever upon mathematics. We must not forget that he was a keenly gifted and carefully trained scientist. Thirdly, he was a man of wealth and position. The four chapters of the book are: "Biographical"; "Pascal in Controversy"; "Pascal's Doctrinal System"; "Pascal's Personal Religion."

We are sometimes assured that saints are rare among men of science. They are probably still rarer among men of the world. But the author seems to prove his thesis that Pascal, who knew both science and the world, was a saint.

J. W. M.

HITCHCOCK, F. R. MONTGOMERY. *St. Patrick and His Gallic Friends*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 164 pages. 3s. 6d.

This book, as the title indicates, is divided into two parts. The first deals with Patrick—the state of religion in Ireland when he came; his doctrine; his writings; his life and mission; and some of the Patrician problems. Among these problems the most interesting one has to do with Patrick's relations to Rome. In a critical study of the evidence the author deals especially with Professor Bury's well-known views which grant the contention of Rome that Patrick in Ireland recognized the authority and worked under the direction of the Bishop of Rome. At the conclusion of this

careful study the author finds no ground for the statements that Patrick "represented the unity of the Church," and showed an "immeasurable reverence for Rome." Rather Patrick himself says: "I had been taught by Christ, my Lord, and my faith was approved in the sight of God and man." Also a note under date 443 A.D. describes Patrick as "abounding in the ardor of the faith and the *doctrine of Christ*."

The second and larger part of the book deals with Patrick in his relations with his Gallic friends. In his foreword the author tells us that "this little book was written to remind all whom it may concern of the time when Gallican bishops came over to help the British Church in its difficulties, and when Gallican bishops educated, trained and consecrated a bishop who was afterwards universally recognized as the National Saint of Ireland." This part of the work is new, for the Gallic contemporaries of Patrick have not hitherto received sufficient attention. Among these contemporaries are: Orientus of Anch; Honoratus of Lerins; Hilary of Arles; and Germanus of Auxene.

Citations and critical notes are found at the end of each chapter.

J. W. M.

COLE, R. L. *Love Feasts: A History of the Christian Agape*. London: Kelly, 1916. 292 pages. 5s.

This is a welcome summary of data bearing upon the obscure subject of the Christian Agape. The history of the usage from earliest times to the present is given, in so far as information is available. The work is descriptive rather than controversial. The author adopts at the outset a commonly accepted view regarding the origin of the Agape and its relation to the Eucharist. He thinks the first Christians were accustomed to meet for a common evening meal (the Agape), at the close of which they celebrated the Lord's Supper. Later the two observances were separated, and in many communities the Agape soon disappeared.

S. J. C.

SCHLATTER, A. *Der Märtyrer in den Anfängen der Kirche*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1915. 86 pages. M. 2.

This is a study in the origins of the ideal of martyrdom, which ultimately came to occupy so large a place in early Christianity. The author maintains that the Christian ideal, which receives its literary expression in the various "Acts" of the martyrs, is largely a heritage from Judaism. The topics briefly discussed are the origin of the idea of a martyr, later Jewish martyrdoms, the prophet as a martyr, the grave of the prophets, the notion of merit, miracles as an attestation of the martyrs, and variation in the representation of a martyr. About half the space is given to extended footnotes dealing with the sources of information.

S. J. C.

APPEL, HEINRICH. *Kurzgefasste Kirchengeschichte für Studierende*. 2. Aufl. Leipzig: Deichert (Scholl), 1915. xix+712 pages. M. 10.

The second edition of this work now appears in a single volume, instead of in four separate parts as in the first edition. There is also a more abundant use of various forms of type to aid the eye in distinguishing between different phases of subject-matter. The literature of the subject has been brought up to date, so far as German works are concerned, and the indices have been remade to cover the contents of the single volume. Otherwise the second edition is essentially a reproduction of the first.

The value of the book has been much enhanced by its new form. As it is primarily a compendium of information, and not an interpretation of the data, it is chiefly valuable as a handbook for ready reference. As such it serves its purpose much better in one volume, with its appended lists of tables and maps. In the divisions of the history into periods, and in the selection of sub-topics, the author has followed in the main traditional lines as laid down by early Protestant church historians.

S. J. C.

HUTTMANN, MAUDE ALINE. *The Establishment of Christianity and the Proscription of Paganism*. (Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, Vol. LX, No. 1.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1914. 257 pages. \$2.00.

Under the above broad title, Miss Huttman has made a further contribution in a field of history that is receiving increasing attention. The author in her preface admits the limitations of time and space, and these limitations are so apparent in the book as to render its title somewhat misleading.

The bulk of the work is contained in Part I, which deals with Constantine in his personal religion and in his relations to the church and to the existing pagan cults.

It can scarcely be said that the treatment has broken new ground, but Miss Huttman has, nevertheless, done a real service to the student of the period, not only in re-presenting and re-examining the sources, but in industriously threading her way through the many disputed questions concerning the personal religion and the religious policy of Constantine the Great. She has familiarized herself with the general literature of the subject and has succeeded in giving a succinct presentation of the views of leading scholars. In this she has been more successful than in arriving at conclusions of her own based upon a critical examination of the sources. For instance, it is hardly sufficient for her to say as she does on p. 54, speaking of Hülle, "His conclusions are sound and cautious, and we can subscribe to those noted above." The ground, however, has been well covered, the political as well as the religious background has been faithfully presented, and various factors which enter into the history of the early fourth century are seen to have a significance which many historians have missed.

Part II of the book is confessedly incomplete; the author has done little more than gather and translate the anti-pagan legislation of the successors of Constantine as preserved in the codes of Theodosius and Justinian and to append to them a brief outline of the political events of each reign. Unsatisfactory as this must be from the standpoint of unity and comprehensiveness, in a treatment of the proscription of paganism, which necessarily cannot be written from the laws alone, it will nevertheless prove very useful to the student for reference in dealing with the codes.

Not the least valuable section of the book is an eight-page bibliography in which the investigator may find a helpful guide to the sources and literature of the period.

T. D.

MERCER, SAMUEL A. B. *The Ethiopic Liturgy*. The Hale Lectures 1914-15. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. xvi+487 pages. \$1.50.

It is fitting that this volume should proceed from the pen of an Episcopalian scholar. In almost any other Protestant community it would be difficult to hold an

audience through six lectures on the most interesting liturgical subjects, not to speak of a similar number of full hours on the modern Ethiopic liturgy. This is not said in disparagement of Episcopalian interest in this direction. It is not altogether to the credit of Protestant churches that they lack this interest. For liturgies, however official, preserve acts, customs, sacred postures, etc., not reasoned beliefs and theological speculations such as are found in the greater part of religious literature, ancient and modern. Liturgies and liturgical practices are therefore of great value in the study of comparative religion, especially popular, folkloristic religion. In Professor Mercer's study of the Ethiopic liturgy the natural Episcopalian interest in things liturgical has not obscured greater interest in human history. The study rises from a broad basis to points of fine and well-developed detail. Not only the liturgist, but also the *Religionsgeschichtler* will therefore find here grist for his mill. Nor need the latter be one who confines himself to the history of Christianity; the liturgical practices of Islam have lately come much into the foreground and its relations to Christian and Jewish practices are at this very moment the subject of lively discussion. It is not likely that Islam borrowed much in this respect directly from Ethiopia, but a comparison of the type of religious service which appealed to the isolated and on the whole rather primitive Abyssinian and that which found favor with the Arab Moslem would not be uninteresting and might prove to be of some use. Of course Mercer's work would have to be used in such case with some caution and not without careful re-investigation here and there; the author himself is conscious of having done pioneer work, some of which will need doing over. To the reviewer it has seemed at times as though the author had now and then too readily accepted at their face value early and less early Christian missionary legends. Further, it was a bit odd to find Baumstark and the *Oriens Christianus* so little mentioned and made use of in a work of this nature by a Ph.D. from Munich. On the whole, however, Professor Mercer's lectures will be found to be a useful and usable book by the select few, who will seek information in its pages.

M. S.

DOCTRINAL

SPENS, WILL. *Belief and Practice*. New York: Longmans, 1915. xii+244 pages. \$1.75.

This volume consists of lectures delivered at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, in 1914. The purpose is to ascertain the finality, not of theology as a whole, but of certain doctrines. Dogma is treated as an inference from experience. The keynote of the book is the consequent authority acquired by dogma. Catholic theology supplies an unexpectedly reliable map to the spiritual life. Tyrrell's position that dogma must control theology is developed and related to the "widest" and "most diverse" experience. Through this relation to experience is derived an authority none the less forceful though not satisfactory to theologians. The assumption of a personal God is necessarily involved in the objectivity of religious experience. Its validity is tested in widening experience. The assumption may not possess finality and room must be allowed for error. Yet it is authoritative.

The author holds that Catholic doctrine corresponds closely to religious experience in the co-ordinating of which it is exceptionally successful. Catholic ideals are remote from the unregenerate instincts of man. The positive values of Protestantism are one with Catholicism but, at best, are partial, lacking synthesis. Catholicism is "the

best extant synthesis and does cover the main lines of experience,"—this, despite the fact that its synthesis is not perfect and therefore lacks finality. Since theology must be a free consensus, Roman theology with its oracular, final authority must be rejected. The Reformation theology rejected too much of experience. Anglican theology admits a consensus and permits reconstruction. Its chief peril is opportunism.

The bulk of the work applies these principles to the controversies relative to the inspiration of the Scriptures and the Eucharist. The problems of pastoral theology that center in the church as an institution are also treated. But the discussion is of partial rather than of general interest.

In fact the interesting element in the discussion is not the insistence upon the primacy of Anglican thought but the emphasis laid upon experience as the determinant of dogma. The discussion approaches pragmatism though the author repudiates the idea. There are times when we fear that the discussion means that whatever is and has been is right. Yet Liberalism, Modernism, and Protestantism in general are curtly dismissed from consideration. The suggestion of special pleading is constantly present.

W. T. P.

CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM. *Christianity and Politics*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915. xi+271 pages. \$1.50.

This volume contains the Lowell Lectures delivered in the autumn of 1914. The word "politics" in the title is employed in a broad sense. Archdeacon Cunningham has furnished a suggestive and thought-provoking discussion of the ways in which Christianity may seek to improve the social, civil, and industrial life of men.

The first four lectures give an excellent historical survey of the typical theories on this point. Catholicism, with its belief in a church-controlled civilization, Anglicanism, in which church and state are merged in one national system of controls, Presbyterianism, with its demand for a society organized according to biblical precepts, and Independentism, with its insistence on the autonomy of the church, and its denial of the right of coercion of conscience, are all discussed, with illuminating citations from literature and references to historical occurrences.

Dr. Cunningham recognizes that the modern state is a secular institution, and exists to promote secular ends. What, now, is the social and political duty of the church in a secular government? It is evident from the rambling and somewhat fragmentary narrative of the final chapters that it is not possible to give to the church any such unified and all-important place as former ages assigned to it. For the most part the moral problems of modern society must be analyzed with the aid of a knowledge of economics and social principles, and the solutions must rest on an experimental basis. The task of Christianity is to inspire lofty ideals, to create the disposition to devote one's self to the service of humanity, and to provide an organization for moral and religious training. This may seem like a modest task; but in view of the partisan and selfish attitude of class interests, it assumes an importance which Dr. Cunningham well emphasizes.

G. B. S.

GARVIE, ALFRED E. *The Evangelical Type of Christianity*. (Manuals for Christian Thinkers, No. 20.) London: Charles H. Kelley. 147 pages. 1s.

This excellent popular exposition of a term which is so often employed as a kind of shibboleth ought to be of real service to many. While Principal Garvie professes

his belief in this type of Christianity, he makes some notable criticisms. He distinctly modifies the dogmatic features of the traditional "evangelical" message so that its theology, as he sets it forth, is frankly liberalized. The notion of original depravity is pronounced untenable. The doctrine of penal satisfaction is condemned on moral grounds. Hostility to science and to biblical criticism is declared to be injurious to the evangelical cause. Narrow views of Christian activity are rebuked. In all this the author is doubtless voicing a widespread sentiment. This liberalizing inevitably results in considerable vagueness at points where the emotional values of old phrases do not exactly correspond to the content in the newer doctrine. In particular is this true in the contention that the Cross must signify an objective atonement. But if the substitutionary theory be rejected, one is driven to some form of "moral influence." Garvie's exposition here is somewhat labored.

The book will serve as a wholesome corrective to narrow evangelicalism; and it is for the historian of modern religious thought an interesting document embodying in a spirit of commendable frankness and reverence certain typical aspects of that liberalizing of orthodoxy which is an outstanding feature of modern Christianity.

G. B. S.

SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR. *The Basis of Morality*. Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. B. BULLOCK. New York: Macmillan, 1915. xxviii+288 pages. \$1.25.

In 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject for a prize essay competition, the question, "Is the fountain and basis of morals to be sought for in conscience or in some other source of knowledge?" Schopenhauer was the only candidate, but his essay was rejected, probably because of its unorthodox character, Hegel and Fichte being the philosophical vogue of that period. The essay was published by the author in 1840 and in a second edition in 1860. It appeared in an English translation in 1902 and in a second edition in 1915. The theory of the essay is that the motive of compassion or sympathy (*Mitleid*) is the source of all morality, and the metaphysical sanction of sympathy is found in the Kantian doctrine of the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. The noumenal Reality "individuates" itself in the phenomenal order under the "forms" of time and space and causality. The noumenal Reality is the One. Its phenomenal self-expression is the Many. In ethical terms this many-ness shows itself in the multiplicity of egoistic lives, and this strife of wills is the occasion of life's innumerable immoralities. But the motive of sympathy tends to reveal the underlying oneness of life, and to overcome its tragic many-ness. In this theory Schopenhauer appeals not only to Kant but also to the ancient wisdom of oriental mysticism.

While today, of course, Schopenhauer's thought appears rationalistic to a degree, yet one cannot withhold admiration for the bold and independent spirit of this essay and the brilliance of its style. Psychology has thrown so much light upon the old egoistic-altruistic issue that it will no longer bear the weight of a metaphysical construction, yet in the middle of the last century this contribution of Schopenhauer was sufficiently original and suggestive to merit something better than the condemnation which the Danish Royal Society meted out to it.

A. C. W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

Patton, Walter M. *Israel's Account of the Beginnings Contained in Genesis I-XI*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1916. xii+182 pages. \$1.25.

NEW TESTAMENT

Abbott, Edwin A. *The Fourfold Gospel. Section IV, The Law of the New Kingdom*. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xxiv+575 pages. \$3.75.
Goodspeed, Edgar Johnson. *The Story of the New Testament*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xi+150 pages. \$1.00.
Souter, Alexander. *The Character and History of Pelagius' Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. VII)*. London: Oxford University Press, 1916. 36 pages. 2s. 6d.

CHURCH HISTORY

Coleman, Christopher Bush. *Constantine the Great and Christianity. (Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. LX, No. 1, Edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University.)* New York: Columbia University Press, 1914. 258 pages.
Good, James I. *Famous Reformers of the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches*. Philadelphia: Heidelberg Press, 1916. xiii+160 pages.
Saeki, P. Y. *The Nestorian Monument in China*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. xi+342 pages. 10s. 6d.

DOCTRINAL

Broughton, Len G. *Is Preparedness for War Unchristian?* New York: Doran, 1916. 219 pages. \$1.00.
Lacey, T. A. *Nature and God*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 77 pages. 1s.

Miller, Lucius Hopkins. *Bergson and Religion*. New York: Holt, 1916. ix+286 pages. \$1.50.
Sheldon, Henry C. *Theosophy and New Thought*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1916. 185 pages. \$0.50.
Smyth, Julian K. *Christian Certainties of Belief*. New York: New-Church Press, 1916. xi+123 pages.
Whittaker, Thomas. *The Theory of Abstract Ethics*. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. viii+126 pages. \$1.35.
Wilson, J. M. *The Natural and the Supernatural in Science and Religion*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1916. 45 pages. 6d.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

Alexander, Hartley Burr. *The Mythology of All Races. Vol. X, North American*. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1916. xxv+325 pages. \$6.00.
Webster, Hutton. *Rest Days—A Study in Early Law and Morality*. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xiv+325 pages. \$3.00.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Fleischmann, Paul. *Alttestamentliche Lyrik (Praktische Bibelerklärung. 8.)*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1916. 60 pages. M. o. 50.
Patten, Simon N. *Advent Songs*. New York: Huebsch, 1916. xxiii+75 pages. \$1.00.
Wardle, Addie Grace. *Handwork in Religious Education*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xviii+143 pages. \$1.00.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ardant, G., Desgranges, J., Thellier, C., De Poncheville, T. *L'Éveil de l'âme française devant l'appel aux armes*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. x+224 pages. Fr. 2.
Bégouen. *Les Catholiques allemands jadis et aujourd'hui*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 47 pages. Fr. o. 60.

- Butler, Nicholas Murray. *The Building of the Nation*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1916. 14 pages.
- Calippe, Charles. *La Guerre en Picardie*. Paris: Téqui, 1916. xii+392 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Clarke, William Newton, *A Biography with Additional Sketches by His Friends and Colleagues*. New York: Scribner, 1916. viii+262 pages. \$2.00.
- Compaign, R. *Notre foi*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1916. 212 pages. Fr. 2.75.
- Delay, Paul. *Les Catholiques au service de la France—Les diocèses de l'intérieur*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 344 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Gorse, M. M. *Échos de guerre—France et Kultur!* Paris: Téqui, 1916. xv+497 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Grandmaison, Geoffroy de. *Les Aumôniers militaires*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 64 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Gulick, Sidney L. *America and the Orient*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. x+100 pages. \$0.25.
- Held, Felix Emil. *Christianopolis—An Ideal State of the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1916. xi+287 pages.
- Lacroix, L. *Le Clergé des diocèses envahis*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 24 pages.
- Lacroix, L. *Les Prières publiques*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 24 pages.
- Lacroix, L. *Une Paroisse champenoise sous la botte allemande*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916. 24 pages.
- Lobbedey, Mgr. [editor]. *La Guerre en Artois*. Paris: Téqui, 1916. xxi+513 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Mills, Walter Thomas. *Democracy or Despotism*. Berkeley, Cal.: International School of Social Economy, 1916. xiv+246 pages. \$1.25.
- Moore, John Monroe. *The South Today*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. xiv+251 pages. \$0.50.
- Pègues, Thomas. *Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la guerre*. Paris: Téqui, 1916. vi+42 pages.
- Pully, Henry de. *L'Ame existe*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1916. 107 pages. Fr. 1.25.
- Sertillanges, A. D. *La Vie héroïque, "Epouses et mères."* Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 20 pages. Fr. 0.30.
- Sertillanges, A. D. *La Vie héroïque, "La femme française."* Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 20 pages. Fr. 0.30.
- Sertillanges, A. D. *La Vie héroïque, "Nos jeunes filles."* Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 20 pages. Fr. 0.30.
- Stuntz, Homer C. *South American Neighbors*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1916. x+211 pages. \$0.60.
- Tissier, J. *La Guerre en Champagne*. Paris: Téqui, 1916. viii+498 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Villeneuve, Hebrard de. *La France de demain*. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915. 44 pages. Fr. 0.60.
- Whitehead, Henry. *The Village Gods of South India*. (Religious Life of India Series.) London: Oxford University Press, 1916. 172 pages. 2s. 6d.

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THE SUMMER QUARTER 1916

at

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



THE Summer Quarter at the University of Chicago is the most largely attended of the year, more than four thousand students having registered in the summer of 1915. The University year is divided into quarters: the Autumn, Winter, Spring, and Summer. In 1916 the Summer Quarter will begin June 19 and close September 1. The First Term will begin June 19; the Second Term, July 27. Students may register for either Term or for both. Students entering at the beginning of the Second Term may register for courses for which they have had the prerequisites. The courses during the Summer Quarter are the same in character, method, and credit value as in other quarters of the year.

A large proportion of the regular Faculty of the University, which numbers over three hundred, and also many instructors from other institutions, offer courses in the Summer Quarter, and in this way many varied points of view are given to students in their chosen fields of study.

ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE

The University offers during this quarter, in the Schools of Arts, Literature, and Science, both graduate and undergraduate courses in Philosophy, Psychology, and Education; Political Economy, Commerce and Administration, Political Science, History, Sociology and Anthropology, and Household Administration; Semitics and Biblical Greek; Comparative Religion; History of Art, Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin; Modern Languages; Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry; Geology and Geography; Botany, Zoölogy, Physiology, Anatomy, Pathology, Hygiene and Bacteriology; and Public Speaking.

The Summer Quarter at

THE PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS

Divinity

The Divinity School is open to students of all denominations, and the instruction is intended for ministers, missionaries, theological students, Christian teachers, and others intending to take up some kind of religious work. The English Theological Seminary, which is intended for those without college degrees, is in session only during the Summer Quarter. The Graduate Divinity School is designed for college graduates. Pastors, theological teachers, students in other seminaries, candidates for the ministry, and other Christian workers, with requisite training, are admitted in the Summer Quarter.

The Chicago Theological Seminary will also be in session during the Summer Quarter, and its courses are open on the same conditions as those that obtain in the Divinity School.

Medicine

Courses in Medicine constituting the first two years of the four-year course in medicine in Rush Medical College are given at the University of Chicago. For the majority of students taking up medical work for the first time, it is of decided advantage to enter with the Summer or Autumn Quarter. For the student who is lacking in any of the admission courses, or who seeks advanced standing, it is of especial advantage to enter for the Summer Quarter. All the courses offered are open to practitioners of medicine, who may matriculate as unclassified or as graduate students. Practitioners taking this work may attend the clinics at Rush Medical College without charge.

Law

In the work of the Law School the method of instruction employed—the study and discussion of cases—is designed to give an effective knowledge of legal principles, and to develop the power of independent legal reasoning. The three-year course of study offered constitutes a thorough preparation for the practice of law in any English-speaking jurisdiction. By means of the quarter system students may be graduated

The University of Chicago

in two and one-fourth calendar years. Regular courses of instruction counting toward a degree are continued through the Summer Quarter. The courses are so arranged that students may take one, two, or three quarters in succession in the summer only before continuing in the following Autumn Quarter. The summer work offers particular advantages to teachers, to students who wish to do extra work, and to practitioners who desire to study special subjects.

Education

In the Professional Schools the Graduate Department of Education in the School of Education gives advanced courses in Principles and Theory of Education, Educational Psychology, the Psychology of Retarded and Subnormal Children, History of Education, and Social and Administrative Aspects of Education. The College of Education is a regular college of the University, with all University privileges, and in addition provides the professional training of elementary- and secondary-school teachers and supervisors. It offers undergraduate courses in professional subjects and in the methods of arranging and presenting the various subject-matters which are taken up in the elementary and secondary schools. The University High School, with the fully equipped shops of the Manual Training Department, is in session during the Summer Quarter, and opportunity is offered to take beginning courses in Latin and to review courses in Mathematics and History. The regular shop work, supplemented by discussions of methods, is open to teachers pursuing these courses.

The University of Chicago is peculiarly fortunate in its environment in summer. The city of Chicago is relatively cool. High temperatures are not frequent or long continued, and the normal temperature, in comparison with that of other large cities, is low. Reports of the United States Weather Bureau show that the average summer temperature of Chicago is lower than that of most cities of its class. In addition to this advantage in weather conditions, the University has an especially favorable situation in the city. To the south stretches the Midway

The University of Chicago

Plaisance, an avenue of lawn a block wide and a mile long; and about equidistant are Washington Park, a large recreation ground on the west, and Jackson Park, equally spacious, on the shore of Lake Michigan, to the east.

Opportunities for diversion are numerous. In Jackson Park there are golf links, and in both Jackson and Washington parks, lagoons for rowing. There are many tennis courts in both parks, along the Midway, and on the campus. Through the Frank Dickinson Bartlett Gymnasium full facilities for physical culture are given to men. The Reynolds Club offers social privileges to men. Similar opportunities for women are offered in the gymnasium, swimming pool, and clubrooms of the new Ida Noyes Hall. Many social clubs are organized among students. The Dames Club of the University of Chicago, composed of wives and mothers of students, meets every second and fourth Saturday of the month. The place of meeting will be announced in the *Weekly Calendar*.

Notable public libraries and museums, highly organized industrial plants, many typical foreign colonies, a large number of settlements, and other significant social institutions make Chicago a peculiarly appropriate center for study and investigation.

A series of public lectures in Literature, History, Sociology, Science, Art, Music, etc., scheduled at late afternoon and evening hours throughout the Summer Quarter, affords an opportunity to students and other members of the University community to hear speakers of authority and distinction in many departments of study and activity. This program will include a number of popular readings and recitals, open-air performances, concerts, and excursions to places and institutions of interest in and near Chicago.

The complete ANNOUNCEMENT of courses for the Summer Quarter of 1916 will be issued later and may be obtained by application to

BOX 4, FACULTY EXCHANGE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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New *and* Recent Books

The University of Chicago Press

A Short History of Belgium. By Léon Van der Essen, Professor of History in the University of Louvain.

viii+168 pages, 12mo, cloth; \$1.00, postage extra (weight 1 lb.)

The world-wide interest aroused in the history of Belgium by its present position in the great European war makes especially timely the publication of this volume by a professor of history in the University of Louvain, who recently gave a course of lectures on the history of Belgium at the University of Chicago.

As Professor Van der Essen remarks in his preface, the volume cannot be placed among the books classed as war literature. The history is objective and gives simply an account of the past history of the Belgian people, leaving entirely out of consideration their present deeds and sufferings. By consulting that history, however, the reader will be able to understand more clearly why the Belgian nation of today took the stand it has taken in the war.

The author brings out clearly the fact that the national culture of Belgium is a synthesis, where one finds the genius of two races—the Romance and the Germanic—mingled, yet modified by the imprint of the distinctly Belgian.

A historical scholar of recognized ability, Professor Van der Essen has treated his intensely interesting subject with imagination and sympathy and yet with a careful sense of historical values and aims.

Individuality in Organisms. (*The University of Chicago Science Series.*) By Charles Manning Child, Associate Professor of Zoölogy in the University of Chicago.

x+214 pages, 12mo, cloth; \$1.25, postage extra (weight 1 lb. 6 oz.)

This volume is the second in "The University of Chicago Science Series," the initial volume of which is *The Evolution of Sex in Plants*, by John Merle Coulter. The new volume is an attempt to state, and to present some of the evidence in favor of, a conception of the nature of organic individuality which has gradually developed in the mind of the writer during the course of some fifteen years' investigation of the simpler processes of reproduction and development in the lower animals. It includes

also a brief critical survey of the various theories which have been developed in this field of investigation.

Dr. Child's widely known work on *Senescence and Rejuvenescence* and the present volume, concerned as they are with associated aspects of the life cycle, are in many respects complementary and together constitute a presentation of the more important results and conclusions from the writer's investigations.

Senescence and Rejuvenescence. By Charles Manning Child,
Associate Professor of Zoölogy in the University of Chicago.

xii+482 pages, 8vo, cloth; \$4.00, postage extra (weight 3 lbs.)

The author of this volume, after many years of experimental investigation of the nature and origin of the organic individual, has established certain facts which afford a more adequate foundation for the general consideration and interpretation of the age changes in the organic world than we have hitherto possessed.

Certain experimental methods have made it possible, not only to follow the physiological age changes in some of the lower animals, but to learn something of their nature. The most important result of the investigation is the demonstration of the occurrence of rejuvenescence quite independently of sexual reproduction. The book differs from most previous studies of senescence in that it attempts to show that in the organic world in general rejuvenescence is just as fundamental and important a process as senescence.

The Modern Study of Literature. By Richard Green Moulton,
Head of the Department of General Literature in the University of Chicago.

vi+542 pages, 12mo, cloth; \$2.50, postage extra (weight 1 lb. 13 oz.)

An introduction to literary theory and interpretation by the Head of the Department of General Literature in the University of Chicago. The purpose of this work is to discuss the Study of Literature: what it must become if it is to maintain its place in the foremost ranks of modern studies. The author's previous well-known books on literary criticism and his long and successful experience in the public presentation of literature have especially fitted him for the authoritative discussion of this problem of modern education.

A Short History of Japan. By Ernest Wilson Clement.

x+190 pages, 12mo, cloth; \$1.00, postage extra (weight 15 oz.)

Because of the intense interest in the present political situation in the Far East this short history of Japan will make a strong

appeal to readers and travelers who are asking for a better knowledge of the background of the struggle for supremacy in the Orient.

The author, Ernest Wilson Clement, whose long residence in Japan as a teacher, interpreter for the United States legation, correspondent, and editor has given him a wide familiarity with the country, has written a brief but discriminating account of both Old and New Japan; and for the many readers who do not care to go into the details of Japanese history the book will be found a highly interesting epitome of what has happened during the long course of Japanese development. As frequent references are made to fuller accounts, the book may well serve as an introduction to further study of the country and its institutions.

Current Economic Problems. By Walton Hale Hamilton, Professor of Political Economy in Amherst College.

xi+790 pages, 8vo, cloth; \$2.75, postage extra (weight 3 lbs. 1 oz.)

The work is intended for the use of students in elementary economics and is designed particularly to meet the needs of those who, having had a thorough course in economic theory, need a general introduction to current economic problems. It will be found useful also in colleges and universities which give in the first semester a course in applied problems. The plan of the book is strictly in line with the prevailing tendency in the teaching of economics. It consists of readings selected from journals, books, and other sources; and these excerpts, presenting as they do different points of view, form an admirable basis for classroom discussion.

University of Chicago Sermons. By Members of the University Faculties.

xii+348 pages, 12mo, cloth; \$1.50, postage extra (weight 1 lb. 6 oz.)

This book contains eighteen sermons delivered by as many leading men from the faculties of the University of Chicago. In each sermon appears the best thought of a well-known scholar on a particular phase of religious life. The contributors include, not only representatives of the biblical and theological departments of the University, but also members of the departments of education, sociology, and philosophy. This combination of modern scholarship and pulpit power makes a volume of religious inspiration for both minister and layman. The names of the contributors to the volume are as follows: Charles Richmond Henderson, Ernest DeWitt Burton, Shailer Mathews, J. M. Powis

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Public Libraries and Literary Culture in Ancient Rome. By Clarence E. Boyd.

viii+78 pages, cloth; \$1.00, postage extra (weight 14 oz.)

By a study of classical literature, inscriptions, and monuments Dr. Boyd has been enabled to present for the first time an adequate conception of public libraries in ancient Rome. His treatise concerns itself with the history, equipment, contents, management, object, and cultural significance of the Roman public library, particular attention being directed to the libraries of the first one hundred and fifty years of the Empire. The first four centuries, however, are included in his general survey.

The School and Society. (Second edition, revised and enlarged.) By John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University.

xvi+164 pages, 12mo, cloth; \$1.00, postage extra (weight 15 oz.)

Teachers and others concerned with education will be interested to know that *The School and Society* has been revised and much enlarged. The position of authority on educational subjects which the author holds and the popularity which the former edition enjoyed are indications of the value of this work. About seventy-five pages of educational contributions from the pen of Dr. Dewey have been added, making a book which consists of eight chapters, as follows: "The School and Social Progress," "The School and the Life of the Child," "Wastes in Education," "The Psychology of Elementary Education," "Froebel's Educational Principles," "The Psychology of Occupations," "The Development of Attention," "The Aim of History in Elementary Education."

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BOOKS

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2 vols., royal 8vo, \$14.50; postage extra

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The author has chosen for description such buildings or parts of buildings as are typical of the history and development of the art, and has confined the examples almost entirely to buildings that he has himself studied. For the purposes of this work, he has revisited many of the buildings referred to, and has used original sketches for illustration rather than photographs.

These volumes will doubtless make an even wider appeal than their predecessors on Byzantine and Romanesque architecture, which *The Nation* said would take their place among the standard classics of every architectural library.

Byzantine and Romanesque Architecture. By Thomas Graham Jackson R.A. With 165 Plates and 148 Illustrations.

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This work contains an account of the development in Eastern and Western Europe of post-Roman architecture from the fourth to the twelfth century. It attempts, not merely to describe the architecture, but to explain it by the social and political history of the time. The description of the churches of Constantinople and Salonica, which have a special interest at this time, is followed by an account of Italo-Byzantine work at Ravenna and in the Exarchate, and of the Romanesque styles of Germany, France, and England. Most of the illustrations are from drawings by either the author or his son, and add great artistic value to the volumes.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLICATIONS

The Genus Iris. By William Rickatson Dykes. With Forty-eight Colored Plates and Thirty Line Drawings in the Text.

246 pages, demi-folio, half morocco; \$37.50, postage extra (weight 11 lbs. 8 oz.)

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The most striking feature of the book is the forty-eight life-size colored plates, reproduced from originals drawn from living plants—making it a volume of remarkable beauty as well as of great scientific importance.

The American Florist. Lovers of irises owe a huge debt of gratitude to William Rickatson Dykes, who after years of labor has produced a magnificent work on these plants. . . . Mr. Dykes combines the scientist's analytical skill with all the grower's enthusiasm.

The Florists' Review. If anything else could be added to the book that would really increase its beauty or its scientific value or its practical utility, the present reviewer is curious to know what that addition could be.

The Duab of Turkestan. A Physiographic Sketch and Account of Some Travels. By W. Rickmer Rickmers. With 207 Maps, Diagrams, and Other Illustrations.

xvi+564 pages, royal 8vo, cloth; \$9.00, postage extra (weight 5 lbs. 7 oz.)

A record of exploration of a little-known region, combined with some elementary physiography. The book discusses the various geographical elements in the natural organic system of the Duab of Turkestan (or Land between the Two Rivers) between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, the information being strung on the thread of a highly interesting story of travel and mountain exploration. The author was at great pains to obtain typical views of physical features such as mountains, valleys, and glaciers, and also of vegetation, village life, and architecture; and there are many diagrams for a clearer understanding of the text.

The book is especially suitable for colleges, libraries, and schools, and for all students or teachers of physical geography and natural science.

The Journal of Geography. The author's delicate touches of humor, his picturesque language in description, and his knowledge of physiography and climatology, . . . all contribute materially to the excellence of the book. Much attention is given to physiographic processes and features, but the splendid halftones tell the story better than words.

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The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain. By Philip C. Yorke, M.A. Oxon., Licencié-ès-Lettres of the University of Paris.

3 vols., xxxi+1,938 pages, royal 8vo, cloth; \$13.50, postage extra (weight 9 lbs.)

This solid and significant work is based on the Hardwicke and Newcastle manuscripts and, in addition to the life of Lord Hardwicke, gives the whole history of the Georgian period from 1720 to 1764. An account of the great judge's work in the King's Bench and in Chancery is included. The characters and careers of Walpole, Newcastle, Henry Pelham, the elder Pitt, Henry Fox, the Duke of Cumberland, George II and George III, and various incidents—such as the fall of Walpole, the Byng catastrophe, and the struggle between George III and the Whigs—appear in a clearer light, which the author, by aid of original papers and manuscripts, has been enabled to throw upon them. These documents are now published, or brought together and annotated, for the first time.

The Harvard Law Review. Every lawyer who venerates the makers of the law, who believes that the personality of a judge determines the nature of his service to the development of law, . . . should read in these pages the life of the man who more than any other impressed upon equity the moral standards of a judge who was as good as he was great.

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78 pages, quarto, boards; \$2.50, postage extra (weight 1 lb. 9 oz.)

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
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